THE RHETORICAL TREATISES OF CICERO
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A. Robert Lauer


Cicero



Index:
I. Rhetorical Treatises: II. Speeches:

I. Rhetorical Treatises:


CICERO (106-43 BC):

         Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC) was a commoner, not a patrician.  He was born in Arpinum, a region of Latium recently incorporated by Rome.  He became a lawyer, a statesman (a consul), a philosopher, a superb essayist and stylist, and one of Republican Rome's greatest orators (the greatest being Julius Caesar).  He lived during the chaotic last years of the Roman Republic (508 BC-27 BC [481 years]), which had been weakened by civil strife [The Roman Kingdom had lasted from 753 BC to 510 BC [243 years]; The Empire would last from 27 BC to 476 AD [449 years] {the Eastern Roman Empire lasted from 330 AD to 1453 <1123 years>}].  As consul, Cicero successfully presented a case against the patrician Lucius Sergius Catilina (Catiline) for conspiracy against the Republic (v. Catiline Orations 1-4).  The Senate, an advisory, not a judicial body, condemned Catiline to death, even though it had no authority to do so (it was also forbidden to put Roman citizens to death without a trial; in addition, the conspirators were strangled).  Cicero made many infelicitous political choices, the final one siding against Marc Antony, avenger of Julius Caesar and member of the Second Triumvirate (the Second Triumvirate [43-33 BC] consisted of Marc Antony, Octavian [later Emperor Augustus Caesar], and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus; the First Triumvirate [60-53 BC] had consisted of Gaius [Julius] Caesar [later Perpetual Dictator {d. 44 BC}], Crassus, and Pompey).  Cicero was beheaded, his hands cut off, and his tongue pierced by Fulvia, Marc Antony's wife. 




RHETORIC: TO HERENNIUS (RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM) [ATTRIBUTED]:

          The rhetorical manual addressed to Gaius Herennius (hence its title, Rhetorica ad Herennium), which was written ca. 86-82 b.C., is the oldest Latin rhetoric; moreover, it has been attributed to Cicero (Marcus Tullius Cicero).  It reflects Hellenistic rhetorical teaching although its terms and examples are Latin.  It is a technical and practical manual and lacks the philosophical (ethical) components one finds in. e.g., Aristotle's Rhetorica or Quintilian's Institutio oratoria.  In deference to Cicero's De inventione, the Rhetorica ad Herennium had been called Rhetorica secunda and Rhetorica nova (in the 12th century).  It has also been called De ratione dicendi (On the Theory of Public Speaking).  In the fifteenth century, Lorenzo Valla and Raphael Regius (in 1491) no loger considered the Rhetorica ad Herennium the work of Cicero.  Petrus Victorius, in 1582, attributed this work to the rhetorician Cornificius, who lived after the time of Cicero and near Quintilian's own day.  The language of the work is "plebian" and reflects a Greek origin.  It is now believed that it was probably the work of a student who took avid notes from a teacher.   It was lost for 500 years after it was written.  It then reappeared in Africa in the fourth century a.C.  The oldest MSS are from the ninth and tenth centuries.  It was very popular in the European Middle Ages from the 12th century onward.  Translations started appearing in the 13th century.  The work was translated into Castilian by Enrique de Villena in 1427.  The Rhetorica ad Herennium reacts against Asianism, a piercing declamatory style using the full voice.  It also contains the oldest section on Style (Elocution) in Latin.  The aim of the book is clarity

BOOK I:
            Theory without continuous practice in speaking is of little avail.  The task of the public speaker is to discuss capably those matters which law and custom have fixed for the uses of citizenship, and to secure as far as possible the agreement of his hearers.  There are three kinds of causes which the speaker must treat: 1. EPIDEICTIC (demonstrative, encomisastic), 2. DELIBERATIVE, and 3. JUDICIAL (forensic).  The epideictic kind is devoted to the praise or censure of some particular person.  The deliberative consists in the discussion of policy and embraces persuasion and dissuasion.  The judicial is based on legal controversy and comprises criminal prosecution or civil suit and defense. 
            The speaker should possess the faculties of 1.  INVENTION (inventio), 2.  ARRANGEMENT (dispositio), 3. STYLE (elocutio), 4.  MEMORY (memoria), and 5. DELIVERY (pronuntiatio).  Invention is the devising of matter, true or plausible, that would make the case convincing (proofs). Arrangement is the ordering and distribution of the matter. Style is the adaptation of suitable words and sentences to the matter devised. Memory is the firm retention in the mind of the matter, words, and arrangement. Delivery is the graceful regulation of voice, countenance, and gesture. 
            The above faculties can be acquired by three means: 1. Theory, 2. Imitation, and 3. Practice.  By theory is meant a set of rules that provide a definite method and system of speaking.  Imitation stimulates us to attain, in accordance with a studied method, the effectiveness of certain models of speaking.  Practice is assiduous exercise and experience in speaking. 
         Invention is used for the six parts of a discourse: 1.  The INTRODUCTION (exordium), 2. The STATEMENT OF FACTS (narratio), 3. The DIVISION (divisio), 4. The PROOF (confirmatio), 5. The REFUTATION (confutatio), and the 6. The CONCLUSION (conclusio).  The Introduction is the beginning of a discourse.  By it the hearer's mind is prepared for attention.  The Narration or Statement of Facts sets forth the events that have occurred or might have occurred.  By means of the Division we make clear what matters are agreed upon and what are contested, and announce what points we intend to take up.  Proof is the presentation of our arguments, together with their corroboration.  Refutation is the destruction of our adversaries' arguments.  The Conclusion is the end of the discourse. 
            The Introduction: To determine what kind of introduction to use, we must consider the cause (there are four of them): 1) honorable, 2) discreditable, 3) doubtful, and 4) petty.  A cause is honorable when we defend a hero or prosecute a parricide.  A cause is discreditable when something honorable is under attack or when something discreditable is being defended.  A cause is doubtful when it is partly honorable and partly discreditable.  A cause is petty when it is unimportant. 
            There are two kinds of Introduction: 1. The Direct Opening (Prooemium) [Proem, Prelude] and 2. The Subtle Approach (Ephodos).  The 1. Direct Opening directly prepares (persuades) the hearer to attend to our speech and should be used (or omitted altogether) in honorable cases.  Its purpose is to enable us to have hearers who are attentive, receptive, and well-disposed.  If our case is of the doubtful, we shall build the Direct Opening upon goodwill (benevolentiae).  If our case is discreditable, we must use the Subtle Approach.  We can have receptive hearers if we briefly summarize the cause and make them attentive.  We can have attentive hearers by promising to discuss important, new, and unusual matters, and by enumerating the points we are going to discuss.  We can make our hearers well-disposed by four methods: by discussing our own person (be humble), the person of our adversaries (instill hatred for them), that of our hearers (praise them), and the facts themselves (if important).  The five emotions of the hearers in the Proem are: pity, anger, fear, hate, and desire (cf. Aristotle's Rhetorica, Book 2). The 2. Subtle Approach is used when our case is 1) discreditable, 2) when the hearer has been won over by the previous speakers of the opposition, or 3) when the hearer has become wearied by listening to the previous speakers.  In such cases, remove yourself from the situation and concentrate on the agent (the client) instead of the action (the crime).  Attack the strongest point of the opposition (show astonishment and use indecision).  Use a bit of humor if the hearers are tired.  Use dissimulation. The goal is to gain the attention of your hearers. 
            Faults to be avoided in the Introduction: Our style should be temperate and the words we use must be current.  An introduction is faulty if it is banal and can be applied to a number of causes.  A common introduction is one that our adversaries can use as well as we can.  The introduction is faulty if it is too long or labored in style, or if it wanders away from the case at hand. 
            The Narration or Statement of Facts: There are three Statements of Facts: 1) When we set forth the facts and turn every detail to our advantage; 2) When we incriminate our adversary; 3) When we use narratives (on facts or on persons) that may be legendary (neither true nor probable, as in tragedies), historical (true but removed in time), and realistic (imaginary but plausible, as in comedies).  A Statement of Facts should have three qualities: brevity, clarity, and plausibility.  To be brief, start at the place where we need to begin (not from the remotest beginning).  No digressions, please.  Remove non-essential matters.  Mention nothing that would weaken a case.  To be clear, list the facts in strict chronological order and omit nothing pertinent.  To be plausible, it should answer the requirements of the usual, the expected, and the natural.
            The Division: There are two parts: 1) what we and our opponents agree on and 2) what remains contested. 
            The Distribution: It has two parts: 1) The Enumeration and 2) the Exposition.  We use the Enumeration when we tell by number how many points we are going to discuss.  The number ought not to exceed three.  The Exposition (Proposition of an argument) consists in setting forth, briefly and completely, the points we intend to discuss.
         Proof and Refutation: The entire hope of victory and the entire method of persuasion rest on proof and refutation.  We must know the Type of Issue that the cause presents.  There are three: 1) Conjectural, 2) Legal, and 3) Juridical.  The issue is Conjectural when the controversy concerns a question of fact.  The issue is Legal when some controversy turns upon the letter of a text or arises from an implication therein (Legal issues are subdivided into six types: 1. Letter and Spirit, 2. Conflicting Laws, 3. Ambiguity [a text presents two meanings], 4. Definition [the name by which an act should be called is in controversy], 5. Transference, and 6. Reasoning from Analogy [when there is no applicable law to a case]).  The issue is Juridical when there is agreement on the act, but the right or wrong of the act is in question.  Two subtypes of juridical issues: 1) Absolute (the act was right) and 2) Assumptive (when the defense is established by drawing on extraneous matter).  There are four subtypes of the Assumptive: 1) Acknowledgment of the Charge (plea for pardon; this includes the Exculpation [on account of Ignorance, Accident, or Necessity] and the Plea for Mercy [confessing the crime and the premeditation and begging for compassion]), 2) Rejection of the Responsibility (we blame others, or attribute the act to circumstances), 3) Shifting of the Question of Guilt (we acknowledge the crime but  state that we were driven to do it by the crimes of others, as in the case of Orestes), and 4) Comparison with the Alternative Course (choosing the lesser of two necessary evils). 
            After finding the Type of Issue, we must seek the Justifying Motive (the defense).  This determines the defense.  Orestes: "I killed my mother [Clytemnestra] because she slew my father [Agamemnon]."  After finding the Motive (e.g., avenging a crime), we must seek the Central Point of the Accusation (the prosecution): "Orestes, Clytemnestra might have deserved her fate, but she should have been tried and not killed by you." The Question for Decision or the Point to Adjudicate (the next step) is established from the meeting of the prosecutor's Central Point and the defendant's Justifying Motive.

BOOK II:
            There are three kinds of causes: 1. Epideictic, 2. Deliberative, and 3 Judicial. The most difficult is the judicial.  Of the five tasks of the speaker, Invention is the most important and the most difficult.  What sort of technical arguments (epicheremata) one ought to seek or avoid in the Proof and Refutation?
            How should we handle causes representing each Type of Issue? In a Conjectural case, the prosecutor's Statement of Facts should contain material inciting suspicion or the defendant. The Statement of Facts of the defendant's counsel should contain a simple and clear account and should also weaken suspicion.  The scheme of a Conjectural Issue includes six divisions: 1. Probability, 2. Comparison, 3. Sign, 4. Presumptive Proof, 5. Subsequent Behavior, and 6. Confirmatory Proof.  Through Probability one shows the crime was profitable to the defendant. Subheads of Probability: 1. Motive and 2. Manner of Life.  By Comparison one proves that the crime benefitted not only one's client but others as well (hence, others could have committed the crime).  Signs (opportunities): 1) Place, 2. Point of Time, 3. Duration of Time, 4. Occasion, 5. Hope of Success, 6. Hope of Escaping Detection. Through Presumptive Proof, guilt is demonstrated by means of indications that increase certainty and strengthen suspicion.  Three periods: 1) preceding the crime, 2 contemporaneous with the crime, and 3) following the crime.  For Subsequent Behavior we investigate the signs that usually attend guilt or innocence.  Confirmatory Proof is what we employ when suspicion has been established: 1) through witnesses, 2) testimony given under torture, 3) rumors.  Signs and presumptive proofs deserve more credence than witnesses.  Conjectural Issues are the hardest to treat.
            Legal Issues: treated earlier.
            Juridical Issues: treated before.
            The most complete and perfect argument is that which is comprised of five parts: 1. The Proposition, 2. The Reason, 3. The Proof of the Reason, 4. The Embellishment, and 5. The Résumé.  The briefest argument has three parts: the Proposition, the Reason, and the Proof of the Reason.  The mean argument has four parts: Proposition, Reason, Proof of the Reason (and either no embellishment or no résumé).
         Defective Arguments: 1) those that can be refuted by the adversary; 2) those that are too general; 3 Those that are declared absolutely impossible; 4) those with a faulty enumeration; 5) those that go too far back in time, 6. Those that are weak or groundless (that is, it rests on a false supposition); 7) when the cause is not a compelling one; 8. Inadequate.  9. A banal defense.  An accurate Proof of the Reason supplies the most cogent support of the whole argument.
            Faults in the embellishment: 
            Faults in the Résumé: A résumé is defective if it does not include every poin in the exact order in which it has been presented; if it does not come to a conclusion briefly; if the summary does not leave something precise and stable so as to make clear what the Proposition was.
         Conclusions (epilogues) are tripartite: 1. The Summing Up, 2. Amplification, and 3. Appeal to Pity.  We can use conclusions in four places: in the Direct Opening, after the Statement of Facts, after the strongest Argument, and in the Conclusion of the speech.
            The Summing Up gathers together and recalls the points we have made, briefly, to refresh the memory.  The Summary must take its beginning from the Division (then Proof, then Refutation).
         Amplification: this is the principle of using Commonplaces to stir the hearers.  There are ten formulae to Commonplaces: 1) The first commonplace is taken from authority, 2) When we state who gets affected by these acts, 3) Perils and disadvantages from pardons or indifference to crimes, 4) if we indulge this man, others will be emboldened to commit crimes, 5) Nothing can remedy a judicial error, 6) The act was done with premeditation and is inexcusable, 7) It was a foul and sacrilegious crime, 8) The crime was not common but unique and must be properly avenged, 9) Comparison of wrongs, 10) Retell the crime in detail as in unfolding in front of our eyes.
         Appeal to Pity: Recall the vicissitudes of fortune, submit to their mercy, enumerate ills to follow, state what will happen to the innocent (parents, spouses, children, kinsmen), by disclosing our kindness to others previously, by deploring our bad fortune.  Make the Appeal to Pity brief, for nothing dries more quickly than a tear.

BOOK III:
            The preceding book dealt with the Invention of topics to any judicial case.  Book III deals with finding ("inventing" [Latin in venire > "to come into"]) the topics appropriate to deliberative and epideictic causes.  The four (of five) departments of rhetoric left to consider and to be dealt with here are: Invention (inventio), Arrangement (dispositio), Delivery (pronuntiatio), and Memory (memoria). Style (elocutio > elocution) will be discussed in Book IV.
            On Deliberative Speeches: Deliberative speeches are either of the kind in which the question concerns a choice between two courses of action ("should Carthage be destroyed or spared?"), or of the kind in which a choice among several is considered ("should Hannibal be allowed to stay in Italy, leave Rome, return to Carthage, or conquer other lands like Egypt?").  Sometimes a question under deliberation is to be examined on its own account ("should enemy captives be redeemed?").  The aim of an orator in a  deliberation is Advantage. (Utilitas > usefulness, advantage, help)  In political deliberations, advantage has two aspects: Security and Honor.  Subheads under Security are Might and Craft.  Might is determined by armies, fleets, arms, engines of war, recruiting of man power, etc.  Craft is exercised by means of money, promises, dissimulation, accelerated speech, deception, etc.  The Honorable is divided into the Right and the Praiseworthy.  The Right is that which is done in accord with Virtue and Duty.  Subheads under the Right are Wisdom (Prudence), Justice, Courage (Fortitude), and Temperance (Modestia > Restraint) [the four cardinal virtues: cf. Plato's Protagoras 330b; St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica 2.1.61].  Wisdom (Prudence) is intelligence used to distinguish good from bad. Wisdom is also knowledge of an art and a good memory.  Justice is equity, giving to each thing what it is entitled to in proportion to its worth.  Courage is the reaching for great things and contempt for what is mean (and also the endurance of hardship in expectation of profit).  Temperance is self-control that moderates our desires. 
            Topics of Wisdom: Advantages/disadvantages; precedents; technical knowledge.
            Topics of Justice: pity innocent persons; punish the guilty;  laws should be preserved; alliances should be honored.
            Topics of Courage: we should strive after noble actions; death before disgrace.
            Topics of Temperance: Inordinate desire for money, office, etc.
            The Praiseworthy is what produces an honorable remembrance at the time of the event and afterwards.  We shall use Proof and Refutation when we establish in our favor the topics explained above and refute the contrary topics. 
            The Epideictic kind of cause: Epideictic discourse includes Praise and Censure.  Subjects of Praise are: 1) External Circumstances (chance, fortune, descent, education, wealth, power, titles, citizenship, friendships), 2) Physical Attributes (agility, strength, beauty, health) and 3) Qualities of Character (wisdom, justice, courage, temperance).
            The Introduction is drawn from our own person, or the person we are discussing, or the person of our hearers, or from the subject-matter itself.
            The Statement of Facts (not necessary).
            The Division: establish the things to be praised or censured.  When portraying a life, keep the following order: 1) External Circumstances (descent, education); 2) Physical Advantages (impressiveness and beauty, exceptional strength and agility, good health); 3) Qualities of Character (the cardinal virtues).
            The Conclusion: is to be brief (a Summary).  Commonplaces and brief amplifications in the discourse.
         Arrangement (dispositio): There are two kinds of Arrangement: 1) one arising from the principles of rhetoric (Introduction, Statement of Facts, Division, Proof, Refutation, and Conclusion); 2) the other accommodated to particular circumstances (Proposition, Reason, Proof of the Reason, Embellishment, Résumé).  [Natural and Artificial arrangement].  It is often necessary to employ such changes and transpositions when the cause itself obliges us to modify with art the Arrangement prescribed by the rules of the art. 
            In the Proof and Refutation of arguments, place the strongest arguments at the beginning and end of the pleading.  Those of medium force should be placed in the middle.  "This arrangement of topics in speaking, like the arraying of soldiers in battle, can readily bring victory" (p. 189; 3.10.18). 
         Delivery (pronuntiatio): This is the most valuable faculty for persuasion that an orator has.  This consists of 1) voice, 2) mien (bearing, posture), and 3) gesture.  Delivery includes 1) Voice Quality (Volume [a gift of nature], Stability [cultivation], Flexibility [different intonations achieved by means of declamatory exercises]) and 2) Physical Movement.
            For the Introduction, start calmly and composed.  Conversational tone.  The tone of debate is energetic (proof and refutation).  A conversational tone comprises four kinds: 1) the dignified, 2) the explicative, 3) the narrative, and 4) the facetious.
         Physical Movement: 1) Dignified conversational tone: stay in position when speaking, lightly move the right hand, express gaiety or sadness or an emotion intermediate.  2) The Explicative Conversational Tone: incline the body forward a little from the shoulders to arouse an audience.  3) The narrative Conversational Tone: same as one.  4) The Facetious conversational tone: express a certain gaiety.
            For the sustained tone of debate, use quick gestures of the arm, a mobile countenance, a keen glance.  For the Broken Tone of Debate, extend the arm very quickly, walk up and down, occasionally stamp the right foot, and adopt a keen and fixed look.  A Hortatory Tone of Amplification: slow and deliberate gesticulation.  The pathetic Tone of Amplification: slap one's thigh and beat one's head, sometimes use a calm and uniform gesticulation, and a sad and disturbed expression.
         Good delivery ensures that what the orator is saying seems to come from his heart.
         Memory: One is natural; another is the product of art.  The second relies on backgrounds and images.

BOOK IV:
            For Style, the author of ad Herennium will use his own examples instead of relying on ancient (Greek) models.  Examples clarify. 
            There are three kinds of Style: 1) the Grand (to sway hearers), 2) the Middle (used for delight), and 3) the Simple (for proofs).   Avoid the 1) Swollen, 2) the Slack, and 3) the Meagre.  Each type of style gains distinction from rhetorical figures distributed sparingly.  A style should have 1) Taste (a. Correct Latinity [avoid Barbarisms or incorrect words] and b. Clarity [avoid solecisms or syntactical errors]), 2) Artistic composition, and 3) Distinction.  Avoid repetition of similar vowels or letters (alliteration), the same words, the same endings, dislocation of words (hyperbaton), and long periods.  Style has distinction if it is ornate and includes figures of diction (words) and figures of thought (ideas).

