Notes on Quintilian's
Institutiones oratoriae
(Based on the trans. by H. E. Butler, 
Loeb Classical Library 124-127 
[London: W. Heinemann; Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP])

By
Prof. A. Robert Lauer
MLLL 5063: Early Literary Criticism
OU, Fall 2006

MARCUS FABIUS QUINTILIANUS (AD ca. 35 – ca. 95):
     Quintilian, the “Father of Rhetoric,” was born in Calagurris (Calahorra [La Rioja]), in the Roman Province of Hispania Tarraconensis (Spain).  His father was a rhetorician.  As a young man, Quintilian was sent to Rome for his education.  His teachers were the grammaticus Remmius Palaemon and the rhetorician Domitius Afer.  He then returned to Hispania to teach rhetoric.  He returned to Rome in 68 AD; there, Emperor Vespasian (69-79) made him Professor of Latin Rhetoric; hence he became the first rhetorician to set up a public school and to receive a salary from the Empire.  He taught for 20 years.  Some of his famous pupils were Pliny and the two sons of Domitilla, sister of Emperor Domitian.  He was a successful pleader in the courts.  He married later in life and had two sons.  They died before him.  He wrote three works: De causis corruptae eloquentiae, Institutio oratoria, and a defense of the uxoricide Naevius Arpinianus.  Only the second work survives.  He was known as humane, kindly, and affectionate, gifted with a strong common sense and a sound literary judgment.  His style is difficult on account of compression and an epigrammatic style, but he is still under the influence of the Ciceronian (Golden) age.  The Institutio oratoria, consisting of 12 books, is highly technical.

INSTITUTIO ORATORIA:
     BOOK I: 
     PREFACE: The work is dedicated to Marcellus Victorius for the purpose of educating his son Geta.  It deals with how an orator ought to be trained since infancy.  The first essential element of a perfect orator’s education is that he should be a good man and have the gift of speech.  A good character is imperative, though.  He ought to be a good citizen and be able to guide the state with his counsel and purge vice by his judgments.  He ought to have the virtues of courage, justice, and self-control (iustitia, fortitudine, temperantia [the four cardinal virtues among the Romans <prudentia is the fourth one>]).).  He should have imagination and amplitude of diction (inventio and elocutio).  Wicked men use eloquence for profit and do not study moral philosophy or ethics.  A genuine orator is a philosopher.  The first book of the Institutio oratoria will deal the education preliminary to the duties of the teacher of rhetoric.  The second will deal with the rudiments of the schools of rhetoric.  Books 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 will deal with Invention (and Arrangement [Dispositio]).  Books 8, 9, 10, and 11 will deal with Eloquence (Elocutio) [and Memory and Delivery {Pronuntiatio}].  In book 12 the complete orator will be delineated. 
      Without natural gifts, technical rules are useless. With natural gifts, one still needs skilful teachers, persistent study, and continuous and extensive practice in writing, reading, and speaking.
     BOOK 1:
     CHAPTER 1:  Reasoning comes as naturally to man as flying to birds. Those who are dull and unteachable are but few in number. 
 A child’s nurse should speak correctly and be of good character.  She should be a philosopher.  A child’s parents (both of them) should be highly educated.  Even a child’s tutor (pedagogue) and friends should be educated.  A child should be corrected when he makes errors.  A child should learn Greek first, then Latin.  His studies should be made an amusement.  He should be questioned and praised when he has done well.  If he refuses instruction, use a child’s envy of others to make him do well.  Engage him in competition.  He should be encouraged to do his best.  The lines a child copies should express thoughts of significance and convey moral lessons.  That will help him form his character, which will last until old age.  Select poems for a child to memorize.  Children like poetry and this practice strengthens and develops the mind. 
     CHAPTER 2: No one can be a good orator unless he is also a good man.  Children should not be spoiled.  Habit becomes second nature.  Children should not be raised to become luxurious or effeminate.  Also, children should be educated in a school, with other children, and not in isolation (in private), for they will need to be stimulated by other students and set standards among themselves (models of common feeling); they also need to learn to deal with people in society eventually.  He should also engage in private study.  Teaching should not be a duty but a labor of love.  “Ambition is the mother of virtues” (51).   Emulation promotes progress.  Also, surpassing one’s peers is also good (besides emulation and competition).  A feeling of shame (disgrace) is also good.  Also, eloquence can not develop in solitude.  We need others with whom to talk.
     CHAPTER 3: Memory should be 1) quick to take in and 2) faithful to retain impressions of what it receives.  The power of imitation suggests that a child is teachable.  He who is truly gifted will also above all else be good.  A child should be spurred on by praise, delighted by success, and ready to weep over failure.  Rebuke will bite him to the quick.  Honor will be a spur.  He must not be indolent, although some relaxation should be required since play in the young is a sign of a lively disposition.  A child should be taught that his actions must be unselfish, honest, self-controlled.  No flogging (fitting only for slaves). Children who are beaten develop a negative sense of shame, the kind that unnerves and depresses the mind. 
     CHAPTER 4: A child should be taught literature as soon as he is able to read and write.  The art of writing is combined with that of speaking, and correct reading precedes interpretation.  A child should read many things (not just poetry) for the subject matter and also for the vocabulary.  Music teaches meter and rhythm.  Philosophy is necessary.  Literature is indispensable.  The force of language resides in the verbs (not the nouns).  Articles were added later to language; then prepositions, the appellations (adjectives) to nouns, then pronouns, then participles, then adverbs (for verbs).  Interjections also.  Boys should learn to decline nouns and conjugate verbs.  Names are frequently derived from races, places, and many other causes.
     CHAPTER 5: Style has three kinds of excellence: correctness, lucidity, and elegance.  Individual words will either be native or imported, simple or compound, literal or metaphorical, in current use or newly coined.  When we have to choose one of two synonyms, we ought to choose the one that sounds best.  Barbarisms and solecisms should be avoided.  Synaeresis and synaloephas are anomalies peculiar to poetry and should not be considered faults (lengthening or shortening syllables).  We must aim for an exact and pleasing articulation (correct pronunciation).  Three errors (solecisms) are pleonasms (an unnecessary addition [“shoppe” instead of “shop”]), ellipsis (omissions: “Who there?”]), and anastrophe (transposition [“I ‘aksed’ him” instead of “I ‘asked’ him”]).  Words are proper when they bear their original meaning; metaphorical when they are used in a sense different from their natural meaning.  Current words are safest to use; there is a spice of danger in coining new. 
     CHAPTER 6: Language is based on reason, antiquity, authority, and usage.  Reason finds its chief support in analogy and sometimes in etymology (this last science demands profound erudition).  Archaic words give style a certain majesty and charm if used sparingly.  Usage in speech is the agreed practice of educated men. 
     CHAPTER 7: The rule of writing well is the province of orthography.  Words should be spelt as they are pronounced.  For the use of letters is to preserve the sound of words. 
