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James Hawthorne Associate Professor Department of Philosophy
Formal Epistemology, |
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James Hawthorne Associate Professor Department of Philosophy
Formal Epistemology, |
Philosophically I'm a scientific realist and a mathematical instrumentalist with a fascination for figuring out what our best scientific theories imply about the nature of physical reality. As a logician my research primarily involves the investigation and development of systematic logics for the representation of uncertain inferences, especially the logic by which evidence may support or refute scientific hypotheses and theories. Much of my work in this area involves the development and explication of the probabilistic inductive logic known as Bayesian Inference or Bayesian Confirmation Theory. I also work on logics of belief and comparative plausibility (e.g., the logic of X is at least as plausible as Y), and on logics of defeasible support.
About my work and views on Probability and Statistics:
James Hawthorne : in A. Hajek and V.F. Hendricks (eds.), Probability and Statistics: 5 Questions
Chapter 6, 2009 , Automated Press, pp. 65-74.
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Inductive Logic and Confirmation Theory:
Inductive
Logic : The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Sept. 2004, revised Feb. 2008, major revision June 2011),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.); pdf version available from theSEP, 151 pages. Online version at
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-inductive/>. Draft of April 2011 revision available here
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Confirmation
Theory : in Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Malcolm Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics:
Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7, 2011, Elsevier, pp. 333-389.
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Bayesian Confirmation
Theory : in S. French and J. Saatsi (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science, 2011, Continuum Press, pp. 197-213.
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The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation : with Branden Fitelson,
Philosophical Perspectives, 24, Epistemology, 2010, pp. 207-241, Elsevier.
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An Even Better Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens :
supplement to The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation, 13 pages in manuscript.
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How
Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens :
with Branden Fitelson, forthcoming in James Fetzer and Ellery Eells (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science, 2010, Springer.
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Degree-of-Belief
and Degree-of-Support: Why Bayesians Need Both Notions :
Mind, v. 114, no. 454, 2005, pp. 277-320.
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Re-solving
Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence : with Branden Fitelson,
Philosophy of Science, v. 71, no. 4, 2004, pp. 505-514.
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On the
Nature of Bayesian Convergence :
PSA1994, v. 1, 1994, pp. 241-249.
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Bayesian
Induction Is Eliminative Induction : Philosophical Topics, v. 21,
no. 1, 1993, pp. 99-138.
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Giving Up Judgement Empiricism: The Bayesian
Epistemology of Bertrand Russell and Grover Maxwell : C. W. Savage and C. A.
Anderson (eds.), Rereading Russell: Essays on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics
and Epistemology, Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science, v. 12, 1989, University
of Minnesota Press, pp. 234-248.
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The Logic of Belief:
Voting in Search of the Public Good: the Probabilistic Logic of Majority Judgments : unpublished manuscript.
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The Lockean
Thesis and the Logic of Belief : Franz Huber and Christoph
Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief, 2009, Synthese Library 342, pp. 49-74.
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Three Models
of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence : Journal of Philosophical
Logic, v. 33, no. 1, 2004, pp. 89-123.
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The Preface,
the Lottery, and the Logic of Belief : with Luc Bovens, Mind, v.
108, no. 430, 1999, pp. 241-264.
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Logics of Nonmonotonic Conditionals Related to Conditional Probabilities:
The Quantitative/Qualitative
Watershed for Rules of Uncertain Inference : with David Makinson, Studia Logica,
v. 86, no. 2, 2007, pp. 247-297.
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Nonmonotonic
Conditionals that Behave Like Conditional Probabilities Above a Threshold : Journal
of Applied Logic, v. 5, no. 4, 2007, pp. 625-637.
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On the
Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities: Predicate
Logic : Journal of Philosophical Logic, v. 27, no. 1, 1998, pp. 1-34.
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On the
Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities : Journal
of Philosophical Logic, v. 25, no. 2, 1996, pp. 185-218. final draft in pdf
A Semantic
Approach to Non-Monotonic Entailments :
J. F. Lemmer and L. N. Kanal (eds.), Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
2, 1988, Elsevier Science Publishers, B.V. (North-Holland), pp. 251-262. final draft in pdf
Logic, Mathematics, and the Sciences:
Mathematical
Instrumentalism Meets the Conjunction Objection : Journal of Philosophical
Logic, v. 25, no. 4, 1996, pp. 363-397.
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For Whom
the Bell Arguments Toll : with Michael Silberstein, Synthese, v. 102,
1995, pp. 99-138.
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Validity
in Intensional Languages: A New Approach : with William H. Hanson, Notre Dame
Journal of Formal Logic, v. 26, no. 1, 1985, pp. 9-35.
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