THE FIGURES OF DICTION (WORDS):
         EPANAPHORA (repetitio): occurs when one and the same word forms successive beginnings for phrases expressing like and different ideas: "Scipio razed Numantia, Scipio destroyed Carthage, Scipio brought peace, Scipio saved the State."  This figure has charm, impressiveness, and vigor.  It serves for embellishment and amplification of style.
         ANTISTROPHE (conversio): we repeat not the first but the last word in successive phrases: "It was by the justice of the Roman people that the Carthaginians were conquered, by its force of arms that they were conquered, by its generosity that they were conquered."
         INTERLACEMENT (complexio): is the union of both figures (antistrophe and epanaphora); we repeat both the first and the last word in a succession of phrases: "Who broke treaties?  The CarthaginiansWho waged war on us?  The CarthaginiansWho now ask for a pardon?  The Carthaginians." 
         TRANSPLACEMENT (traductio, polyptoton): makes it possible for the same word to be frequently reintroduced not only without offense to good taste, but even so as to render the style more elegant: "One who has nothing in life more desirable than life cannot cultivate a virtuous life."  Or "People who have what they want are fond of telling people who haven't what they want that they really don't want it" (Ogden Nash).
            In the four kinds of figures listed so far (epanaphora, antistrophe, interlacement, and transplacement), the frequent recourse to the same word is not dictated by verbal poverty; rather there inheres in the repetition an elegance which the ear can distinguish more easily than words can explain.
         ANTITHESIS (contentio): when the style is built upon contraries.  This figure embellishes our style and gives it impressiveness and distrinction: "To err is human; to forgive divine" (Alexander Pope).
         APOSTROPHE (exclamatio): is the figure that expresses grief or indignation by means of an address to some man or city or place or object.  If we use Apostrophe in its proper place, sparingly, and when the importance of the subject seems to demand it, we shall instill in the hearer as much indignation as we desire: "It is you I now address, Africanus, whose name even in death means splendor and glory to the state!"
         INTERROGATION (interrogatio): it reinforces the argument that has just been delivered: "When I was admonishing the Athenians against Macedonia, were you not talking with Philip II in private, Aeschines?"
         REASONING BY QUESTION AND ANSWER (Ratiocinatio): we ask ourselves the reason for every statement we make, and seek the meaning of each successive affirmation.  This figure is exceedingly well adapted to a conversational style, and both by its stylistic grace and the anticipation of the reasons, holds the hearer's attention:  "Why did he enter the room?  Because he saw an opportunity.  Why did he take the money?  Because he was needy.  Why did he kill the owner?  Because he wanted to cover his crime."
         MAXIM (Sententia): is a saying drawn from life, which shows concisely either what happens or ought to happen in life.  The brevity of the statement has great charm.  We should insert maxims only rarely, that we may be looked upon as pleading the case, not preaching morals.  When so interspersed, they will add much distinction:  "Undue attention to details tends to unfit us for greater enterprises" (La Rochefoucauld).
         REASONING BY CONTRARIES (contrarium): of two opposite statements, this figure uses one so as neatly and directly to prove the other.  This figure ought to be brief, and completed in an unbroken period.  A conclusion from consequents is called an epicheireme ("How can anyone who cannot control himself control the state?").  A conclusion from incompatibles is called an enthymeme ("How can anyone who is an adulterer control the state?"). 
         COLON or CLAUSE (membrum): is the name given to a sentence member, brief and complete, which does not express the entire thought, but is in turn supplemented by another colon.  The figure can consist of two cola, but it is neatest and most complete when composed of three.  This figure is used to move its object more slowly and less often.  The arm draws back and the hand whirls about to bring the sword to the adversary's body [notice the military imagery]: "You betrayed your friends, you sided with our enemies, you destroyed the state." 
         COMMA or PHRASE (commata, incisum, articulus, caesa [Eng. cut] oratione): when single words are set apart by pauses in staccato speech.  This figure is used to move its object more quickly and frequently.  The body is pierced with quick and repeated thrusts [notice the military imagery]: "He vanquished the enemy by his strength, valor, and discipline." 
         PERIOD (continuatio): is a close-packed and uniterrupted group of words embracing a complete thought.  It is best used in a maxim, a contrast, or a conclusion: "The book of life begins with a man and woman in a garden; it ends with revelations" (Oscar Wilde).
         ISOCOLON (compar): is the figure comprised of cola which consist of a virtually equal number of syllables.  In this figure it may often happen that the number of syllables seems equal without being precisely so, as when one colon is shorter than the other by one or even two syllables: "The father was meeting death in battle; the son was planning marriage at his home."
         HOMOEOPTOTON (similiter cadens): occurs when in the same period two or more words appear in the same case, and with like terminations:  "The rain in Spain falls mainly in the plain."
         HOMOEOTELEUTON (similiter desinens): occurs when the word endings are similar, although the words are indeclinable.  These two figures, of which one depends on like word endings and the other on like case endings, are very much of a piece.  And that is why those who use them well generally set them together in the same passage of a dialogue: "He did it swiftly and vigorously."
         PARANOMASIA (adnominatio): is the figure in which, by means of a modification of sound, or change of letters, a close resemblance to a given verb or noun is produced, so that singular words express dissimilar things.  This is done by thinning or contracting the same letter, by the reverse, by lengthening or shortening the same letter, by adding or omitting letters, and by transposing or changing letters.  These are word plays which depend on a slight change or lengthening or transposition of letters, and the like.  Eng.: pun: "I am not very good with dates; that is why I am still single."
            The above three figures (homoeoptoton, homoeoteleuton, and paronomasia) are to be used very sparingly when we speak in an actual case, because their invention seems impossible without labor and pains.  Such endeavors seem more suitable to a speech of entertainment than for use in an actual cause.  Hence, the speaker's credibility, impressiveness, and seriousness are lessened by crowding these figures together.  Also, apart from destroying the speaker's authority, such a style gives offense because these figures have grace and elegance, but not impressiveness and beauty.  Thus the grand and beautiful can give pleasure for a long time, but the neat and graceful quickly sate the hearing, the most fastidious of the senses.  It is a childish style.  But it can brighten our style agreeably with striking ornaments (occasionally).
         HYPOPHORA (subiectio): occurs when we enquire of our adversaries, or ask ourselves, what the adversaries can say in their favor, or what can be said against us; then we subjoin what ought or ought not to be said, that which will be favorable to us or, by the same token, be prejudicial to the opposition.  There is much vigor and impressiveness in this figure because, after having posed the question, "What ought to have been done?", we subjoin that that was not done.  Thus it becomes very easy to amplify the baseness of the act.  The result of an accumulation of this kind of hypophora is to make it seem obvious that of all the possibilities nothing preferable to the thing done could have been done.
         CLIMAX (gradatio, concatenatio, ascensus, catena): is the figure in which the speaker passes to the following word only after advancing by steps to the preceding one.  [NB: This is a figure of repetition, like epanaphora, antistrophe, interlacement, transplacement (traductio), and antanaklasis (a pun: prophets/profits)].  The constant repetition of the preceding word, characteristic of thsis figure, carries a certain charm: "First he came, and after coming, he saw, and after seeing he conquered."
         DEFINITION (definitio): in brief and clear-cut fashion grasps the characteristic qualities of a thing.  It sets forth the full meaning and character of a thing so lucidly and briefly that to express it in more words seems superfluous, and to express it in fewer is considered impossible: "Experience is the name we all give to our mistakes" (Oscar Wilde).
         TRANSITION (transitio): is the name given to the figure which briefly recalls what has been said, and likewise briefly sets forth what is to follow next.  This figure reminds the hearer of what the speaker has said, and also prepares him for what is to come.  Cf. enumeratio and propositio.  Example: "You know how he has just been conducting himself towards his fatherland; now consider what kind of son he has been to his parents."
         CORRECTION (correctio): retracts what has been said and replaces it with what seems more suitable.  This figure makes an impression upon the hearer, for the idea when expressed by an ordinary word seems rather feebly stated, but after the speaker's own amendment it is made more striking by means of the more appropriate expression: "After the men in question had conquered, or rather had been conquered-for how shall I call that a conquest which has brought more disaster than benefit to the conquerors?"
         PARALIPSIS (occulatatio): occurs when we say that we are passing by, or do not know, or refuse to say that which precisely now we are saying.  This figure is useful if employed in a matter which it is not pertinent to call specifically to the attention of others, because there is advantage in making only an indirect reference to it, or because the direct reference would be tedious or undignified, or cannot be made clear, or can easily be refuted.  As a result, it is of greater advantage to create a suspicion by Paralipsis than to insist directly on a statement that is refutable:  "Of your youthful intemperance I say nothing, but return to the issue in this trail."
         DISJUNCTION (disiunctum): is used when each of two or more clauses ends with a special verb.  Disjunction is suited to elegant display, and so we shall use it moderately, that it may not cloy: "With disease physical beauty fades, with age it dies."
         CONJUNCTION (coniunctio): occurs when both the previous and the succeeding phrases are held together by placing the verb between them.  Conjunction is suited to brevity, and hence is to be used more frequently: "Either with disease physical beauty fades, or with age."
         ADJUNCTION (adiunctio): when the verb holding the sentence together is placed not in the middle, but at the beginning or the end: "Either with disease or age physical beauty fades."
         REDUPLICATION (conduplicatio): is the repetition of one or more words for the purpose of Amplification or Appeal to Pity.  The reiteration of the same word makes a deep impression upon the hearer and inflicts a major wound upon the opposition, as if a weapon should repeatedly pierce the same part of the body: "You are promoting riots, Gaius Gracchus, yes, civil and internal riots."
         SYNONYMY or INTERPRETATION (interpretatio): is the figure which does not duplicate the same word by repeating it, but replaces the word that has been used by another of the same meaning.  The hearer cannot but be impressed when the force of the first expression is renewed by the explanatory synonym: "You have overturned the republic from its roots; you have demolished the state from its foundations."
         RECIPROCAL CHANGE (chiasmus or commutatio): occurs when two discrepant thoughts are so expressed by transposition that the latter follows from the former although contradictory to it.  One cannot deny that the effect is neat when in juxtaposing contrasted ideas the words also are transposed.  This figure is hard to invent: "As not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country."
         SURRENDER (permissio): is used when we indicate in speaking that we yield and submit the whole matter to another's will.  It is specially suited for provoking pity: "I have spoken; you have heard; you know the facts; now give your decision" (Lysias, Against Eratosthenes). 
         INDECISION (dubitatio): occurs when the speaker seems to ask which of two or more words he had better use: "At that time the republic suffered exceedingly from-ought I to say-the folly of the consuls, or their wickedness, or both."
         ELIMINATION (expeditio): occurs when we have enumerated the several ways by which something could have been brought about, and all are then discarded, except the one on which we are insisting.  This figure will furnish the strongest support to conjectural arguments.  We can use it only when the very nature of the business gives us the opportunity: "Since I am alive, my property could not have come to you by inheritance. It remains, then, that you have expelled me by force from my estate."
         ASYNDETON (dissolutum): is a presentation in separate parts, conjunctions being suppressed.  This figure has animation and great force, and is suited to concision: "Indulge your father, obey your relatives, gratify your friends, submit to the laws."
         APOSIOPESIS (praecisio): occurs when something is said and then the rest of what the speaker had begun to say is left unfinished.  Here a suspicion, unexpressed, becomes more telling than a detailed explanation would have been: "Of your mother, Aeschines, let us not talk, in case I should be accused later of saying something disgraceful."
         CONCLUSION (conclusio): by means of a brief argument, deduces the necessary consequences of what has been said or done before: "End of story" (Fargo).

THE TROPES:
            There remain ten Figures of Diction (these are the tropi or tropes ["turns" or a word or expression used in a figurative sense]: "a trope is an artistic change of a word or phrase from its proper signification to another") that have in common the fact that the language departs from the ordinary meaning of the words and is, with a certain grace, applied in another sense:
         ONOMATOPOEIA: this figure suggests to us that we should ourselves designate with a suitable word, whether for the sake of imitation or of expresiveness, a thing which either lacks a name or has an inappropriate name (roar, bellow, murmur, hiss).  This figure is to be used rarely, lest the frequent recurrence of the neologism breed aversion; but if it is used appropriately and sparingly, then the novelty, far from offending, even gives distinction to the style.
         ANTONOMASIA (pronominatio): designates by a kind of adventitious epithet a thing that cannot be called by its proper name.  In this way we shall be able, not without elegance, in paise and in censure, concerning physical attributes, qualities of character, or external circumstances, to express ourselves by using a kind of epithet in place of the precise name: "Der Führer became friends with Il Duce and El Generalísimo."
         METONYMY (denominatio): is the figure which draws from an object closely akin or associated an expression suggesting the object meant, but not called by its own name.  This is accomplished by substituting the name of the greater thing for that of the lesser, or by substituting the name of the thing invented for that of the inventor (wheat for Ceres), or the instrument for the possessor, the cause for the effect (Mars [war] forced you to do that), or effect for cause, content by container, container by content.
         PERIPHRASIS (circumitio): is a manner of speech used to express a simple idea by means of a circumlocution: "The foresight of Scipio crushed the power of Carthage" (e.g., Scipio crushed Carthage).
         HYPERBATON (transgressio): upsets the word order by means either of Anastrophe (transposition or reversal of order) or Transposition.  One approximates a poetic rhythm this way: "One swallow does not a summer make, nor one fine day"
(Aristotle).
         HYPERBOLE (superlatio): is a manner of speech exaggerating the truth, whether for the sake of magnifying or minifying something.  This is used independently or with comparison.  Hyperbole with comparison is formed from either equivalence or superiority: "The sun never sets on the Spanish (or English) empire." 
         SYNECDOCHE (intellectio): occurs when the whole is known from a small part or a part from the whole.  The plural will be understood from the singular, or the singular from the plural: "The Spaniard helped the Carthaginian in the Punic War." "Lend me a hand." 
         CATACHRESIS (abusio): is the inexact use of a like and kindred word in place of the precise and proper one: "The long wisdom in the man." 
         METAPHOR (translatio): occurs when a word applying to one thing is transferred to another, because the similarity seems to justify this transference.  Metaphor is used for the sake of creating a vivid mental picture, for the sake of brevity, for the sake of avoiding obscenity, for the sake of magnifying, for the sake of minifying, for the sake of embellishment.  A metaphor ought to be restrained, so as to be a transition with good reason to a kindred thing, and not seem an indiscriminate reckless, and precipitate leap to an unlike thing: "Show me your pearly whites (teeth)".
         ALLEGORY (permutatio): is a manner of speech denoting one thing by the letter of the words, but another by their meaning.  It assumes three aspects: comparison, argument, and contrast: "The Bridegroom (Christ) embraced the Bride (Church) in the Song of Songs.

THE FIGURES OF THOUGHT (IDEAS):
         DISTRIBUTION (distributio): occurs when certain specified rôles are assigned among a number of things or persons.  This figure has richness, for it embraces much in little and, by assigning to each his duty, severally distinguishes a number of entities: "The duty of the prosecutor is to bring the charges; that of the counsel for the defense to explain them away and rebut them; that of the witness to say what he knows or has heard; that of the presiding justice to hold each of these to his duty."
         FRANKNESS OF SPEECH (licentia): occurs when talking before those to whom we owe reverence or fear, we yet exercise our right to speak out, because we seem justified in reprehending them, or persons dear to them, for some fault.  If Frank Speech of this sort seems too pungent, there will be many means of palliation, for one may immediately thereafter add some praise to quiet the feelings aroused by the frankness.  As a result, the praise frees the hearer from wrath and annoyance, and the frankness deters him from error.  This precaution in speaking is especially effective in keeping the hearers from error and in presenting us, the speakers, as friendly both to the hearers and to the truth: "That is reprehensible, but I understand your motives." 
         UNDERSTATEMENT (deminutio): occurs when we say that by nature, fortune, or diligence, we or our clients possess some exceptional advantage, and, in order to avoid the impression of arrogant display, we moderate and soften the statement of it.  This figure is used to avoid being considered arrogant, to avoid envy, and to secure praise.  For things of this sort, if you handle them indiscreetly, in life provoke jealousy and in a speech antipathy.  Therefore just as by circumspection we escape jealousy in life, so by prudence we avoid antipathy in speaking: "Q. How are you doing?  A. Not too bad."
         VIVID DESCRIPTION (descriptio nominatur, demonstratio [ocular demonstration], consequentium frequentatio): is a name for the figure which contains a clear, lucid, and impressive exposition of the consequences of an act.  With this kind of figure either indignation or pity can be aroused, when the consequences of an act, taken together as a whole, are concisely set forth in a clear style.
         DIVISION (divisio): separates the alternatives of a question and resolves each by means of a reason subjoined: "Why should I now reproach you in any way?  If you are an upright man, you have not deserved reproach; if a wicked man, you will be unmoved."
         ACCUMULATION (frequentatio, enumeratio, consummatio): occurs when the points scattered throughout the whole cause are collected in one place so as to make the speech more impressive or sharp or accusatory.  Of this same kind is that other Accumulation, which is very useful in conjectural causes, when the implications which were petty and weak because expressed separately, are collected in one place and so seem to make the subject evident and not dubious.  This figure has force, and in a conjectural issue is almost always essential; in the other types of causes and indeed in all discourse it is to be used occasionally: "He is angry because he did not get the job.  He is insolent because he did not get help from his friends. He is disdainful of others because he believes himself superior to them.  In short, he is angry, insolent, and disdainful."
         REFINING (expolitio): consists in dwelling on the same topic and yet seeming to say something ever new.  It is accomplished in two ways: by merely repeating the same idea, or by descanting upon it.  Our changes will be of three kinds: in the words, in the delivery, and in the treatment.  Our changes will be verbal when, having expressed the idea once, we repeat it once again or oftener in other equivalent terms.  Our changes will reside in the delivery if now in the tone of conversation, now in an energetic tone, and now in variation after variation of voice and gesture, repeating the same ideas in different words, we also change the delivery quite strikingly. 
         DIALOGUE (sermocinatio): occurs when we put in the mouth of some person language in keeping with his character.  The idea is changed in the treatment by means of a transfer to the form of Arousal, when not only we ourselves seem to speak under emotion, but we also stir the hearer.  The theme will be varied in speaking in these three ways: in the words, in the delivery, in the treatment.  In the treatment we shall vary the theme by two means: by Dialogue and by Arousal.
         DWELLING ON THE POINT (commoratio): occurs when one remains rather long upon, and often returns to, the strongest topic on which the whole cause rests.  Its use is particularly advantageous, and is especially characteristic of the good orator, for no opportunity is given the hearer to remove his attention from the strongest topic.  This topic is not isolated from the whole cause like some limb, but like blood is spread through the whole body of the discourse. 
         ANTITHESIS (contentio): through antithesis contraries will meet. 
         COMPARISON (similitudo): is a manner of speech that carries over an element of likeness from one thing to a different thing.  This is used to embellish or prove or clarify or vivify.  It has four forms of presentation: Contrast, Negation, Detailed Parallel, and Abridged Comparison.  The resemblance between the two things need not apply throughout, but must hold on the precise point of comparison.
         EXEMPLIFICATION (exemplum): is the citing of something done or said in the past, along with the definite naming of the doer or author.  Examples are drawn from history (demonstratio).  It renders a thought more brilliant when used for  no other purpose than beauty; clearer when throwing more light upon what was somewhat obscure; more plausible when giving the thought greater verisimilitude; more vivid when expressing everything so lucidly that the matter can almost be touched by the hand.
         SIMILE (imago): is the comparison of one figure with another, implying a certain resemblance between them.  This is used either for praise or censure.  It is also used to excite hatred, envy, and contempt: "Like a wolf, he plundered the state."
         PORTRAYAL (effictio): consists in representing and depicting in words clearly enough for recognition the bodily form of some person.  This figure is serviceable to designate some person, and graceful, if fashioned with brevity and clarity.
         CHARACTER DELINEATION (notatio): consists in describing a person's character by the definite signs which, like disntinctive marks, are attributes of that character.  Character delineations which describe the qualities proper to each man's nature carry very great charm, for they set before our eyes a person's whole character (e.g., a boastful, envious, pompous man, a miser, a climber, a lover, a voluptuary, a thief, an informer).  By such delineation any one's ruling passion can be brought into the open.
         DIALOGUE (sermocinatio): consists in assigning to some person language which as set forth conforms with his character (Personification, Decorum): "You betcha" (Sarah Palin).
         PERSONIFICATION (conformatio): consists in representing an absent person as present, or in making a mute thing or one lacking form articulate, and attributing to it a definite form and a language or a certain behavior appropriate to its character.  It is most useful in the divisions under Amplification and in Appeal to Pity.
         EMPHASIS (significatio): is the figure which leaves more to be suspected than has been actually asserted.  It is produced through hyperbole, ambiguity, logical consequence, aposiopesis, and analogy.  This figure sometimes possesses liveliness and distinction in the highest degree; indeed it permits the hearer himself to guess what the speaker has not mentioned.
         CONCISENESS (brevitas): is the expressing of an idea by the very minimum of essential words.  Conciseness expresses a multitude of things within the limits of but a few words, and is therefore to be used often, either when the facts do not require a long discourse or when time will not permit dwelling upon them.
         OCULAR DEMONSTRATION (demonstratio): occurs when an event is described in words that the business seems to be enacted and the subject to pass vividly before our eyes.  This we can effect by including what has preceded, followed, and accompanied the event itself, or by keeping steadily to its consequences, or the attendant circumstances.  Ocular demonstration is very useful in amplifying a matter and basing on it an appeal to pity, for it sets forth the whole incident and virtually brings it before our eyes.
            "I have here carefully collected all the principles of embellishing style.  If, Herennius, you exercise yourself diligently in these, your speaking will possess impressiveness, distinction, and charm."

END OF RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM




ON INVENTION (DE INVENTIONE):

         On Invention is considered an elaborate note-book and an immature work, consisting here of two books, probably published in 87 BC, when Cicero was 19 years-old.  Unlike the Rhetorica ad Herennium, which is a complete rhetorical manual, De inventione is unfinished and reads like a law book.  The original title was supposed to be Rhetorici libri and, if complete, would have included, apart from Invention (Inventio), the other parts of rhetoric (Arrangement [Dispositio], Expression [Elocutio], Memory [Memoria], and Delivery [Pronuntiatio]).  However, Invention, or the discovery of ideas and subject matter, is the most important part of any rhetoric.  Moreover, Cicero's On Invention includes aspects of Arrangement. 