     CHAPTER 8: The practice of reading (aloud).  The golden rule here is that the reader must understand what he reads to know when the sense ends or begins, when to take a breath, when to pause, when to raise or lower the voice, when to read fast or slow, or speak with greater or lesser energy.  One’s reading should be manly and combine dignity and charm.  The voice should be modulated when impersonating another speaker. They should read what is eloquent and also morally excellent.  Start with Homer and Virgil so that they can sense the majesty of heroic verse and the greatness of themes and sentiments.  Tragedy and lyric poetry (but not Greek lyric, which is licentious) will also nourish the mind.  Comedy introduces different characters and emotions.   A child’s mind should be enlarged and his intellect nourished with good literature.  Literature also contributes richness of vocabulary.  It provides arrangement also.  It shows appropriate character.  It also gives tropes and various figures of speech. 
     CHAPTER 9: Teachers of literature are either 1) methodic? (when they deal with the art of speaking correctly) or 2) historic? (when they deal with the interpretation of authors).  A pupil should learn to write aphorisms (sententiae) [general propositions] , moral essays (chriae) [they take some action as their text], and delineations of character (ethologiae) [of persons].  Short stories from the poets should be read not for the style but as a means to increase knowledge. 
     CHAPTER 10:  Boys ought to be instructed before being handled over to the teacher of rhetoric.  Music is the oldest of the arts related to literature.  The praises of heroes and of gods were sung to the music of the lyre at the feasts of kings.  The music of the spheres corresponds to the notes of the heptachord.  The art of letters and the art of music were once united.  Music has two modes of expression: 1) in the voice (divided into rhythm [measure] and melody [sound and song]) and 2) in the body (music includes dancing).  Knowledge of music is necessary for orators (for pleading) for three reasons: 1) gestures, 2) arrangement of words, and 3) inflexions of the voice.  Eloquence varies tone and rhythm to express sublime thoughts with elevation, pleasing thoughts with sweetness; ordinary with gentle utterances.  By the raising, lowering, or inflexion of the voice, the orator stirs the emotions of the hearers.  Also, the motion of the body must be suitable and becoming (eurhythmic).  The music of old was used to praise brave men. 
 Geometry (all mathematics), concerned with a) numbers and b) figures, exercises a pupil’s mind, sharpens his wits, and generates quickness of perception.  Logical development is one of the necessities of geometry and of oratory.  Geometry arrives at its conclusions from definite premises and by arguing from what is certain proves what was previously uncertain.  By syllogism, geometry is closer to logic than to rhetoric.  The orator sometimes will prove his point by formal logic.  The most absolute form of proof is linear demonstration.  Oratory sometimes discovers the truth by the use of geometric methods.  Geometry by its calculations demonstrates the fixed and ordained courses of the stars and hence we acquire the knowledge that all things are ruled by order and destiny.
     CHAPTER 11: The comic actor will help a future orator in the art of delivery.  A boy should not talk with the shrillness of a woman or in the tremulous accents of old age, or copy the motions of a drunkard or the manners of a slave, or learn to express the emotions of love, avarice, or fear.  He must avoid staginess.  A teacher should correct faults of pronunciation and see that the utterance is distinct and that each letter has its proper sound.  No words should be uttered from the depth of the throat.  The quality of speech should be continuously maintained.  Gestures and voice should be mutually appropriate.  The speaker should face his audience.  The face should not be thrown back nor the eyes fixed on the ground, nor the neck slanted to the right or the left.  Do not raise your eyebrows while you talk (especially first one, then another) or wear a perpetual frown.  Nothing unbecoming can have a pleasant effect.  An actor can teach an orator how to deliver a narrative, how to indicate an authoritative tone (when advising), how to show excitement (to mark anger), and how to indicate a change of tone (for pathos).  Delivery, voice, and memory should be simultaneously trained.
     Gymnastics.  Devote some time to gymnastics, but don’t kill the mind by over-attention to the body.  When gesturing, the arms should be extended in a proper manner, and the hands, and the feet and head must move with poise.  Chironomy is the law of gesture.  An orator should learn to move his body in a bold and manly fashion derived not from actors on a stage but from martial and gymnastic exercises. 
     CHAPTER 12: The mind can do several things simultaneously.  Variety refreshes and restores the mind.  It is actually harder to work at one subject without intermission.  Youth can endure fatigue with greater ease than the old.  Also, the mind is all the easier to teach before it is set. 
     Oratory is the queen of all the world.

Emperor Domitianus Augustus
(51-96)

INSTITUTIO ORATORIA:
     BOOK 4:
     PREFACE: Emperor Domitian [Domitanus Augustus] has entrusted Quintilian with the education of his sisters’ grandsons.  The order to be followed in forensic causes is this one: 1) exordium (prooemio), 2) statement of facts (narratio), 3) confirmation (proofs [probatio] {confirmation of our assertions or refutation of the opponents}), 4) refutation (refutatio), and 5) peroration (peroratio) [a brief recapitulation of the facts to refresh the memory of the judge and to stir his emotions].
     CHAPER 1: The commencement or exordium is what the Greeks call a proem or prelude (a [musical] tune or introduction).  It is an introduction to the subject to win the indulgence or good will of the judges (captatio benevolentiae).  The proem is the portion of the speech addressed to the judge.  The sole purpose of the exordium is to prepare an audience to be well disposed to receive instruction.  Plaintiff (accuser), defendant (the accused), and judge (the arbiter).  Being a good man (the pleader) secures the best good will from an audience.  The case must also be free from suspicion of meanness, personal spite, or ambition.  Patriotism and personal considerations carry much weight in a case.  Appearing in a weaker position to the opponent helps, since an audience side with the underdog.  One must not give the impression of being abusive, malignant, proud, or slanderous toward any individual.  Judges also give greater credence to those whom it is a pleasure to listen.  As far as a client is concerned, we should stress his worth or his weakness.  Sex (women), age (old men or wards), and situation are also important factors in securing good will.  Praising the judge helps (appeal to his rank [if defending a client of good birth], his sense of justice [when defending the lowly], his pity [in pleading cases of misfortune], or his severity [when we champion the victims of wrong]).  Sometimes judges are hostile to us and friendly to our adversaries.  If the judge has this kind of prejudice towards us, it is our obligation to remove it or, if the opposite is the case (he is partial towards us), to strengthen it. One may also instill fear in the judge by threatening him with the displeasure of the Roman people.  The exordium differs from the peroration in that the former deals with the future, the latter with the past.  In our opening, any preliminary appeal to the compassion of the judge must be restrained, but in the peroration we may give full rein to the emotions.  External circumstances affecting a case are time, the appearance of the court, public opinion, the ill-repute of the law courts, and the popular expectation excited by the case.  Confidence may be seen as arrogance.  But one secures good will universally by expressions of wishing, detestation, entreaty, or anxiety, for it keeps the judge’s attention on the alert, if he is led to think the case novel, important, scandalous, or likely to set a precedent.  The exordium does not expound but merely propounds; it indicates the points on which the orator proposes to speak. 
