

warrant inherent marginalization? Rather than destroying society, multiculturalists are merely confronting a type of unearned privilege. What is undemocratic or unhealthy about this activity?

NOTE

1. See for instance Kallen's books, *Structure of Lasting Peace, Culture and Democracy in the United States*, and *Freedom in the Modern World*. Also see Bourne's books, *The Radical Will* and *Towards an Enduring Peace*.

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Chapter 3

Adopting the Caucasian "Look": Reorganizing the Minority Face

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INTRODUCTION

Traditionally cultures have differed concerning ideals of beauty (Cash, 1981). These ideals, as physical characteristics, are amplified by the use of adornments, including modern cosmetics. Ideas of what is and is not beautiful are thus emphasized, exaggerated. The modern cosmetics industry and related mass marketing are acting in unison today like a cultural steamroller, eliminating traditional ideals of beauty and replacing them with a uniform global look that emerges from the fashion centers of the world. The cosmetics industry, including its mass marketing of course, plays an enormous role today in teaching young women and men what is beautiful and also the value of beauty such that it is smart and chic to conform to certain body and phenotypic standards.

As the modern saying goes, one can never be too rich or too thin. Any suggestion to the contrary is widely seen as quaint at best or more likely as patently stupid, but at least deviant (Dion & Walter, 1972). But one, especially a woman, can be too smart (Cash, Rossi, & Chapman, 1985). Chic and intelligent are not exactly the same things. Many so-called supermodels are in fact high-school dropouts. To be chic is to follow fashion, to be a sort of dumb or passive medium, infinitely adaptable to every current of fashion, willingly dressed and painted by the industry in the hope of being acceptable if not desirable. It is practically a tautology: it is fashionable to be fashionable.

But traditionally what exactly constitutes beauty has always been a locally indigenous evaluation. This fact is changing across the world. We can see the initial impact of the globalization of beauty in Japan, the first and arguably most Westernized nation in Asia.

The multibillion-dollar-per-year cosmetic industry is trans- not multinational, which means that it purviews a very narrow spectrum of what constitutes chic across national and cultural boundaries, effectively replacing local versions with the notion of a single global market selling cool.

In the past Japan was influenced by Chinese concepts of beauty, but the modern sense of beauty in Japan is an industrial product. The modern version also saturates all of Japanese culture, not just the nobility, and it constitutes a special challenge because modern beauty is based on a Caucasoid (not Mongoloid) body type and phenotype, which includes larger breasts, eye folds, round eyes, longer legs, light hair and skin, and so on. Otherwise, as in the case of Sayoko Yamaguchi, who debuted in Paris, not Tokyo, the ideal Japanese beauty is a Westernized Oriental; it is, to recall Edward Said (1979), a Western version of what the exotic Orient should be. The chic official version of beauty is generated by a tiny cadre of high-fashion power brokers who then sell it to Oriental consumers as *their* ideal beauty.

The cosmetic industry as it is now configured originated in the industrial West and remains centered in Westernized urban cosmopolitan areas, such as Paris, New York, and Tokyo. This highly lucrative industry has a very powerful influence in creating a kind of real, a new "naturalism" that is anything but natural (Cox & Glick, 1986; Williamson, 1994). The "natural-looking" beauty is difficult to challenge and even more difficult to achieve without hours of sitting under the expert hands of an artist. The hypertrophic egocentrism that has imploded to a single celebrated face or look (for that's what the worship of celebrity is) is not restricted to fashion models, as we see with the singularity of "O." The TV personality Oprah Winfrey, arguably the most visible black woman in the world, takes at least three hours every day just for her hair, as well as several more hours under the guidance of a personal trainer, dietician, and cosmetologist. By the time she goes before the cameras on her TV show she is practically a mannequin who dares not move too fast or dynamically lest her face and hair come apart. She is a model minority, doling out mainstream-sounding advice without herself having ever been married or having ever raised a child. Like most model minority exemplars, she is one who can hardly be emulated. As noted in Chapter Six of this volume about minority spokespersons, Oprah (and Martha Stewart) is a category of one. Yet she claims to be an expert and spokesperson, with a huge megaphone, for both women and blacks. She is very removed from the daily experiences of the groups she claims to not just be a member of but a prime example of success for.

However, as a heroine, she fails to demonstrate an alternate path and set of principles for her followers, for even she cannot escape the larger hegemonic forces impinging on women's self-esteem. Her success is in fitting with the mainstream culture's version of the ideal woman and ideal black woman. Even though they may bemoan the power of the beauty myth, most women still continually struggle to measure up to the increasingly mass-mediated, pervasive version of what is beautiful, desirable, and acceptable. Even models suffer

from the power of the myth, many (including Oprah) struggling with weight "problems" to the point of needing psychological and psychiatric care.

As for Japan, although these standards may have originated in foreign lands, they now dominate the psyches of Japanese people through intercultural transmission, cultural borrowing, and the power of mass marketing. Via cultural fusion and integration, these values have become Japanese. Modern (visiocentric) boys and girls stand before their mirror images and compare themselves with the buffed and beautiful fantasies of digitally enhanced nobodies (literally so, as they are sometimes computer-generated virtual people) on magazine covers (Kramer, 1997; Kramer & Ikeda, 2000; Wolfe, 1991). Millions are obsessed with a relative handful of fabricated body images (Cash & Wunderle, 1987). This is the power of mass mediation with its fantastic narrowing of horizon. A single persona "speaks" to millions simultaneously. This is the concentration of will-power-drive that characterizes massified visiocentric modernity (Kramer, 1993; 1994; 1997).

Homogenization manifests the Western ideology of bourgeois positivism with its faith that life progresses by solving a series of discrete problems and that each problem has one best solution, which is discovered through the therapeutic steps of the one best way to think and believe. Experts become distant personae who never listen, who cannot hear, for the structure of the communication process is manifestly dictatorial (Lyotard, 1984). According to this Hegelian dream, insofar as people are rational, human life will converge on the one best culture or way to live, which, by coincidence, just happens to be the style of thinking, believing, and acting that originated in Western Europe. This is to be expected because the ones doing most of the communicating are Western Europeans and their former colonies. Thus, their ethnocentrism is manifested in their messages; perspectivism is inflated to global validity via the status conferred on it by virtue of being "the message" that is globalized by means of telecolonialism (Ikeda & Kramer, 2002; Kramer & Ikeda, 2000). All that is needed is mass education, all from the same book. This is what is unique about late modern cultural transfer. Modern mediation is not exchange between traders facing each other eye to eye. Rather, it is a one-way disembodied electronic message (not a conversation, exchange, or negotiation) with a single voice that is deaf, being attended to by the masses, that is, by a huge synchronized aggregate of individuals without a sense of community unless it be a cybercommunity. They are mesmerized by the rhetoric of the technological power in and of itself. People rush out to buy the means of mediation, a radio or television or personal computer (*personal* stressing the isolation of viewing by one's self, like "bowling alone"), for the technology itself is the message (McLuhan, 2001), and the message is "get with it," be modern, even futuristic (by skipping the now altogether, for the future is here today!).

The first lesson is that the positive progressive voice is new and good; one should listen to it because it is the solution, the path, (the) (ab)solution and happiness. It knows reality positively. This is self-evident, for after all, just look

at the way it arrives. The gadgetry confers status onto the message, which cannot be separated from it; form and content are one. The message is the way to a satisfying future; in fact it *is* the future (Mumford, 1966). You just need to stay tuned to not fall further behind, to stay "current," like the electricity that brings the world to us.

THE GOD-MAKERS

Careful meditation on and worship of the ideal beauty images preoccupies the psyches of millions. Mass media create a collective psyche that shares a very few (if not singular) images of beauty. Primarily women editors of fashion magazines and Hollywood casting directors comb through thousands of would-be idols, selecting the right look. Tens of thousands of teenage girls and their parents invest in photo sets, cosmetic surgery, and hair work to conform to and complete the mythic circle and desperately try to become a model, even a supermodel. But first the hopeful must be selected by those with supervision, the bosses of the image, the gatekeepers. Their power is enormous for they are the vision givers and god-makers, the teachers. Following Carl Jung's (1981) observation that myth is collective dream, we agree with Naomi Wolfe's (1991) application of this insight, that what we are discussing here is a beauty myth and the shamanic might of the media apparatus to create and propagate it, now to global audiences. The beauty myth is like a dream, which is essentially not the same as the actual. It is of the realm of virtue. As such, it can never be actualized but instead remains a constant exemplar and evaluator, an irritating taskmaster and authoritative threat to actual women.

There has never been a power or age like this one. It is the age of mass seduction, where heavily hyped nymphets tear their own clothing off before screaming preteens while strutting before cameras singing "I wanna be your lover," which, of course, is impossible. A time when children's toy makers argue over which video game babe offers the most booty, *Tomb Raider's* Lara Croft or *No One Lives Forever's* Cate Archer (*Maximum PC*, August 2001, p. 96). Through the gadget power of interactive video, you can make these "women" bounce again and again. Roland Barthes (1973), who brackets the metaphysics of realism, notes that myth is neither true nor false; rather it functions to dehistoricize, to decontextualize, we say to deactualize, and thus and ironically naturalize a virtual reality that is an invention, a mere contingency masquerading as an absolute. Naturalism is an ideology, a mythic process. It is ultimately a political move, a rhetorical ploy to make the contingent seem eternal and therefore beyond criticism. Thus, we are talking here not merely of the politics of conventional colonial encroachment and overt oppression but of the politics of the self, which is the most egregious trespass for it invades the confidence people have in their own value. No assault could be more intimate. It threatens their sense of self-worth in the all-important life of desire, of a per-

son's wish to be wanted, accepted, and even worthy of amorous pursuit. Threatening a person's sense of self-worth is to assault them below the belt as it were, to make them insecure and then manipulate those insecurities explicitly for the sake of profiteering. This is not new. What is new is the global scope and psychographic precision of the efforts now under way and the narrowness of alternatives being entertained.

As Mircea Eliade (1998) states, the important question to ask about myth is not merely if it is true or false, especially in the case of aesthetics, but rather to determine if it is alive or dead, for living myth is image that is manifested as prejudice (prejudice) and as such lies outside the reach of reflexive reason and analysis. Either you are or are not beautiful. Research indicates that people make this judgment of others' physical characteristics within ten seconds (usually less) of first contact. Living myth is not seen as myth at all. Rather, it is simply the real. Living myth means that the myth, the evaluation, has become an integral part of perception itself.