BOOK 1:
            Wisdom without eloquence does too little for the good of states; eloquence without wisdom is disadvantageous. If anyone neglects the study of philosophy and moral conduct, the most honorable of pursuits, and devotes his whole energy to oratory, his civic life is nurtured into something useless to himself and harmful to his country (patria).  At one time, men wandered at large in the fields like animals, unguided by reason and relying solely on physical strength.  Passion satisfied itself by misuse of bodily strength, which is a very dangerous servant.  At this juncture, a great and wise man introduced them to every useful and honorable occupation and transformed them from wild savages into gentle folk.  Only a speech powerful and entrancing could have induced them to give up physical strength and submit themselves to justice without violence.  Hence, eloquence serves the highest interests of mankind.  However, when eloquence lacks virtue or moral duty, then low cunning supported by talent can corrupt cities and undermine the lives of men.  Sometimes he who acquires eloquence alone to the neglect of the study of philosophy appears to be equal in power or superior.  If he acquires power, great and disastrous wrecks can occur.  Only men possessed of the highest virtue and eloquence may be given authority to protect the state (res publica).  From eloquence the state (res publica) receives many benefits, provided it is accompanied by wisdom.  From eloquence those who have acquired it obtain glory and honor and high esteem.  Eloquence based on the rules of art is called rhetoric.  Oratorical ability is part of political science.  The function of eloquence seems to be to speak in a manner suited to persuade an audience, the end is to persuade by speech.  The orator concerns himself with three classes of subjects: the epideictic, the deliberative, and the judicial.  The epideictic is devoted to the praise or censure of a particular individual.  The deliberative is at home in a political debate and involves the expression of an opinion.  The judicial is at home in a court of law and involves accusation and defense or a claim and counter-plea.
            The parts ot the art of rhetoric are Invention, Arrangement, Expression, Memory, and Delivery.  Invention is the discovery of valid or seemingly valid arguments to render one's cause plausible.  Arrangement is the distribution of arguments thus discovered in the proper order.  Expression is the fitting of the proper language to the invented matter.  Memory is the firm mental grasp of matter and words.  Delivery is the control of voice and body in a manner suitable to the dignity of the subject matter and the style.
            Every subject that contains in itself a controversy to be resolved by speech and debate involves a question about a fact, or about a definition, or about the nature of an act, or about legal processes.  This question is the constitutio [constitutio coniecturalis] or the "issue" [issue of fact; others are issues of law].  The issue is the first conflict of pleas which arises from the defense or answer to our accusation ("you did it," "I did not do it," "I was justified in doing it").  When the issue is about a fact, the issue is said to be conjectural (coniecturalis) because the plea is supported by conjectures or inferences.  When the issue is about a definition, it is called the definitional issue, because the force of the term must be defined in words.  There is a controversy about definition if, e.g., a sacred object is stolen.  Is it theft or sacrilege? 
            There are three genera of arguments: deliberative, epideictic, and forensic.
            In a qualitative issue, there are two subdivisions: equitable and legal.  The equitable deals with the nature of justice and right or the reasonableness of reward or punishment.  The legal deals with the law according to the custom of the community and according to justice.  The equitable is subdivided into two parts: the absolute and the assumptive.  The absolute is that which contains in itself the question of right and wrong done.  The assumptive is that which of itself provides no basis for a counterplea, but seeks some defense from extraneous circumstances.  The assumptive has four subdivisons: concessio (confession and avoidance), remotio criminis (shifting the charge), relatio criminis (retort of the accusation), and comparatio (comparison).  Confession and avoidance is used when the accused does not defend the deed but asks for pardon.  This is divided into two parts: purgatio and deprecatio.  Purgatio is when the deed is acknowledged but intent is denied.  It has three parts: ignorance, accident, and necessity.  Deprecatio is used when the defendant acknowledges that he has given offense and has done so intentionally, and still asks to be forgiven (this can very rarely occur).
            When the issue in the case has been determined, it is well to consider if the case is simple or complex.  A simple case contains in itself a plain question ("shall we declare war on Corinth?").  A complex case is made up of several questions ("should Carthage be destroyed or returned to the Carthaginians?").  The case involves comparison when various actions are contrasted and the question is which one is more desirable. 
            Disputes may turn on general reasoning or written documents.  Disputes about the nature of written documents give rise to five issues: 1) [Letter and Intent] when there is variance between the actual words and the intent of the author; 2) [Conflict of Laws] when two or more laws disagree; 3) [Ambiguity] when what is written has two or more meanings; 4) [Reasoning by Analogy] when from what has been written something is discovered which has not been written; 5) [Definition] when there is a question about the meaning of a word. 
            Afterwards one must determine what the 1) question (quaestio) in the case is [the subject of the debate / the conflict of pleas: "you did it," "I did not"], 2) the excuse or reason (ratio) [what holds the case together: "I was justified in doing it"], 3) the point for the judge's decision (iudicatio) ["was it right?"], and 4) the foundation or supporting argument (firmamentum) [the defense's strongest argument] <use the example of Orestes>. 
            Then the separate divisions of the whole case must be considered.  The parts of the oration are to be arranged in the proper order: 1) exordium (prelude), 2) narrative, 3) partition, 4) confirmation, 5) refutation, and 6) peroration (conclusion).
            The EXORDIUM: An exordium is a passage which brings the mind of the auditor into a proper condition to receive the rest of the speech.  The auditor must become well-disposed, attentive, and receptive.  There are five kinds of cases: 1) honorable (these win the auditor's sympathy immediately), 2) difficult (the auditor lacks sympathy and becomes alienated from it), 3) mean (the auditor thinks it is unworthy), 4) ambiguous (partly honorable, and partly discreditable, engendering good- and ill-will), and 5) obscure (difficult for the auditor to grasp). 
            The exordium is divided into to species: 1) introduction and 2) insinuation.  An introduction is an address which directly and in plain language makes the auditor well-disposed, receptive, and attentive.  Insinuation is an address which by dissimulation and indirection unobtrusively steals into the mind of the auditor.  Difficult cases might require an insinuation, especially if the auditor is in a state of rage.  In the mean case, it is necessary to remove the auditor's disdain to make him attentive.  Ambiguous cases might require a discussion of the doubtful part of the case.  If it is partly honorable, the case might begin by transferring it to the honorable class.  Honorable cases might dispense with the introduction and start with the narrative, unless one wishes to increase the good-will already obtained.  Obscure cases require an introduction to make the audience receptive. 
            Good will is to be had from four quarters: 1) from our own person (we refer to our own acts and services, without arrogance), 2) from the person of the opponents (if we bring them into hatred, unpopularity, or contempt), 3) from the persons of the jury (if we praise them, but avoiding excessive flattery), and 4) from the case itself (if we praise it and depreciate our opponent's with contemptuous allusions). 
            The Insinuation is to be used when the case is difficult and the auditors hostile.  Histility arises principally from three causes: 1) if there is something scandalous in the case, 2) if those who have spoken first have convinced the auditor; and 3) when the auditor is wearied by listening and then it is our turn to speak.  Scandalous cases require distancing ("I hate the act too, dear auditors," "I have nothing to do with this act," "I came to bury Caesar, not to praise him").  If the opponent's speech has won conviction, discuss the opposition's strongest argument first, or one of his most recent statements, express doubt about what to say first, or which passage to answer before all others, show perplexity and astonishment, show confidence and assurance.  If the auditor is wearied, promise him you will be brief and will not imitate your opponent.  Or start with some new topic, or a joke, or a story, or a fable, or a laughable incident.  Or do the opposite and tell something appalling, unheard of, or terrible.  Humor or a "morsel with a bit of a tang" will wake up the auditor and make him attentive again.
            The exordium should be sententious and of high seriousness; it should contain everything which contributes to dignity, it should contain very little brilliance (so that the auditor does not feel manipulated). 
            An exordium should not be general, common, interchangeable, tedious, unconnected, out of place, or contrary to the fundamental principles.
            The NARRATIVE: The narrative is an exposition of events that have occurred or are supposed to have occurred.  There are three kinds: 1) one that contains just the cause and the whole reason for the dispute; 2) one that contains a digression (to attack the opposition, to compare the case, to amuse the audience, or to amplify a point); and 3) one unconnected with public issues and recited solely for amusement or embellishment [amplification?] (a. one concerned with events [1. fabula, 2. historia, 3. argumentum]; b. another one with persons [and dealing with fluctuations of fortune, contrast of characters, unexpected disaster, etc.]). 
            The narrative is an exposition of a case at law.  It should have three qualities: 1) be brief (stick to the points at hand; don't go to the remotest past), 2) clear (stick to chronology), and 3) plausible (as would appear or happen in real life [possessing verisimilitude]). 
            The PARTITION: In an argument, a partition correctly made renders the whole speech clear and perspicacious.  It takes two forms: 1) one shows in what we agree with our opponents and what is left in dispute (position it to your advantage, not the opposition's); 2) the other sets forth in a methodical way what we intend to discuss (it should have three qualities: a. brevity, completeness, and c. conciseness [deal with the genera of things, and do not confuse genus, a class of things {animal}, with species, which is a part of a genus {horse}]).
            The CONFIRMATION: The Confirmation or Proof is the part of the oration which by marshalling or arranging arguments lends credit, authority, and support to our case.  All propositions are supported in argument by attributes of 1) persons (a. name, b. nature [sex, race, age, temperament], c. manner of life [occupation, friendships, home life], d. fortune [free, slave, rich, poor], e. habit [physical and mental constitution], f. feeling [temporary changes in mind or body due to one cause], g. interests [mental activities], h. purposes [plans in life], i. achievements [what he did], j. accidents [what happened to him], and k. peeches made [what he said]) or of 2) actions (a. attributes coherent with the action itself, b. partly considered in connection with the performance of it [place, time, occasion, manner {current state of mind then}, facilities {conditions}], c. partly adjunct to it [similarity, contrary, negative, genus, species, result], and d. partly consequent upon its performance). 
            Arguments drawn from the above topics are either 1) probable (a. a sign, b. something credible, c. a point on which judgment has been given, or d. something which affords an opportunity for comparison [something that contains 1. similitude, 2. a parallel, or 2. an example]) or 2) irrefutable (things which cannot happen or are proved otherwise than as stated, or are proven by elimination of all but one cause in a logical and complete enumeration). 
            Every kind of argument can be discovered under the above headings, but it is the embellishment of the argument once it has been discovered, and the arrangement of it in definite divisions, which make the speech attractive to the audience.
            All argumentation is to be carried on either by 1) induction or by 2) deduction.  Induction is a form of argument which leads the person with whom one is arguing to give assent to certain undisputed facts; through this assent it wins his approval of a doubtful proposition because this resembles the facts to which he has assented ("would you like my donkey or yours?" "Yours." "My money or yours?" "Yours." "My spouse or yours?").  Socrates used this a lot.  By careful direction of the questions he must be led without his knowing it from the statement which he has granted to that which he does not wish to grant.  If he refuses to answer, he must be lured into giving an answer or, since "silence gives consent," you must finish the argument just as if he had conceded your point.  Deduction or syllogistic reasoning is a form of argument which draws a probable conclusion from the fact under consideration itself; when this probable conclusion is set forth and recognized by itself it proves itself by its own import and reasoning.  It has three or five parts.  The conclusion merely states the necessary deduction from all the parts (the major premise and its proof, as well as the minor premise and its proof): "Human beings are mortal" [I. Major premise]; "statistically speaking, no human being has ever lived past 150 years, according to all the historical records we have; hence, human beings are mortal" [II. Proof of the major premise]; "Socrates is a human being" [III. Minor premise]; "anatomically speaking he is neither a vegetable nor a mineral; he is therefore human" [IV. Proof of the minor premise]; "Socrates is therefore mortal" [V. Conclusion by deduction].  [NB: an enthymeme is a syllogism in which the major premise is only probable or one in which one term is omitted; an epicheireme is the true five-part syllogism].  Arguments may consist of five, four, three, two, and even one part, as in "Since she has borne a child, she has lain with a man" [this requires no proof or conclusion].
            The REFUTATION: The refutation is that part of an oration in which arguments are used to impair, disprove, or weaken the confirmation or proof in our opponents' speech.  It uses the same sources of invention that confirmation does, because any proposition can be attacked by the same methods of reasoning by which it can be supported.  Every argument is refuted by not granting one of its assumptions, by denying a conclusion that should follow from them, by showing the form of argument to be fallacious, or by meeting a strong argument with a stronger one ("their position is advantageous, mine is honorable").  An enumeration is shown to be incomplete.  A simple conclusion can be shown to contain a fallacy.  A sign can be disproved by the same topics by which it is supported.  A false argument is one containing a statement obviously untrue.  A false definition is one which sets forth characteristics applicable to many objects.  A controvertible argument is one in which a dubious reason is given to prove a dubious case.  A self-evident argument is one about which there is no dispute.  A disputable argument is one where the point which is being amplified is a matter of controversy.  An offensive argument is one that wounds the sensibilities of the audience.  An argument is inconsistent when conflicting statements are made by the same speaker on the same subject.  An adverse argument is one that does harm to one's own case.  An argument not adapted to its purpose is one where the speaker proves fewer points than he has promised to prove; or if he answers a charge which has not been brought against him.
            [The DIGRESSION: Hermagoras suggests a digression before the peroration.  Here a passage is introduced unconnected with the case.  Amplification.  Cicero does not recommend digressions, except in the case of commonplaces.]
            The PERORATION: The peroration is the end and conclusion of the whole speech.  It has three parts: 1) The Summing-Up, 2) The Indignatio or exciting of indignation or ill-will against the opponent, and 3) The Conquestio or the arousing of pity and sympathy.  The Summing-Up is a passage in which matters that have been discussed in different places here and there throughout the speech are brought together in one place and arranged so as to be seen at a glance in order to refresh the memory of the audience.  The Indignatio is a passage which results in arousing great hatred against some person, or violent offense at some action (use topics like the following: appeal to a higher authority (the gods); who will be affected; what if all behaved like this; deed was done purposely and intentionally; deed was undertaken with force and violence; not an ordinary crime [crimes against kin, elders, friends, the dead, women, children]; comparison with other crimes; violent denunciation; this happened to us first, etc.).  The Conquestio (lament, complaint) is a passage seeking to arouse the pity of the audience.  This ought to be done by means of commonplaces (locis communibus) which set forth the power of fortune over all men and the weakness of the human race.  The delivery should be grave and sententious.  Commonplaces: once they were fortunate, now they suffer from all evils; show each misfortune one at a time; a discourse is addressed to mute and inanimate objects; reveal one's helplessness and weakness and loneliness; entreaty (humble tone), etc.  But once emotions are aroused, do not linger there long, for "Nothing dries more quickly than tears."

BOOK 2:
            Not all qualities of beauty one might look for are to be found in one specimen.  In no single case has nature made anything perfect and finished in every part.  Tisias (a sophist from the 5th c. BC) was the originator of rhetoric.
            Every speech, whether epideictic, deliberative, or forensic must turn on one or more of the "issues" described in the first book.  In trials the inquiry is about what is just; in an epideictic speech, about what is honorable; in speeches before deliberative bodies, about what is honorable and advantageous.  The conjectural issue or issue of fact or question arises after a charge is challenged ("You did it." "I did not"). Every inference is based on arguments from the cause of the action, from the character of the person involved, and from the nature of the act. 
            The cause of an act falls under the heads of 1) impulse and 2) premeditation.  An impulse is what urges a person to do something without thinking about it.  Premeditation, however, is careful and thoughtful reasoning about doing or not doing something.  A topic (locus) is what one might call the foundation or basis of the issue.  Deeds are done for reasons.  If premeditation is used, advantages were sought or disadvantages avoided.  One should not judge one's intent by the result, but consider what the intent was regardless of the success attained.  What was the force and nature of the emotion which drove the defendant to crime? 
            Inferences may be drawn from the person of the accused if the attributes of persons are carefully taken into account.  At times, suspicion arises from a name.  What is the nature of the defendant?  Is the person a man or a woman?  Who were his ancestors?  What is his age, temperament, physical condition?  What is his way of life?  Some suspicion can be drawn from purpose.  These are the attributes of persons and the prosecutor must select arguments from all this collection to discredit the defendant.  Anything that detracts from the defendant's honor and repute lessens his chance for a complete defense.  The counsel for the defense must prove his client an outstanding citizen.  How the defendant treated his parents, kin, friends, etc.  services to the state.  Envy of others.  Back-biting.  Or concentrate on action, not on defendant's character.  Suspicions may be derived from the act itself. 
            Arguments that can be transferred to many cases are called common topics.  In arguments, the end is to give what is said the appearance of truth.  In common topics, the chief end is amplification. 
            When there is a dispute about the name by which an act is described, the issue is known as the constitutio definitiva (or issue of definition) because the meaning of the word must be defined.
            When it is agreed that an act has been performed and by what name it shall be called and there is no dispute about procedure, and the question is simply about the import, the nature and the essence of the occurrence, we call the issue qualitative.  Two divisions: 1) legal and 2) equitable.
            The origin of law: the origin of the law is nature.  Certain principles either obvious or obscure have passed into custom.  Afterwards, certain principles approved by custom or deemed to be really advantageous have been confirmed by statute.  And the law of nature is something which is implanted in us not by opinion, but by a kind of innate instinct.  It includes religion (fear and worship of the gods), duty (to our country, parents, kin), gratitude (for returning services, honor, and acts of friendship), revenge (we defend or avenge ourselves, repel violence and insult, and punish offenses), reverence (for superiors in age, wisdom, honor, or high station), and truth (avoidance of discrepancies between statements and facts).  The rights of nature are not involved in the civil law. 
            Customary law is thought to be that which lapse of time has approved by the common consent of all without the sanction of statute: 1) covenants (contracts between parties), 2) equity (what is just and fair to all), and 3) decisions (something determined previously by the opinion of some person or persons).
            Statue law must be learned from the statutes.
            Qualitative issues (equitable) are cases in which there is a question of the nature of justice and of the principles of reward or punishment. 
            The assumptive branch of the equitable issue.  The issue is assumptive when the act taken by itself cannot be approved  but is defended by some argument from extraneous circumstances.  There are four subdivisions: 1) comparatio (comparison is the case where some act which cannot be approved by itself is defended by reference to the end for which it was done), 2) relatio criminis (retort of the accusation; a retort of the charge occurs when the defendant admits the act of which he is accused but shows that he was justified in doing it because he was influenced by an offense committed by the other party), 3) remotio criminis (shifting the charge to another person or thing), concessio (confession and avoidance; this is the plea in which the defendant does not approve of the deed itself but asks that it be pardoned: purgatio [the intent of the accused is defended but not the act: ignorance, accident, necessity] and deprecatio [plea por pardon without making a defense of the deed]).
            Punishment should not be inflicted before judgment is given.  One should also point to the laws and courts of justice by which the crime which the defendant avenged on his own authority, could have been punished in accordance with custom and judicial process. 
            In all things one should regard the intent.
            Common topics: beg the jury to consider his intent, and not the result; dispute over the letter of the law.
            Controversies about written documents: ambiguity, letter and intent, conflict of laws, reasoning by analogy, definition.
            The law has to do with matters of the highest importance, advantage, honor, and sanctity. 
            Topics and rules for the presentation of arguments in the deliberative and epideictic types of rhetoric.  The end of a forensic speech is equity (a subdivision of the larger topic of honor).  In a deliberative type, the end is advantage (utilitatio), or honor and advantage.  In an epideictic speech, the end is honor alone. 
            Rules for deliberative oratory: Three things must be sought: virtue, knowledge, truth; also profit, advantage, money; also friendship and a good reputation.  Honorable and advantageous things.  Honor is a higher quality than advantage or utility.  Honor and advantage are the qualities of things to be sought, and baseness and disadvantage of things to be avoided.  Honorable is anything that is sought wholly or partly for its own sake.  Virtue (a habit of mind in harmony with reason and the order of nature).  Virtue has four parts: 1) wisdom (a. memory, b. intelligence, c. foresight), 2) justice (a. natural law [religion, duty, gratitude, revenge, reverence, truth]; b. customary law [covenants, equity, decisions]; and c. statute law [written documents]), 3) courage (a. highmindedness, b. confidence, c. patience, and d. perseverance), and 4) temperance (a. continence, b. clemency, and c. modesty).
            Qualities to be avoided: cowardice (the opposite of courage), injustice (the opposite of justice), diffidence (the opposite of confidence), temerity (the opposite of courage).  Each virtue has a vice bordering upon it: temerity borders on courage or stubbornness, which borders on perseverance, or superstition, which is akin to religion. 
            Advantage: 1) glory (a person's reputation and praise), 2) rank a distinguished office that merits respect, honor, and reverence), 3) influence (fullness of power, dignity, and resources), and 4) friendship (a desire to do good to others).
            Advantage lies either in the body or in things outside the body.  There are two parts of advantage: 1) security (safety) and 2) power (possession of resources sufficient for preserving one's self and weakening another).  The qualities that go with honor and advantage are 3) necessity (a. the necessity of doing what is honorable [superior to security], b. the necessity of security, c. the necessity of convenience) and 4) affection (e.g., not going over to the enemy).
            Praise and Censure: 1) mind, 2) body (health, beauty, strength, speed), and 3) external circumstances (public office, money, connections by marriage, high birth, friends, country, power).
            Invention is the first and most important part of rhetoric.

END OF DE INVENTIONE




THE BEST KIND OF ORATOR (DE OPTIMO GENERE ORATORUM):

            This short treatise was written by Cicero in 46 BC.  To Cicero, Demosthenes is the greatest orator of all times.  This work professes to be an introduction to a translation of Demosthenes' On the Crown (384/3-322 BC), and Aeschines' Against Ctesiphon (ca. 390-315 BC).
            Poetry takes many forms: every composition in verse, tragedy, comedy, epic, and also melic and dithyrambic.  Each has its own tone and way of speaking.  In an art we ask what is ideal perfection.  The orator I do not divide in parts, for I am looking for the perfect example.  There is only one kind of perfect orator.  The supreme orator is the one whose speech instructs, delights, and moves the minds of his audience.  The orator is in duty bound to instruct; giving pleasure is a free gift to the audience, to move them is indispensable.  We must grant that one does it better than another, but the difference is in degree, not in kind. 
            Eloquence consists of language and thought.  Our diction should be faultless and pure, and our words proper (the most elegant) and figurative (modest in metaphors and careful to avoid far-fetched comparisons).  Thought in exposition and explanation should be pointed; bright and witty for entertainment; weighty and impressive for rousing the emotions.  There is a way of putting words together to create rhythm and smoothness; and a way of arranging ideas and an order which is best suited to proving one's case.  The foundation is memory.  That which gives it light is delivery.
            The man who is supreme is all these departments will be the most perfect orator; one who attains moderate success will be mediocre; he who has the least success will be the worst speaker.  Still they will all be called orators.  They will differe in ability, not in kind. 
            There is only one kind of oratory, the kind that flourished (modestly) in Athens.  Asia produced an opulent style full of faults.  Let us imitate Lysias for his simplicity, and Demosthenes (who could speak in all styles).  The Attic orators used a sparse and faultless style, but also a grand, ornate, and copious style tha was equally faultless.  Speaking in the Attic fashion means speaking well.  Demosthenes is the chief or model. 
            The orator whom we are seeking must treat cases in court in a style suitable to instruct, to delight, and to move.  Isocrates (436-338 BC) was a consummate orator, but not perfect, for he lacked nerve and a good voice, and refrained from public appearances (his speeches were to be read).