     There are five kinds of causes: 1) the honorable, 2) the mean (or scandalous), 3) the doubtful or ambiguous, 4) the extraordinary (or scandalous), and 5) the obscure.  In ambiguous cases, it is especially important to secure the good will of the judge; in the obscure, to render him ready to receive instruction; in the mean to excite his attention.  Honorable cases win the approval of the judge.  In the scandalous and extraordinary, some kind of palliation is required. 
     The exordium may have two parts: 1) the introduction (where good will is secured) and 2) the insinuation (where good will insinuates itself little by little in the minds of the judges, especially in scandalous cases).  If the case is weak, we may derive help from the character of our client.  If the client’s character is doubtful, we may find salvation in the nature of the case.  If both are hopeless, we must look out for something that will damage our opponent.  When all fails, we should strive to minimize actual dislike.  When the charges cannot be denied, we should show the charges to be an exaggeration, or that the act is not what is alleged, or that the facts are irrelevant to the case, or that what was done may be atoned by penitence or that our client has already been sufficiently punished.  An opportune display of wit also helps.  Effective exordia draw their material from the speech of our opponents.  An exordium is also effective if the speaker displays a certain simplicity in his thoughts, style, voice, and looks.  Do not display too much confidence.  Judges dislike self-confidence in a pleader.  Avoid all display of art.  In fact, no art should be noticed in an exordium.  The exordium should be simple and unpremeditated.  This way it insinuates itself better into the minds of our hearers.  The length of the exordium is determined by the case.  Simple cases require a brief introduction; complicated, suspect, or unpopular cases require longer exordia.  Sometimes an apostrophe might be used (instead of addressing a judge directly).  Some exordia are vulgar, common, interchangeable, transferred, and contrary to rule.  Sometimes the exordium may be dispensed with.  At times the exordium may be used in other portions of the speech (e.g., in the Statement of Facts).  A complex case may require brief introductions in different sections (the statement of facts and the proofs). Our intention should be mentioned at the end of our introduction to provide a smooth transition to the statement of facts. 
     CHAPTER 2: The Statement of Facts.  The Statement of Facts would seem to be indispensable.  However, it may be dismissed by one of the parties.  The Statement may also be summarized in only one sentence.  The sequence of events and the motive for the deed will be matters for the defense to expound.  The Statement of Facts gives a general account of the charge before the court.  There are two Statements of Facts in forensic speeches: 1) the one expounding the facts of the case, and 2) the one that sets forth facts that have a bearing on the case.   For the purpose of the Statement of Facts is not merely to instruct but rather to persuade the judge.  The proof cannot be brought forward until the facts of the case are known.  After first rebutting the charge, we make our Statement of Facts the opening of an incrimination of the other party (just as in a fight we parry our adversary’s blows before we strike him down ourselves).  A Statement of Facts should be lucid (plain), brief, and plausible (credible).  A Statement of Facts is a persuasive exposition of that which either has been done, or is supposed to have been done.  It is a speech instructing the audience as to the nature of the case in dispute.  The Statement of Facts will be either wholly in our favor or wholly in that of our opponent or a mixture of both.  We should not be obscure (from excessive abridgment), we should preserve due proportion, and we should say only what is likely to win belief (what is necessary and sufficient).  We achieve lucidity and clearness in our Statement of Facts by setting our story in words that are appropriate, significant, and free from any taint of meanness.  Our delivery must be adapted to our matter.  It is just when an orator gives the impression of absolute truth that he is speaking best.  The Statement of Facts should be brief, concise, and have no irrelevant material.  Avoid abruptness of speech.   At times, circumstances necessitate a long Statement of Facts.  When this happens, Division [e.g., three short statements rather than one long one] of our Statement of Facts into its various heads is a method used to avoid tedium.  At times we might interrupt the narrative.  At times, a brief summary after the Statement of Facts might be necessary.  The Statement of Facts will be credible 1) if we say nothing contrary to nature, 2) if we assign reasons and motives for the facts, 3) if we keep the character of the actors in agreement with the actions to be presented (to make the act believable [a person accused of theft must be shown as covetous; an adulterer as lustful, a homicidal killer as rash, etc.]).  It might also be useful to scatter hints of our proofs here and there (in the Statement of Facts).  Our opponents may make a Statement of Facts wherein are added comments of a prejudicial nature against us and make the facts seem worse than they are by the language they might use.  If that is the case, we must restate the Statement of Facts in a different way, alleging other motives and another purpose, and putting a different complexion on the case.  Some imputations we may mitigate by the use of other words: luxury will be softened down into generosity, service into economy, carelessness into simplicity.  I would also try to get some favor or pity by look, voice, and attitude.  Sometimes a frank confession is of itself sufficient to move the jury to tears.  A Statement of Facts should be a Proof put forward in continuous form, while a Proof is a verification of the facts as put forward in the Statement of Facts.  It is important to put in our Statement of Facts anything that can be given a different complexion from that put upon it by our opponent.  The Statement of Facts may be repeated.  After all, a Statement of Facts is placed before the Proof merely to prevent the judge from being ignorant of the question at issue.  Sometimes we get a false Statement of Facts.  We must make sure not to contradict ourselves.  If we invent things, they should not be able to be checked with evidence.  We can put words in the mouth of the dead or in someone whose interests are identical to ours (for they will not contradict us), or even in the mouth of our opponents (who would not contradict us, for if they do they would not be believed).  Also, certain things can only be proved by persistent assertion.  Digressions should be short and appear to have been forced by a momentary emotion.  You can use the emotions when presenting the Statement of Facts (whose main function is to inform the judge).  If you wait for the peroration to show emotion it might be too late.  The Statement of Facts more than any other portion of our speech should be adorned with the utmost grace and charm.  The utmost care must be exercised in choice of words.  The rhythm should be unobtrusive.  There is no portion of a speech at which the judge is more attentive.  The judge is more ready to accept what charms his ear and is lured by pleasure to belief.  In some cases we might excite horror by our narration or abominable wrongs or pity by a tale of woe.  A powerful effect may be created if to the actual facts of the case we add a plausible picture of what occurred, such as will make our audience feel as if they were actual eyewitnesses of the scene.  There is also credit that accrues to the Statement of Facts from the authority of the speaker.  Such authority should first and foremost be the reward of our manner of life, but may also be conferred by our style of eloquence.  For the more dignified and serious our style, the greater will be the weight that it will lend our assertions.  We should never go to the extent of repeating the Statement of Facts in its entirety.  We can attain the same result by a repetition only of parts.  Some hold that the Statement of Facts should always begin by referring to some person, whom we must praise if he is on our side, and abuse if he is on the side of our opponents. 
