James Hawthorne Associate Professor Department of Philosophy University of Oklahoma Formal Epistemology, Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, Philosophy of Science hawthorne@ou.edu

Philosophically I'm a scientific realist and a mathematical instrumentalist with a fascination for figuring out what our best scientific theories imply about the nature of physical reality. As a logician my research primarily involves the investigation and development of systematic logics for the representation of uncertain inferences, especially the logic by which evidence may support or refute scientific hypotheses and theories. Much of my work in this area involves the development and explication of the probabilistic inductive logic known as Bayesian Inference or Bayesian Confirmation Theory. I also work on logics of belief and comparative plausibility (e.g., the logic of X is at least as plausible as Y), and on logics of defeasible support.

Inductive Logic and Confirmation Theory:

Confirmation Theory : forthcoming in Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Malcolm Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7, Elsevier. view draft in pdf

How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens : with Branden Fitelson, forthcoming in James Fetzer and Ellery Eells (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science, 2010, Springer. view draft in pdf

Degree-of-Belief and Degree-of-Support: Why Bayesians Need Both Notions : Mind, v. 114, no. 454, 2005, pp. 277-320. view final draft in pdf

Inductive Logic : The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Sept. 2004, revisions Feb. 2008), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-inductive/>.

Re-solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence : with Branden Fitelson, Philosophy of Science, v. 71, no. 4, 2004, pp. 505-514. view in pdf

Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence : Journal of Philosophical Logic, v. 33, no. 1, 2004, pp. 89-123. view in pdf

On the Nature of Bayesian Convergence : PSA1994, v. 1, 1994, pp. 241-249. view in pdf

Bayesian Induction Is Eliminative Induction : Philosophical Topics, v. 21, no. 1, 1993, pp. 99-138. view in pdf

Giving Up Judgement Empiricism: The Bayesian Epistemology of Bertrand Russell and Grover Maxwell : C. W. Savage and C. A. Anderson (eds.), Rereading Russell: Essays on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology, Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, v. 12, 1989, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 234-248.

The Logic of Belief:

Voting in Search of the Public Good: the Probabilistic Logic of Majority Judgments : unpublished manuscript. view draft in pdf

The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief : Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief, 2009, Synthese Library 342, pp. 49-74. view draft in pdf

Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence : Journal of Philosophical Logic, v. 33, no. 1, 2004, pp. 89-123. view in pdf

The Preface, the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief : with Luc Bovens, Mind, v. 108, no. 430, 1999, pp. 241-264. view in pdf

Nonmonotonic Logic

The Quantitative/Qualitative Watershed for Rules of Uncertain Inference : with David Makinson, Studia Logica, v. 86, no. 2, 2007, pp. 247-297. view final draft in pdf

Nonmonotonic Conditionals that Behave Like Conditional Probabilities Above a Threshold : Journal of Applied Logic, v. 5, no. 4, 2007, pp. 625-637. view final draft in pdf

On the Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities: Predicate Logic : Journal of Philosophical Logic, v. 27, no. 1, 1998, pp. 1-34. view in pdf

On the Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities : Journal of Philosophical Logic, v. 25, no. 2, 1996, pp. 185-218. view in pdf

A Semantic Approach to Non-Monotonic Entailments : J. F. Lemmer and L. N. Kanal (eds.), Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 2, 1988, Elsevier Science Publishers, B.V. (North-Holland), pp. 251-262.

Logic, Mathematics, and the Sciences:

Mathematical Instrumentalism Meets the Conjunction Objection : Journal of Philosophical Logic, v. 25, no. 4, 1996, pp. 363-397. view in pdf

For Whom the Bell Arguments Toll : with Michael Silberstein, Synthese, v. 102, 1995, pp. 99-138. view in pdf

Validity in Intensional Languages: A New Approach : with William H. Hanson, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, v. 26, no. 1, 1985, pp. 9-35. view in pdf