END OF DE OPTIMO GENERE ORATORUM




TOPICS (TOPICA):

            The treatise on the Topics was written in 44 BC.  The work professes to be a translation or adaptation of the Topics of Aristotle, with illustrations and examples from Roman jurisprudence, but it bears little resemblance to is treatise.  The Topica deals with more than topics of argumentation.  The following sections discuss testimony and are succeeded by an enumeration of the three kinds of oratory, the parts of a speech, etc.  What emerges is a little treatise on Invention.  The book was dedicated to Gaius Trebatius Testa, a jurisconsult of repute. 
            Every systematic treatment of argumentation has two branches, one concerned with invention of arguments and the other with judgments of their validity.  If we wish to track down some arguments, we ought to know the places or topics, the "regions" from which arguments are drawn.  We may define a topic as the region of an argument, and an argument as a course of reasoning which firmly establishes a matter about which there is some doubt.  Of the topics under which arguments are included, some are inherent in the very nature of the subject which is under discussion, and others are brought in from without.  Inherent in the nature of the subject are arguments derived from the whole, from its parts, from its meaning, and from the things which are in some way closely connected with the subject investigated.  Arguments from external circumstances are those that are removed and widely separated from the subject. 
           Sometimes there is an enumeration of parts.
            Arguments are also drawn from circumstances closely connected with the subject which is under inquiry.  Some arguments are "conjugates" (arguments based on words of the same family [Greek syzygy: words etymologically related), others we derive from genus, species, similarity, difference, contraries, adjuncts, antecedents, consequents, contradictions, cause, effect, and comparison with events of greater, less, or equal importance.
            Extrinsic arguments depend principally on authority.
            A definition is a statement which explains what the thing defined is.  Some things exist (house, horse), others do not (possession, guardianship).  A notion requires definition.  Definitions are made partly by enumeration (parts, members) and partly by analysis (genus/species, classes, kinds). 
            A concept (prolepsis) is an innate knowledge of anything that has been previously apprehended and needs to be unfolded.
            Orators and poets define by comparison, using metaphors.
            Many arguments are derived from notation (etymology) [Latin veriloquium].  Words are tokens (notae) of things.  Aristotle used symbolon for the idea represented by the Latin nota. 
            Topic embracing circumstances: conjugation (words etymologically related).
            Similarity comes next: "If honesty is required of a guardian, a partner, and a trustee, it is required of an agent" (argument by induction). 
            After similarity comes difference. 
            The next topic is called "from contraries": wisdom and folly. 
            Argument from adjuncts (corollaries). 
            Consequents, antecedents, and contradictories.  Consequents necessarily follow something.  Whatever follows something is necessarily connected with it.  Whatever is contradictory has such a nature that it can never be connected with it. 
            Syllogisms:
   1. Constructive hypothetical syllogism: "If it is day, there is light.  It is day, therefore there is light."
   2. Destructive hypothetical syllogism: "If it is day, there is light.  There is no light, therefore it is not day."
   3. Affirmative disjunctive syllogism: "It cannot be day and night at the same time.  If it is day, therefore it is not night."
   4. Affirmative disjunctive syllogism: "It is either day or night.  It is day, therefore it is not night."
   5. Negative disjunctive syllogism: "It is either day or night.  It is not night, therefore it is day."
            The next topic concerns efficient forces which are called causes, and secondly, things effected by efficient causes.  There are two kinds of causes: one which by its own force surely produces that effect which depends on this force, for example, fire burns.  Efficient causes.  There are some causes which clearly effect a result without aid from another source, and others which require assistance.  This cause without which something does not occur must, therefore, be carefully distinguished from that by which something surely occurs.
            Looking at all causes we find that in some there is uniformity of operation, and not in others.  Closely connected with the topic of causes is the topic of the effect of causes.  For just as the cause shows what has been effected, so what has been effected points out what the cause was.  For a knowledge of causes produces a knowledge of results. 
            There remains the topic of comparison.  Comparison is made between things which are greater, or less or equal.  In this connection, the following points are considered: quantity (more goods are preferred to fewer, fewer evils to more), quality (honor is preferable to profit), value (distinctions: the stable is valued more than the uncertain), and also a particular relation to certain things (the interests of leading citizens are of more importance than those of the rest).  When equals are compared there is no superiority or inferiority; everything is on the same plane. 
            This is the end of the rules for the invention of arguments. 
            Topics from without have no relation to our discussion of the law.  This form of argumentation does not rely on art but on testimony. Testimony is anything that is brought in from some external circumstance in order to win conviction.  To win conviction, authority is sought, but authority is given by one's nature (virtue) or by circumstances (talent, wealth, age, good luck, skill, experience, necessity, fortuitous events).  Those tested by a long time (the talented, the wealth) are worthy of credence.  Knowledge has great influence in convincing, and people generally put faith in those who are experienced.  Necessity (torture, stress of mind) also wins conviction.  The truth is also obtained from childhood, sleep, inadvertence, intoxication, insanity.  The flight of birds, portents, visions.  We trust virtuous people: orators, philosophers, poets, historians, the talented.
            Inquiries: there are two kinds of inquiries: 1) the general (thesis, proposition) and 2) the particular (hypothesis, case).  A case involves definite persons, places, times, actions, affairs. 
            Inquiries about any possible subject (general inquiries) are either 1) theoretical (whose purpose is knowledge) or 2) practical.  Theoretical questions fall into three groups: 1) Does it exist? (this is answered by inference and conjecture) 2) What is it? (this is answered by definition [use enumeration and definition]) 3) What is its character?  (right or wrong).
            The topics which can be drawn from causes, effects, and conjuncts are best fitted to conjecture and inference.  The knowledge and science of defining is important for definition. 
            Natural law has two parts: the right of every man to his own property and 2) the right of revenge.
            There are three kinds of speeches on special subjects: 1) the judicial, 2) the deliberative, and 3) the encomiastic.  The end of the judicial speech is justice; the end of a deliberative speech is advantage; the end of an encomiastic speech is honor.
            The proper topics must be used in the introductions to make the audience well-disposed, receptive, and attentive.  The narratives must receive similar treatment in order to be brief, clear, credible, restrained, and dignified.  The division of a speech which  follows the narrative is the proof.  This is accomplished by perusasion.  The peroration makes special use of amplification; the effect of this should be to excite the spirits of the audience or calm them.

END OF TOPICA




ON THE ORATOR (DE ORATORE):

          De oratore was written in 55 BC.  In 58 BC, Cicero had been banished for the illegality of the Catalinarian affair.  This work is a treatise or essay on rhetoric in the form of a conversation or a dogmatic sort of dialogue.  One finds therein the following speakers: Lucius Licinius Crassus (140-91 BC), who is 49 years old when the discussion is supposed to take place (September, 91 BC).  He was a lawyer, an orator, and a politician (a consul [the highest elected political office in the Roman Republic]) belonging to the optimate party (the conservative optimates were pro-aristocratic and favored a stronger Republican Senate, which was geared toward the nobiles, against the Tribunes of the plebs [the plebs were landowners but were perceived as second-class citizens {new money} in contrast to the patricians {old money}, who were elite members of Rome in the Roman Kingdom].  They were opposed by the [also aristocratic] populares, who sided with the plebeians, wished to limit slavery, and to extend Roman citizenship to communities outside Rome and Italy.  The optimates opposed the ascension of novis hominis [new men, or provincials]; they also opposed the extension of Roman citizenship to non-Romans.  Ironically, Cicero was a defender of the optimates, even though he was a novus homo and never totally accepted by the optimates; Julius Caesar was the champion of the populares).  Crassus is Cicero's mouthpiece in De oratore.  Marcus Antonius Orator (d. 87 BC), the grandfather or Marc Antony (the triumvir).  He is 52 years old in the dialogue.  He was a praetor (civil magistrate and military commander) and put down piracy in Cilicia (a Roman province in present-day Turkey).  He was later a censor (a magistrate in charge of the census and public morality) and a consul.  He died murdered on orders of Gaius Marius (Roman consul and general, reformer of the army).  Publius Sulpicius Rufus (121-88 BC) was 33 years old.  He was an orator, a statesman, and a tribune (magistrate of the Plebeian Council) of the plebs.  He was a democratic reformer.  He was assassinated.  Gaius Aurelius Cotta (124-73 BC) is also 33 years old in the dialogue.  He was consul and died accidentally in Gaul.  He was a moderate.  Quintus Mucius Scaevola the Augur (159-88 BC) [the religious office of augur was an elected one in the Roman Republic; augurs interpreted the flight of birds].  He was a tribune, consul, praetor, and aedile (an officer in charge of public buildings and public festivals) in the Roman Republic. He was an expert on law and a governor in Asia.  He was a Stoic.  He appears only in Book One of De oratore.  In Book Two, Quintus Lutatius Catulus (d. 61/60 BC) [a general, a consul, an orator, and a poet; he also knew Greek literature well] and his half-brother Gaius Julius Caesar Strabo Vopiscus (130-87 BC) [he was pontifex (a religious officer), quaestor (an officer in charge of the treasury in the Roman Republic), and aedile, as well as a tragedian] appear.   Book One of the treatise De oratore gives an account of a discussion held in September, 91 BC, at the Tusculan villa (in Latium, near Rome) of Antonius between him and Crassus.  Minor roles are taken by Scaevola, Sulpicius, and Cotta.  Crassus praises oratory.  Antonius views the orator as someone who does not need wide general culture.  Book Two deals with the next day's debate.  Catulus and Caesar arrive.  Caesar discusses wit.  Book Three deals with Crassus's exposition of style.  De oratore was first printed at Subiaco (a town in Lazio, Province of Rome) in 1465 (Lucrezia Borgia was born there).  It was the first book printed in Italy. 


Lucrezia Borgia (1480-1519), 
Duchess of Ferrara,
by Bartolomeo Veneto (1470-1531)

BOOK ONE:
            The book is addressed to Cicero's younger brother Quintus (102-43 BC), who was a soldier, aedile, and praetor; like his older brother, he was assassinated.  Cicero believes that eloquence is dependent upon the trained skill of highly educated men.  Quintus believes eloquence s a natural talent.  Few great orators are rare, as are eminent people in all fields.  The most learned men hold philosophy to be the creator and mother of all the reputable arts.  There are fewer good orators than good poets.  Oratory was invented and perfected in Athens.  After our (Roman) world-empire was established, and an enduring peace assured us (Romans) leisure, all youths thirsty for fame strove after eloquence.  They tried to attain skill by their natural ability and reflection.  But oratory is a greater thing and has its sources in more arts and branches of study than people suppose.  A knowledge of many matters must be grasped, without which oratory is but an empty and ridiculous swirl of verbiage.  The full power of oratory is seen in its calming or kindling the feelings of the audience, as well as in its distinctive style, choice of words, and arrangement.  Humor and wit form part of rhetoric, as well as a delicate charm and urbanity.  Precedents must be retained in the memory, as well as knowledge of statute and national law (civilis scientia).  The speaker's delivery must be controlled by bodily carriage, gesture, play of features and changing intonation of voice.  It is from knowledge (of all important subjects and arts) that oratory derives its beauty and fullness.  Without it, one's discourse is empty and childish.  Every subject proposed to an orator will be treated with distinction and knowledge. 
            Cicero now remembers being told that in the time of Roman consul Lucius Marcus Philippus (91 BC) [a senator descended from kings {The Roman Republican Senate directed magistrates and consuls, passed decrees, and appointed dictators} who opposed the democratic reforms of Marcus Livius Drusus, a senator who was a member of the Tribune of the plebs, later assassinated, giving rise to the Social War {91-88 BC}], Lucius Crassus, went to Tusculum (near Rome, home of many senators) during the Roman Games (Ludi romani [4-19 Sept. 91] in honor of Jupiter).  Therein he was visited by Quintus Mucius and Marcus Antonius (personal and political friends).  Young men later accompany them: Gaius Cotta and Publius Sulpicius (friends of Drusus).  They talk first about politics, later bathe and have supper.  The next morning they imitate Socrates in Plato's Phaedrus and have a discussion on oratory to banish their melancholy (tristitia).  Crassus is a perfect host, charming and humorous.  They sit together on benches and cushions under a plane-tree (a large shade-tree).  Crassus introduces the theme of oratory to relieve the minds from the discourse (on politics) of the day before.
            Crassus speaks: there is no more excellent thing than the power of oratory to win the good will of men at assemblies, to direct their inclinations, and divert them from whatever the orator wishes.  It is most pleasing to the understanding and the ear to hear a speech adorned and polished with wise reflections and dignified language.  It has the power to transform the impulses of the crowd, the consciences of the judges, and the austerity of the Senate.  Eloquence is a kingly function worthy of the free (liberale).  It brings help to the suppliant, raises those who are cast down, bestows security, and maintains men in their civil rights.  Men are superior to animals in that they can converse with each other.  Eloquence was strong enough to gather scattered humanity into one place to lead it out of its brutish existence.  It has a civilizing function; it gives shape to laws.  The wise control of the orator upholds his dignity, the safety of many individuals, and even of the entire State (universae reipublicae). 
            Scaevola makes courteous observations: he asks whether it was by eloquence or merely good counsel and wisdom that Romulus (771-717 BC, traditional founder and first King of Rome, son of the god Mars and the priestess Rhea Silvia, descendant of Aeneas; Romulus founded the Roman Legion and the Roman Senate, expanded the territory of Rome and mixed the Romans with the Sabine women {an Italic tribe in Latium} after the abduction of the latter; Romulus either "disappeared" or was slain by the Senate) united the ancient Romans, brought about marriages with the Sabines, and pacified neighboring tribes.  Moreover, some eloquent men have harmed the State by their eloquence.  Other factors of civilization may be more important than eloquence, like our ancient ordinances and the customs of our forefathers, or the rules of private law (NB: the rules pertaining to private property is a Roman concept).
            Crassus replies: Crassus mentions that Scaevola's point of view sounds Greek to him.  The function of oratory requires science and style.  The Athenians drove the orators from the helm of State, shut out from all learning and knowledge, and placed them in law-courts and petty little assemblies.  That notwithstanding Plato's attack on orators in Gorgias is outstanding because of Plato presenting his views as a consummate orator.  An orator must have extensive knowledge of all public businesses, ordinances, customs, and general law, as well as of human nature and character.  Cleverness and skill are not sufficient.  Excellence in speaking cannot be made manifest unless the speaker fully comprehends the matter he speaks about.  Also, the orator's virtue is pre-eminently manifested in rousing men's hearts to anger, hatred, or indignation, or mildness and mercy.  An orator must know human nature and character well to arouse those emotions.  The complete and finished orator must speak on any matter with fullness and variety.  Science and philosophy must come to oratory for style.  No one can be eloquent on a subject he does not know.  Likewise, no one who knows a subject well can present it well without polish or eloquence.  The orator can speak better than experts on matters they might know better.  But an orator, like a poet, needs a wide education.  The poet is the ally and counterpart of the orator, although more fettered as regards rhythm.  No one should be membered with the orators who is not accomplished in all those arts that befit the well-bred.  He must be trained in the liberal arts.
I.  Artes liberales (triviales & quadriviales):
     A.  Trivium (artes triviales): The three language disciplines (the "arts") associated with eloquence
            1.  Grammar: The study of language (lingua), to enable one to speak properly,
            2.  Dialectics (logic): The study of reason (ratio), to enable one to search for truth
            3. Rhetoric: The study of figures (tropus), to enable one express oneself    eloquently.
     B.  Quadrivium (artes quadriviales): The four scientific disciplines (the "sciences") associated with mathematics:
           1.  Arithmetic: The study of numbers (numerus),
           2.  Geometry: The study of angles (angulus),
           3.  Astronomy: The study of stars (astra),
           4.  Music: The study of tones (tonus)

            Scaevola replies with a smile: Any man who would master all knowledge and should, in addition, have the gift of eloquence, would be remarkable and worthy of admiration. 
            Crassus: This person would be ideal.
            Antonius observes: A man who has grasped the principles and nature of every subject and art would be better equipped as a speaker (he would be a true "philosopher" and wise man).  Demosthenes (384-322 BC), according to Charmadas (an Academic philosopher), had consummate wisdom and eloquence.  Corax of Syracuse (Sicily) [fl. 5th C. BC] and Tisias (ca. 467 BC) are the founders of rhetoric.
            Sulpicus: He asks Crassus if he thinks, like Antonius, that there is an art of oratory.
            Crassus: Gorgias of Leontini (487-376 BC: First generation of Sophists, born in Sicily; he charged a fee for his impromptu eloquence on varied subjects) is the author of this practice.  There is no science of rhetoric, but experience can furnish it with a system of rules.  Natural talent is essential to the virtue of oratory, especially a ready tongue, ringing tones, strong lungs, vigor, a suitable build and shape of the face and body.  Some men cannot be orators if they are tongue-tied, discordant in tone, and wild and boorish in features and gesture.  The ideal is hard to attain.  An excellent orator satisfies and is wonderful in the eyes of the judges (NB: countenance counts).  The better the orator the more he is frightened of the difficulty of speaking, the doubtful fate of a speech, and the anticipations of an audience.  The shameless ones deserve a reprimand and punishment.
            All admire Crassus's modesty and integrity (NB: What a great captatio!).
            Antonius speaks: an orator's role is harder than an actor.  One forgives an actor for a mistake; not so an orator.  An orator is supposed to have the subtlety of the logician, the thoughts of the philosopher, a diction almost poetic, a lawyer's memory, a tragedian's voice, and the bearing of a consummate actor.  He is rare indeed. 
            Crassus: He must be perfect, since defects are noticed at once.  He must also have enthusiasm and something like the passion of love.  Without them there is no success and one does not attain the uncommon.  The orator must speak in a style fit to convince.  Every speech has to do with an investigation of a general question or with a problem that is concerned with specific individuals.  Inquiry is made whether a deed was done or, if done, what is its character or by what name it is known, or whether it was done lawfully.  Contention arises pertaining documents, whether there is ambiguity or a contradiction, or at variance with the intention.  Some questions take place in courts of justice, others are deliberations, others encomia.  There are also commonplaces to be used in the court-room, in deliberations, and encomia.  There are five divisions in rhetoric: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery.  There are several (six) parts in a speech: securing good will, statement of the case, definition of the dispute, confirmation, refutation, and peroration.  For the embellishment (style), one must speak pure and correct Latin, with simple lucidity, and with elegance.  One must have dignity and grace.  One must write as much as possible.  The pen is the best and most eminent author and teacher of eloquence.  This is good for arrangement, rhythm, and measure.  Read poetry.  Study actors as well as orators to train the voice.  One must train one's memory by learning by heart many pieces from Latin writers and the foreigner.  One must acquaint oneself with historians and argue every question on both sides.  One must study law, ethics, and political philosophy.  One must cultivate humor too. 
            A great silence ensued after Crassus had finished (NB: another captatio).
            Crassus: The Twelve Tables (the legal foundation of the Roman Republic) are superior to all philosophy.  Our ancestors surpassed in practical wisdom the men of other nations (Lycurgus, Draco, Solon), especially the Greeks.  Orators must know the law. 
            Antonius: The orator is similar to a general a statesman, and a philosopher.  They use strategy.  But he does not require philosophy.  Plato's statements on justice (in the Republic) befit an ideal (utopian) society unlike any in existence.  Socrates was condemned to death in spite of his philosophical wisdom (but lack of oratorical eloquence during his trial).  Consummate eloquence can exist quite apart from philosophy.  Crassus has won many cases by his wit, charm, and highly refined pleasantries.  The court was filled with gaiety and delight.  Eloquence and grace proved of service.  He, Antonius, never learned the common law.  One should not waste one's energy over too wide a field of study.  Neither delivery nor intonation requires special study.  Accomplished speakers have helpers, attorneys, to help them out in court.  General culture is sufficient.  An orator must, as Crassus says, be a man who can speak in a way calculated to convince. 
            He finishes his speech.  Sulpicius and Cotta don't know for sure who is closer to the truth
            Crassus: He opines that Antonius is making the orator into a mechanic.  The orator ought to lack nothing.

END OF BOOK ONE OF DE ORATORE.

