Professor
Formal Epistemology, |

My research primarily involves the investigation of
logics of evidential support, especially the probabilistic
inductive logic called *Bayesian Inference* or *Bayesian Confirmation Theory*. I also work on logics of
comparative support, belief, and
comparative plausibility (e.g., the logic of *X is at least as plausible as Y*).

**About my work and views on Probability and Statistics:**

James Hawthorne : in A. Hajek and V.F. Hendricks (eds.), *Probability and Statistics: 5 Questions
* Chapter 6, 2009 , Automated Press, pp. 65-74.
final draft in pdf

**Inductive Logic and Confirmation Theory:**

A Logic of Comparative Support: Qualitative Conditional Probability Relations Representable by Popper Functions :
forthcoming in A. Hajek and C. Hitchcock (eds.),
*The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy*, Oxford U. Press, 19 pages in manuscript.
Draft of final revision
draft in pdf.

Inductive
Logic : *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Sept. 2004, revised Feb. 2008, major revision June 2011),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.); pdf version available from the*SEP*, 151 pages. Online version at
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-inductive/>. Draft of April 2011 revision available here
draft in pdf.

Confirmation
Theory : in Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Malcolm Forster (eds.), *Philosophy of Statistics:
Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7*, 2011, Elsevier, pp. 333-389.
final draft in pdf

Bayesian Confirmation
Theory : in S. French and J. Saatsi (eds.), *The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science*, 2011, Continuum Press, pp. 197-213.
final draft in pdf

The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation : with Branden Fitelson,
*Philosophical Perspectives, 24, Epistemology*, 2010, pp. 207-241, Elsevier.
final draft in pdf

An Even Better Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens :
supplement to The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation, 13 pages in manuscript.
draft in pdf

How
Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens :
with Branden Fitelson, forthcoming in James Fetzer and Ellery Eells (eds.), *The Place of Probability in Science*, 2010, Springer.
final draft in pdf

Degree-of-Belief
and Degree-of-Support: Why Bayesians Need Both Notions :
*Mind*, v. 114, no. 454, 2005, pp. 277-320.
final draft in pdf

Re-solving
Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence : with Branden Fitelson,
*Philosophy of Science*, v. 71, no. 4, 2004, pp. 505-514.
final draft in pdf

On the
Nature of Bayesian Convergence :
*PSA1994*, v. 1, 1994, pp. 241-249.
final draft in pdf

Bayesian
Induction *Is* Eliminative Induction : *Philosophical Topics*, v. 21,
no. 1, 1993, pp. 99-138.
final draft in pdf

Giving Up Judgement Empiricism: The Bayesian
Epistemology of Bertrand Russell and Grover Maxwell : C. W. Savage and C. A.
Anderson (eds.), *Rereading Russell: Essays on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics
and Epistemology, Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science*, v. 12, 1989, University
of Minnesota Press, pp. 234-248.
final draft in pdf

**The Logic of Belief:**

Voting in Search of the Public Good: the Probabilistic Logic of Majority Judgments : unpublished manuscript.
draft in pdf

The Lockean
Thesis and the Logic of Belief : Franz Huber and Christoph
Schmidt-Petri (eds.), *Degrees of Belief*, 2009, Synthese Library 342, pp. 49-74.
final draft in pdf

Three Models
of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence : *Journal of Philosophical
Logic*, v. 33, no. 1, 2004, pp. 89-123.
final draft in pdf

The *Preface*,
the *Lottery*, and the Logic of Belief : with Luc Bovens, *Mind*, v.
108, no. 430, 1999, pp. 241-264.
final draft in pdf

**Logics of Nonmonotonic Conditionals Related to Conditional Probabilities:**

A Primer on *Rational Consequence Relations*,
*Popper Functions*, and their Ranked Structures :
*Studia Logica*, v. 102, no. 4, 2014, pp. 731-749.
draft in pdf

Appendix to A Primer on
*Rational Consequence Relations*,*Popper Functions*, and their Ranked Structures :
the appendix to
A Primer on *Rational Consequence Relations*,
*Popper Functions*, and their Ranked Structures
only available online ---
draft in pdf

The Quantitative/Qualitative
Watershed for Rules of Uncertain Inference : with David Makinson, *Studia Logica*,
v. 86, no. 2, 2007, pp. 247-297.
final draft in pdf

Nonmonotonic
Conditionals that Behave Like Conditional Probabilities Above a Threshold : *Journal
of Applied Logic*, v. 5, no. 4, 2007, pp. 625-637.
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On the
Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities: Predicate
Logic : *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, v. 27, no. 1, 1998, pp. 1-34.
final draft in pdf

On the
Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities : *Journal
of Philosophical Logic*, v. 25, no. 2, 1996, pp. 185-218. final draft in pdf

A Semantic
Approach to Non-Monotonic Entailments :
J. F. Lemmer and L. N. Kanal (eds.), *Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
2*, 1988, Elsevier Science Publishers, B.V. (North-Holland), pp. 251-262. final draft in pdf

**Logic, Mathematics, and the Sciences:**

Mathematical
Instrumentalism Meets the Conjunction Objection : *Journal of Philosophical
Logic*, v. 25, no. 4, 1996, pp. 363-397.
final draft in pdf

For Whom
the Bell Arguments Toll : with Michael Silberstein, *Synthese*, v. 102,
1995, pp. 99-138.
final draft in pdf

Validity
in Intensional Languages: A New Approach : with William H. Hanson, *Notre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic*, v. 26, no. 1, 1985, pp. 9-35.
final draft in pdf