I.         The Testing of Meno’s Knowledge (70a-80e)
            A.        Setting up the Question (70a-71e)
                        1.         Is virtue teachable? (70a)
                        2.         The Priority of Definition & Socrates’ Disavowal (70a-71c)
                        3.         Meno’s Claim to know what virtue is (71d-e)
            B.         First Attempt to Answer the Question (71e-73c)
                        1.         A man’s virtue, a woman’s virtue, a child’s virtue ... (71e-72a)
                        2.         Socrates explains the question (72a-73c)
            C.        Second Attempt (73c-d)
                        1.         Virtue is the capacity to govern men (73c)
                        2.         Counter-example (73d)
            D.        Third Attempt (73d-77a)
                        1.         Virtue is justice and justice is virtue
                        2.         Socrates explains question again (73e-77a)
                                    a.         Shape example (74b-76a)
                                                i.          shape is what always accompanies color
                                                ii.          shape is the limit of a solid
                                    b.         Color example (76a-77a)
            E.         Fourth Attempt (77b-78b)
                        1.         Virtue is the desire for fine things and the power to acquire them (77b)
                        2.         The argument that everyone desires fine things (77b-78b)
            F.         Fifth Attempt (78b-79e)
                        1.         Virtue is the power to acquire fine things (78b)
2.         Argument that they must be acquired justly and so the definition is circular or question-begging (78c-79d)
                        3.         Exhortation to try again (79e)
II.         The Theory of Recollection (80a-86c)
            A.        Meno’s Paradox (80a-80e)
                        1.         Meno’s Recognition of ignorance (80a-b)
                        2.         Socrates’ repeated disavowal (80c-d)
                        3.         Meno’s version of the paradox (80d)
                        4.         Socrates’ version of the paradox (80e)
            B.         The Theory of Recollection (81a-e)
            C.        The Conversation with the Slave Boy (82a-86a)
                        1.         The Statement of the Question (82a-e)
a.         How many feet long will the will the side of square twice the area of a four square foot square be?
                                    b.         The slave-boy’s profession of knowledge (82e)
                                    c.         commentary (82e)
                        2.         Testing of the knowledge profession (83a-84d)
                                    a.         First attempt: 4 feet long
                                    b.         Refutation (83a-c)
                                    c.         Second attempt: 3 feet long (83e)
                                    d.         Refutation (83e)
                                    e.         Recogniton of ignorance (84a)
                                    f.          Commentary (84a-d)
                        3.         Arrival at true belief (84d-85c)
                                     a.        The diagonal (84d-85b)
                                    b.         Commentary (85b-c)
                        4.         Description of the process to knowledge (84c-d)
                        5.         Conclusion (84d-86a)
            D.        Conclusion (86b-c)
III.       The Teachability of Virtue (86c-100c)
            A.        Introduction & Method of Hypothesis (86c-87c)
            B.         The Argument that Virtue is Teachable (87c-89c)
                        1.         The Argument that Virtue is Knowledge (87c-89a)
                        2.         Conclusion (89a-c)
            C.        The Argument that Virtue is not Teachable (89d-96d)
                        1.         If teachable then teachers (89d-e)
                        2.         Anytus: The virtuous statesmen don’t teach virtue (90a-94e)
                        3.         Meno: The Sophists don’t teach virtue (95a-96d)
            D.        The True Belief Solution (96d-100c)
                        1.         True Belief is sufficient for Virtue (96d-97c)
                        2.         The Distinction between Knowledge and True Belief (97c-98b)
                        3.         Virtue qua True Belief is acquired by Divine Dispensation (98b-100c)


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