BOOK TWO:
            Cicero, in an introduction addressed to his brother Quintus, tells him about Crassus's brilliance.  There was nothing about which he was ignorant, and he speaks Greek perfectly.  In Greece appeared many men (NB: probably Sophists) with natural eloquence but without knowledge, so unlike Crassus and Antonius, who are wise, knowledgeable, and eloquent.
            The next morning, at 8 AM, while Crassus was still in bed and Sulpicius was sitting by his side, and Antonius was strolling with Cotta in the colonnade, Quintus Catulus the elder suddenly arrives, accompanied by his brother Gaius Julius.  They hope their visit is not a nuisance.  Crassus tells them he already spoke, so Antonius is the one to hear now.  They talk about leisure and that the free man is unable to do nothing: hence their dialogue (NB: which justifies their "freedom" as free men). 
            Antonius speaks: Oratory is not a science but derives distinction from ability (not art).  The activity of the orator has to do with opinion, not knowledge.  We take opposite sides.  He shall speak as one who is dealing with a subject which is founded upon falsehood.  Oratory is not the highest form of art; yet, clever rules may be laid down for playing upon men's feelings and making prize of their goodwill.  Experience is necessary.  Oratory is not one of the arts, but there is nothing more splendid than a complete orator.  Eloquence is the governing force in a free community.  There is not a subject that is not the orator's own, provided only that it is one which deserves elegant and impressive treatment.  The orator can express an opinion with authority, arouse a listless nation, curb unbridled impetuosity, bring the deceitful to destruction and the righteous to deliverance, encourage virtuous conduct, censure the wicked and praise the worthy.  Masters of other arts express themselves with grace if they know something about eloquence.  Panegyric oratory needs no special rules.  A panegyrist deals fully with the favors of fortune: advantages of race, wealth, connections, friendships, power, good health, beauty, vigor, talent, etc.  The person commended made a right use of these benefits or managed sensibly without them if they were denied to him.  Or he bore the loss with resignation if they were taken away from him.  The panegyrist will discern instances of wisdom, generosity, valor, righteousness, greatness of soul, sense of duty, gratitude, kindliness, or any moral excellence.  He who wishes to disparage will readily find evidence in rebuttal.  Who is qualified to write history?  History began as a compilation of annals.  Review of Greek historians: Herodotus was highly eloquent and gave intense pleasure.  Thucydides surpassed all in dexterity and composition.  They never handled lawsuits.  Some historians began as philosophers, like Xenophon, Callisthenes, and Tamaeus.  But the system of rhetoric contains no rules of style for history.  Fluency and diversity of diction must be used.  History's first law is to tell the truth.  There must be no suggestion of partiality, nor of malice.  The completed structure rests upon the story and the diction.  The nature of the subject needs chronological arrangement and geographical representation.  One must tell the plans of a campaign, the executive actions, and the results.  There must be some intimation of what the writer approves, and in the narrative of achievement, a statement of what was done or said, and the manner of doing or saying it.  There must be an exposition of all contributory causes.  One must give an account of the exploits of the individual actors, and include particulars of the lives and characters of those outstanding persons.  The style must be easy and flowing.  [NB: Excellent take on the writing of history!]. All things relating to the intercourse of fellow-citizens and the ways of mankind, or concerned with everyday life, the political system, our own corporate society, the common sentiments of humanity, natural inclinations and morals must be mastered by the orator.  Forensic oratory is the most difficult.  The Greeks divide rhetoric into two branches: the discussion of 1) concrete (disputes between litigants) and 2) abstract (something involved in boundless uncertainty) problems.  They have a five-fold division of rhetoric: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery.  Then they get good-will; state the case in a plausible, lucid, and brief manner; then define the matter in hand, giving proofs and refutations; then conclude, at times with a prior digression for amplification.  But it is natural capacity that matters in the making of an orator.  He should be a man of some learning, who has done some listening and some reading.  He must have appropriate intonation, physique, energy, and fluency.  He must be of sound character.  If he is ordinary, one should not bother much with him.  If he is unsuitable, he should be recommended another vocation.  He should copy a good model for an orator, and practice a lot.  Every age produces its own style of oratory: the Greeks (Pericles, Alcibiades, Thucydides) were accurate, pointed, terse, and wealthier in ideas than diction.  List.  Gifted individuals can dispense with models.  They have natural aptitude and copy no man.  The issues of a case: what has been done?  What is being done?  What is going to be done?  Or the nature and description of something.  In forensic cases one pleads not guilty and denies nearly every allegation.  All acts may be defended as justifiable.  Question of definition.  For purposes of persuasion, the art of speaking relies wholly upon three things: the proof of our allegations, the winning of our hearers' favor, and the rousing of their feelings to whatever impulse our case may require.  Have commonplaces ready at hand.  The style must be elegant, copious, and diversified.  One must attain three things in a speech to gain conviction: winning over an audience (use gentleness of style), instructing (this calls for acuteness), and stirring of men's minds (use excitement).  Use commonplaces (have life experiences to put commonplaces to good use).  Cultivation requires practice, listening, reading, and writing (NB: these are the basic language skills).  In oratory, three things are necessary to discovery of arguments: 1) acuteness, 2) theory, and 3) painstaking (diligence) [listening with close attention to our opponent].  There is very little room for art.  All else depends on carefulness, mental concentration, reflection, watchfulness, persistence, and hard work.  A speaker would be more pleasing and acceptable to a nation like ours (Rome) if he were to show as little trace as possible of artifice, and none whatsoever of things Greek.  Intrinsic arguments: when the problem concerns the character of the subject as a whole; extrinsic arguments: when topics are assembled from without and not inherent in the nature of the case.  Favor of the audience must be secured, for men decide more problems by emotions (hate, love, sorrow, joy) than by reality, authority, legal standard, judicial precedent, or statute (NB: very true).  Feelings are won over by a man's merit, achievements, or reputable life.  Attributes useful in an advocate are a mild tone, a countenance expressive of modesty, gentle language, and the faculty of seeming to be dealing reluctantly and under compulsion with something you are really anxious to prove.  It is very helpful to display the tokens of good-nature, kindness, calmness, loyalty, and a disposition that is pleasing and not grasping or covetous.  One must be unassuming, upright, not given to haste, stubbornness, strife, or harshness.  Vigorous language is not always wanted; one prefers a calm, gentle, and mild tone.  One must paint their characters as being upright, stainless, conscientious, modest, and long-suffering under injustice.  This presentation of character is very compelling.  Use good taste and style in speaking.  A delivery must be unruffled, eloquent, of good-nature, and the speaker must appear upright, well-bred, and virtuous.  But closely associated with this is the dissimilar style of speaking so as to excite and urge the feelings toward hatred or love, ill-will or well-wishing, fear or hope, desire or aversion, joy or sorrow, compassion or the wish to punish.  Try to guess an audience's thoughts, judgments, anticipations, and wishes.  The speaker must himself feel the emotions he wishes to excite; otherwise he will not be believable (NB: Diderot on cerebral acting).  "No man can be a good poet who is not on fire with passion, and inspired by something very like frenzy" (339; 2.46.194).   Be wrathful, indignant, and tearful in your speech-making.  But rhetorical fireworks should not be used in petty matters or with men of such a temper that our eloquence can achieve nothing in the way of influencing their minds (NB: only the flexible can be moved; the stubborn cannot).  The emotions that eloquence must excite in the minds of the tribunal are love (when one defends the good), hate, wrath, jealousy, compassion, hope, joy, fear, and vexation.   The emotion of jealousy is by far the fiercest of all, and needs as much energy for its repression as for its stimulation (351; 2.51.209).  People are especially jealous of their equals, or of those once beneath them, when they feel themselves left behind and fret at the others' upward flight.  Jealousy of their betters also is often furious, especially if those conduct themselves insufferably and overstep their rightful claims on the strength of pre-eminent rank or prosperity (not the fruit of merit but of vice).  Most people are jealous.  Two styles: 1) one mild; 2) another emotional.  Jesting (wit) is agreeable and effective.  It is a natural gift.  It cannot be taught.  There is 1) irony (in a story) and 2) raillery (in a jab).
            Julius on the laughable: In laughter there are five matters to consider: 1) its nature (leave this to Democritus, the "laughing philosopher"); 2) its source (the unseemly or ugly); 3) whether willingness to produce it becomes an orator (yes, for all admire acuteness; merriment wins goodwill for its author, it shatters the opposition, it shows the orator a man of taste, it relives dullness and tones down austerity, and dispels distasteful suggestions); 4) the limits of his license (do not make fun of the well-loved, or make fun of outstanding wickedness or wretchedness); and 5) the classification of things laughable (things easily ridiculed are those that call for neither strong disgust nor deepest sympathy; ugliness and physical blemishes; but avoid bad taste, buffoonery and mimicking).  There are two kinds of with: 1) one employed upon facts (stories, anecdotes, caricature, even vulgarized mimicry), and 2) the other upon words (jabs).  One must, however, be well-bred, modest, and avoid unseemly language and offensive gestures.  Use control and restraint.  The nature of laughter: of facts and words (a union of both is best).  Puns.  Ambiguous equivocation.  Mimicry (but not for the well-bred).  Grimacing (beneath our dignity).  Indecency (degrading for a public speaker).  Play on words ("date"; talented, clever, wondrous, although not that funny).  The unexpected (Russian joke).  Assonance or variation in a letter or two ("traduttore/tradittore").  The explanation of a name (Cicero > chickpea).  Words taken literally ("Jeffrey Dahmer was not a vegetarian").  Allegory/metaphor/irony ("hi, you little shrimp").  Antithetical expressions ("when will you stop drinking?" "When you stop smoking.").  Comparisons.  Caricature (of ugliness or physical defects).  Understatements and overstatements.  Irony (Socrates).  When something disgraceful is called by an honorable epithet (calling a stingy person frugal).  Absurd jokes.  Pretending not to understand what one understands perfectly.  Hinted ridicule.  Unexpected turns, when sentences do not hang together ("the poor man lacks cash, and character").  Personal retorts.  Wishing for things that are impossible.
            Antonius resumes: On invention.  Concentrate on the part of the case that is most capable of influencing men's minds.  Do not reply to troublesome or difficult arguments or topics.  Do not advance a case if it might cause you damage.  Do not lose your temper.  On arrangement: present strongest arguments first and last; place the weak ones in-between; get rid of the bad arguments.  Instruction, persuasion, and appeal to the emotions are necessary to bring people to hold our opinions.  One's opening remarks should always be carefully framed, pointed, and epigrammatic (concise) and suitably expressed.  One must charm and attract the hearer straight away (first impressions matter).  First remarks must not be presented with force.  The opening passage must be drawn from the case itself, not from some outside source.  The client must be presented as a man of high character, a gentleman, a victim of misfortune deserving of compassion.  The audience is most attentive when they have the whole of the speech to look forward to, and they are more receptive at the start (their attention diminishes in the middle section).  Narratives should be entertaining and convincing too.  The narrative gains liveliness when it brings in several characters and is broken up with speeches.  The narrative must be clear and use ordinary language.  It must present events chronologically and not digress.  Narrative should not be used if the facts are known and there is no doubt what occurred, of if the prosecutor has already stated it, unless one is going to refute him.  Minimize or excise weak or ambiguous matter that might harm one's case.  The case must be supported with proofs to demolish the opponent's arguments and establish your own.  On advisory speeches and panegyrics: Deliberations call for a person of character.  Wisdom, ability, and eloquence are necessary to make an intelligent forecast and give an authoritative proof.  In an advisory speech, nothing is more desirable than dignity.  Mora worthy is the highest object of ambition, but expediency wins the day.  The chief consideration should be integrity or expediency.  List the advantages of peace, wealth, power, revenue, military strength, etc.  Moral worth has to do with one's ancestors and their achievements.  Demonstrate what is possible, impossible, and inevitable.  Debate is cut short when one proves something to be impossible.  One must have knowledge of the constitution of the state, and of the national character.  In deliberations, grandeur and brilliance are required.  One must arouse the emotions of the audience at times by exhortations to either hope, fear, desire, or ambition, and to call them back from rashness, anger or hope, injustice, envy, and cruelty.  Use the most orate oratory here.  Be careful not to arouse disapproving outcries of the people (if you make a mistake or are arrogant, harsh, base, or mean), or if the subject is unpopular, or if the audience is overly exited or alarmed.  Remedies: Use reproof (if one has authority); admonition (a gentle form of reproof); promises; and apologies (the least suggested method).  Use facetious turns here, a rapid style, epigrammatic remarks expressed in a dignified and attractive way.  On panegyrics: Romans don't do much with this kind of oratory, except at funerals.  It's more of a Greek thing.  Look for praiseworthy aspects of a person in his family, good looks, bodily strength, resources, riches, and other external and internal gifts of fortune.  What is important is virtue, intellectual ability, high-mindedness, strength of character, mercy, justice, kindness, fidelity, courage (things that are beneficial to the human race in general).  Services performed without profit or reward.  Virtue that is profitable to others is what counts in a panegyric.  Or how one bears adversity wisely.  Or not to have lost dignity under duress.  Honors given.  Unprecedented achievements (not small achievements).  Know all the virtues (and the vices) for a good panegyric.  On memory: Simonides of Ceos (556-468 BC) is the inventor of the science of mnemonics.  Orderly arrangement (by localities).  The chief source of this endowment is nature.  The keenest of all the senses is sight.  A material object without a locality is inconceivable.  Practice engenders habit.  We may grasp ideas by means of images and their order by means of localities. 
            Debate is adjourned until the afternoon, when Crassus will talk about style.  Everyone wants to hear him at once (NB: another captatio).
END OF BOOK TWO OF DE ORATORE
BOOK THREE:
            Cicero tells his brother Quintus about the death of Crassus a week after their talk, a victim to the cruel blade of civil war (NB: which Cicero helped bring about, but I digress).  Cicero was not present at the talk in question, but received a report from Gaius Cotta about the opinions of the debate.  Everyone was a master in his own class.  After a siesta, the resume their talk in the afternoon and in the middle of the plantation, under a tree.
            Crassus speaks: Every speech consists of matter and words, which are inseparable.  It is impossible to achieve an ornate style without ideas put into shape.  No idea can possess distinction without lucidity of style.  The senses are entertained, especially the ear (perceptions) and the eyes (delights).  The other senses partake of gratifications of various kinds.  Poets are the next of kin to orators.  There is a variety of styles.  The four requisites of style are: 1) correct diction (formed by knowledge of literature and increased by reading the orators and poets), 2) lucidity or clarity (use correct grammar; avoid archaic language, except occasionally; avoid obscurity [by engaging in proper arrangement] and long periods; use appropriate pronunciation [neither excessive precision nor slackness; neither feebleness nor excessive fullness of volume; neither effeminate nor unmusical in tone; no rustic or provincial language], and use charm [develop an urbane, witty, methodical, Roman-like accent, with a certain rhythm and cadence]).  Eloquence was associated with wisdom among the ancient Greeks (Lycurgus [lawmaker of Sparta], Solon [legislator of Athens]).  Others, with the same wisdom, pursued tranquility and leisure (Pythagoras, Democritus, Anaxagoras) and abandoned the sphere of government.  In the old days, instruction imparted education in right conduct and good speech (e.g., ethics and rhetoric).  Men of action and orators are inseparable (e.g., "arms and letters" [sapientia et fortitudo]).  But Socrates scorned the practice of oratory.  He divided the science of wise thinking (dialectics) from that of elegant speaking (rhetoric).  Separation of tongue and brain.  Now contemporary thinkers make pleasure the sole standard of value (NB: this would be the philosophy of Epicurus [c. 341c. 270 BC]: pursue modest pleasures and avoid pain [Julius Caesar leaned towards Epicureanism <as did Thomas Jefferson>]).  Crassus is actively seeking the great political leader of the nation, guiding the government and being pre-eminent for wisdom and eloquence in the Senate and the Tribune (NB: Cf. this Ciceronian quest to Plato's pursuit of the Philosopher King or wise ruler).  Crassus is also looking for the most appropriate philosophy for his ideal orator.  He does not by any means disapprove of the Stoics.  After all, they believe that eloquence is a virtue and a form of wisdom.  However, Crassus dismisses them (NB: they lack passion, for one thing).  The Peripatetics (Aristotelians ) and Academics (Platonists) have as a dogma that nothing can be apprehended with certainty either by the senses or the mind (NB: ideas like these would be impractical in politics).  The philosophers look down on eloquence, and the orators on wisdom, even though at one time there was an alliance between oratory and philosophy (NB: what Cicero has in mind is the "early" or mythic legislator of a city-state, the "founding father" who would have been both a statesman and an orator [like Lycurgus or Solon, and perhaps even Romulus]).  The orator needs wide culture.  The contents of philosophy are discovered by intellects of the keenest acumen in eliciting the probable answer to every problem, and the results are elaborated with practiced eloquence.  An orator cannot have sufficient cogency and weight if he lacks the vigor that public speaking demands, and cannot be adequately polished and profound if he lacks width of culture.  The orator and the actor are similar (as the orator and the poet).  Crassus admits that being an eloquent orator requires much training and that he only has a cursory knowledge of things in general on account of his public lifestyle.  One should take what one needs of them and have a good tutor and study by oneself.  One has to be able to learn a subject quickly to learn it thoroughly.  Other requirements of oratory are 3) ornament (to hold the attention of the audience) and 4) appropriateness of style (pleasing and calculated to find its way to the attention of the audience and having the fullest possible supply of facts).  We are moved strongly by what is disgusting at first.  In singing we are moved by trills and flourishes more than by notes firmly held, but if used often they cause disgust.  Taste is the most voluptuous of the senses, and yet it will reject something extremely sweet.  In all things, the greatest pleasures are only narrowly separated from disgust.  In the case of a florid speech, the ear and the mind will reject too much charm.  The charm of an orator should be severe and substantial, not sweet and luscious.   The highest distinction of eloquence consists in amplification by means of ornament.  Amplification makes a speech convincing, effective, and persuasive.  One must be aware of commonplaces (to amplify arguments).  Orators are bound to possess the intelligence, capacity, and skill to speak both pro and contra on the topics of virtue, duty, equity, and good, moral worth and utility, honor and disgrace, reward and punishment, and like matters.  Cases or controversies are limited to three occasions: 1) a lawsuit, 2) a debate (also called a deliberation since it propounds an unlimited subject of inquiry), or 3) a panegyric.  Every matter can be the subject of inquiry and discussion (whether the issue deals with abstract deliberations or with things within the range of political and legal debate).  Everything, likewise, has as an object either 1) the acquisition of knowledge or 2) the performance of action. 
            There are three modes of acquiring knowledge: 1) inference (to discover the essential content of a thing), 2) definition (explains the force possessed by a particular thing like "what is wisdom?"), and 3) deduction (the procedure when we are investigating a thing's consequence).  Inference deals with 1) what actually exists, 2) what is the origin of something, 3) what is the cause or reason of things?, and 4) dealing with change.  Disputes about definition deal with 1) what is the conviction generally prevalent, 2) what is the essential property of something, 3) when a thing is divided into parts, how many classes of things are there?, or 4) what is the special form and natural mark of a particular thing?  Questions about deduction are: is the question simple or complex? Or it involves a comparison.  Simple questions are of three modes: 1) concerning things to be desired or avoided, 2) concerning right or wrong, and 3) concerning the honorable and base.  There are two modes for comparisons: 1) when it is asked whether two things are the same or whether there is a difference (e.g., between king and tyrant), and 2) when it is asked which of the two things is preferable.  End on matters of knowledge.
            As to particular problems of conduct:  Issues of this nature either 1) deal with the discussion of duty or 2) wish to produce or remove some emotion.  For the latter one uses exhortation, reproach, consolation, compassion, and every method of exciting. 
            On ornamentation: if the subject discussed is of an elevated character, it produces a spontaneous brilliance in the language. 
            Catulus discusses the liberal education of a gentleman and mentions mathematics, music, literature, poetry, natural science, ethics, and political science.  He also mentions the sophist Gorgias of Leontini and makes the point that either he was not defeated by Socrates in Plato's dialogue of the same name or, if he was, then Socrates would have been the better orator.  The Greeks were demoralized by sloth and have not even preserved their own heritage. 
            Crassus continues: Oratory avoids narrow specialization.  In the past, no separation of knowledge was undertaken or departmentalized.  Philosophers then knew everything and put their wisdom at the service of his fellow-citizens.  Everybody consulted them about all matters, whether religious or secular (for ecclesiastical law was connected with civil law).  Nowadays, men come to power ignorant of knowledge.  The ancient Greek statesmen (the Seven Wise Men [Bias, Chilon, Cleobulus, Periander, Pittacus, Solon, and Thales]) were men of culture.  There was one particular course of education, including all the subjects worthy of a man of culture and of political ambition, and which included eloquence.  Philip of Macedon wisely chose Aristotle as tutor to his son Alexander, to impart to him the principles of conduct and of oratory.  If Crassus had to make a choice, he would choice wisdom lacking power of oratory than talkative folly.  The prize must go to the orator who possesses learning. 
            All oratory is made of words.  Grace of style is of two kinds: 1) one derived from the separate words and 2) another from their combinations.  An orator avoids what is commonplace and selects distinguished terms that seem to have some fullness and sonority in them.  The basic foundation is the employment of a good and copious vocabulary.  Rare, archaic language is used by poets more than orators, but orators should use them nonetheless, although sparingly.  Metaphors were born out of necessity (cf. Vico) due to the original poverty and deficiency of language, although now they are used for entertainment.  Things are clear by the resemblance of things.  Metaphors should be used only to make the meaning clearer (hence, use metaphors based upon resemblance).  Metaphorical terms give people much pleasure.  To invent them is a mark of cleverness.  They also lead the hearer's thoughts to something else, without going astray.  Also, metaphors suggest the thing and a picture of the whole.  Also, metaphors have a direct appeal to the senses, especially sight, the keenest of them all.  The mind's eye is carried more easily to things we have seen than to things we have heard of.  A metaphor of sorts is the figure called metonymy (less elegant than a metaphor).  Arrangement, rhythm, and balance are important too.  Arrangement involves placing the words together in such a structure as not to have any harsh clash of consonants or hiatus of vowels.  Smoothness.  Prose style for the Greek masters, should resemble a kind of versification, that is, certain definite rhythms or cadences.  Rhythm gives pleasure to the ear.  This was devised by the musicians.  (NB: examples: any commercial or service announcement: "Be all that you can be in the Army"; "Click it or ticket").  Our ears are gratified by a style of delivery which is not merely endurable but also easy for the human lungs.  Use the iambus ( - ' ), tribrach ( - - - ), dactyl (' - - ), paean ( ' - - - or - - - '), or cretic ( ' - ' ).  Aristotle recommends finishing a clause with a long syllable.  The language should not be diffuse and rambling.  Everybody notices the last part of sentence even if they do not notice the beginning (NB: cf. a preacher's vibrato).  Rhythms are rooted deeply in the general sensibility.  We notice them even if we don't know any theory about them.  Everybody is influenced not only by skillful arrangement of words but also by rhythms and pronunciations.  Rhythms and words rouse us up to excitement, smooth and calm us down, and lead us to mirth and sorrow, though their extremely powerful influence is more suited for poetry and song. 
            There are three artistic styles: the full and rounded style of oratory, the plain style (not devoid of vigor and force), and the middle style (which combines elements of either class). 
            Figures of speech and figures of thought.  Use metaphorical words frequently, new coinages occasionally, and archaic words rarely.  One must vary one's discourse.  Dwelling on a single point can be impressive, as is a clear explanation and a visual presentation of events as if practically going on.  Other good tactics of embellishment are conciseness, digression, returning to the subject, repetition, syllogism, exaggeration, understatement, interrogation, question and answer, irony, hesitation, distinction, correction, transference of responsibility, imitation of manners, impersonation of people, picturing the results, raising a laugh, forestalling the other side's case, comparison and example, division into parts, interruptions, contrast of opposites, relapse into silence, compliment, deprecation, anger, entreaty, brief divergence from the subject, imprecation, appeals to the powers above, etc. 
            Some figures of speech are: iteration of words, repetitions at the beginning, end, and beginning and end of a clause, same case-ending, inversion, antithesis, omission of connecting particles (asyndeton), change of subject, self-correction, exclamation, abbreviation, the use of a noun in several cases, concession, hesitation, enumeration of points, correction, distribution, similarity, answering one's question, metonymy, digression, periphrasis, etc.  Practice is extremely important.  Different styles are used depending on the case and the occasion.  The audience is also important (age, station, office). 
            Delivery is the dominant factor in oratory; without it the best speaker cannot be of any account at all.  Delivery includes voice and gesture.  Nature has assigned to every emotion a particular look and tone of voice and bearing of its own.  Anger uses shrill, hasty, and short abrupt clauses.  The tone for compassion and sorrow is wavering, full, halting, and mournful.  To express fear one uses low, hesitating, and despondent tones.  To express energy, one uses intense, vehement, eager tones with a sort of impressive urgency.  The tone of dejection is heavy, not employing appeal to compassion, drawn out in a single articulation and note.  All these emotions must be accompanied by gesture.  The countenance and the eyes are important, as well as throwing out the chest, moving one's hands, the arm thrown out rather forward, a stamp of the foot at the beginning and end of emphatic passages, etc.  The eyes indicate emotions.  The face is next in importance to the voice.  Delivery influences everybody, for the same emotions are felt by all people and they both recognize them in others and manifest them in themselves by the same marks.  The voice is paramount in delivery.  Change tones to save the voice. 
            Time for refreshment.  Le us give our minds a rest.