This chapter is an effort to rehistoricize, to recontextualize the concept of beauty in Japan, and thus to demythologize (denaturalize) it, rendering it available to analytic scrutiny.

THE PATH OF BEAUTY

What characterizes modernity is an obsession with space as such and the expansion into it, the exploration of it, the fragmentation of it, and the replication of it. Modernity is not new. It first erupted into Western consciousness with the classical Greeks, reaching its ancient zenith in imperial Rome. Then it subsided as the West vacillated, becoming predominantly two-dimensional again for about twelve hundred years (Gebser, 1985; Kramer, 1992, 1997). The apogee of the second eruption of three-dimensional spatial thinking (with its attendant dissociative consequences leading to the valuation of "disinterest") occurred at the height of the cold war between the Soviet and Western industrial economies. Since about 1975, the consciousness of time (already crystallizing with Benjamin Franklin, Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, Albert Einstein, Pablo Picasso, Henry Ford, F.W. Taylor, the Blitz, an obsession with accelerating computation, etc.) has marked the so-called postmodern West. Although ample evidence has been amassed to demonstrate the current struggle to spatialize and control time (reified fragmented, measured existential duration), spatial thinking is still a major aspect of the Western world. This is clear in the continuing project of the age of exploration (globalization) and the domination of the philosophical ideology of empiricism. Under these conditions, the direction of transmission has almost always been from the "advanced" nations to those still "developing" (according to the hegemonic criteria deployed by the advanced countries, criteria which, when applied reflexively to the West, just happen to demonstrate its evolutionary superiority).

In the face of colonial wealth and power, developing nations have wished to be developed, too. Why? After initial resistance and attempts to protect traditional identities, military and economic sanctions launched by colonial powers have tended to bring the less developed around to accepting the criteria of advancement so generously offered. They, the backward peoples, are continuously told, in modern linear (spatialized) terms, that they are "backward," and "culturally lagging" behind the forward, most advanced leading authorities. Leading to where? A utopia, of course, which is by definition unreachable because it promises permanent progress. Insofar as they internalize this way of thinking and accept the lifeline that has been given to them—a line extending, in classically narrow-minded variable analytic style from primitive to advanced—they come to see themselves through these metaphors, this scheme of comparative/competitive human development, as indeed underdeveloped.

This neo-Hegelian notion of developmental evolution extends beyond mere technological know-how. It inevitably implicates the entire globe (physically and psychologically), applying a single scale to all societies, so that it is not merely technologies that are evaluated as comparatively inferior but the people who created the inferior technologies. Hence we have the periodic recurrence of global scaling from Buffon and Linnaeus in the early nineteenth century, to Alfred Binet's IQ testing in the early twentieth century, to Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's *Bell Curve* (1994). In fact, Francis Galton (a cousin to Charles Darwin) along with his follower, Karl Pearson, launched mathematical social science as eugenics. Modern materialism reduces the value of a people to the power of their technology. Such global criteria, which are applied to the entire world with such ethnocentric audacity, are imposed by the powerful onto minorities, for the very act of measuring is a one-sided conversation whereby one person defines another with categories and scales of his or her own making. The definer has power over the defined. Minorities are thus established in the very process of reckoning them and objectively (for the same scale is applied to all equally) "proving" them to be backward. Of course the calibration of the scale, and the human characteristics selected as salient and included (privileged) as the very structure of the operational process of definition, manifests the ethnocentric attitudes of the designers of the scale (despite their pretense to be unbiased). What Jim says about Bob may or may not tell me something about Bob, for it may be forever indeterminate. But it surely, manifestly, tells me something about Jim. The scale may or may not reveal something about those subjected to it. But it certainly tells me about those who designed it. Yet the rhetoric of instrumentation insists, "Look for yourself!" The unbiased expert will say, "What a pleasant surprise. When I apply my scale to myself, I come out on top! This is not a cultural bias but a disinterested observation because, after all, I applied the scale to myself just as I did to others. Never mind the fact that I generated the scale, thus reifying my own perspective, reifying and elevating my own values to the status of universal validity by virtue of the fact that I

then go around applying it to everyone in the world." Thus, whole countries can be ranked from one to ten in beauty and desirability.

To be developed and advanced in part means to be modern, smart, and chic, all of which usually means Western and presumes wealth in a strictly and restrictively materialistic way, because that fits the metaphysical prejudice of quantitative methods. A case in point is Bhutan, which is presumed to be one of the least developed nations and peoples on Earth, despite having cultural practices rooted in thousands of years of tradition. When told that the United States enjoys a standard of living seventy-eight times higher than his countrymen, King Jigme Wangchuck of Bhutan retorted that he doubts very much that gross domestic product is identical with happiness; he doubts that Americans are seventy-eight times happier than Bhutanese (statement made at the 1987 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, hosted by Bhutan). Bhutan is a prime example of a country under great pressure to open up and develop, but the country is trying to control its own destiny. Thus, the government strictly controls tourism. The notion of development being applied to the Bhutanese according to many Western Christian missionaries includes moral development, as many Web sites run by such organizations decry the fact that the king married four women at once, all sisters, and lives with none of them (each has her own house). Yet Bhutan is famous for gender equality. It is traditional there among the Buddhists for a woman to have several husbands, too.

The criteria and definition of what counts as advanced and developed (and presumably happy, according to positivism) originates in the most advanced and developed centers so that the evaluation is biased in favor of those who see as salient such characteristics as number of televisions or telephones per thousand population. The measures come from the urbanized who are economically and technologically privileged. Yet the suicide rates among the privileged are much higher than among traditional, backward peoples. Throughout the great age of globalism (beginning in the 1400s), the seduction of wealth and power has led to comparative rankings, self-appraisals, and competition. Thus, we have the first, second, third, and, some add, fourth worlds. This very way of seeing and evaluating the world is highly restrictive and purely economic in the modern Western sense of the term.

BACKWARD AND FORWARD JAPAN

During the nineteenth century, Japan perceived itself as backward as compared with forward nations like Germany, the United States, and England. Presuming the authority of Western criteria—after all, gunpowder and a belligerent mindset willing to use it is quite convincing—the Japanese came to accept this comparative conclusion. According to Western criteria, of course, the West was advanced, progressive, and positive. Thus, with the Meiji Restoration,

Japan launched itself into an all-out effort to catch up, which included, to the detriment of the rest of Asia, the Japanese mimicking of Western-style colonial ambition. Of course, to be advanced, one must assume some final goal, and (as has been explicated elsewhere) the definers of the final solution live in the centers of the West. Colonial expansion leads logically to global conquest. This is the final solution, the completion of salvation via the domestication and cultivation of the wild, which most especially includes "dark savages." However, this program, this utopian goal (i.e., various incarnations of manifest destiny rooted in the natural superiority of some peoples and societies over others) is a figment of the Western urban imagination.

Although phenomenologically an essentially shared ambition can be discerned, each version of colonial ambition can be analyzed as historically and culturally contingent. That is, although the same logical form is evident, clearly there is a unique age of global expansion that can be traced in its origins to the rebirth of the ancient Alexandrian dream of world conquest, revisited by the Romans, and reborn with the Renaissance. The inspiration remains the same despite technological and historical differences. Each reincarnation of this world ambition gets stronger, improving on the limitations of its previous manifestation. In its current manifestation, Western globalism can be seen as what Jared Diamond (1993) calls a cultural steamroller, eliminating a myriad of languages and cultures in its path; what Friedrich Nietzsche, a hundred years before Diamond and sensing the rising tide of fascism in Europe, called the elimination of the play that enables experimentation at living. Alternative lifestyles, legal systems, religions, economic systems, value systems, belief systems, and motivations are seen from the center as merely contingent deviants that must and will (by the laws of nature no less) eventually "tend toward the mean," which means the majority with its central tendency. Hence the obsession with measures of regression and correlation that characterize Galton, Pearson, and Yule's version of Western social science.

The current Western expansion makes Roman imperial ambitions pale by comparison. To have a future, developing nations are confidently told they must get in and online. Some mainstream writers, such as the neo-Hegelians Gudykunst and Kim (1997), who interpret the world from the center, even equate such conformity with "evolution," "becoming mature," to "upward and forward" progress along an evolutionary dialectic, and being "mentally healthy!" Local diversity is labeled by them a "defilement"; a pathetic attachment to backward parochialism that must be eliminated for people to grow into healthy "transcultural identity" or "personhood" (Gudykunst & Kim, 1997, p. 364).

The success of the United States during World War II underscored the validity of its path to the future, proving that alternative ways of seeing time and the future are inferior. Not only do the victors write history, but so, too (and more important), they define the sense of the possible; the future. Those who win de-

termine the course of future history, especially when the winners think in pseudo-religious (Hegelian) notions of destiny and fatalism; conform or fail.

THE NEW, IMPROVED MODERN BEAUTY

During Japan's self-criticism and its resultant clamor to catch up with the West, she not only embraced machine technology but also white Western/American ideals of female physical beauty in place of her own traditional, indigenous ideals. This transmission was a part of an Othering process, at least in a Lacanian sense, whereby a false alter ego or Other is created in mass-mediated images. These images are promoted as advanced, modern, and as such desirable. Not just physical culture and technology can be advanced, cutting-edge, or obsolete. With the advent of positivism, people, too, becoming reduced to measured functions, resource base, and behavior patterns, are seen through these adjectival lenses. Thus Japanese women were taught that a certain type of beauty is what Western men want, and that so far as Japanese men are forward thinking, they also want this foreign style of beauty; therefore, in their mode of conforming to what is expected of them to be desirable, they should also desire to look Western/modern. Otherwise, they were out of date, old fashioned, and ignorant. In this process, Japanese women were also taught that style and beauty is something one does not have inherently or naturally but is something that one can buy at a store and put on (be it Western clothes, hairstyle, or cosmetics). The notion that beauty can and in fact must be bought serves the obvious interest of those who have it to sell.

Thus, beauty in Japan changed dramatically to a commodity first found in advertisements and then in products. Beauty had a price. It was an essential part of opening Japan to international trade. Thus we have the commercialized image of beauty found in many advertisements, especially those promoting the sale of Western-style cosmetics and their manifest ideal face. The ads worked as mirror imaging (Lacan, 1982; Williamson, 1994). Nothing less than self-esteem was at stake (Cash, Rossi, & Chapman, 1985; Miller & Cox, 1982). Thus, the female Japanese face was systematically devalued and then hijacked.