     CHAPTER 3: In the natural order of things the Statement of Fact is followed by the Verification (confirmatio), for it is necessary to prove the points which we stated with the proof in view.  There is no part of speech so closely connected with any other as the Statement of Fact with the Proof.  There is room for Digression (egressio).  In difficult cases one might add a second exordium to the Proof to mollify a judge.  Digressions are used to express indignation, pity, hatred, rebuke, excuse, conciliation, or to rebut invective.  Digressions are used also to amplify or abridge a topic, to make an emotional appeal, or to introduce topics that add charm to oratory.  Some topics are inserted in the midst of matter even when they have no connection with it to strive to excite, admonish, appease, entreat, or praise the judge.  If an orator breaks away in the middle of his speech, he should not be long in returning to the point from which he departed.
     CHAPTER 4: After the Statement of Facts some place the Proposition, but the beginning of every Proof is a Proposition.  It is not always necessary to employ it.  The nature of the main question is sometimes sufficiently clear without any Proposition, especially if the Statement of Facts ends exactly where the question begins.  Consequently, the Recapitulation generally employed in the case of arguments is sometimes placed immediately after the Statement of Facts.  Sometimes Proposition is advantageous when the fact cannot be defended.  In difficult cases, Proposition makes the case clearer and serves to make it more moving.  Propositions may be single, double, or manifold.  If Propositions are combined with Proofs, they fall under the head of Partition. 
     CHAPTER 5: Partition may be defined as the enumeration in order of our own propositions, those of our adversary, or both. 

INSTITUTIO ORATORIA:
     BOOK V:
     PREFACE: The duty of the orator is to instruct and to appeal to the emotions.  Of the five parts into which one divides judicial cases (IO 3.9.1), any single of them may on occasion be dispensed with except the Proof.  There can be no suit without Proof.
     CHAPTER 1: There are two kinds of Proofs: 1) Inartificial Proofs (proofs requiring no art on the orator’s part, hence: decisions of previous courts, rumors, evidence extracted by torture, documents, oaths, and witnesses) and 2) Artificial Proofs (deduced by the orator himself, involving art).
     CHAPTER 2: Decisions of previous courts: precedents, praeiudicium.  Two cases are scarcely ever alike in all their details.
     CHAPTER 3: Rumors: the verdict of public opinion for some; vague talk and malignity for others.  It will be easy for both parties to produce precedents to support their arguments.
     CHAPTER 4: Evidence extracted by torture: an infallible method of discovering the truth for some; prone to result in false testimony in the opinion of others.
     CHAPTER 5: Documents: they can be rebutted and attacked as forgeries.
     CHAPTER 6: Oaths: a sign of bad faith unless both parties (defender and opponent) take it.
     CHAPTER 7: Evidence may be given orally (by witnesses present in court) or in writing.  Documentary evidence is easier to dispose of.  The absence of the witness who signed a document is an indication of bad faith.  One can also attack the witnesses to someone’s signature.  Witnesses (in court) can be made to trip; once a witness loses his composure and presence of mind he will do more harm to his own side than good.  Reluctant witnesses should be extorted to tell the truth.  This is done by questioning that seems irrelevant (about antecedent or subsequent acts related to the case) and which will lure him into making an admission or a contradiction (by comparing previous with subsequent replies).  Keep him in the witness-box for an unusual length of time.  Make him a suspect witness so that the opposition will get rid of him while it can.  Too few witnesses? > Insufficient evidence.  Too many? > A conspiracy.  Minimize the importance of inconspicuous witnesses.  If the witnesses are too powerful, complain about undue influence.  A timid witness may be terrorized; a fool outwitted; an irascible man provoked; vanity flattered; a shrewd and self-possessed witness should be dismissed as malicious and obstinate; if a witness’s past life admits of criticism, his credit may be overthrown; honest and respectable witnesses should not be pushed too hard so that they can be mollified by courtesy.  Skill in examination comes from natural talent of practice.  Fortune at times is kind and gives us a witness who is inconsistent or one who contradicts himself.  Questions should be asked in everyday speech so that even the uneducated can understand them.  Documentary evidence is not frequently in conflict with oral.  Supernatural evidence.  So much for Inartificial Proofs.
     CHAPTER 8: And now to Artificial Proofs, those requiring art and which are shown to produce belief.  Much can be gained by pleasing the audience and stirring their emotions.  Nothing can be proved except by reference to something else (greater, less than, or equal to it).  All Proofs fall into three classes: 1) necessary, 2) credible, and 3) not impossible.  There are four forms of Proofs: 1) we may argue that because one thing is, another thing is not (“it is day; therefore, it is not night”); 2) we may argue that because one this is, another thing is (“the sun is risen; therefore it is day”); 3) it may be argued that because one thing is not, another thing is (“it is not night; therefore it is day”); 4) it may be argued that because one thing is not, another thing is not (“he is not a reasoning being; therefore he is not a man”). 
     CHAPTER 9: Every artificial Proof consists either or 1) Indication (a bloodstained garment, a shriek, a dark bloth), 2) Arguments, or 3) Examples.  Indications as a rule come under the head of inartificial proofs; they are not discovered by the orator but are given to him with the case itself.  Arguments are only possible in controversial matters.  But if they are doubtful they are not arguments but require arguments to support them.  When an indication is irrefutable, there can be no dispute as to facts. But indications which are probabilities do not involve a necessary conclusion.  A signum (sign) is also called an indicium (an indication) or a vestigium (trace).  Signs enable us to infer that something else has happened (blood may indicate that a murder has taken place or that someone had a nose bleed, etc.).  A sign in conjunction with other indications may be produce as evidence.  What was before a suspicion may now be a certainty.  Great things are sometimes indicated by trivial signs.
     CHAPTER 10: Arguments.  An enthymeme (commentum or commentatio in Latin [an incomplete syllogism]) has three meanings: a) anything conceived in the mind, b) a proposition with a reason, and c) a conclusion or an argument drawn either from denial or consequents or from incompatibles.  A conclusion from consequents is an epicheireme.  A conclusion from incompatibles is an enthymeme.  It is a contrarium or argument from contraries.  It is a rhetorical syllogism or an incomplete syllogism.  It is an aggressio or an attempt (an attempted or imperfect Proof).  A definite conception of some thought consists of at least three parts (a major, a minor, and a conclusion).  An apodeixis is portion of an epicheireme (the part containing the truth). A form of reasoning or probatio.  There must be something which either is or is believed to be true, by means of which doubtful things may be rendered credible.  We may regard as certainties those things we perceive through the senses; those things about which there is general agreement; those things that are established by law or have passed into current usage.  With regard to credibility, there are three degrees: a) the highest (based on what usually happens), b) the highly probably, and c) that where there is nothing absolutely against an assumption.  The places of arguments: arguments may be drawn from persons or things (causes, time, place, occasion, instruments, means) such as birth, nationality, race, country, sex, age, education, training, bodily constitution, natural disposition, occupation, personal ambitions, past utterances, design, certain dispositions of mind, names: these are the accidents of persons.