END OF BOOK THREE OF DE ORATORE




ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF RHETORIC (DE PARTITIONE ORATORIA):

            This book is also known as The Divisions of Oratory (Partitiones oratoriae).  It is a brief essay on the art of oratory written by Cicero for the instruction of his son Marcus Tullius (19 years-old).  It takes the form of a dialogue.  It is set in Cicero's villa at Tusculum (near Rome).  The year is 46 BC.  The book deals with 1) a speaker's personal resources in point of matter and style (inventio, collocatio, elocutio, actio, memoria), 2) the structure of a speech (exordium, narratio, confirmatio, reprehensio, peroratio), and 3) the various subjects available for treatment (infinita quaestio, finita quaestio). 

ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF RHETORIC:

            The theory of rhetoric is subdivided into three parts: 1) the speaker's personal resources (vis oratoris), 2) the speech (oratio), and 3) the question (quaestio).  Invention is used specially of the matter and delivery of the language.  Arrangement belongs to both (invention and delivery), although it is applied to invention.  With delivery go voice, gesture, facial expression, and general bearing.  All of these are in the keeping of memory. 
            The speech has four parts: Two of them (the statement of the facts and the proof) serve to establish the case; and two (exordium and peroration) influence the mind of the audience. 
            The division of the question are, 1) one, unlimited (a discussion), and 2) another, limited (a cause).
            The aim of invention is to discover how to convince the persons whom he wishes to persuade and how to arouse their emotions.  Things that serve to produce conviction are arguments, which are derived from the topics that are either contained in the facts of the case itself or are obtained from outside.  Topics are pigeonholes in which arguments are stored.  An argument is a plausible device to obtain belief.  Arguments from outside are the evidence of witnesses.  Internal arguments are those inherent in the actual facts of the case. 
            Evidence may be 1) divine and 2) human.  Divine would be, e.g., oracles, auspices, prophecies, augurs.  Human evidence is that provided freely or under compulsion (torture) and would include written documents, pledges, promises, statements made under oath, or under examination. 
            For internal arguments (inherent in the facts themselves), sometimes definition is employed, sometimes enumeration of the parts, sometimes etymology, relations, similarities, differences, contraries, connections, precedents, consequents, causality, antithesis, etc.  After arguments are found, the next step is to put them together.  One must produce conviction and excite emotion.  A conviction is a firmly established opinion.  Emotion is the excitement of the mind to pleasure, annoyance, fear, or desire.  The purpose of the statement is to convince, and the purpose of the case is both to convince and to excite emotion. 
            There are three kinds of speeches: judicial (which requires a decision by a judge about a past matter), deliberative (future serious matters entertained by a senate), and panegyric (present matters for pleasure).  An auditor is either a hearer or an arbitrator (judge) who must be moved or made to make a decision.  Embellishment in a judgment arouses severity or clemency in a judge; in a persuasion it inspires hope or alarm in a member of a deliberative body; in a panegyric it gives pleasure. 
            To give pleasure, there are different forms of arrangement: chronological, arrangement in classes, ascending from smaller to larger, or gliding gown from larger to smaller, or grouping things irregularly.
            The aim of a deliberation: the opening passages are either brief or absent.  Not much narration might be needed either.  Narrative deals with matters past or present, but persuasion deals with the future.  The entire speech must be applied to convincing and arousing emotion. 
            Arrangement in judicial cases: the prosecutor follows the order of facts to his own use, and makes an effective and vehement peroration, for his object is to make the judge angry.  The defendant must first secure good will, cut down on the narration, engage in digression, and secure compassion in the peroration.  A trail lawyer must also go with the flow and adjust the order of his plan as circumstances dictate. 
            II.  On the speech itself: In combining words, the things that have to be observed are certain rhythms and sequences.  Rhythms are judged by the ear.  Sequence guards the style against irregularity of gender, number, tense, person, or case.  The following five ornmanets belong to single words and combinations of words: 1) lucidity (no obscure language), 2) brevity (simple terms), 3) acceptability (in conformity with the opinions and customs of mankind), 4) brilliance (eye appealing), and 5) charm (sonorous and smooth vocabulary).  Anything that causes surprise gives pleasure, and the most effective style is one that stirs up some emotion in the mind, and that indicates amiability of character in the speaker himself. 
            On delivery: change the voice, use gestures, glances, in harmony with the speech. 
            On memory: the twin sister of written script.  Memory uses topics.
            Rules that govern a speech: there are four divisions.  The first (introduction) and last (peroration) serve to arouse emotion.  Narrative and proof procure belief in what is said.  Amplification must be used in the course of the speech, especially when a statement has been supported or challenged.  It's very effective for securing credence.  It exercises influence. 
            Introductory passages: they serve to secure for us a friendly hearing, an intelligent hearing, and an attentive hearing.  Good will is procured from ourselves, the judges, or the opponents.  To secure an attentive and intelligent hearing, we must start from the actual facts themselves.  Define and divide the parts.  Clearness in the narration.
            The statement of the case: The statement is an explanation of the facts.  Clarity, convincingness, and charm are essential in the statement.  Use brevity.  The statement will be convincing if the facts are narrated in accordance with the persons, the times, and the places.  What we say must be based on evidence and to be in agreement with the judgment of mankind, as well as with the law and custom and religion.  Charm may be used by creating surprise and suspense, or unexpected issues, with an intermixture of human emotions, dialogues between people, exhibitions of grief, rage, fear, joy, and desire. 
            Ways to secure credence: by confirmation and refutation.  The aim of confirmation is to prove our own case; and that of refutation is to refute the case of our opponents.  Use inference, definition, and ratiocination.  The topics of inference: probabilities and essential characteristics of things.  Under the head fo times we observe present, past, and future.  Accidental occasions are sacrifices, holidays, weddings.  Actions and occurrences are either matters of design or unintentional.  Anecdotes have an effect on people.
            On refutation: Deny the whole of what the opponent has said if you are able to show it is imaginary or untrue.  Recall similar examples that have not obtained credence.  Some doubtful points have been taken for certain.  Results do not follow from assumptions.  Etc.  Backward ratiocination is very effective.  Declare how unreliable witnesses are as a class.  Proofs are matters of fact, but the evidence of witnesses is a matter of personal inclinations.  Weigh and judge the witnesses (are they honorable or unreliable?).  Oppose the use of examination under torture.  Refute witnesses if they give ambiguous or contradictory evidence. 
            On peroration: 1) amplification and 2) recapitulation.  Amplification wins credence in the course of speaking by arousing emotion.  In the sentences, the words must be disconnected (asyndeton) so as to make them seem more numerous.  Enlargment is also effected by repetition, iteration, and doubling of words.  Effective are accumulations of definitions, recapitulation of consequences, juxtaposition of contrary, discrepant, and contradictory statements.  Men are moved by love (of the gods, country, parents), affection (brothers, wives, children, households), by moral considerations (respect for virtues that promote human fellow-feeling and generosity).  These supply exhortations to hold fast to them, and also arouse hatred for those who violate them, and they engender compassion.  There is no object so pitiable as the unhappy man who once was happy.  Discretion must also be used.   Enumeration is more necessary for a prosecutor than a defendant.  Your case will be strengthened by recapitulating and briefly setting forth the main points of your argument.
            III.  The question: Two kinds of questions: 1) a cause (limited by referring to particular occasions or persons) and 2) thesis (unlimited).  There are two kinds of theses: 1) one is a matter of learning (the object is knowledge: a. does a thing exist? [reality] B. what is it? [definition] and c. what are its qualities? [quality]); 2) the other is a matter of action, which is directed to doing something (a. obtaining or avoiding something or b. advantage or utility).
            On laudation and vituperation: everything associated with virtue deserves praise; everything associated with vice deserves blame.  Praise is aimed at moral excellence; blame at moral baseness.  The narration exhibits past actions without employing arguments.  Its style is one of gentle influence rather than one (vehement) of conviction and proof.  This gives the audience pleasure and entertainment.  Use foreshadowing by portents, prodigies, oracles, or fate.  External goods must be praised briefly and moderately.  Speak of his fortune and estate, and of his physical endowments (which reflect virtue).  The arrangement can be chronological, by most recent first, or classify actions under different virtues.  Virtue is exhibited in 1) knowledge (prudence, intelligence, wisdom) or in 2) conduct (temperance, fortitude, patience).  The virtue that embraces these qualities under a single head is greatness of mind (magnanimity [magnitudo]), which includes liberality in the use of money, loftiness of mind, dignity and calm, justice, religion, piety, goodness, good fait, mercy, friendliness and benevolence.  Eloquence is wisdom delivering copious utterances.  The guardian of all the virtues is modesty. 
            Other states of mind trained for virtue by proper studies and sciences would include the study of literature, rhythms, music, astronomy, riding, hunting, fencing, religion, filial affection, friendship, hospitality.  Be aware of vices that simulate virtues.  Vices are the opposites of virtues.  The greatest attention is to be focused on the quality of a person's breeding and upbringing and education and character. 
            On deliberations: the purpose in deliberating is to obtain some advantage (utilitas).  If a thing is unattainable (or necessary), debate about it is cancelled.  But in process of inquiring what can be achieved, we must also consider how easily it can be achieved, for things that are of extreme difficulty ought in many cases to be deemed entirely impracticable.  This class of cases consists in advising or dissuading.  Good things (necessary) are life, self-respect, and freedom.  Circumstances often bring it about that utility is at variance with moral value.  There are two kinds of people: 1) the humane and cultivated (who prefer moral value: honor, glory, good faith, justice, and all forms of virtue) and 2) the uninstructed and uncultivated (who would prefer utility to moral value, profits, gain, etc.). 
            Motives of action: people fly from what is evil much more energetically than they pursue what is good.  They do not necessarily seek after what is honorable as much as they try to avoid what is disgraceful.  The human race was designed by nature for what is honorable, although it has been corrupted by bad education and erroneous opinions.  In addressing well educated people we should speak most of glory and honor, and of things that protect and increase the common advantage of mankind.  The unlearned and ignorant understands profits, rewards, pleasures, and modes of avoiding pain.  Both understand disgrace. 
            On judicial speeches: the aim of such a speech is equity.  Lines of prosecution: deny that the action took place (this would require conjecture), or admit it but justify the deed (this would require definition), or admit that the act was undertaken and was right (this requires clemency).
            Emotions have a bearing on the cause of an action in cases where there is a recent outburst of anger, a long-standing hatred, desire for revenge, resentment for injury, desire for honor or glory or power or money, fear of danger, debt, and strained circumstances.
            Corroborative evidence: an inconsistent answer, hesitation, stammering, looking pale, trembling. 
            Handling of witnesses:  Praise the witnesses individually.  If examination by torture produces expected results, praise the institution of torture and speak about the efficacy of pain. 
            Lines of defense: demolish the arguments from motives, showing there were none, or not strong enough, or not merely selfish ones, or that the object could have been secured in an easier way, or that the charge is not consistent with one's character, or one's record, or that there were not motives or no sufficiently overpowering motives for the act. 
            On definition: victory is bound to go to the one who in his definition and analysis of a term has entered more deeply into the mind and the ideas of the judge. 
            Right and wrong: may be divided into 1) nature and 2) law; divine and human right; equity and religion.  There are 1) written (a. private [deeds, covenants, contracts] and public [statutes, resolutions of the senate, treaties]) and 2) unwritten codes of law (maintained by ancestral custom or by the conventions and virtual consensus of mankind, hence international law). 
            Law and equity: one who bases his defense on the meaning and intention of the law will maintain that the force of the law resides in the purpose and intention of the person who drafted it and not in its words and letters. 

END OF DE PARTITIONE ORATORIA




BRUTUS:

            The three books on De oratore constitute the theoretical foundation of Ciceronian rhetoric; the Brutus evinces the historical exemplification; the Orator demonstrates the delineation of the ideal orator.  Cicero's Orator has its roots in the copiousness of Asiatic rhetoric, which informed Roman oratory.  Roman Atticism emerged with Gaius Licinius Calvus (82c.47 BC) as an antithesis to Asiatic rhetoric.  Atticism was a plea to a return to Attic simplicity and artlessness of expression.  The scene of the dialogue on Brutus is 46 BC.  Cicero's Brutus tries to demonstrate historically the correctness of the writer's point of view concerning effective oratory.  The statesman Marcus Junius Brutus (ca. 85-42 BC) was one of Julius Caesar's assassins (on 15 March 44 BC).  He took his own life subsequently.  One of his ancestors had been Lucius Junius Brutus (6th C. BC), who revolted against the monarchy of Tarquinius Superbus and subsequently declared the Roman Republic in 509 BC.  In the Brutus, Cicero praises Caesar the orator, writer, and scholar.  The dialogue as a literary form was primarily a vehicle of inquiry, reflecting debate and conversation upon some problem of common interest to the speakers.  In Plato, the leading speaker has a leading role, lightened by interruptions and questions from the other speakers.  The dialogue (whether in Plato or Cicero) engages in a dialectical inquiry and presents a subject matter in a continuous fashion.  Aristotle's dialogues, the models for Cicero's, are lost.  In them there are three speakers: one carries the principal part and rests his exposition on the inquiries of the minor characters.  The style of the Brutus seems spontaneous (like a conversation) and engages in literary criticism as practiced in the late Roman Republic.  The Brutus was first discovered in Lodi, Lombardy (north of Italy) in 1421.
 