Nothing less than the faces of Japanese women were reevaluated in a mirror held up by a dominating Other, the Western hand. And they were found lacking. The very face of Japanese women was thus seen as a problem and Westernization as the solution. This is the essence of hucksterism. First comes the pitch, which includes the claim that there is a problem, of dissatisfaction, followed by (luckily, even coincidentally) the solution! Here we have the confluence of economics and personal imagination, the political economy of desire and self-esteem. As has happened all over the world, with Japan being one of its first and greatest successes, the Western media apparatus was imported as the beachhead for facilitating all future imports. The Western apparatus of mass

media arrived with its political/economic structure servicing industrialization. First come the techniques of mass mediation, which herald modernity like nothing else except perhaps the mechanical clock, then comes the rest through its channels (Kramer & Ikeda, 2000). The simple presence of channels themselves signifies modern sophistication. For example, cities often boast how many TV and radio stations and newspapers are available to their citizens. Regardless of the content, the form itself is a measure of progress. To have a telephone (let alone a cell phone, a personal computer, or a TV) as a form of importation is cherished as progressive. So, to those striving to catch up, to progress, embracing as many channels of mass (qua commercial) media as possible is a must. Once established, the channels proceed to flood the popular imagination with imported images, which immediately pose a challenge to old dreams, expectations, motivations, beliefs, and values—in a word, *culture*, and the encultured self.

This apparatus of culture formation then acts as a matrix of channels or port-holes into the new environment, transforming it into a market, for development means nothing other than developing or transforming a people into a market. The channels of desire, so aptly named by Stuart Ewen and Elizabeth Ewen (1992), are lines of persuasion and suggestion promoting the super-value of all things modern/Western. Collectively, all importation, all trade and marketing, all modernity is depicted as the ultimate, unquestionable good. All indigenous cultural components, such as religion, language, race, and gender, are subsumed. It does not matter what race or religion or nationality a person is, under the transcendental gaze of capital power, anyone can be a laborer or customer. The inescapable laws that govern in the form of Adam Smith's "invisible hand" treat all equally, as market (labor and/or consumer), the new divinity that sees all, knows all, evaluates all, and rewards and punishes with utter indifference.

Once online the structural content begins to flow, including its most essential part, advertising. But it is something of a mistake to separate the shows from the ads, for both include images of a new good life that serve to create mass dissatisfaction. A prime example is the content of the enormously popular *telenovela* phenomenon around the world, the imaginary content of which consistently purveys images of surgically altered actors playing wealthy characters and lifestyles far beyond the economic reach of the average viewer.¹ But the products that just happen to decorate the *telenovela* world can be purchased (except in Venezuela, where cosmetic surgery is paid for by government entitlements, which has led to an epidemic of such procedures).

Thus, industrialization, with its ethos of standardization and mass production, which requires mass consumption, is introduced and tirelessly promoted. In this instance, it is the face of Latinos and Latinas and also Japanese women that is mass reproduced in Western style. The new, improved modern face comes from a store-bought bottle that has also been promoted as naturally and objectively better than personal likes and contingencies. Their original faces must be critically assessed; otherwise there would be no sale. Self-satisfaction is the absolute

bane of the modern profiteer. To create the matrix of desire, first their faces had to be visiocentrically demonstrated to be inadequate, in need of improvement. The media apparatus works to demonstrate empirically, visually, objectively, naturally, really, that the Japanese face just does not measure up. But fear not, for the magical powers of modern industrial alchemy can fix all. All Japanese women are ugly until they purchase the new mass-reproduced face that comes from mass-produced cosmetics, available as a blessing to them for a small compensation, of course. Industrialization is thus a savior. There is no time to lose.

The Western face in the mirror had several steps to take before arriving at the surface of Japanese (qua ugly) eyes, peering as they were out of ugly faces. First the idea of industrial scale profiteering had to be transferred. Then Japanese businessmen could take it from there. They knew the mind of the Japanese woman and man better than any Western marketer. They knew their complexes, insecurities, and fears. So they took the business model and applied it. Thus, historically we find that the Western ideal was largely imposed on Japanese women by a handful of enterprising Japanese businessmen. They exploited the model and its contents to the hilt, for their own personal gain, of course, but also for the sake of progress. What does it matter if all of Japan's women come to see themselves as inadequate? So much the better for sales!

The introduction of the new face was thus part of a period of powerful, sometimes hegemonic Western/American impact on Japan. The process worked so well that many politicians and scholars have noted a pervasive inferiority complex in Japan that may very well have fueled her attempts to mimic Western-style imperialism within Asia in an attempt to measure up, to also be a world power. The Meiji Restoration and the colonial ambitions of Japan manifest its exertions to become significant on the world stage according to Western criteria. But before Japan could be a colonizer, it first had to be colonized.

THE OTHER IMAGINARY FACE IN THE MIRROR

The imaginary Other peering out of the mirror of natural beauty in the ever-so-modern newspapers and magazines and the mirror image of the inadequate self do not match. The virtual and the actual do not match. This conflict forms the nexus where the stronger subjugates the weaker to its values. Through this mirror with a double image is projected a set of evaluative and highly correlated relationships: beauty/ugly, forward/backward, rich/poor, modern/old-fashioned, sophisticated/rustic, smart/stupid, and desirable/undesirable.

What is presented here is how physical beauty has historically been promoted through the commercialization of cosmetics, its transfer to Japan, and the resultant transformation of Japanese ideals of physical beauty. Not only physical beauty but also a more spunky, sassy, cute mental outlook and way of acting characterizes the true modern woman. This transformation inherently involves Japaneseness, and its study offers a window onto Japanese conceptions of cul-

ture and consciousness. To pursue this goal, first, we explain some pertinent characteristics of Japanese beauty and cosmetics from the ancient (sixth century) to the Edo period (1868). Second, we examine the Japanese version of beauty after the Meiji Restoration (1868 to the present). We do this by using cosmetic ads and by explaining how the cosmetic industry and related mass marketing have influenced Japanese ideals of physical beauty and female attitudes that are attractive to the modern man.

Overview of Japanese Cosmetics and a History of Japanese Beauty to the Edo Period

At this point we briefly discuss the preindustrial, premassification of the ideal face and the means to try to achieve it; after all, aesthetics existed before industrialization, including cosmetics, although in a very limited, typically elitist way. Preindustrial agrarian peoples typically did not fret a great deal about their looks.

The manufacture and use of face powder, rouge, eyebrow paint, and other cosmetics were imported in the sixth century from Korea and China. In early times cosmetics were used only by special participants in religious ceremonies and festivals. Cosmetics were not worn for mundane adornment. The practice gradually spread among the aristocracy as a means of enhancing one's beauty. In the Heian period (794–1185) men as well as women used cosmetics. In the Azuchi-Momoyama period (1568–1600), in addition to face powder, facial lotion was imported from Portugal, Spain, and Holland. During the Edo period (1600–1868) makeup styles changed along with variations in hairstyles. Kabuki actors, courtesans, and geishas set the pace. They were depicted in woodblock print media, such as *ukiyo*e prints, and popular literature. Beauticians also played an important part in setting fashions.

Among the various cosmetic compounds used, *oshiroi*, a white powder, and *beni* (rouge) contributed in constructing a woman's beauty. White powder was used to whiten the face and other parts of the body. The oldest form of face powder was made from white soil and rice flour. In the seventh century, the manufacture of *keifun* (mercury chloride) and *empaku* (white lead) was imported from China. Their use was confined to the upper classes until the seventeenth century, when it became popular among the general public. In accordance with the old saying "a fair complexion hides many defects," fair skin was the foremost quality attributing to a woman's beauty. As a result, white powder was used extensively during the Edo period, especially white lead powder. It was mixed with water and applied with a brush. In the 1870s, the toxic quality of lead was recognized, and soon after a lead-free facial powder began to be domestically produced.

Beni was first seen on *haniwa*, clay tomb figures of the third to the sixth centuries, whose faces were painted with ocher and vermilion. However, this soft-hued natural red is thought to have been a form of ritual makeup. In the early

seventh century safflower (*benibana*), which had come from Egypt via India, Central Asia, China, and Korea, was introduced to Japan, and an extract was used as rouge. This rouge, bright and full-hued, was regarded as a symbol of joy and happiness. By the tenth century the safflower was cultivated in Japan, but the yield was minimal, resulting in a costly product. That is why *benibana* rouge was not widely used until the seventeenth century. At the end of the eighteenth century, *sasabeni*, an iridescent greenish rouge, applied mainly to the lower lip, came in vogue and continued to the nineteenth century. Rouge was applied mainly to the lips; its facial use was limited to special occasions.

Other cosmetics, such as *ohaguro*, used in tooth blackening, were supposed to enhance sex appeal and, in the case of *ohaguro*, help maintain healthy teeth. By about the twelfth century, the custom spread to the men of nobility and the samurai class as well. By the eighteenth century, it became limited again to only women. Later, only married women used it, and the custom continued until the end of the nineteenth century. One reason for tooth blackening in Southeast Asia even today and perhaps the origin of the fad in Japan, is linked to the belief that one way to tell the difference between a female demon and a human female was black teeth. Demons have white fangs. In the Heian era, the practice of shaving the eyebrows and tooth blackening marked the transition into adulthood for girls, as well as social status among women. *Okimayu*, shaving the eyebrows and drawing new ones, was practiced particularly among the upper classes. The reshaping of one's eyebrows gradually became a custom for the average woman to show her married status and continued through the end of the nineteenth century.

The ideal of female beauty in Japan for nearly a thousand years, from the Heian (794–1183) through the Kamakura (1184–1333) and Muromachi (1391–1660) periods, was a plump woman with a round face and cheeks, a large forehead, and eyes slanting down with a fair complexion. By the end of the Edo period (1600–1868), however, some variations began to occur (Murasawa, 1987). Comparison of early with late *ukiyo*e prints reveals that the original plump woman ideal began to give way to a tall and slender body image. A fair complexion still remained as the most important attribute of female beauty. Thus, a dark-complexioned woman from a tropical area (such as Okinawa) would find beauty unattainable because dark skin was considered a defect (Wagatsuma & Yoneyama, 1967). To maintain her beautiful complexion, the woman of the past used a *nukabukuro*, a small bag of rice bran, to wash and polish her face. For Japanese people, white skin was a necessary condition for beauty, and thus they made much use of white powder.