     Now things: Actions, Why, Where, When, How, By what means? Arguments are drawn from the causes of past or future actions.  Right actions have right motives.  Evil actions are the result of false opinions.  Questions of definition are at times intimately connected with motives.  Arguments are also drawn from place.  Motives of actions may belong to past time.  Some things are done because something else is likely to follow.  Accidental circumstances also provide matter for arguments (as in subsequent time).  One must consider the resources possessed by the parties concerned.  Instruments provide us with indications of actions.  Manner is concerned with quality and the letter of the law. 
     We must give attention to three things: Whether it is, What it is, and Of what kind it is.  Arguments may be drawn from definition (genus, species, difference, property).  We must proceed from the genus to the ultimate species.  Property and difference.  Properties serve to establish definitions; differences to overthrow them.  A property is that which happens to one particular object and that alone; speech and laughter for instance are properties of man.  What is not a property will be a difference.  Exact definition.  Definition is assisted by division and partition.  It is the property of a good man to act rightly; of an angry man to be violent in speech and action. 
     Division is valuable for both the Proof and the Refutation.  By the elimination of previous suppositions he is shown to belong to another.  As far as Time is concerned, everything has a beginning, growth, and consummation (a quarrel, blows, murder).  A conclusion may be inferred from a beginning; or a beginning from a conclusion; or from the growth of a situation, we may infer either its beginning or its end. 
     Arguments may also be drawn from similarities (induction) or from unlikes; or from contraries; or from contradictions.  Arguments may be reversed, be consequent, or insequent.  There are also arguments from causes: apposite or comparative.  Genus/species: “what has happened once may happen often.” 
     Such in the main are the usual topics of Proof as specified by teachers of rhetoric.
     CHAPTER 11: The third kind of Proof: comparisons of like with like (especially historical parallels).  One can also argue from the greater to the less or from the less to the greater.  Arguments from unlikes are most useful in exhortation.  Arguments from unlikes present great variety, for they may turn on kind, manner, time, place, etc.  Another method to be pursued in arguments is to quote from the fictions of the poets (although this would have less force as Proof).  Fables or apologues or examples.  Also, arguments may be drawn from similar, opposite, and dissimilar points of law.  Arguments by analogy or similarity.  Authority may be drawn from external sources to support a case (judgments or adjudications [examples and precedents]): opinions of nations, peoples, philosophers, distinguished citizens, illustrious poets, common sayings, popular beliefs: they form a testimony).  Supernatural evidence; supernatural arguments. 
     CHAPTER 12: An argument to be effective must be based on certainty.  Still, some things which are adduced as Proof require proof themselves.  There are no stronger proofs than those in which uncertainty has been converted into certainty.  In insisting on our strongest arguments we must take them singly; whereas our weaker arguments should be massed together.  Trivial arguments may have a cumulative effect.  Certain arguments must not merely be stated but supported as well.  Pathetic and emotional arguments.  Aristotle said (Rhet. 1.2.4) that the strongest argument in support of a speaker is that he is a good man.  But to seem good is also of value.  Another form of proof is provided by asseveration.  A more forcible kind of proof is that drawn from character and supported by some plausible reason.  The strongest arguments should be placed first (to take possession of a judge’s mind) AND last (to leave a good, final impression on the judge).  Weaker arguments should be in the middle to gain strength from their neighbors.  We should avoid descending from the strongest proofs to the weakest. 
     CHAPTER 13: The duty of the defense consists solely in Refutation.  Whatever is said by our opponents must be rebutted.  As a rule, no strong appeal to the emotions is made in refutation.  Defense is harder than prosecution.  It is easier to accuse than to defend, as it is easier to wound than to heal.  In Refutation, we must deny or justify the facts or raise the question of competence.  Pleas of mercy can rarely be used.  Confidence and knowledge of the case carries much weight.  Defenders must begin by refutation.  But from our answers to objections new objections will arise.  These will be like the strokes of gladiators. 
     CHAPTER 14: An Enthymeme is an incomplete syllogism (e.g., a proposition and a reason but without a conclusion).  The most effective enthymeme is the one in which a reason is subjoined to a dissimilar or contrary proposition.  An epicheireme consists of 3 or 5 parts: a major premise and its reason, a minor premise and its proof, and a conclusion.  The conclusion makes the necessary inference from the preceding parts.  It is deductive reasoning.  There is no difference between the epicheireme and a syllogism, except that the latter has a number of forms and infers truth from truth, whereas the epicheireme is frequently concerned with statements that are no more than credible.  This kind of proof may be countered in three ways: by attacking all its parts.  If the major or minor premises are false, the conclusion cannot be true.  The enthymeme draws its conclusion from denial of consequents.  However, dialectical reasoning is good for philosophers, not so good for forensic cases, where the audience may be uneducated and an appeal to their emotions might be necessary.  Arguments should be distinct and clear.  If the subject is of great importance, every kind of ornament should be used, as long as one’s meaning is not obscured.  It should be well disguised, though, to convince an audience.

INSTITUTIO ORATORIA:
     BOOK 6:
     PREFACE: Quintilian expresses his sorrow after having lost his wife (aged 19) and two children (aged 5 and 9).  “Literature can provide true solace in adversity.”
     CHAPTER 1: Peroration (completion, conclusion, epilogue, enumeration, recapitulation).  There are two kinds: 1) the one dealing with the facts, 2) the one dealing with the emotional aspects of the case.  The repetition and grouping of the facts serve to refresh the memory of the judge and to place the whole case before his eyes.  Their cumulative effect is considerable.  The final recapitulation or enumeration must be as brief as possible (otherwise it might resemble a second speech).  Appeals to emotion are necessary if there are no other means for securing the victory of truth, justice, and the public interest.  Recapitulation may be profitably employed in other portions of the speech as well.  The defender has to appeal with greater frequency to the emotions than the prosecutor.  The prosecutor arouses the judge; the defender softens him.  Our attempts to sway the judges are made more sparingly at the commencement of the speech.  An appeal to fear is also common in the peroration.  The peroration also provides freer opportunities for exciting the passions of jealousy, hatred, and anger.  The accuser will make a case against his client appear atrocious and deplorable (to incite the judge to anger and justice).  The manner of the act contributes most to the impression of its atrocity (other factors could be age, sex, place, etc.).  The accuser will also try to excite pity (for the victims).  Appeals to the future (of the victims) will arouse pity and compassion.  Appeals to pity are the best, though.  Impersonations may be employed with profit.  Appeals to pity should be brief, though, since nothing dries so quickly as tears.  The peroration is the place where the appeal to the emotions should be more pronounced.  Actions (bringing bloodied garments or unkempt witnesses in rags, etc.) as well as words may be employed to move to court to tears.  Invocation to the gods or throwing yourself at the judge’s feet helps too.   The client should help too, though, and not be incongruous with the words of his defender.  Moving an audience to tears is the most effective emotional appeal.   The chief task of the peroration consists of amplification.  Complicated cases require a peroration to be distributed among different portions of a speech.