Marcus Junius Brutus

Julius Caesar
BRUTUS:
            Cicero recalls the death of Quintus Hortensius Hortalus (114-50 BC) [an optimate consul in the Senate whose oratory was based on the Asiatic style].  Cicero is subsequently visited in his villa by Marcus Brutus and Titus Pomponius "Atticus" (112 BC/110 BC/109 BC 35 BC/32 BC) [Atticus was a Greek sympathizer, an optimate, a friend of Cicero's, and an Epicurean; like Brutus, he committed suicide].  Pomponius and Brutus would like to have Cicero discuss the beginning of Roman orators that he had initiated earlier in his house in Tusculum.  Cicero obliges. 
            Brutus states that one should engage in the pursuit of all the liberal arts, for no one can be a good speaker who is not a good thinker.  Whoever devotes himself to true eloquence devotes himself to sound thinking.  That would be true of philosophers as well as generals.
            They all sit down on the lawn near a statue of Plato.
           Cicero speaks: Oratory is the subject matter under discussion: is it a product of rules and theory?  Is it a technique dependent on practice?  Does it depend on natural gifts?  It is difficult, composed of five unique arts: invention, arrangement, diction, action, and memory.  Greece was first fired with a passion for eloquence, especially Athens.  Therein oratory began to be consigned to written records.  Pericles, Solon, Pisistratus, Clisthenes, Themistocles, Alcibiades, Critias, etc., were effective speakers, according to Thucydides.  Many teachers of rhetoric arose, among them Gorgias of Leontini, Thrasymachus, Protagoras, etc.  Opposed to them was Socrates, from whose discourses (moral: ethical and political) philosophy arose (dealing with good and evil, human life and society), distinct from the natural philosophy of an earlier time (the Pre-Socratics, concerned with the nature of the universe and the character of matter than with man and his ethical and social problems: Thales [fl. 585 BC], Parmenides [515 BC], Pythagoras [570 BC], Democritus [460-370 BC], Empedocles [ca. 493-433 BC], Heraclitus [fl. 480 BC], and others).  Isocrates was a great orator and an ideal teacher, but he shrank from the broad daylight of the forum.  He was superior to his predecessors and the first to recognize that even in prose, while strict verse should be avoided, a certain rhythm and measure should be observed.  Period must end with a rhythmical cadence.  The ear itself judges what is complete and what is deficient; also, the breath by natural compulsion fixes a limit to the length of the phrase.  If the breath labors or fails utterly, the effect is painful.  Lysias was a writer of extraordinary refinement and elegance, almost a perfect orator.  The perfect orator, of course, is Demosthenes.  Demetrius of Phaleron entertained rather than stirred his countrymen.  He was the first to modulate oratory and to give it softness and pliability.  He chose charm rather than force.  Before Solon and Pisistratus there is no record of any notable speaker.  Oratory always exercised great influence.  The deliberate cultivation of this art and its greater influence became recognizable in Pisistratus.  Next came Themistocles.  The privilege is conceded to rhetoricians to distort history in order to give more point to their narrative.  Pericles was the first orator to be influenced by theoretical study.  He was trained by Anaxagoras, the natural philosopher, and transferred his mental discipline from obscure and abstruse problems to the business of the forum and the popular assembly.  This age first produced in Athens an all but perfect orator.  Eloquence prospers in peace and tranquility in a well-established civic order.  Corax and  Tisias the Sicilians first put together some theoretical precepts.  Protagoras wrote out and furnished discussions of certain large general subjects such as we now call commonplaces (topics of a general character such as patriotism, justice, avarice, etc.).  Gorgias did the same.  The pursuit of oratory was limited in Greece to Athens (Sparta produced no orators).  Outside of Greece, eloquence was cultivated with great ardor.  Piraeus in Asia.  The Attic orators were wholesome.  The Asiatic orators became redundant and lacked conciseness.  The school of Rhodes retained more sanity and more similarity to the Attic source. 
            In Rome, the early orators would have been people like Lucius Brutus, who expelled the kings.  This could not have been accomplished without the persuasion of oratory.  Lucius Valerius Potitus assuaged the passions of the common people against the patricians after the hatred aroused by the decemvirs (rule of ten men in the Roman Republic).  Cato was most admirable: he was weighty in commendation, sharp in censure, shred in aphorism, subtle in presentation and proof.  He had brilliant diction.
            The Greeks consider than language is embellished if changes in the use of words (tropes) are used.  They call figures of thought and language postures.  By the time of Gaius Sulpicius Gallus, a richer and more brilliant habit of speaking had arisen.   Servius Galba was the first to employ those resources proper to oratory, like digressions from the business in hand for embellishment, to delight his listeners, to move them, to amplify his theme, to use pathos and general topics.  Publius Rutilius proved that the two chief qualities that the orator must possess are accurate argument looking to proof and impressive appeal to the emotions of the listener.  The orator who inflames the court accomplishes far more than the one who merely instructs it. 
            Some orators merely out of inertia have left nothing written.  Most orations are written after, and not for, delivery.  Others do not strive to improve their style and do not crave a memorial of their skill for posterity.  Writing, more than anything else, contributes most to good speaking.  Others do not write because they know they speak better than they write. 
            Lucius Cassius was a favorite of the people not because of a free and genial disposition but for his very harshness and severity.  Decimus Brutus, son of Marcus, was well versed in Latin and Greek letters. 
            It is not enough to discern what is to be said unless you have the ability to say it fluently and with some charm; not even is this enough unless what is said is recommended by some grace of voice, facial expression, and action.  In the oratory of Marcus Scaurus, he conveyed the impression of experience, wisdom, and that quality that holds the secret of success, trustworthiness.  In the case of Publius Rutilius, he kept to a style of speaking somber and severe.  Both men were by nature intense in feeling and sharp.  In Rutilius's case, his orations were dry since he was trained in the doctrines of the Stoics.  The Stoics' oratory is acute and systematic, but meager and not well suited to winning the assent of a popular audience.  One must do for the forum what one does for the stage: award praise not only to those whose acting is marked by rapid movement and complicated effects, but also to those who are called "stationary," whose performance displays a simple realism, free from exaggeration (Cato was a Stoic, but an exception).  Cicero attributes the poor and unresourceful delivery of the Stoics to their being absorbed in dialectic.  The Peripatetics (Aristotelians) and the Academics (Platonists) could never produce the perfect orator, for their oratory is too free and discursive.  Stoic oratory is too closely knit and too compact for a popular audience. 
            Back to Roman orators: Gaius Fimbria was a pleader of the truculent type.  He was harsh, abusive, too fervid and excited.  Yet, by reason of his thoroughness, the vigor of his mind, and the purity of his life, he was held in high esteem in the counsels of the senate.  Marcus Brutus, as a prosecuting lawyer, was sharp-tongued and ugly.  Titus Albucius, being an Epicurean, was ill-suited to public speaking (Epicureans value pleasure and avoid pain). 
            Only with Marcus Antonius and Lucius Crassus, Rome was comparable in oratory to Greece.  For Antonius, nothing relevant escaped his attention, and it was all set in proper place for greatest force and effectiveness.  "Like a general with his cavalry, infantry, and skirmishes, he knew how to place his material in the most opportune parts of his discourse." If we divide delivery into gesture and voice, his gesture did not seek to reflect words, but agreed with the course of his thought, hands, shoulders, chest, stamp of the foot, posture in repose and in movement, all harmonizing with his words and thoughts; voice sustained, with a touch of huskiness.  For Demosthenes, the main element in oratory was action, action, action.  Equal in rank to Antonius is Lucius Crassus.  His Latinity was careful and well chosen, but without affected preciseness.  In presentation and argument, his lucidity was admirable.  Crassus, along with kindliness and affability, had a certain severity.  Someone like Quintus Scaevola had great knowledge of the civil law, but someone like Servius Sulpicius made of it an art: thar art that teaches the analysis of a whole into its component parts, sets forth and defines the latent and implicit, interprets and makes clear the obscure, recognizes the ambiguous and then distinguishes, applies a rule or measure for adjudging truth and falsehood, and for determining what conclusions follow from what premises, and what do not.  In other words, he used logic (dialectic), although he also knew letters and a finished style of speaking.  Back to Crassus:  Crassus was always prepared and ready.  He was waited for eagerly and listened to with attention.  There were no violent movements of the body, no sudden variation of voice, no walking up and down, no frequent stamping of the foot.  His language was vehement, sometimes angry and filled with righteous indignation.  He was a man of much wit, but always dignified.  He was at once ornate and brief.  In the give and take of altercation he was unequalled.  After orators like Crassus, Roman oratory came to maturity.  Henceforth, no one could expect to add anything considerable to it unless he should come better equipped in philosophy, in law, or in history. 
            Quintus Caepio had a natural complexion, free from make-up.  His periods were compact and short.  He preferred to break up his language into members (colons).
           Latin colonists and other (non-Roman) "foreigners" are similar to Romans, except that they lack a certain urban coloring (a certain intonation distinctive of the city of Rome).
            Gaius Julius was gay and clever of wit.  His oratory was entirely lacking in force, but he was incomparable in humor, grace, and general charm. 
            The orator who is approved by the multitude must inevitably be approved by the expert.  There are three things an orator should effect: 1) instruct his listener, 2) give him pleasure, and 3) stir his emotions.  The supreme orator is recognized by the people.  When one hears a real orator he believes what is said, thinks it true, assents and approves; the orator's words win conviction.  The listening crowd is delighted, is carried along by his words, is bathed deep in delight.  They feel now joy now sorrow, are moved now to laughter now to tears; they show approbation, detestation, scorn aversion; they are drawn to pity, to shame, to regret; are stirred to anger, wonder, hope, fear.  A poem full of obscure allusions can from its nature only win the approbation of the few; an oration meant for a general public must aim to win the assent of the crowd.  There is nothing that has so potent an effect upon human emotions as well-ordered and embellished speech (docere, delectere, movere).  Oratory that does not win the approval of the people is unable to win the approval of the expert.  What skill the orator has in playing on the minds of his audience is recognized by the emotion produced.  Thus, the intelligent critic in a single glance can for a correct judgment of an orator.  He observes if one of the judges is yawning, talking to a fellow judge, gossiping in a group, sending out to learn the time, asking the presiding judge to adjourn the court, etc.  If the judges are alert, attentive, and have the appearance of learning eagerly about the case in hand, or showing assent by their faces, or are hanging upon the words of the orator, or if they are stirred to pity, hate, or some like emotion, an orator is present in that court and the proper work of an orator is in process or is already accomplished.
            Back to Crassus: he captivated the ears of all present and diverted their minds from earnest consideration of the case to a mood of pleasantry.  He always won credence.  He provoked much admiration and won such assent that no opposition seemed possible. 
            There are two kinds of good oratory: 1) one simple and concise; 2) the other elevated and abundant.  Everything more brilliant and impressive is better.  The concise orator must be on his guard against meagerness and emaciation; the abundant and elevated type against inflation and errors of taste.  It is the business of the discerning teacher to note the bent of each man's nature, and with that as his guide to train his pupils.  It is important to see with one's own eyes how each thing is urged by my opponent and how each thing is received.  An orator wins commendation by the excellence and wealth of his diction.  The great orator is far more significant than the mediocre military leader.  But the military leader is of more practical value.  The foundation of oratory rests on a faultless and pure Latin diction.  Of all the resources of an orator, far the greatest is his ability to inflame the minds of his hearers and to turn them in whatever direction the case demands.  If the orator lacks this ability, he lacks the one thing most essential.  An excellent orator is like the famous actor Quintus Roscius Gallus (ca. 126 - 62 BC) on the stage.  [Roscius, a comic Roman actor, took lessons from Hortensius and Cicero took lessons from Roscius;  Cicero also admired Clodius Aesopus {fl. 1st C. BC} for his tragic roles; both were former slaves, and both went to the forum to learn from the lawyers, especially Hortensius].  He will fill every bench, get numerous applauses, and make people laugh or cry at will.  Dialectic is a contracted or compressed eloquence (like a clenched hand, according to Zeno [ca. 490 BC ca. 430 BC], a Pre-Socratic philosopher inventor of dialectic or logic); while an open hand expresses the breadth and expansiveness of rhetoric.  A great crowd of people call for an orator of animation, of fire and action and full voice.  There are two types of Asiatic style: 1) the one sententious and studied, less characterized by weight of thought than by the charm of balance and symmetry; 2) the other type is not so notable for wealth of sententious phrase, as for swiftness and impetuosity, combining with this rapid flow of speech a choice of words refined and ornate.  Asiatic oratory had a rush and movement which provoked admiration, but it lacked elaborate symmetry of phrase and sentence.  Both of these styles are suited to youth; in older men they lack weight and dignity.
            Back to orators: Gaius Aurelius Cotta was acute in invention, pure and facile in diction; lacking vigor of lungs and voice, he had very wisely learned to sacrifice vehemence, and to accommodate his style of speaking to his physical weakness.  In his language, everything was genuine, sane, and healthy.  Servius Sulpicius was the most elevated in style and, hence, the most theatrical.  His voice was strong, pleasing, and of brilliant timbre; his gesture and bodily movement extraordinarily graceful; his language swift and of easy flow without being either redundant or verbose.  Lucius Aelius was a Roman knight of the highest integrity, deeply read in Greek and Latin letters.  He was a professed Stoic and had no ambition to be an orator.  He wrote orations for others to deliver.  Curio employed a diction of superior brilliancy and used a Latin which was not so bad, by reason, doubtless of his home training, for he was absolutely without literary or theoretical training.  [The purity of one's diction was cultivated by the Scipionic group; it was a class thing; it added aristocratic glamour].  Curio was untutored in the liberal arts.  He knew no poetry, history, or private or civil law.  But he had a thorough mastery of the art of speaking (all five parts).  If he had been crippled in any of them he could not have been an orator.  Gaius Carbo had dignified diction and he spoke readily and his whole style possessed a certain natural authority.  Gnaeus Pomponius had lung-power and was able to rouse his auditors; he was sharp, sarcastic, and skilful in insinuating guilt.  Lucius Appuleius Saturninus took the fancy of the public by externals, such as his action or even his dress, rather than by any real faculty of expression or of sound sense.  Marcus Crassus had a moderate rhetorical training and less natural endowment, but by hard work and application he became successful.  His oratory was characterized by a pure Latinity, a vocabulary not vulgar or commonplace, his matter was carefully arranged, although devoid of ornament; he had much liveliness of thought, but little voice and delivery: everything was said in one uniform manner.  Gaius Fimbria shouted everything at the top of his voice.  Gnaeus Lentulus had an effective use of pauses and ejaculations, and a voice sonorous and agreeable.  Publius Lentulus covered up his slowness of thought and speech by dignity of bearing; his action was full of art and grace, and he possessed a strong and pleasing voice.  He had nothing but delivery.  Marcus Piso had a natural acumen which he had sharpened by training.  Gaius Piso (son-in-law of Cicero's) was a stationary orator or quiet type, his manner of speaking was wholly conversational.  He had zeal and industry.  He also had self-control, devotion.  Gnaeus Pompeius had a fine voice and great dignity of bearing, elements that made his delivery impressive.  Titus Torquatus possessed a fair and natural endowment for ready and fluent speaking.  Gnaeus Lentulus Marcellinus possessed a sonorous voice and considerable wit.  Gaius Memmius was highly trained in letters, but only in Greek, since he despised Latin.  Julius Caesar is the purest user of the Latin tongue.  He is master of an eloquence which is brilliant and with no suggestion of routine, and which in respect to voice, gesture, and the speaker's whole physique, possesses a certain noble and high-bred quality.  His orations are admirable.  Catulus the Elder had natural charm of his voice and nice enunciation, which gave him the reputation of pure speech.  Lucius Lentulus had a pleasing voice, and his diction was not too harsh; his whole style of speaking was intense, even threatening.  Titus Postumius as a political orator spoke with the same energy that he showed as a soldier, unbridled and bitter, but with sound knowledge of constitutional law and precedents.  Marcus Calidius had words not left loose or disjointed but bound together by rhythms.  He made use of word play and figures.  He saw clearly the point at issue.  He had a general manner of speaking quietly and sincerely.  He had perfect lucidity of exposition (docere) and the ability to hold his audience by the charm of his words (delectere).  But he was unable to rouse the listener (movere), for he had no force or intensity.  Publius Crassus had a good, if not brilliant, mind, his language was choice and abundant, and he had dignity without arrogance, and modesty without sloth.  But he was overly ambitious.  Gaius Licinius Calvus engaged in excessive self-examination and fear of admitting error; hence, he lost true vitality.  [Calvus introduced in Rome the new Attic oratorical style, a revolt against the abundance and elaboration of the traditional Roman manner represented by Cicero and Hortensius.  Hegesias of Magnesia {fl. 300 BC} was the Greek inaugurator of the florid and affected Asiatic style.  The earliest teachers of oratory at Rome were from Asiatic schools, and Roman oratory down to and including Cicero was essentially Asiatic].  Hortensius possessed a very accurate memory and was highly devoted to his studies.  He was unique in establishing heads of divisions of what he meant to say, followed by summaries of what had been said on the other side, and of what he himself had said.  He was brilliant in his choice of words, as well as fastidious and felicitous in their combination.  He engaged avidly in rhetorical exercises.  He always knew his case by heart and divided it sharply into its parts.  His voice was sonorous and agreeable.  His delivery and gesture even a little too studied for the orator.  His oratorical style was Asiatic (as was Cicero's).  His type of (Asiatic) eloquence lacked weight and authority and was better suited to his youth.  Cicero himself studied philosophy in Athens, with Antiochus, of the Old Academy; he also studied rhetorical exercises in Athens under Demetrius the Syrian.  He then went to Rhodes to study with Molo.  Molo allegedly changed Cicero's redundant and excessive style (hah!).  No one before Cicero had embraced philosophy the way he did, nor master thoroughly the civil law, or knew thoroughly Roman history, or provoked a smile or open laughter, or understood how to amplify a case, or enliven it with a brief digression, or inspire in the judge a feeling of angry indignation, or move him to tears, or in short sway his feelings in whatever direction the situation demanded (NB: This is an example of Ciceronian modesty, no doubt).  Cicero rests his hopes on Brutus (hence his dedication of this treatise to him).
END OF BRUTUS




THE ORATOR (ORATOR):

            The Orator was written in 46 BC.  It is the latest of Cicero's rhetorical works and rounds out the discussion of questions raised in the earlier works with a brilliant defense of his own career as an orator.  It takes the form of a letter addressed to Marcus Junius Brutus and answers a request from Brutus for a picture of the perfect orator.  Most of the treatise is devoted to elocutio.  There is a bare allusion to memoria.  Inventio, collocatio, and actio are dismissed in a few paragraphs.  It is not a complete and impartial account of the perfect orator but a defense of Cicero's own oratorical practice against the criticism of the Attici (Calvus and Brutus represented this type).  The Attici called for a plan and lucid style with a minimum of rhetorical ornament, a studied neglect of rhythm, and an infrequent use of emotional appeal.  Their style was the severe style of the logician; their object to instruct rather than to move.  They took as models the Attic writers of the fifth and early fourth centuries: Thucydides, Lysias, Xenophon (a historian, an orator, and a philosopher turned historian).  They were purists.  Cicero was denounced by the Attici for exuberance and verbosity, for the use of rhythmical cadences, and the frigidity of his wit.  To the Attici Cicero opposes Demosthenes, the master of all styles.  Cicero devotes a large portion of this work to prose rhythms, the Orator being the best ancient account of the theory and practice of prose rhythm.  The MSS containing the whole of the Orator are derived from a codex found in 1421 by Gherardo Landriani, bishop of Lodi.  It contained De inventione, the Ad Herennium, the De oratore, the Brutus, and the Orator. 

ORATOR:

            The book is dedicated to Brutus and engages in the search for the ideal orator.  One must have physical endowment, outstanding intellectual ability, and be sufficiently trained in cultural studies.  The perfect orator perhaps has never existed.  With our minds we conceive the ideal of perfect eloquence, but with our ears we catch only the copy.  Patterns of things (called ideas by Plato) do not become; they exist for ever and depend on intellect and reason.  Whatever ability Cicero possesses comes from the specious grounds of the Academy, not from the workshops of the rhetoricians.  But the orator has not received sufficient training from the philosophers for pleading in the courts of law.  That was left for the ruder Muses.  The eloquence of the courts was scorned and rejected by the philosophers.  As a result, the learned lacked an eloquence which appealed to the people, and the fluent speakers lacked the refinement of sound learning.  Philosophy is essential for the education of our ideal orator.  It helps the orator as physical training helps the actor.  For no one can discuss great and varied subjects in a copious and eloquent style without philosophy.  Without philosophical training we cannot distinguish the genus and species of anything, nor define it nor divide it into subordinate parts, nor separate truth from falsehood, nor recognize consequents, distinguish contradictories, or analyze ambiguities.  No one attains to that true and perfect eloquence because there is one course of training in thought, and another in expression; from one group of teachers we seek instruction in facts, from others instruction in language.  Cicero invites Butus to search for the perfect orator to see what he would be like.
            There are three oratorical styles: 1) the orators of the grandiloquent style showed splendid power of thought and majesty of diction; they were forceful, versatile, copious, and grave, trained and equipped to arouse and sway the emotions.  2) At the other extreme were the plain orators who explained everything and made every point clear rather than impressive, using a refined, concise style stripped of ornament.  3) Within these two there is a mean and tempered style.  Demosthenes represents ideal eloquence.  No one has excelled him in the powerful, the adroit, or the tempered style.  The eloquence of the orators has always been controlled by the good sense of the audience.  The Attic manner of speech (refined and precise) belonged to Lysias.  One must concede that ornate, vehement, and eloquent language is found in the Attic style of Aeschines and Demosthenes (although the singing, whining voice, and violent modulations are part of the Asiatic manner).
            There are three kinds of speeches: 1) the epideictic (show pieces for the pleasure they will give), found in eulogies, descriptions (where the audience act as spectators, not judges), histories (history in antiquity was regarded as a branch of rhetoric [cf. Plutarch's Lives]), and exhortations (cf. Isocrates's Panegyric), many of the orations of the Sophists (e.g., Gorgias of Leontini), and all other speeches unconnected with battles of public life.  This style increases one's vocabulary and allows the use of a somewhat greater freedom in rhythm and sentence structure.  It also indulges in a neatness and symmetry of sentences, and uses well defined and rounded periods.  It does not conceal adornment, but shows it.  The epideictic oration has a sweet, fluent, and copious style, with bright conceits and sounding phrases.  It is the proper field for sophists and is fitter for the parade than for the battle; set apart for the gymnasium and the palaestra (a wrestling school), it is spurned and rejected in the forum.  It is the cradle of the orator. 
            The orator must consider three things: 1) what to say  (inventio) 2) in what order (dispositio), and 3) in what manner (actio) and style (elocutio) to say it.  Our perfect orator then should be acquainted with the topics of reasoning and argument, for in all matters under controversy and debate, the questions which are asked are: 1) Was it done? (Is it?) [this question is answered by evidence]; 2) What was done? (What is it?) [this question is answered by definition]; 3) What was the nature of the act? (Of what sort is it?) [this question is answered by the principles of right and wrong].  The outstanding orator always removes the discussion from particular times and persons, because the discussion can be made broader about a class than about an individual, so that whatever is proved about the class must necessarily be true of the individual.  Such general discussion is called a thesis.  Topics are signs or indications of the arguments from which a whole speech can be formed on either side of the question.  Our orator, finding certain definite topics enumerated, will run rapidly over them all, select those which fir the subject, and then speak in general terms.  This is the source of the commonplaces (general arguments).  Once the orator has gained attention by the introduction, he will establish his own case, refute and parry the opponent's argument, choosing the strongest points for the opening and closing, and insert the weaker points in between.  Fluency and volubility please those who make eloquence depend on swiftness of speech; others like clearly marked pauses and breathing spells. 
            Manner of speech: 1) delivery and 2) use of language.  Delivery is a sort of language of the body, since it consists of movement or gesture as well as of voice or speech.  Gestures include facial expression.  Demosthenes was right in considering delivery the first, second, and third in importance.  The one who seeks supremacy in eloquence will strive to speak a) intensely with a vehement tone, b) gently with a lowered voice, and to show c) dignity in a deep voice, and d) wretchedness by a plaintive tone.  There is, moreover, even in speech, a sort of singing, especially in the epilogue.  The superior orator will vary and modulate his voice.  He will also use gestures in such a way as to avoid excess.  He will maintain an erect and lofty carriage, with but little pacing to and fro, and never for a long distance.  As for darting forward, he will keep it under control and employ it but seldom.  There should be no effeminate bending of the neck, no twiddling of the fingers, no marking the rhythm with the finger-joint.  He will control himself by the pose of his whole frame, and the vigorous and manly attitude of the body, extending the arm in moments of passion, and dropping it in calmer moods.  The countenance provides dignity and charm.  There must be a careful control of the eyes, for as the face is the image of the soul, so are the eyes its interpreters.  The style of the philosophers is gentle and academic and has no equipment of words or phrases that catch the popular fancy.  It is not arranged in rhythmical periods, but is loose in structure.  There is no anger in it, no hatred, no ferocity, no pathos, no shrewdness.  "[I]t might be called a chaste, pure, and modest virgin" (p. 353).  Consequently it is called conversation rather than oratory.  The Sophists are on the look-out for ideas that are neatly put rather than reasonable.  History is nearly related to this style (?).  It involves a narrative in an ornate style, with here and there a description of a country or a battle, with occasional harangues and speeches of exhortation.  The aim is a smooth and flowing style, not the terse and vigorous language of the orator.  The poetic style has rhythm and verse.  In oratory, only rhythm is used, never (or occasionally) verse.  Poets have a greater freedom in the formation and arrangement of words than orators have, and they pay more attention to sound than to sense.  "Distinguishing the orator, then, in point of style from the philosopher, the sophist, the historian, and the poet, we must set forth what he is to be" (p. 357) [NB: Cicero uses the figure of frequentatio in this passage]. 
            The man of eloquence will be able to speak in court or in deliberative bodies so as to prove, to please, to sway or persuade.  To prove is the first necessity, to please is charm, to sway is victory.  For these three functions of the orator there are three styles: 1) the plain style for proof, 2) the middle style for pleasure, and 3) the vigorous style for persuasion.  The foundation of eloquence is wisdom.  In an oration, as in life, nothing is harder than to determine what is appropriate.  This is called decorum (Greek ??????> prepon) or propriety.  Moreover, the orator must have an eye to propriety not only in thought but in language (too much is more offensive than too little).  Propriety is what is fitting and agreeable to an occasion or person.  It is important often in actions as well as in words, in the expression of the face, in gesture, and in gait.  Even the actor seeks for propriety.  Totally different styles must be used in a speech, as well as in the different parts of the speech.  The true Attic orator is restrained and plain.  The orator must also use certain rhythms with a definite plan. 
            The language (of the plain or simple style of oratory) must be pure Latin, plain and clear.  Propriety will always be the chief aim.  The orator will employ an abundance of apposite maxims, dug out from every conceivable place.  The individual word wins approval that has the best sound or expresses best an idea.  In variations, use metaphors, occasionally use archaic language.  Words connected together embellish a style if they produce a certain symmetry.  The plain orator will avoid figures such as clauses of equal length, with similar endings, or identical cadences, and the studied charm produced by the change of a letter, lest the elaborate symmetry and a certain grasping after a pleasant effect be too obvious.  He will not represent the State as speaking or call the dead from the lower world.  His delivery is not that of tragedy nor of the stage.  He will employ only slight movements of the body, but will trust a great deal to his expression.  A bit of humor and wit help.  Cotta best exemplifies the plain style.
            The second (middle) style is fuller and somewhat more robust than the simple style, but plainer than the grandest style.  In this style there is perhaps a minimum of vigor, and a maximum of charm.  All the ornaments are appropriate to this type of oration.  The orator's style is calm and peaceful.  There follows a discussion of some figures like hypallage (metonymy), metaphor, and allegory.  This speaker will develop his arguments with breadth and erudition, and use commonplaces without undue emphasis.  The philosophical schools produce such orators (of the middle style).  Hortensius best exemplifies the middle style.
            The orator of the third (grandiloquent) style is magnificent, opulent, stately, and ornate, and undoubtedly has the greatest power.  This eloquence has power t sway men's minds and move them in every possible way.  This grandiloquent orator (grand, impetuous, fiery), if he does not temper his abundance with the other two styles, is much to be despised.  For the plain orator is esteemed wise because he speaks clearly and adroitly; the one who employs the middle style is charming; but the copious speaker, if he has nothing else, seems to be scarcely sane.  Sulpicius best represents the grand style. 
            The perfect orator is eloquent if he can discuss commonplace matters simply, lofty subjects impressively, and topics ranging between in a tempered style.  He will be an eloquent speaker who can discuss trivial matters in a plain style, matters of moderate significance in the tempered style, and weighty affairs in the grand manner (NB: in order words, he used wisdom or prudence).  The man of perfect eloquence should possess the faculty of fluent and copious speech and acquire the science of logic (dialectic).  The perfect orator must be familiar with all the theory of disputation which can be applied to speaking.  A certain grace and style must be used in presentations.  The perfect orator must know not only logic (dialectic) but also all the topics of philosophy and have practical training in debating those topics.  He should not be ignorant of natural philosophy.  He must not be ignorant of the divine order of nature nor of human affairs.  He should understand the civil law.  He should know the history of events of past ages, particularly of our (Roman) state, as well as of imperial nations and famous kings.  To be ignorant of what occurred before you were born is to remain always a child.  For what is the worth of human life, unless it is woven into the life of our ancestors by the records of history.  Moreover, the mention of antiquity and the citation of examples give a speech authority and credibility, as well as pleasure to an audience.  He must be acquainted with the different types of cases.  He must be aware of disputes and controversies in facts and words. 
            The rules for arguments: 1) from probability (these require art: win the favor of the audience [exordium], set the facts briefly and clearly [narratio], prove the case [confirmatio], demolish the opposition's case with conclusive arguments [refutatio], and inflame the passions of the audience [peroratio]) and from 2) documentary evidence (these are given).  Wisdom is used to adapt oneself to occasions and persons.  He will be eloquent who can adapt his speech to fit all conceivable circumstances.  A rich subject will not be treated meagerly; nor a grand subject in a paltry way: the speech will be proper and adequate to the subject.  The beginning will be modest; the narrative will be credible, expressed almost in the tone of everyday conversation.  As the subject rises in importance, the style will become more elevated.  When a case presents itself in which the full force of eloquence can be expended, the orator will display his powers more fully.  Then he will rule and sway men's minds, and move them as he will, that is as the nature of the cause and the exigency of the occasion demands. 
            A discussion of a general principle is called a thesis (in Greek) or a proposition.  There are also amplifications that require commonplaces.  There are two topics which arouse admiration for an orator's eloquence: 1) ethikon > ethos > "expressive of character," habits and intercourse of life, and 2) pathetikou > pathos > "relating to the emotion," what arouses and excites the emotions.  In this last part oratory reigns supreme.  The first is courteous and agreeable, adapted to win goodwill.  The second is violent, hot, and impassioned, and by this, cases are wrested from our opponents; when it rushes along in full career it is quite irresistible.  Appeals to sympathy may be aroused by other than verbal means, e.g., hold a babe in your arms during a peroration.  The juror must be made to be angry or appeased, to feel ill will, or to be well disposed; he must be made to feel scorn or admiration, hatred or love, desire or loathing, hope or fear, joy or sorrow. 
            Among the figures of embellishment, the metaphor, by virtue of the comparison involved, transports the mind and brings it back, and moves it hither and thither, and this rapid stimulation of thought in itself produces pleasure.
            Figures of thought are of greater importance (than figures of diction).  The whole essence of oratory is to embellish in some fashion all or most of the ideas.  The orator, like Demosthenes, will make frequent use of these figures. 
            Practical knowledge is pleasing to men, but a clever tongue suspect.
            The arrangement (collocatio) of words in the sentence has three ends in view: 1) that final syllables may fit the following initial syllables as neatly as possible, and that the words may have the most agreeable sounds (synaloepha); 2) that the vey form and symmetry of the words may produce their own rounded period (length); and 3) that the period may have an appropriate rhythmical cadence (prosody).  For as the eye looks ahead in reading, so in speaking the mind will foresee what is to follow.  For however agreeable or important thoughts may be, still if they are expressed in words which are ill arranged, they will offend the ear.  We are not allowed to make a pause between vowels, even if we should wish to do so (no hiatus).  Consonants are frequently omitted in contractions, for greater smoothness.  Men's names are shortened to make them more compact.  Words are often contracted, not for convenience, but merely for the sake of sound.  Cicero is glad to follow custom which favors the ear (NB: hence, he would be an "Anomalist," someone who takes usage as the guide to correctness of speech [the opposite would be the "Analogists," who endeavored to formulate rules and remove the irregularities from the language]).  Speech should gratify the ear.  Custom, untaught, is an artificer of sweet sounds.  The decision as to subject-matter and words to express it belongs to the intellect; but in the choice of sounds and rhythms the ear is the judge.  The former (words and thoughts) are dependent on the understanding; the latter (sounds and rhythms) on pleasure.  Therefore, reason determines the rules of art in the former case; and sensation in the latter.  Two things charm the ear: sound and rhythm.  One should select the most euphonious words.  Sentences become rhythmical unintentionally if they have similar endings, or if clauses are equally balanced, or if contrary ideas are opposed (in an antithesis).  Gorgias (the Sophist) was the first to strive for this sort of symmetry. The rhythm was not studied but was the natural result of the thought. 
            On the well-knit rhythm of prose: My ear (Cicero's) rejoices in a full and rounded period; it feels a deficiency, and does not like an excess.  I have often seen the whole assembly burst into a cheer in response to a happy cadence.  For the ear expects the words to bind the sentence together.  The rhythmical ending was a later invention.  But the word rhythm is invidious when it is said to be employed in judicial and forensic oratory.  It seems too much like a trick to catch the ear, if the orator in the midst of his speech, is hunting for rhythms.  But if the subject-matter has merit, and the words are well chosen, why should they prefer to let the sentence limp or stop short rather than keep pace with the thought?  The passages of the speeches of the old orators that are most highly praised are generally those which end rhythmically.  Aristotle forbids the use of verse in an oration, but requires rhythm.  Nature herself has implanted in our ears the power of judging long and short sounds, as well as high and low pitches in words.  Isocrates was the first to introduce rhythm in prose (although the inventor was Thrasymachus).  For when he observed that people listened to orators with solemn attention, but to poets with pleasure, he is said to have sought rhythms to use in prose as well.  Gorgias was the first to employ clauses of equal length, with similar endings, and with antithesis, which, by their very nature, generally have a rhythmical cadence.  For the ear, or rather the mind which receives the message of the ear contains in itself a natural capacity for measuring all sounds.  Accordingly it distinguishes between long and short and always looks for what is complete and well proportioned.  Phrases that are too long or run beyond reasonable bounds are rejected by the ear, for excess is more offensive than deficiency.  Verse itself is not recognized by abstract reason, but by our natural feeling.  Later on theory measured the verse and showed us what happened.  The art of poetry, therefore, arose from observation and investigation of a phenomenon of nature (NB: in other words, poetry is a natural phenomenon).  Two things lend flavor to prose: 1) pleasing words and 2) agreeable rhythms.  Words furnish a certain raw material which is the business of rhythm to polish.  It is clear, then, that prose should be bound or restricted by rhythm, but that it should not contain actual verses.  The foot, which is employed in rhythms, is of three types: 1) the dactyl ( ' - - [tangerine]), the iambus ( - ' [attempt]), and the paean ( ' - - - or - - - ' [formidable]).  Our speech consists largely of iambi.  The iambic rhythm is the closest to ordinary speech.  It is chiefly used in the drama.  It is used in plain, simple, conversational style.  The dactylic rhythm is better suited to the lofty style of hexameter (epic) verse.  This rhythm is used in both plain and elevated speeches.  The most pleasant and stately prose rhythm is the paean (NB: Quintilian would agree with this assessment), although poetry frown upon it.  This is a stately rhythm, and the best cadence according to the ancients.  The cretic rhythm is also pleasant ( ' - ' ["happy days"]).  Trochaic rhythm ( ' -) is short and undignified (it is a dancing rhythm).  The spondee ( ' ' ["White founts . . ."]) and the tribrach (- - - ["Break, break, break") are not to be used: the former is too rapid; the latter too slow.  The rhythms used in verse are the same rhythms used in prose.  Prose without rhythm is too loose, rambling, and vulgar.  But too much rhythm would be deemed as too strict, confined, and artificial.  Audiences find words and ideas pleasurable.  Every passage that does not waver, but advances steadily and uniformly is considered rhythmical.  And in spoken prose, a passage is regarded as rhythmical not when it is composed entirely of metrical forms, but when it comes very close to being so.  That is why prose is harder to write than verse, for in the latter there is a definite and fixed law which must be followed.  In a speech there is no rule, except that the style must not be straggling or cramped or loose or chaotic.  The end of a sentence should be the most rhythmical, since the ear is always awaiting the end and takes pleasure in it, hence, the end should not be without rhythm (NB: this explains the use of vibrato by preachers).  Practice in writing will enable an orator to start the rhythm at the beginning of a sentence, and not just at the end.  All the words at the beginning and in the middle should look to that rhythmic end.  A sentence must end with euphony, symmetry, and rhythm.  However, this style of prose should not be used in forensic speeches constantly, for a continuous use of rhythm wearies the audience or angers even the layman, who realizes the trick.  It would rob the audience of their natural sympathy and destroy the impression of sincerity.  Rhythmic speech is most appropriate in ornate laudatory passages (in encomia) and in amplifications as well as perorations ("if it doesn't fit, you must acquit").  It is also appropriate when the audience have been won over by the speaker.  This style should not be maintained for a long time in the rest of the speech.  A vigorous dispute requires speed; exposition requires a slower rhythm.  There is no thought which can bring credit to an orator unless it is fitly and perfectly expressed, nor is any brilliance of style revealed unless the words are carefully arranged.  Both thought and diction are embellished by rhythm.  A sentence should not drift along vaguely like a river but because the rhythm brings it to a necessary close.  Even boxers and gladiators make graceful motions in combat (cf. Brazilian capoeira [ritualized martial arts <picture>] or Filipino komedya duels <picture>).  The speech of those who do not form their sentences with a rhythmical cadence seems to me to resemble the movements of those whom the Greeks call apalaistrous > "untrained in gymnastics."  A great deal of practice is required.  Asiatics are slaves to rhythm and add extra words for the sake of rhythms.  To speak with well-knit rhythm without ideas is folly; to present ideas without order and rhythm in the language is to be speechless. 
            "You have my judgment, Brutus, of what an orator should be."

END OF ORATOR


Filipina komedya

Brazilian capoeira

II. Speeches:

In Catilinam (1, 2, 3, 4):

       Lucius Sergius Catilina (108-62 BC) was a patrician, a Roman Senator, and an agrarian (the populares) reformer. In 65 BC, he was accused, along with Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, of trying to kill a number of consuls (the aristocratic Optimates) in order to seize power.  This is known as The First Catilinarian Conspiracy, even though historians doubt Catiline was involved in this scheme. The Second Catilinarian Conspiracy (63 BC), promoting debt relief, was a plot to overthrow the Roman Republic. It was led by Catiline and other high ranking members like Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura, Publius Autronius Paetus, Lucius Cassius Longinus, and Gaius Cethegus. Cicero discovered the plot, obtained dictatorial powers from the Senate, accused Catiline of treason, managed to have the Senate condemn him and others to death (Julius Caesar, one of the triumvirs [the others were Crassus and Pompey], opposed this drastic action against noble Roman citizens), and claimed to have saved the Republic. His famous and eloquent four orations against Catiline are known as the Catiline Orations (Oratio in Catilinam).

THE FIRST SPEECH AGAINST LUCIUS SERGIUS CATILINA (Oratio in L. Catilinam prima). Delivered in the Roman Senate on 8 Nov. 63 BC.

       Cicero addresses Catiline directly (notice the absence of a proemium): "In heaven's name, Catiline, how long will you take advantage of our forbearance?" Notice the famous line «O tempora, o mores!» (32; 2: "What an age we live in!") Notice the series of rhetorical interrogatives and isocola: "Do you think that there is a man among us who does not know what you did last night or the night before last, where you were, whom you summoned to your meeting, what decision you reached?" Notice the answer and the swift condemnation: "The Senate knows it all, the consul sees it, and yet--this man is still alive." Cicero accuses Catiline of planning the senators' death (Catiline had previously threated Cicero's life). Cicero introduces the desire to apply the death penalty at this early stage of the speech: "You, Catiline, should have been led to your death long ago and on a consul's orders." An antecedent is mentioned: Publius Scipio, a private citizen, killed Tiberius Gracchus, a tribune (not a traitor) who supported agrarian reforms. Cicero blames himself for his compassion, inaction, and negligence (e.g., for not having put Catiline to death for treason). In Etruria, Italy, there is a camp of enemies of the State. Catiline will be executed only when all see the justice of such act. Cicero is aware of all of Catiline's moves: "Nothing you do, no attempt you make, no plan you form, but I hear of it, see it, and know of it" (notice the double triple parallelism). Cicero accuses Catiline of having plotted to kill him earlier and commands him to leave the city (Rome): "You cannot remain among us any longer; I cannot, I will not, I must not permit it" (notice the anaphoras). Cicero praises the gods, especially Jupiter, for guarding the city of such pestilence. 
       If before, Catiline attacked Cicero, now he is attacking "the whole commonwealth" (notice the increase from singular to plural, from private to public). Everybody fears Catiline, everybody hates Catiline. He murdered his first wife to marry another. However, "I omit these crimes" (but he has named them or alluded to them, thus creating suspicion). Cicero claims he does not hate Catiline; he pities him, albeit undeservedly. When he sat in the Senate, all other Senators moved away from him. The native land ("the mother of us all") hates Catiline. If "she" could talk, she would say "Depart [. . .] that I may not be destroyed" (notice the prosopopoeia). Cicero believes that Catiline would be glad to depart if the Senate exiles him. But Cicero will not ask the Senate to do this, since it is contrary to his practice. Instead, "Leave the city, Catiline, free the commonwealth from fear." Cicero asks him to observe the Senate's silence: "their inaction signifies approval, their acquiescence a decision and their silence applause."
       Cicero knows Catiline has already sent men to the town of Forum Aurelium (50 miles from Rome) and has agreed with his tool Gaius Manlius on a day to attack the Republic. Catiline has a band of evil men, "the refuse of society." They enjoy debauchery. The seek acts of "banditry not war." According to Cicero, "Never in this city have these who have rebelled against the State kept the right of citizens." In other words, traitors should be deprived of their citizenship. By wishing to punish Catiline, Cicero is doing the honorable thing, even if it should prove unpopular. If Catiline is killed, this "cancer" of the State can be held in check. It would be preferable that he banish with his followers and marches off to other lands: "Let the traitors, then, depart." 
       Jupiter, the Supporter of the city, will visit them with eternal punishment.

THE SECOND SPEECH AGAINST LUCIUS SERGIUS CATILINA (Oratio in L. Catilinam secunda). Delivered before the people on 9 Nov. 63 BC.

       "At long last, citizens, we have expelled Lucius Catilina," says Cicero (notice the captatio and the use of the plural): "He has gone, left us, got away, broken out." Notice the anaphoras: "No longer. . . ." (69; 1) and "because . . ." (69; 2). "And the city? I think that it is thankful that is has vomited forth that deadly pestilence and rid itself of it." (71; 3). Cicero wishes Catilina had been put to death long ago. But many doubted Cicero's charges. Cicero would have gladly lost popularity and even his life to save the commonwealth. Cicero claims that lowly persons had communion with Catilina, including poisoners, gladiator, bandits, assassins, parricides, forgers, cheats, gluttons, spendthrifts, adulterers, whores, corrupters of youth, rogues, scoundrels (notice the congeries and the final asyndeton) [75; 7]. "They" think of nothing but murder, arson, and pillage (check the Latin) [77; 10]. Cicero claims there are no foreigners or kings left to fear (79; 11). Cicero is not the cruelest of tyrants but the most vigilant of consuls (notice the antithesis). He has saved the citizens (quirites) from civil war (83; 15). 
       Cicero then gives a catalogue of the types of men who followed Catiline: 1) those with heavy debts, 2) those overwhelmed with debts who expect to enjoy absolute power, 3) those who are old but yet physically fit who have run deeply in debt, 4) troublemakers who have been in debt for years, 5) parricides, assassins and criminals, 6) Catiline's intimate and luxurious friends: gamblers, adulterers, lechers, effeminate and poisoner boys (93; 23), and ponces (leeches): "On our side fights decency, on theirs viciousness; on our side morality, on theirs debauchery; on ours good faith, on theirs deceit; . . . on ours honour, on theirs disgrace; on ours self-control, on theirs a surrender to passion; in short, justice, moderation, bravery, wisdom, all the virtues, contend with injustice, intemperateness, cowardice, folly, all the vices" (95; 25) [notice the isocola, the antitheses, the accumulation, and the summation). Cicero urges the people to defend their homes with patrols and guards. Cicero promises to punish only a few so that "you can all be saved" (99; 28). The suppression of the conspiracy was undertaken by the virtue (power) of the Senate and the providence of the gods (98; 29). The foreign and now distant enemies have been removed from the most beautiful, most prosperous, and most powerful city in the world (99; 29). 

THE THIRD SPEECH AGAINST LUCIUS SERGIUS CATILINA (Oratio in L. Catilinam tertia). Delivered before the people on 3 Dec. 63 BC.

       Cicero addresses the Roman citizens (quirites): "It is I who have quenched the fires which were on the point of being set to the whole city, to its temples, its shrines, its houses and its walls and which were about to engulf them" (101; 2). Cicero gives the people a detail of the conspiracy he discovered and suppressed. Catiline has left the city (on 8 Nov.) but has left criminal accomplices in Rome. Cicero claims that Titus Volturcius, a supporter of Catiline, had instructions from Publius Lentulus (Marc Antony's stepfather) and a letter to Catiline wherein he urges him to rally the slaves, march on Rome, and set fire to every part of the city (NB: this would have terrified the Romans, who would recall the 73-71 BC Third Servile War led by Spartacus, which cost c. 50,000 Roman lives; also, 19 Dec. was the Saturnalia, when special license was given to slaves. It is unlikely Catiline would have considered this option. Also, Volturcius was given immunity for this information; Lentulus was executed, which eventually caused Cicero's life, on Marc Antony's orders). Cicero informs the people that the Senate decided to remove Lentulus from the praetorship (he was a magistrate) and be given into custody, along with Catiline associates Gaius Cornelius Cethegus (executed on 5 Dec.), Lucius Statilius (executed on 5 Dec.), and Publius Gabinius. The Senate, in its "kindness," decides to punish nine conspirators to save the Republic and bring the others to their senses (117; 15).
       Cicero recalls (portrayal [effictio]) that Catiline had a genius for crime and was able to win many people over with his tongue. He could also endure cold, thirst, and hunger. There were divine portents at the time of the conspiracy: meteors, thunderbolts, earthquakes. Even the soothsayers from Etruria (the traditional home of augury) had foretold murder and arson, the end of the rule of law, rebellion and civil war, the destruction of the city and the (Republican) empire. At that time, the statue of Jupiter Optimus Maximus was erected. Only then did the Senate and the people saw clearly the imminent conspiracy (125; 21-22).  Hence, although Cicero foiled the treason, Jupiter was the one who truly hindered the traitors. One must have a thanksgiving to the gods for their mercy. Rome has been spared, under Cicero's consulship, the cruelty of a civil war. Since it is now night, the people should pray to Jupiter and go home now (133; 29).

THE FOURTH SPEECH AGAINST LUCIUS SERGIUS CATILINA (Oratio in L. Catilinam quarta). Delivered in the Senate on 5 Dec. 63 BC.

       Cicero addresses the Roman "gentlemen" (patres): He sees they are concerned at their own danger and that of the Republic, as well as Cicero's. He hopes the gods who watch over the city will recompense him for his services. If anything should happen to him, he will die calm and resigned (137; 3). He often thinks back to his home and his "terror-stricken wife," daughter, boy, and son-in-law. He tells the patres they should devote their energies to the salvation of the State. There are in custody those men who stayed in Rome (Catiline's men) to burn it and massacre the citizens. There is evidence of their letters, seals, handwriting, and confessions. They had tampered with the Allobroges (Celts from Gaul [southern France and modern-day Switzerland]) and the slaves to attack Rome. This evil (Catiline's) has spread across Italy, crossed the Alps, and taken hold of many provinces (hyperbole): "Holding back and delay are quite useless in crushing it; your punishment, whatever form it takes, must be a swift one" (141; 6). So far there are two proposals in the Senate: 1) Decimus Silanus (consul) proposes that those who have attempted to destroy Rome should be punished by death. 2) Gaius (Julius) Caesar (consul and general) opposes the death penalty but advocates the full rigor of the law. Cicero claims Julius Caesar has taken the "democratic side of politics," wishing, like the absent Marcus Licinius Crassus (also a democrat, a consul, a general, and one of three members of the First Triumvirate, consisting of Crassus, Julius Caesar, and Pompey) to avoid voting on the life or death of Roman citizens (145; 10). Cicero's response is that "an enemy of the Republic cannot in any respect be regarded as a citizen" (147; 10). If the death penalty sounds cruel, reducing the penalty would be crueler to the fatherland (patria) [153; 13]. Cicero urges the patres not to fail the Roman people by failing to protect them: "Your lives, too, and the lives of our wives and children, the fortunes of you all, your houses and your hearths, depend upon the decision you have to make this day" (159; 9). 
       Cicero compares himself to the Roman generals Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus (Scipio the Elder), who defeated Hannibal in Carthage in 202 BC, thus ending the Second Punic War, and Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus Numantinus (Scipio the Younger, who was the adopted grandson of Scipio Africanus the Elder), who destroyed Carthage in 146 (Third Punic War) and Numantia (Spain) in 133. Cicero alone has preserved the Republic. Hence, he deserves public thanksgivings from Rome (161; 21). In a bout of modesty, Cicero asks merely to be remembered: "You have a consul who will not shrink from obeying your decrees and, while he lives, from defending your decisions and answering for them in person" (165; 24).


Cesare Maccari. Cicero denouncing Catiline (1888). Palazzo Madama (Rome).

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