LOVE AND ITS MANY VARIETIES

Iki is a Japanese aesthetic concept that helps explain the Japanese ideal of beauty. *Iki* originally denoted "spirit" or "heart." Later it came to mean "high

spirit" or "high heart" and referred also to the way in which a high-spirited person talked, behaved, and/or dressed. As it became expressive of the Edo commoners' ideal, its connotations were affected by the Osaka concept of *sui*. The concept of *iki* is often compared with that of *sui*. These concepts are aesthetic and moral ideals of urban commoners. The concept of *sui* was a common term used initially in the Osaka/Kyoto area during the late seventeenth century, and the term *iki* came into usage in the Kanto region, where Edo (now Tokyo) exists. Both refer to the common desire for an ideal and moral lifestyle. Initially this involved the purity of Buddhism as it related to innocent beauty. Both *iki* and *sui* have implications for male/female relationships.

Until the modern (Meiji) era in Japan, male/female relationships were expressed using the words *iro* and *koi*. *Iro* includes the sense of *iki* (or *sui*, depending on the region), which means the pleasant feelings men and women have toward each other when they are in love. It also signifies carnal desire or lust, which was frowned on by Meiji (Westernized) intellectuals as primitive or obscene. *Koi* was also used in the pre-Meiji era to signify love between men and women, but it signified not physical action so much as the feelings one has within him- or herself, which are not shared. The idea of a love marriage, a modern concept of largely Western origin, stresses the role of the individual in making the choice of mate. With the advent of Western-style romanticism and also where Christianity was most successful in Japan, a highly idealized notion of love emerged and was signified by *ai* (*Ren'ai*). At the same time *sei* (sexuality) and *sei'yoku* (sexual desire) were yet closely associated with *ai*. The combination of the two is essential to the modern Japanese version of romantic love; like its Western progenitor, a tension also exists that is expressed by the oppression of desire, especially sexuality, ironically as an expression of love. Thus, in the middle Meiji period, virginity gains a high valuation, which is quite contrary to pre-Meiji sentiments.² After the Meiji Restoration, *sei* and *ai* (sex and love) become more exclusively associated with the relationship of *kekkon* (modern-style marriage), but at the same time they are differentiated. Such a differentiation is basically a modern fragmentation. As Japan modernized, this ideal was relaxed and *sei* and *ai* became dissociated, and their meanings changed to an aim for pleasure (*sei*) as different from a striving for intimacy (*ai*). And *ren'ai* faltered because it was too idealistic and the above-mentioned tension was not viable. The Christian concept of love, which contains both eros and agape, was distorted in Japanese romanticism whereby *ai* means only eros.

During the Meiji era (late 1800s) the high value placed on virginity manifested as *iki*. It had to do with flirting with the unattainable, the ache of being so close yet so far. Later, *iki* came to be translated as a sort of coy mode of interaction, which was considered chic. This may seem strange, but what it means in terms of philology is that modern Western styles and morals came to dominate Japanese aesthetics. Shuzou Kuki proposed in 1930 that the essence of *iki* refers to chic, smartness, posh, dapper, elegant, and so on (Kuki, 1930).³ It em-

phasized the sexual tension of sexual repression. Kuki defined *iki* as a "sensuous radiance" through whose lively delight there breaks the glow of something "supra-sensuous" (Miller, 1978, p. 114). What is meant by *supra-sensuous* is that direct embodied sexuality is repressed in favor of an ideal.

Iki is used to mean a coquettish chat with the opposite sex, with those in whom one perceives the possibility not so much of love but rather of flirtatious dalliance (Miller, 1978). It shows the quick-witted sophistication of the chivalrous sort. It indicates the beginning of the end of the floating sensual world of premodern Japan. In this marginal world we see a tension, a mixing of carnal pursuits with high ideals, of *iro* (carnal lust) and *ai*, which involves *iki*, meaning having pleasant feelings while keeping a proper distance.

This new sort of teasing, which became the modern urban style of interaction in the common public houses, characterizes the world known as *ukiyo*, where relatively poor samurai cavorted in the "floating world," the official/unofficial pleasure quarters. The floating world (*ukiyo*), made famous in *ukiyo*e woodblock prints, was a marshy area northeast of present-day Asakusa (part of Edo), about half a mile behind the Kannon temple and within site of Shin Yoshiwara's Nightless Castle (*Fuyajo*), which lent a sort of backhanded recognition (if not legitimacy) to the area. It was known for its rushes and thus came to be called *Yoshiwara*, "Rush Field." This was the demi-monde of the Edo era, a neighborhood in the marshes at the edge of civilization (old Edo—Tokyo). Yet it became the cradle of cultural invention, of the arts, which only makes sense. Invention, by definition, is cutting edge. The new always comes from the margins. Here not only bordellos appeared but also *ageya* houses (later called *machiya*, from *chaya*, or tea house) for arranging introductions. Thus came into maturity a fabled area for artists, rogues, *ronin*, or masterless samurai who formed bands, which became the modern *zakuza*, wayward monks, kabuki actors, geishas, and prostitutes. Nicholas Bornoff's excellent description of this Edo period demi-monde merits quotation here:

Wealthy townsmen eager to circumvent the austerities of the regime did so with a characteristic step-by-step escalation towards sybaritic ostentatousness. Despite sumptuary laws and a great many sporadic and arbitrary clampdowns, the Yoshiwara was the one place in which they could enjoy with impunity a freedom forbidden elsewhere. Surpassing even Kyoto's *shimabara*, the Yoshiwara became much more than just the haunt of harlotry. A splendid cultural microcosm, it was to become the home of restaurants and fancy shops, high fashion and the kabuki theater, of music and dance, of literature and the visual arts. In this unique setting, there blossomed a culture, which, for the first time, issued not from the aristocracy but from the people. (Bornoff, 1991, p. 163)

Out of this milieu was born a new style, the Genroku style, which spanned the latter half of the seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth centuries and which still affects Japanese culture. It marks the apogee of the Edo period, becoming synonymous with Edo style. At this time we see the emergence of a truly popular culture articulated in the novellas of Ihara Saikaku, most notably *Five Women*

Who Loved Love (and *Life of an Amorous Man*) being representative and Murasaki Shikibu's classic *Tale of Genji* (both published in 1682), as well as books of erotic *ukiyo-e*, such as *Yoshiwara Makura* (*Yoshiwara Pillow Book*, in 1660). The Genroku culture was not only contrary to the Christian and Western values that would later challenge it, but in its irreverently cheeky play with authority and rules, it threatened to erase the divide between the common people and the nobles. For instance, thinly veiled political critiques in kabuki plays irritated the Tokugawa rulers.

Finally, the floating world and its decadent yet tolerated ethos came to a crisis with a scandalous affair between a woman from the aristocratic Ejima samurai family and the great actor-playwright Ichikawa Danjuro in 1711. Despite (or perhaps because of) its illicit blending of the common and the aristocratic, epitomized by the Ichikawa affair, the Yoshiwara continued to be the birthplace of cultural styles for another century. But by the 1860s with straight-laced diplomats and exploitative merchants of the "colonialist ilk" becoming more common, Japanese were being sized up through foreign eyes with a "haughty condescension" (Bornoff, 1991, p. 205).

During the 1860's, foreigners had steadily beleaguered the Japanese with their righteous indignation, which rose in summer commensurate to the mercury in their thermometers. They were horrified by the mixed public baths and at the sight of workmen wearing only a *fundoshi* loincloth; shuddering ... at the sight of naked bathers and shapely pearl divers on the coast, they averted their delicate eyes from the dreadful sight of women dropping their kimonos to the waist and fanning themselves in the sultry heat of the theaters. (Bornoff, 1991, p. 205)

Yet the *ketto* (hairy barbarians) brought money that transformed the economics of the demimonde, bringing to an end (practically speaking) the world of the geishas and the birth of prostitution. The *ketto*, being utterly unable to appreciate the subtle arts of the geisha, including the *iki* quality of their conversational virtuosity, diverted directly to their singular sexual intent, which nearly any woman could fulfill. Meanwhile, more upright foreigners were outraged by the very existence of licensed pleasure quarters. Japan was about to be saved from itself.

Thus, the spirit of *iki*, which Kuki (1930) had described as including the Buddhist virtue of resignation (*akirame*), was coming to an end and being replaced with Western-style materialism and straightforward pragmatic positivism. Traditional Japanese beauty had as much to do with the how as the what. Traditional Japanese beauty was demure and not simply a case of physical body structure. It could not be reduced to material physicality. One might say in the vernacular that it was classy. Thus, modern Japanese chic harmoniously conjoins coquetry, resignation, and pride along with rigorous attention to detail and a presentation of self as self-effacing. *Iki* is then to be understood as commingling the ethical idealism of Bushido with the religious idealism of Buddhism (Dale, 1986). Its demise would drive many artists, including Yukio

Mishima, practically crazy. *Iki* requires patience and time, virtues lost on the modern world. By comparison, modern style has little style; it is surface only. Compare for instance, geishas, who spend years in various art classes (kimono, music, calligraphy, tea ceremony, poetry recitation, dance, etc.) and hours daily reading the news to be great companions, to the pornographic pinups of today, who are regularly humiliated on the *Howard Stern Show* for their incredible ignorance of even the most mundane knowledge. The latter have little to hide.

According to Kuki (1930), the term *iki* as an essential aspect of Bushido articulates not a dualism but a complementary polarity in the world as follows: chic—subdued elegance; sweetness—rough, uncouthness; refinement—plainness; dandyism—vulgarity. Kuki asserts that "nothing stands in the way of our considering *iki* as one of the conspicuous forms of self-expression of the unique existential modes of Eastern culture, nay, rather of the Yamato race (Japanese people) itself" (quoted in Watanabe, 1974, p.88).

Iki is viewed in four structures: its intensive structure, extensive structure, natural expression, and artistic expression. In the natural expression of *iki*, Japanese beauty is manifested. As for the agent supporting the emotional expression, a slender woman with a willowy waist is chic because slenderness shows the weakening of the flesh and at the same time the strengthening of the spirit (Kuki, 1930). As for the face, a slender face rather than a round face is *iki*. As for the eyes, *nagashime* means chic, flowing eye. That is, the movement of the pupil seems to float coquetry-like toward the other sex. As for the facial makeup, *usugeshou*, light makeup, is the expression of *iki*. *Iki* is demure yet smart, imminently aware. It is a sort of retiring intelligence, which shows itself through grace and skill rather than words. In the case of male/female relations there is also the art of conversation, which includes knowing how to listen and appreciate the varieties of quietude, especially when doing something, as well as appreciating gaiety and mirth. The power, the charm of expression comes precisely from its proper economy. As Barthes (1973) has noted, sexual appeal comes less from total nudity as it does from a gap in clothing where just a flash of flesh invites desire. The brain (with its imagination) is the most powerful erotic organ.