     CHAPTER 2: The peroration is the most important part of forensic pleading, and in the main consists of appeals to the emotions.  A Peroration can have more force than a Proof.  It is in its power over the emotions that the life and soul of oratory is to be found.  Emotions are of two classes: 1) pathos (adfectus, emotion, the more [momentary] violent emotions [love, hate, anger, dislike, fear, pity] that command or disturb [resembling tragedy]) and 2) ethos (mores, morals, ethics, moral philosophy, every attitude of the mind, the calm and gentle [continuous] emotions [like affection] that persuade [ingratiate] and induce a feeling of [courtesy and] good will [resembling comedy]).  To defy hatred, pass censure on violence by silence.  It is better to make your antagonist unpopular than to abuse him.  Ethos denotes moral character.  Our speech must be based on ethos.  Ethos requires the speaker to be a man of good character and courtesy.  The excellence of his good character will make his pleading convincing.  Three styles: 1) Attic (Greek: restrained), 2) Intermediate (pleasant and persuasive [the one orators should use]), 3) Asiatic (grand style).  We use Amplification (amplification) [Gr. deinosis: “making terrible”) to make things appear worse than they are (e.g., making words more injurious than blows, or disgrace worse than death, etc.).  The prime essential for stirring the emotions of others is first to feel those emotions oneself.  Visions, hallucinations, or vivid descriptions are effective.  From such impressions one gains clearness, illumination and actuality.  To awaken pity, we must feel pity ourselves and take the place of those suffering.  Acting. 
     CHAPTER 3: Laughter.  Cicero was unduly addicted to jests (Demosthenes wasn’t).  Sayings designed to raise a laugh are generally untrue (and falsehood always involves a certain meanness) and are often deliberately distorted and never complimentary.  Laughter is elicited by words, deeds, and even touch.  We laugh at things that are witty, but also at things that reveal folly, anger, or fear.  Laughter is never far removed from derision.  Laughter has its basis in some kind or other of deformity or ugliness.  Laughter may be regarded as a trivial matter, and an emotion frequently awakened by buffoons, actors, or fools.  In matters of great importance, laughter dispels hatred or anger.  Wit always appears to greater advantage in reply than in attack.  On wit: 1) urbanitas (city humor, learned, used by the educated classes), 2) venustus (what is said with grace and charm), 3) salsus (the laughable), 4) facetus (what raises a laugh), 5) iocus (the opposite of seriousness), 6) diacitas (banter [attack]).  Wit saves a speech from becoming tedious.  We laugh at a) others (reprove, refute, deride), b) ourselves (absurdity), or c) things intermediate (things taken in a different sense and which affect neither party to the suit).  There is also a humorous look, manner, or gesture.  Jests are either free, gentle, and lively; or abusive, bitter, and wounding.  Our jests should never wound.  Orators should not distort their features or use uncouth gestures.  Ribald jokes and obscenity are out.  Insolence and arrogance are to be avoided.  Sarcasm is injudicious.  A good man will see that everything he says is consistent with his dignity and the respectability of his character.  Laughter may be derived from the physical appearance of our opponent, or from his character, or from external sources.  The narration of a clever story may be a good device for an orator to use.  Brevity in wit gives greater point and speed.  Double entendres and coarse jibes should be avoided in the courtroom.  Humor by metalepsis (substitution).  Jests that turn on the meaning of things are at once more pointed and more elegant.  Hyperbole, irony, allegory, emphasis, and metaphor are used for humor.  Refutation consists in denying, rebutting, defending, or making light of a charge, and each of these affords scope for humor.  To make jokes about oneself should be done by buffoons only, not professional orators.  Brutal jests, although they may raise a laugh, are unworthy of a gentleman.  The prettiest kind of humor is the jest that depends for success on deceiving anticipation or taking another’s words in a sense other than he intended (date joke here).  Ambiguity: the essence of all wit lies in the distortion of the true and natural meaning of words.  The most agreeable of all jests are those which are good humored and easily digested.  Apt quotation of verse may add to the effect of wit.  Effects of mild absurdity are produced by the simulation of folly. 
     CHAPTER 4: Forensic debate. Altercatio: follows the set speeches and takes the form of a number of brief arguments pro and con (like gladiatorial parrying and striking).  Debate consists in attack and defense.  This is a brief and discontinuous for of oratory.  Debate consists of questions and replies.  At times, the debate may be the deciding factor in a case.  Inartificial cases give rise to the most heated debates.  There is no point of a trial where the judge’s attention is keener.  For debate, one must have a quick and nimble understanding and a shrewd and ready judgment, for there is no time to think. Some debates become brawls.  The skilled debater must control his anger; anger being the greatest enemy of reason.  Moderation and longsuffering are the best policies. The opponent’s statements have to be refuted; they must also be treated with contempt or made light of or held up to ridicule (where wit would be displayed).  If our opponents adopt turbulent methods, we must put on a bold front and resist their impudence with courage.  Some advocates will interrupt us in the middle of a sentence and confuse us.  We must repel their onslaughts with vigor by crushing their insolence and making appeals to the judges or insisting on following the proper order of speaking.  Acumen is the most serviceable quality in a debate: never lose track of the issue at hand.  Surprise attacks (bringing up arguments excluded earlier) resemble an ambush.  Unscrupulous violence makes an unpleasant impression on a judge.  Where defeat is inevitable, it is better to yield.  Surrender with a good grace will generally secure some mitigation of punishment.  It is wise to conceal some of our weapons or yield ground to our opponent (to confuse him or lead him astray).  The debate is a battle between advocates.  Prudence unsupported by learning will accomplish more than learning unsupported by prudence.

QUINTILIAN 3:

INSTITUTIO ORATORIA:
     BOOK 7:
     PREFACE: Enough has been said on the subject of invention in the previous books.  Now, ARRANGEMENT will be reduced to reduce Invention to order and to give it connection and structure.  Arrangmenet is the second of the five departments of Oratory (the parts are: Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory, and Delivery).  No two cases have ever been alike. 
     PART 1: Division means the division of a group of things into its component parts.  Partition is the separation of an individual whole into its elements.  Order is the correct disposition of things in such a way that what follows coheres with what precedes.  Arrangement is the distribution of things and parts to the places which it is expedient that they should occupy.  But arrangement is generally dependent on expediency, and the same question will not always be discussed first by both parties.  It will always be expedient for the parties to place different points first.  The facts of the case are definite and called themes or propositions.  Consider them from my opponent’s point of view and from my own.  Consider what the prosecutor will say first: his point must either be admitted or controversial: if admitted, no question could arise in this connection.  Only when the parties cease to agree on facts does any question arise.  We must consider what constitutes the first question.  The charge may be simple or complex.  Complex cases have several questions and bases.  One must consider what needs to be refuted.  As regards the prosecutor, the first place should be given to some strong argument.  Weak arguments are placed in the middle.  Finish the case with a strong argument.  Wit the defense things are different: the strongest arguments have to be disposed of first; but this is subject to alteration if minor arguments are obviously false and the more serious argument difficult.  Attack then the strongest argument last and discredit the prosecution by demonstrating the falsity of the weaker (false) arguments.  Charges brought against the past life of the accused should generally be dealt with first.  Determine whether the question is of fact (if a fact, deny it or justify it [some minor facts may be dropped]) or law (the letter or the intention of the law? Under what law?  Contradictory laws).  When we are defending, there should be an increase of force in the treatment of questions and we should proceed from the weaker to the stronger.  As a general rule, it is of advantage to the accuser to mass his facts together and to the defense to separate them.  The means to secure the acquittal of an accused person are strictly limited: a) his innocence may be established, b) some superior authority may intervene, c) force or bribery may be employed, d) his guilt may be difficult to prove, e) there may be collusion between the advocates.  Questions of equity should be introduced last, since judges pay close attention to those.