In the Edo period, the women of Kyoto and Osaka used heavy makeup and were ridiculed in Edo as *yabo* (rough, uncouth). Kuki (1930) says that the material cause and the formal cause of *iki* are embodied in the expression of coquetry, through makeup and then of idealism expressed by halting the makeup at the state of suggestion, at the nape of the neck for instance. A slender woman with a slender face and light makeup was considered beautiful at that time.

Japanese Beauty after the Meiji Restoration: The Influence of the Modern Cosmetics Industry on Japanese Beauty

After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, cultural exchange with Europe and the United States led to gradual Westernization of clothing, hairstyles, and makeup

techniques. Tooth blackening, considered barbaric by Western standards, gradually became obsolete. Since World War II, Western influence has been so strong that Japanese styles no longer differ markedly from those of the United States and Europe. Today, traditional makeup is used only by *maiko* (young apprentice geishas), kabuki actors in performance, and during special rituals (occasionally it may be used by a bride during her wedding). The reason Japanese physical beauty became Westernized after the Meiji period can be traced directly to the strong influence of the cosmetic industry. Cosmetic and fashion industries are concerned with the look of beauty. These industries work as signifying agents that construct the look for whole societies. It is a business. We now consider some examples of cosmetic advertisements and examine how the commercialization of beauty and cosmetics transformed Japanese aesthetic ideals.

During the Meiji period (1868–1912), the new science of chemistry was introduced to Japan from the West and promoted the development of cosmetics. The new government encouraged those who engaged the development of all modern technologies, including Western-style medicine and chemistry.

In 1872, in Tokyo's high-end Ginza shopping district, Yushin Fukuhara started Japan's first Western-style pharmacy.⁴ The process of cultural transmission and fusion, which marks the Shiseido vision, is personified by the Fukuhara family. Yushin's son, Arinobu Fukuhara, founded Shiseido as we know it today; in turn, his son, Shinzo Fukuhara, traveled to Columbia University in 1908 to study pharmacology and became the first president of Shiseido. While in New York, Shinzo met Noburo Matsumoto, who received a bachelor's degree in commercial science from New York University's business school in 1912. Matsumoto would become Shiseido's first managing director, handling the business end of Shiseido.

It is vital to understand three things about Shiseido. First, the Shiseido Art House was and remains a centrally important source of modernism in Japan. Second, French art and culture formed the focus of Western influence on the Fukuhara family and therefore Shiseido's artistic vision and Japan's initial sense of Westernized aesthetic. Why France? This is tied to the third point, which is that France and Japan had a strong sense of cultural reciprocity and fusion. The Paris Fairs in 1867, 1878, and 1889 (in part) introduced Japanese art to the French artistic community, which led to the Impressionist and Postimpressionist movements there. (Similarly, the Chicago Fair of 1893 introduced Frank Lloyd Wright to Japanese architecture.) Going in the opposite direction, in 1900 Shiseido's founder, Arinobu Fukuhara, traveled to Paris and visited the Universal Exposition, which intensified his obsession with French art and culture. Then Shinzo went to France, where he immersed himself in the Paris art scene and became a skilled photographer. In 1915, Shinzo himself designed the company's camellia trademark and ran the company's design department.

In 1903, Nakamura Taiyodo started the Club Cosmetic Company to sell cosmetics, such as powder, lotion, and facial soap. Club's advertisements used photo-

graphs of two beautiful women in Western clothing wearing flower crowns, called *sou bijin*. These women represented an imagined world of graceful and elegant upper-class (modern) ladies. Notice that during and after the Meiji Restoration, the upper class and opinion leaders embraced the new, progressive, Western style of all things. Eventually this picture became the trademark of the Club Cosmetic Company. To attract upper-class women to buy cosmetics, Taiyodo's company joined hands with the Mitsukoshi Kimono Shop (later the Mitsukoshi Department Store chain), where many women of the upper classes shopped.

In 1902, another cosmetic company, Momotani Juntendou, sold a lotion for eliminating acne that was a big hit and led the company to market a successful line of facial care products. The success of their original lotion was partly due to its advertising message: "A fair complexion hides many defects, so apply our facial lotion to make your skin whiter" (Mizuo, 1998). What is obvious here is that the traditional notion of beauty was still vital.

In the late Meiji period, *teikoku gekijou* (imperial theater) opened and many Western dramas, such as *Hamlet*, were performed, providing women with an opportunity to not only go out but at the same time to show that they were cosmopolitan. Going to the theater was an opportunity to dress up, displaying status and one's progressive persona. Theater attendance was a status symbol for the women of the upper class. This activity enhanced the use of perfumes and such cosmetics as face powder and *beni*. A famous advertising message of the time sums up the influence of the theater on women's fashion: "Today is for *Teigeki* [imperial theater], tomorrow for Mitsukoshi [department store]." In other words, "Today a woman will see a new Western play at a theater, and tomorrow she will buy the latest Western fashion at Mitsukoshi."

During the Taisho period (1912–1926), Japan's early flirtation with democracy further promoted the Westernization of Japan. The Ginza, for example, Tokyo's most exclusive shopping district, boomed. Along with *teigeki*, the imperial theater, the kabuki theater reopened. Although these two theaters had been rivals, they provided opportunities for cosmetic companies to advertise their products during intermission, and in this sense they shared a common purpose. Many Western-style restaurants, bakeries, tailors, and lamp shops began in the Ginza district, which was located near Tsukiji, the foreigners' residential area. The Ginza led the swift assimilation of Western culture, spurring the adoption and consumption of all things Western, from cigarettes to phonograph records to games like billiards, tennis, golf, and poker.

Under the influence of the short-lived Taisho democracy, a scientist at Shiseido invented a new, daring cosmetic product. At that time, there was only one makeup powder (white), but Shiseido invented the technology for producing powders of seven colors. This range of hues was advertised with the motto: "Let's choose your makeup powder based on your real skin color to make you beautiful." The beauty ideal, then, began to incorporate women's individual, natural skin color. The irony here is the proposition that to be more natural looking a woman had to use cosmetics. It exploited the notion that modern

women are individuals. With the variety of makeup colors available, these developments were liberating to the women of that time, for they were no longer limited to just one makeup color, a color few women could match exactly.

In 1911, Japan's first Western-style actress, Sumako Matsui, performed Western drama. She is best remembered for her 1915 portrayal of Nora in Ibsen's *A Doll's House*. At about the same time, opera at Asakusa became popular. Big news was made when the first female student was admitted to Tohoku National University. Also about this time, the Japan Women's University was established. In 1920 Fusae Ichikawa joined Hiratsuka Raicho and Oku Muneo to establish the *Shin Fuji Kyokai* (New Woman's Association), and in 1924 she helped found the *Fusen kakutoku domei* (Women's Suffrage League). Thus, the liberal, Westernized atmosphere of Taisho raised women's consciousness. Women's magazines such as *Fujinn no Tomo* (Woman's Friend), and *Fujin Kouron* (Women's Review) were published. The former magazine focused on intellectual, progressive subjects, such as equal rights for women. The latter targeted middle-class housewives and their betterment. Each issue contained Christian ideas about the proper place of women, ideas that were quite foreign to Japan. The magazine was geared toward the improvement of women's lives. In total, by mid-Taisho period, five women's magazines were published. These magazines carried many cosmetics ads, promoting the sale and use of cosmetics among women.

In 1916 Shinzo Fukuhara established Shiseido's Design Department by gathering a team of gifted young artists. They created a series of beautiful art nouveau-inspired posters and advertisements. For the products themselves they began designing elegant packages with distinctive arabesque graphics. For a country still new to the ways of the West, the message was one of novel, exotic luxury—the perfect expression of Shinzo's motto, "richness in all." Shiseido used the culture of Ginza as its corporate image and changed the company's name to Tokyo Ginza Shiseido in 1923. According to a women's magazine in 1925, there were some females with blue eye makeup walking around at Ginza, which was an unprecedented event in Japan. Thus, Ginza was a fashion center, and Shiseido became a leading cosmetics company in Japan.

In the late 1920s, many Japanese women were still hesitant to wear Western-style attire. In the January 1927 issue of the Shiseido magazine, an interesting survey was published. According to the survey, in just one hour on an afternoon in December, 1,151 males passed by the Ginza Shiseido gallery; 797 wore Western-style clothing, 349 wore kimonos, and 5 were foreigners. During the same hour, 522 female passersby were recorded; 22 wore Western-style clothing, 494 wore kimonos, and 6 were foreigners. This may indicate that not only in the cosmetic industry but in society at large men were leading the way to modernization. Women readers of this survey would hardly miss the message; Japanese men like modern Western things and, by implication, girls.

In 1927, a new fashion called *mobo* (modern boy) and *moga* (modern girl) was popular. To be a *mobo* one had to wear bell-bottom trousers, round glasses

with thick plastic rims, and a hat. *Moga* wore Western clothes, short hair, a hanging-bell hat, and high-heel shoes. About the same time the number of working women increased. Women started to work as telephone operators and hostesses at milk halls, which made them change from Japanese kimonos to wearing more practical (for industrial-type work) Western clothes. The Takasimaya department store hired beautiful women to work as mannequins. They wore Western-style uniforms and carried placards. They also demonstrated how to apply makeup. This marked the beginning of public relations for cosmetics. Shiseido also used beauticians who were later called Miss Shiseido. By the mid-1930s, Shiseido advertising moved beyond simply assimilating Western influences to developing a distinct style of its own. Emerging from this striking synthesis of Western and Japanese elements was a new kind of woman: an idealized woman not only at the forefront of fashion but also aware of herself and her potential. Ads in 1936 suggested a beauty from within, reflecting a woman's own sense of identity. But still this was a Westernized identity with Western-style makeup used to announce itself.