     CHAPTER 2: Questions of fact: all conjecture is concerned either with facts or intention.  Each of these may occur in one of three times: past, present, or future.  Questions concerning facts are either general or definite.  In the law courts, past time is of most importance, since all accusations are concerned with what has actually been done, while what is being done or is likely to be done is inferred from the past.  We should also enquire into origins.  We seek for the motives of an act.  Further, there is more than one way of transferring the charge to another.  At times this results in mutual accusation.  At times the charge is transferred to some person who cannot be brought to trial.  The accused will always begin by denying the act, since if this can be successfully proved, there is no need to say anything more, while if it is not proved, there remain other means of defense.  A third type of conjectural case is where the fact is admitted and the only question is as to the author.  In dealing with a case, we first ask what the accused intended to do, next what he was in a position to do, and lastly what he actually did.  Consequently, the first point on which we must fix our attention is the character of the accused.  If this does not work, claim that the charges made are not relevant to the case. Rank may be pleaded in defense of the accused, although at times it may be used to prove his guilt.  Poverty, humble rank, and wealth may be used as arguments for or against the accused.  Upright character, however, and the blamelessness of his past life are always of the utmost assistance to the accused.  The next type of proof is derived from causes or motives, such as anger, hatred, fear, greed, or hope.  However, not all motives apply to all persons.  Should we deal with persons first or with motives?  Quintilian prefers persons (Cicero motives).  Next we must consider the intention.  There is also the question why the accused should have chosen that particular place or time or means for the commission of the crime.  Next we inquire as to whether the person accused of a fact was in a position to commit it.  The question whether he actually did the deed belongs to the second division of time, namely the present, and secondly to time that is almost though not actually contemporary: under this latter head come circumstances such as noise, cries, or groans, while concealment, fear, and the like belong to subsequent time.  Any ambiguity in our own words will always tell against us.  [Cases of adultery, forgery, treason, and tyranny follow].
     CHAPTER 3: Conjecture is followed by definition.  The laws that govern definition also govern conjecture.  Sometimes we may pass from quality to definition, as in actions concerned with lunacy, cruelty, and offenses against the State.  Definition is the statement of the fact called in question in appropriate, clear, and concise language: genus, species, difference, and property.  For instance, a horse belongs to the genus “animal”; the species “mortal”; the difference “irrational” (since man is also mortal); and the property “neighing.”  Sometimes we have recourse to quality.  Definition is concerned with identity and difference (since he who denies the applicability of one term must always produce another term which he regards as preferable).  Definition falls into three types or species.  There is also great variety in definitions.  The order to be followed in definition is: First we should ask what a thing is (in establishing what a thing is, we must establish our own definition and destroy that of our opponent), and then, whether it is this.  A definition may be overthrown on two grounds: 1) it may be false or 2) it may be too narrow.  The most effective method of establishing and refuting definitions is derived from the examination of properties and differences, and sometimes even from considerations of etymology.  Etymology is rarely of assistance.  Great ingenuity may be exercised with regard to properties and differences.  By settling what a thing is we have come near to determining its identity, for our purpose is to produce a definition that is applicable to our case.  Now the msot important element in a definition is provided by quality, as for example in the question whether love is a form of madness.  Arguments may also be drawn from contraries.  Quality is the matter that comes next in order of discussion.
     CHAPTER 4: When speaking on quality, sometimes the question turns on size and number.  In all these cases we arrive at our conclusions by conjecture, yet each involves a question of quality.  Such questions are sometimes treated in deliberative themes.  Similarly, all the topics of demonstrative oratory involve a qualitative basis.  When a judge decides to punish, the duty of the pleader is to defend, extenuate, or excuse the act, or to plead for mercy.  The strongest defense is to assert that the act that forms the charge is actually honorable.  Justice is either natural or conventional.  Natural justice is found in actions of inherent worth.  Under this head the virtues of piety, loyalty, self-control, etc., are listed.  To retaliate, or meet violence with violence does not imply injustice.  In cases where justice is on both sides, the two parties must both come under the same law and the same conditions.  Convention, on the other hand, is to be found in laws, customs, legal precedents, and agreements.  Another kind of defense consists if defending an act in itself indefensible by arguments drawn from without.  One can also appeal to the interests of the State.  In a comparison of evils, the lesser evil must be regarded as a positive god.  Defense by comparison.  If an act can’t be defended, shift the blame to another.  At times the blame may be shifted to a thing.  Or we may plead necessity.  Or we can blame fortune and assert that although we undoubtedly did wrong, we did so with the best intentions.  Or we can extenuate the offense and appeal to a quantitative basis.  In the last resource we may plead for mercy, especially if we may hope that the accused (a member useful to society) will never do the crime again.  Or we may claim our client has suffered enough to expiate for his crime.  Or that he has sincerely repented.  We must also base his appeal on his external circumstances, his birth, his rank, his connections, his friendships.  We must also appeal to the judge trying the case by emphasizing his clemency (and not weakness).  With respect to rewards, is our client worthy of it; and if there are two claimants, who is worthier?  Consider the immediate object of the gift, the occasion, and the intention. The real task of oratory is to demonstrate quality (questions of moral obligation).  Under quality we find cases of disinheritance, lunacy, cruelty to a wife, and claims of female orphans to marry relatives.   It is definition which tells us what precisely is meant by lunacy or cruelty to a wife.  Cases concerned with lunacy arise either out of what has been done or out of something which may or may not be done in the future.  The accused must assume a temperate tone in his defense, for the reasons that, as a rule, anger and excitement are near akin to madness.  Other controversial themes involving quality are: assault, appointment of a prosecutor or divinations, guardianship, fraud on the part of an agent, conduct of business, crimes not covered by the law, misconduct on the part of an ambassador, action contrary to the interests of the state, cases of ingratitude, cases of unjust divorce, and wills.  Quantity also falls as a rule under the head of quality, whether it is concerned with measure or number.