At the beginning of the Showa period (1926–1989), Japanese movies and dramas were in their glory. A Japanese version of the Hollywood star system emerged. Cashing in on the opportunity, cosmetic companies used famous movie actresses to advertise their products. But before turning to the local stars, cosmetic companies enlisted the more powerful faces of Hollywood idols. In 1936, a Japanese cosmetic company, Momotani Juntendo, first used a foreign movie actress, Foxster. The ad campaign appeared in the Osaka Asahi newspaper to sell crinsin cream. The ad read, "9 of every 10 women from the West wash their faces with our crinsin cream." Not to be outdone, Shiseido hired Marlene Dietrich to sell white powder. These two advertisements stressed Western makeup, including eyelashes, lipstick, and eye shadow. At that time, only some women wore eye shadow, but by the mid-1960s eye shadow became popular with most Japanese women. We can say that Western women with big eyes, double-edged eyelids, straight noses, and curly hair were seen as ideals and as the standard of beauty by Japanese women living in the city.

At the time of the Sino-Japanese War (1936–1937) and World War II (1941–1945), the production and use of cosmetics decreased dramatically. Due to the war, the government prohibited cosmetics ads. Due to austerity, women applied modest amounts of makeup because excessive makeup was considered an inappropriate luxury. Domestic public service announcements used phrases such as "we don't want anything until the war is won" and "luxury is an enemy." Yet the idea that popular cosmetics constituted a tacit recognition of Western aesthetic superiority was unassailable. The assumption was so deeply held that no one questioned the ultimate value of looking more Caucasian, more beautiful.

Immediately following World War II, because daily necessities were in short supply, rebuilding the cosmetics industry was not a priority, and what cosmetic products that existed were often used as barter. This served only to make cosmetics even more valuable, giving them greater status as luxuries. Shiseido

commenced advertising activities in January 1946. The first advertisements were in black-and-white layouts with the camellia logo and the words "Shiseido Cosmetics." In July 1946, the Shiseido Cosmetics Store was decorated with a red Shiseido neon light, the first such light on the Ginza. By November, Shiseido used a famous movie actress, Setsuko Hara, to create a color poster for distribution to chain stores throughout the country. The poster became a symbol of Japanese postwar aspirations, reconstruction, and hope. Setsuko Hara is a Japanese actress who used to appear in the films of Akira Kurosawa, Yasujiro Ozu, Mikio Naruse, and so on. She is called the "eternal virgin" in Japan and was a symbol of Japan's golden age of film (1950s).

Setsuko Hara's Western clothes; smiling face with big eyes, big nose, and big mouth; and posture (looking skyward) projected the message that it was time to give up the old tradition of wearing *monpe*, Japanese slacks. The picture gave the impression that a woman can stand on her own two feet in the new age of Showa (Shimamori, 1998). Her physical appearance was different from that of the traditional Japanese woman. It revealed a different type of woman: an independent woman like one from the West. Yet she was unmistakably Japanese. In this image we have a fusion of East and West, the emergence of the postwar modern nation of Japan including the new Japanese woman.

One of the most talented designers of the Showa period was Ayao Yamana, who brought life to this Shiseido ideal. His refined, stylized graphics with their delicate lines captured the very essence of the company's new approach to beauty. His depictions of what came to be known as the modern girl in 1952 served as a model for young ladies while manifesting Shiseido's image as a leader in the fashion industry.

Japan in the 1960s was in the midst of an unprecedented economic boom. Consumption had gone beyond status to become practically a duty, an ethic; advertising emerged as an expression of this celebration, a true commercial art form. Shiseido launched its first seasonal promotion campaign in 1961 on the theme "Candy Tone." One poster illustration included four young ladies wearing Western clothes with long hair, big eyes, and happy faces, projecting the message that the new beauty (Western style) was within the reach of every woman. Success personally and nationally meant the transformation of Japan into a new economic power in the Western way. Showing the latest colors of lipstick, the campaign proved to be a huge success, particularly among younger women and soon grew into an annual event. With television coverage of the marriage of the crown prince (currently the emperor) to Michiko Shoda in 1959, the sales of TV sets exploded, exceeding 2 million. TV became an important medium for the advertisement of cosmetics. Shiseido used it as a medium to sell their products to the masses, which means to control their image of beauty. The candy tone ads purposely used four models to project the idea of sameness in beauty among women. Curiously, the editor of the monthly journal *Koukoku Hihyon* (Advertising Criticism), Michiko Shimamori, called this massification of beauty and the use of the four different models in the spectac-

ularly successful campaign "the democratization of beauty," which means that a unified image of beauty was sought at that time that would be applicable to all equally. It did not mean the tolerance or promotion of diversity, however.

During the 1960s social change was in the air, and Shiseido was no exception. What was emerging was a huge, primarily white affluent youth market in the United States, with its own music, clothing, hairstyles, cinema, and fashions. In 1966 Shiseido established its summer promotion with its second campaign featuring Bibari Maeda (of later Godzilla movie fame). This was the first time they had done overseas filming, and the art director for the shoot, Makoto Nakamura, selected Hawaii. The famous color ad featuring Maeda can be seen by going to Shiseido's Art House Web page on the Internet.⁵ This second summer campaign for Shiseido featured something not seen in Japan before—a seventeen-year-old woman-child in a swimsuit with tanned skin and a Western look. This was a dramatic departure from the traditional fashion of pale skin. Maeda was a half-Caucasian/half-Japanese woman with an exotic face, big eyes, bold eyebrows, and a big nose.

The picture projected the message of a liberated, fun-loving American-type girl with a healthy, outdoorsy body and carefree life. With this ad, Shiseido sold face foundation, "beauty cake," by using the phrase *Taiyou ni aisreyou* ("I want to be loved by the sun"). Maeda's tan skin and public exposure of lots of it was a clear and bold shift toward the very American surfer and beach culture then prominent. It also was a pronounced mimicking of American advertising trends, which were tapping into the emerging American youth-oriented market.

One critic has offered a different interpretation, however. Shimamori (1998), writing about the Maeda layouts, makes a very dubious attempt to link her suntan to the civil rights motto in the United States, "black is beautiful." The image, it seems to us, has much more to do with Hawaii's romance than any political consciousness about race relations. It is highly doubtful that Shiseido had any desire to associate its products with a foreign civil rights movement three thousand miles away, especially because Japan had very few black residents in 1965 (or even now). But Japan does have many young women and many beaches, and Hawaii is a favorite honeymoon spot for young Japanese newlyweds. Cosmetics appeal to the modern Western sense of romance. Shimamori's hypothesis seems unreasonable.

Besides the fact that blacks don't (noticeably) tan, during the 1960s they did not partake in the surfer mystique that dominated the American, and to some extent world, popular culture featuring the Beach Boys sound along with suntanned Caucasian boys and girls like Annette Funicello, Frankie Avalon, Fabian, and "Mr. American," the "Blond Bomber" bodybuilder Dave Draper (who helped launch Santa Monica's muscle beach into international fame that allured young Europeans like the "Teutonic Giant," Arnold Schwarzenegger). Simply put, it is impossible to comprehend a claim that Shiseido wanted to associate its products with the black racial strife that was erupting in the United States (the Black Panther slogans of "black power" and "black is beautiful";

Martin Luther King Jr.'s march on Selma, Alabama; race riots, etc.), not to mention the daily international news throughout the 1960s about apartheid conflict in South Africa, rather than the romantic and idyllic white youth culture in the early 1960s.

With Maeda's youthful, fresh, sunny portrait, Shiseido shifted its image strongly away from the traditional demure Japanese beauty to embrace and promote an Americanized image that included the cult of the beach baby teen beauty made internationally famous by movies created by American International Pictures (AIP). AIP created the beach party genre beginning with the 1963 release of *Beach Party*, followed by six more such films, including *Muscle Beach Party* (1964), *Bikini Beach* (1964), and *How to Stuff a Wild Bikini* (1965). Shiseido, like advertisers all over the world, was clearly cashing in on the new fad of sun, fun, and (literally) thinly veiled adolescent sexual exploration.

Here was an advertisement that presented not just a pretty face but also a true sense of modern chic risqué. This was a pseudo-rebel with a cause (to sell Shiseido). Shiseido once again broke with convention, firmly renewing its avant-garde reputation in Japan by conforming to current international advertising trends. This was the birth of the supermodel who had a name and celebrity. From the plastic miniskirt and op art clad mod stick girls Twiggy and Jean Shrimpton (the face of Yardley) from fab Carnaby Street to the wind-in-the-hair freshness of Lauren Hutton, Jennifer O'Neill (the face of Cover Girl Clean Make-up), and Cheryl Tiegs (the face of Revlon), and the sunbathing Maeda, youth was in, skin was in, audacity was in, and unabashed fun was in. Maeda's poster became famous in Japan; with it a deep suntanned face became the new fashion. It worked famously. For the first time ever in Japan, girls and young women came to see a suntan as beautiful, and sales of suntan oil soared.

But something more important was happening with the Shiseido look: fusion. Maeda was half-Caucasian and half-Japanese. Shiseido continued this look with other mixed-race Eurasian models. Shiseido art director and designer M. Nakamura used American sisters Tina and Bonnie Lutz, who had a Japanese mother and an American father and whose features, like those of Maeda, were neither fully Japanese nor Western but rather a combination thereof. They promoted the Love in Color line of lipstick, which featured pinks and pastels instead of reds, the color that had been dominant in Japan for many years.⁶ There are other Eurasian models featured by Shiseido, including Tina Chow (who was also a designer) and her daughter, China Chow. Of course, the fusion face is even more impossible for the average woman to achieve than the traditional beauty.

Always seeking to stay fresh in its image, in 1973 Shiseido seized on another foreign triumph and made it its own. This one was traditional but not much more actual than a doe-eyed mixed-race beauty with only one ear (see note six about Bonnie Lutz). In 1972, an unknown Japanese model named Sayoko Yamaguchi made her international modeling debut in Paris. She was a sensation. To Western eyes, she was quintessentially Oriental. On her return to Japan, Shi-

seido, realizing that the time had arrived for a pure, true Japanese face, signed her to be the persona of Japanese beauty. She was featured in their 1973 autumn makeup campaign. Tacitly, if you can make it in the West (namely Paris), you must be great. Shiseido seized on Yamaguchi's success, making it their own, and promoted her as Japan's "greatest supermodel" who also happens to use Shiseido products (at least in the ads). It was a good wedding for both parties—both Shiseido and Yamaguchi enjoyed great success together. The focus of the campaign was eye makeup, which is significant because Yamaguchi is famous for having very narrow eyes, which makeup artists and photographers further accentuated.

Though Eurasian models with Western looks were very popular in Japan at the time, Shiseido went against the trend that it had helped create with Maeda. Yamaguchi's trademark *okappa* short-bob hairstyle made her look like a traditional Japanese doll. She was hyped as the personification of Japanese beauty par excellence. She was often featured in a kimono, with white face powder and rouge. She was featured in *Shiseido Chiffonette*, which promoted eye makeup suitable for Asian eyes.⁷ With her debut at the 1972 Paris collections, her charm was dubbed mysterious. She was a sensation in Paris and London, winning international fame as a classical Japanese beauty with bobbed hair and not-round eyes. In the Shiseido ads, she wore a red dress and had black hair, slit eyes, and a small red lip (traditionally, girls including *maiko*, or young geisha apprentices, put red lip color only on their upper lip to minimize the apparent size of their mouth). Yamaguchi was posed and directed into demure positions. The photos that were published did not show her smile, as was the trend. In these ads her face looks expressionless, like a *noh* mask. Yamaguchi's image embodied the Western version of idealized Japanese style, which ironically, because the West loved her, was enthusiastically adopted by the Japanese market. It seems that Japan itself had become so Westernized that the new (starting in the 1970s) Shiseido campaign was exotic even to the domestic audience.

With this campaign Shiseido reintroduced the "true" Japanese beauty. It worked. The mystique created with Yamaguchi now existed for the Japanese consumer just as it did for Parisians and New Yorkers. In other words, mimicking Western beauty had become passé, therefore Shiseido, needing a fresh angle as always, promoted the "essence" of Japanese beauty, but only after it had been so identified in the West. Although the look changed, the Western form of commercial art remained beyond question. Japan had changed forever, and just as with Western corporate culture, its commercial needs were quick to exploit any cultural form that would work. In this instance it was the creation and promotion of a myth of the true, essential Japanese beauty. It worked because the commercial landscape in Japan had become so uniform that such a break with conventional content seemed nothing short of revolutionary.

The mystique of *iki* had been rediscovered in Japanese commercial art. It can be seen in many ads, especially ones for eye shadow, for commercial art always rushes to imitate success. In 1976, a movie actress, Kimie Singyouji, was used

in Shiseido ads. Similar to Yamaguchi, Singyouji has a plain, mask-like face with slit eyes. The operant phrase in the Singyouji ads was *yureru, manazasi* (swaying look), which emphasized the *iki* of chic, subtle flirtation with the eyes. Already in the 1970s Shiseido was driving to expand its market into foreign countries. It continued this effort by stressing its identity as a distinctly Japanese company to find a unique niche among all the competition. Thus, Shiseido associated its corporate image and products with an idealized Euro version of Japanese physical beauty that appealed most to foreign consumers.

During the 1980s and 1990s, some leading Japanese cosmetic companies, such as Shiseido, Kanebo, and Kose, actively engaged in global markets to boost stagnant domestic profits. To this end they established offices in Europe, the United States, and throughout Asia. Shiseido started to create many faces of beauty. To execute its global marketing strategy, Shiseido created an in-house ad department in Tokyo, which closely works with local companies to translate and tailor the basic message of their ads to each market. Their UV-White skin care and cosmetics line is a good example of how this philosophy works in practice (Herskovitz, 1997). In Japan, where UV-White is Shiseido's second most popular product line, ads feature a Japanese model demonstrating how the product prevents skin from darkening. The underlying theme is that skin protection yields whiter skin, which has come back into vogue throughout Southeast Asia. The message remains the same in other Asian markets, but local models are used. However, in Europe and the United States, the whitening emphasis is supplemented by a focus on UV protection, with local models demonstrating the product. Thus, one product is given two distinctly different identities and use values depending on the target audience, one mainly aesthetic and the other pseudo-medicinal.

The face of Shiseido varies from models to movie stars, and the age range stretches from teens to late forties. The company has always associated itself with the Miss Shiseido image. In the early twentieth century, there were perhaps twenty Miss Shiseidos at any one time.⁸ There were more than one so that they could travel throughout Japan, giving sales and promotional pitches. But after World War II, with the development of much more powerful mass media and the advent of the supermodel, Shiseido began to have one flagship face, as we have seen with Maeda and then Yamaguchi. Thus, the ideal of beauty, like any absolute, became perspectively narrowed to just one set of parameters, one face.

Since the 1980s, when the company sought a new global image for itself, it employed French artist Serge Lutens as its image creator. According to Shiseido's description, he is dedicated "to creating a new concept of beauty derived from the meeting of Oriental, and Western (European and American) cultures, and to creating the colors and images of Shiseido makeup." This is essentially the engineering of a fusional face that belongs to practically no one (Kramer, 2000). His imagination roams freely from classical Greek motifs featured in his 1989 collection to the Russian supremacist influences in the 1991 collection *Les Suprematistes*.

Recent trends stress natural beauty. In the 1990s, in addition to preventing skin from aging, whitening (hardly a natural process) became an important theme. Medicated or nonmedicated cosmetics, effective for whitening (*bihaku*) such as UV-White (Shiseido), Faircrea (Kanebo), Antellige (Kosei), and Lumiera Whitissimo (Pola), are promoted for their ability to prevent freckles. Following first the West's obsession with the sun and then its awareness of the skin damage that prolonged exposure causes, Japanese companies are following this trend. Ironically these products are sold to preserve natural skin color, when, of course, it is natural to tan in the sunlight. According to Shiseido's promotional materials for 1999, that season's makeup featured a translucent yet matte-textured complexion. The enhancement of the radiance of the cheeks was supposed to generate a look of "natural elegance." Eye makeup became less pronounced with a more natural look. The new eye was one that had an artificial eye line and little else. The 1999 season's lips featured a "healthy translucent radiance," along with the striking use of red lipstick.

As Williamson (1994) notes, such products are pitched as magical potions that absurdly promise that as scientific cultural artifacts, only they can evoke nature. Nature becomes, through the incantatory power of cosmetic advertising, an industrial product. The "natural look" can be had, but only at the price of some cosmetics. And by the means of this idolic form of communication, the self as face becomes identical with the "look," which is identical with the powers of the cosmetic alchemy (Kramer, 1997). All are one, *pars pro toto*. The model in the ad is the look, she is Shiseido, and you can be the look, too, you can become her, your face can become a Shiseido face, a beauty, but only if you buy the magic potion.

FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS IN JAPAN

According to Root and Root (1993), in order of market size and share, the top cosmetic manufacturers in Japan are Shiseido, Kao, Kanebo, Pola, and Kobayashi Kose, respectively. Though not in the top five, French and U.S. cosmetic companies are also successful in exporting their products to Japan. American cosmetics that enjoy popularity include Max Factor, Hélène Curtis, Estée Lauder, and Clinique. Historically speaking, of the American marketers Max Factor has had the greatest impact on Japanese beauty. Max Factor established his cosmetic company in 1953. In 1987, the company was replaced by the new Max Factor KK in Tokyo. In 1991, Procter and Gamble, who had started business in Japan in 1972 as a joint venture with Nippon Sunhome, acquired Max Factor.

Throughout the development of the motion picture industry in the early 1900s, Max Factor (the man) was instrumental in providing makeup consultation and expertise to American movie stars, including Elizabeth Taylor, Greta Garbo, Bette Davis, and Judy Garland. The innovations of various foundation lines, lipstick shades, and eye shadows later formed what was known as the system of

5-10-1990
 to 2-10-1990
 67

color harmony. The most well-known creations include the Max Factor Lip Gloss, which appeared in 1930, the Beauty Calibrator in 1932, Pan-Cake Make-up in 1937, Pan-Stick Make-up in 1948, Erace (cover-up stick) in 1954, and waterproof makeup in 1971. In 1959, Max Factor introduced the idea of marketing to Japan and launched a sales campaign for Roman Pink lipstick.

Not accidentally, during the 1950s and early 1960s a spate of Hollywood and Italian films that were enormously popular worldwide, including in Japan, featured Rome as their romantic setting. The rage began in 1953 with Audrey Hepburn, who had started modeling at age twenty-two. She made her American film debut in *Roman Holiday* (1953) playing opposite Gregory Peck. Hepburn, who was hugely popular in Japan, won the Academy Award for Best Actress for her work in this film. That was followed by *Charade* (1963), in which she starred with Cary Grant. In 1955, *To Catch a Thief* featured Cary Grant and Grace Kelly. Alfred Hitchcock won an Academy Award for best cinematography for this film. In 1954, the Trevi Fountain became a mainstay in romantic American films, beginning with *Three Coins in the Fountain*, for which Sammy Cahn and Jule Styne won the Academy Award for best song (of the same name). In 1956 and 1957 Federico Fellini won back-to-back Academy Awards for best foreign film (*La Strada* and *Nights of Cabiria*). Again in 1960, Fellini gained international acclaim for his hit *La Dolce Vita*, and in 1962 *Marriage Italian Style* was released, featuring Sofia Loren and Marcello Mastroianni, who was nominated for an Academy Award for his work on this film. *Marriage Italian Style* won the Golden Globe Award for best foreign language film.

Our point is that during the 1950s and extending into the 1960s romantic exoticism was portrayed by two European capitals, Rome and Paris (notably *The Last Time I Saw Paris*, 1954, featuring Elizabeth Taylor, and the film *An American in Paris*, 1951). Rome had cachet, and stars like Audrey Hepburn, Grace Kelly, and Sofia Loren set the fashion pace. In films like *Funny Face* (1957), starring Hepburn and Fred Astaire, and *Cover Girl* (1944), starring Gene Kelly and Rita Hayworth, Hollywood presented a synergy of intertextual semiosis by combining high fashion with the debonair romance of classical musical stars, such as Kelly and Astaire, with Rome and Paris. Each component—the stars, the settings, and the look (the fashion)—became integral, one with the others. Max Factor the man created their look, and Max Factor the cosmetic company mass-marketed the look.

The 1959 Max Factor lipstick campaign made extensive use of the mass media. The hook phrase was “even statues in Rome can be revitalized by our Roman Pink.” It was a very sensational campaign, influencing the way the Japanese cosmetics industry sold their products domestically. In 1965, Max Factor introduced a new eye shadow, called fascinated eyes, and makeup foundation. These products changed Japanese traditional makeup usage from white powder to makeup foundation, which can be applied under any condition, for example, during the summer or on rainy days. In the Japanese movie *Karumen*

kokyou ni kaeru (*Carmen Comes Home*, 1951), directed by Keisuke Kinoshita, Max Factor Pan-Cake foundation was used so that the actor’s makeup would not come off easily. It was new to the Japanese cinema industry. Because the cinema is a powerful motor of cultural innovation, especially in the areas of fashion and beauty, pancake-type foundation gained popular acceptance. To add to the already formidable inertia of this cinematic influence, in 1959 Akiko Kojima became the first Japanese woman to win the Miss Universe beauty contest, and Max Factor, a sponsor of the contest, quickly capitalized on her victory, producing Akiko Lipstick for the Japanese market. It was very popular. Thus, Max Factor contributed to creating the beauty culture of eye makeup in Japan and introduced marketing techniques for cosmetics sales there.

CONCLUSION

Japanese ideals of beauty have gone through two fundamental changes, both caused by foreign influences, first Chinese and then Western. Because people judge and are judged on the basis of their physical appearance, beauty plays an important role in society. In practice, societies treat beauty as absolute values, but the fact is that beauty is culturally determined and societies differ radically in their definitions of what constitutes beauty. However, in recent decades a tremendous reduction and narrowing of what constitutes beauty has been occurring. This is largely due to the power of mass marketing on a global scale.

This chapter describes how physical beauty has become commercialized through the mass marketing of cosmetics. Most recently, the cross-cultural influence of Western standards of beauty has been dominant in Japan. Historically the ideal of physical beauty and cosmetics usage in Japan can be divided into three main periods: (1) the pre-Meiji period (before 1868), (2) the Meiji and Taisho periods (1868–1926), and (3) the Showa and Heisei periods (1926 to the present). In each of these periods the Japanese ideal of physical beauty went through major transformations. During the pre-Meiji period, a round face with round cheeks, a large forehead, and downward-slanting eyes characterized the ideal of physical beauty. The most common makeup was *oshiroi* (white powder) and *beni* (rouge). Fair skin was the most important characteristic of female physical beauty. A *nukabukuro* (a small bag of rice bran) was widely used for washing one’s face to achieve this effect. This version of beauty most probably originated with Chinese influence during the eighth century.

However, during modernization/Westernization (the Meiji and the Taisho periods), this ideal of physical beauty was gradually Westernized, and a standardization of ideal physical beauty based on new hair and clothing styles emerged. The pre-Meiji value on white skin dovetailed easily with the new Western stress on Caucasoid characteristics. In the 1960s the value of an outdoorsy, less demure, more dynamic or spunky beauty in the fashion of Brigitte Bardot and Audrey Hepburn emerged. With it, a tanned skin became fashion-

able. Other physical features changed. Thus, big eyes, double-edged eyelids, curly hair, a pronounced bust line, and a straight nose became the new standard of beauty. During this period all cosmetics and fashion styles were geared toward achieving a uniquely Western look that was promulgated by mass marketing. Caucasian models were used in Japan to promote elite products (Kramer, 1999). Therefore, during the 1950s and early 1960s cosmetics that promised whiter skin and "improved" Westernized features were in greater demand and usage than the traditional style.

Dark skin (including a tanned complexion) was considered a defect. But during the mid- to late 1960s Japan followed the Western trend of the youthful, sun-and-fun beach beauty. The once negative connotation of tanned skin, which indicated that a woman worked outdoors, was replaced by the woman who played outdoors. The earlier stress on white skin in Japan had been a class marker, for elite women did not have to work in the fields. As noted, this was a concept of beauty introduced from China during the T'ang dynasty (eighth century), when Japan was heavily influenced by all things Chinese (i.e., language, religion, education, artistic styles, clothing, forms of government, etc.). This prejudice toward whiter, fairer skin would be challenged for a short time in the 1960s and early 1970s, when the influence of the American youth culture was powerful in Japan. The older standard of fair skin and demure *iki*-style expression, as opposed to the Western style of frank emotional expression and ostentatious display of sexuality, staged a comeback later in the 1970s. The old standard of white skin and the new version dovetailed in the persona of supermodel Yamaguchi. The theme of this ideal of physical beauty was that a whiter complexion hides many defects.

However, for Japanese women, in the long run achieving this ideal of beauty has proven to be unattainable. Few actual Japanese women can look like a virtual, kimono-clad, bob-haired supermodel. Neither the Western ideal nor the Western ideal of Oriental beauty embodied by Yamaguchi makes much sense to a typical Japanese woman. But this is part of the marketing plan. For if the ideal were easily attained, two things would result that would be bad for the cosmetics industry. First, sales would drop because once achieved, women would quit buying in an endless effort to attain the ideal. Second, it would be difficult to keep "the look" fresh by unilaterally reinventing the beauty myth periodically. This is why the new face of beauty being created by Shiseido makes perfect sense. It is a fusion face that combines Western with Japanese features that is practically unattainable except in mixed-blood persons like one of their supermodels, Maeda. All of this indicates the power of cultural imperialism as it has impacted the very self-esteem of Japanese women. But also, with Shiseido's ambition to appeal to a global market, this chapter demonstrates why that company would be moving aggressively to invent a postmodern face that fuses racial characteristics, transcending market and racial boundaries.

The overall goal is to make women feel inadequate and to keep them feeling that way. The emergence of the new virtual mixed-race global face will do just

that. Its exoticism is unmatched in actuality. This is a marketing ploy that is now deeply entrenched in Japan as its culture has industrialized and commercialized. Thus the very psyche of Japanese men, women, and children is being systematically manipulated, effecting the self-esteem of millions, encouraging them to work harder to achieve a goal that is impossible because (1) it cannot be actualized and (2) it is periodically reengineered with the attendant introduction of new lines of cosmetics, clothing, and hair fashions that make the things one already owns obsolete. The modern fashion industry thrives on the passing seasons, which constitute the passing of fashions. One is always on the verge of being out of fashion, thus keeping the circle of production/consumption moving. This includes the face. Faces, phenotypic "looks," go out of fashion now just like clothes, keeping woman anxious to not fall out of favor, to become ugly. The old value of harmony has been replaced across the board, including with one's own body, with self-dissatisfaction and continual striving.

NOTES

1. The *telenovela* form of soap opera, now enjoying enormous popularity throughout the third world, originally was (and still is) designed specifically to be a vehicle for showcasing commercial products and lifestyles. The original writers and producers worked in pre-Castro Cuba. When the revolution occurred, they took their efforts to other Latin American audiences. Today, this form (which ultimately originated in the United States as daytime serial melodramas, first on radio and then TV, well before Latin American countries even had television systems) is now a very powerful motor of cultural production.

2. This stress on the value of virginity is evident in the era's literature. For instance in Futabatei Shimei's *Heibon* (About mediocrity), published in 1907, and Mori Ougai's *Vita Sexualis* (1909).

3. In 1994, Sakuko Matsui of Sydney University set out to revise John Clark's original English translation of Kuki's 1930 work on the "structure" (a curious choice of terminology itself in relation to *iki*) of *iki*. To this end he visited the Kuki archives at Konan University in Kobe to double-check the original notes and quotations. Matsui attempts to illustrate the great difficulty one encounters in trying to translate the terms *sui* and *iki*. He cites a passage as an example of how vastly different two translators can be. The first is from a recent publication on Kuki, and the second is his and Clark's more recent version. Version A: "She who wears her kimono in the style of *iki*, having attained by necessity a state of Buddhist deliverance, gathers uncommon grasses in a rarefied atmosphere redolent of *amour-goût*." Version B: "People who live for *iki* must reach emancipation where they live in the thin air of *amour-goût* by picking bracken." Here, with the help of one of Kuki's translators, we see the difficulty we face when discussing the meaning of *iki* (and *sui*).

4. Established in the Ginza district in Tokyo in 1872, Shiseido is today a global manufacturing and sales corporation in the fields of cosmetics, salons, pharmaceuticals, toiletries,

and nutrition products. After inaugurating its global business with sales to Taiwan in 1957, Shiseido began marketing to Europe in 1963 and to the United States in 1965. In Japan, Shiseido has long been considered an important force in the arts through its product designs and advertisements—which were originally overseen by the company's first president, Shinzo Fukuhara. Shiseido currently organizes exhibitions of contemporary art in two public galleries in Tokyo and mounts permanent installations in the Shiseido Art House and the Shiseido Corporate Museum in Katagawa. It also publishes a monthly magazine of culture and fashion, called *Hanatsubaki*.

5. The ad is featured with a brief explanation in several languages. The English-language page is at <http://www.shiseido.co.jp/h/h0012arh/html/artp0007>.

6. You can see one of Shiseido's promotional ads using the Lutz sisters at <http://www.nyu.edu/greyart/exhibits/shiseido/pop12.htm>. Also interesting is how Nakamura touched up the photo, removing Bonnie Lutz's left ear to enhance the silhouette of the two faces.

7. You can see some of her photographs at a Shiseido Web site dedicated to her, <http://www.a2galler.com/html/SMITH/jp04>.

8. A group picture of all the Miss Shiseidos taken in 1934 can be seen on the Web at <http://www.nyu.edu/greyart/exhibits/shiseido/5wom2>.

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Chapter 4

The Violence of Assimilation and Psychological Well-Being

Chi-Ah Chun and Jung Min Choi

RACE RELATIONS AND ASSIMILATION

The history of race relations in the United States, in addition to almost everywhere else, has been dominated by the order perspective (Choi, Callaghan, & Murphy, 1995, pp. 154–57). According to this outlook, norms, laws, and other institutional forms are presumed to be objective and powerful enough to control persons. In fact, unless order represents a widespread system of institutional controls, the belief is that society will not survive. As Durkheim argues, in the absence of a “reality *sui generis*”—an autonomous and inviolable foundation—order will be unstable and inevitably collapse.

With regard to race relations in general and gender issues in particular, culture has assumed the role of this fundamental reality. Certain timeless standards, as Matthew Arnold contends, are available to provide the cement that is essential for uniting societies. Because these criteria transcend the limitations associated with any particular society, they are touted to be cultural ideals. These collective characteristics, moreover, are expected to be universally recognized, because they are untainted by ideological biases. They are truly cultural imperatives. According to this argument, these standards represent the best that humans are capable of creating.

Assimilationists are straightforward about their desire to have everyone adopt these principles. They make no excuses or apologies about having every ethnic group conform to a single set of cultural and behavioral expectations (Bennett, 1992, pp. 17–38). Without this type of conformity, produced by what is often called the melting pot, balkanization is guaranteed. Assimilationists maintain that no society can survive for long without a culture that is recognized universally as valid and inculcated.