     CHAPTER 5: He who neither denies nor defends his act, nor asserts that it was of a different nature from that alleged, must take his stand on some point of law that tells in his favor, a form of defense which generally turns on the legality of the action brought against him.  This usually comes up during the course of the actual trial (prescription or demurrer).  When the dispute turns on prescription, there is no need to enquire into the facts of the case itself.  Every law either gives or takes away, punishes or commands, forbids or permits.  The letter (of the law) is either clear or obscure or ambiguous.  What is true about laws is true about wills, agreements, contracts, documents, and verbal agreements.
     CHAPTER 6: Lawyers frequently raise the question of the letter and the intention of the law.  Such questions arise when the law presents some obscurity.  Under these circumstances, both parties will seek to establish their own interpretation of the passage and to overthrow that advanced by their opponent.  There are three ways to combat the letter: 1) it is impossible to always observe the letter of the law; 2) Different laws show one cannot stand by the letter of (the) one law; 3) the actual wording of the law may enable us to prove the intention of the legislator was different. 
     CHAPTER 7: Contrary laws.  When one law contradicts another, both parties attack the letter and raise the question of intention.  It is important to consider which course is best from the point of view of morality and justice.
     CHAPTER 8: The syllogistic basis.  The syllogism is sometimes employed in conjunction with definition: for often if the definition is weak it takes refuge in the syllogism.  The syllogistic basis, then, deduces from the letter of the law that which is uncertain; and since this conclusion is arrived at by reason, the basis is called ratiocinative. We infer what is doubtful from what is certain.  What is similar may be greater, equal, or less.  Appeal to equity (the best policy).
     CHAPTER 9: Ambiguity.  In the opinion of certain philosophers, there is not a single word which has not a diversity of meanings.  Single words give rise to error, when the same noun applies to a number of things or persons (homonymy).  There is another form of ambiguity where a word has one meaning when entire and another when divided.  A third kind of ambiguity is caused by the use of compound words.  Groups of words give rise to more serious ambiguity. 
     CHAPTER 10: There is a certain affinity between all these bases.  In all cases where the letter and the intention of a document have to be considered, it is ambiguity that gives rise to the question at issue.  Subdivisions require to be arranged in the order which is appropriate to them.  This gift of arrangement is to oratory what generalship is to war.  The skilled commander will know how to distribute his forces for battle.  But to possess this gift, our orator will require all the resources of nature, learning, and industrious study.  Let no man hope he can acquire eloquence merely by the labor of others.  He must burn the midnight oil, persevere to the end, and grow pale with study.  He must have his weapons ready for immediate use.  Our speech must give the impression of natural continuity.  Style is the next theme of the following book.

INSTITUTIO ORATORIA:
     BOOK 8:
     PREFACE: Rhetoric is the science of speaking well.  It is useful, an art, and a virtue.  It subject matter consists of everything on which an orator may be called to speak.  There are three classes of oratory: DEMONSTRATIVE, DELIBERATIVE, and FORENSIC.  Every speech is composed of matter and words.  As regards matter, we must study invention.  As regards words, we must study style.  As regards both matter and words, we must study arrangement.  All of this is the task of memory to retain and delivery to render attractive.  The duty of an orator is composed of instructing, moving, and delighting his hearers.  Statement of facts and arguments fall under the head of instruction.  Emotional appeals are concerned with moving the audience and are more effective at the beginning and end of speeches.  The element of charm is the special sphere of style.  There are two kinds of questions: indefinite and definite.  And they involve considerations of persons and circumstances of tie and place.  Whatever our subject matter, there are three questions which we must ask: 1) is it? What is it? Of what kind is it?  Demonstrative oratory consists of praise and denunciation.  This task is also concerned with what is honorable or expedient.  In deliberations one must consider whether the subject of deliberation is possible or likely to happen.  It is important to know who it is that is speaking, before whom he is speaking, and what he says.  Forensic cases turn at times on one point of dispute; at times on several.  In some cases it is the attack, in others the defense that determines the basis.  Every defense rests on denial. Questions must turn on something written or something done.  The nature of all cases, criminal or civil, falls under the heads of the letter and intention, the syllogism, ambiguity, or contrary laws.  Forensic speeches have five parts: exordium (to conciliate the audience), statement of facts (instruction), proof (confirmation of our propositions), refutation (overthrow the arguments of the opponent), and peroration (to refresh the memory of the hearers or play upon their emotions).  Now, Cicero claims that while invention and arrangement are within the reach of any man of good sense, eloquence belongs to the orator alone.  Style requires greater care and industry.  Eloquence cannot be acquired without the assistance of the rules of art.  The Attic style is dry; the Asiatic unrestrained.  Style is elegance itself, the fairest of all the glories of oratory, but only when it is natural and unaffected.  A tasteful and magnificent dress lends added dignity to its wearer.  The best words are essentially suggested by the subject matter.  Those words are best which are least far-fetched and give the impression of simplicity and reality.  The worst fault in speaking is to adopt a style inconsistent with the idiom of ordinary speech and contrary to the common feeling of mankind.  The most satisfactory words are those that give the best expression to the thoughts of our mind and produce the effect which we desire upon the minds of the judges.  Such style will give pleasure and awaken admiration.  The pleasure evoked by the charm will have nothing morbid about it but will be praiseworthy and dignified.
     CHAPTER 1: Elocutio is style. The words we use should be Latin, clear, elegant, and well-adapted to produce the desired effect.  They must also be correct.  Our words should have nothing provincial or foreign about them.  Our voice and all our words should be such as to reveal the native of this city, so that our speech may seem to be of genuine Roman origin. 
     CHAPTER 2: Clearness results from propriety in the use of words.  But sometimes we must not call things by their right names to avoid what is obscene, unseemly, or mean.  Language is mean when it is beneath the dignity of the subject or the rank of the speaker.  The opposite, flying to the other extreme, is impropriety.  The original term from which the others are derived is styled the proper term.  Emphasis makes a thing more intelligible.  Obscurity results from the employment of obsolete words.  It should be avoided.  Sentence obscurity (with lots of hyperbaton) should also be avoided, as well as parenthesis also (unless it’s short).  Useless words also, should be avoided.  Don’t do the opposite and become excessively brief, for words necessary to the sense will be lost.  Clearness is the first essential of good style.  There must be propriety in our words, their order must be straightforward, the conclusion of the period must not be long postponed, and there must be nothing lacking and nothing superfluous.  Thus our language will be approved by the learned and clear to the uneducated. 
     CHAPTER 3: On ornament (ornatum).  A speaker wins but trifling praise if he does no more than speak with correctness and lucidity; in fact, his speech seems rather to be free from blemish than to have any positive merit.  When our audience find it a pleasure to listen, their attention and their readiness to believe what they hear are both alike increased, while they are generally filled with delight, and sometimes even transported by admiration.  Eloquence which evokes no admiration is unworthy of the name.  But such ornament must be bold, manly, and chaste, free from all effeminate smoothness and the false hues derived from artificial dyes, and must glow with health and vigor.  True beauty and usefulness always go hand in hand.  However, the same form of ornament will not suit demonstrative, deliberative, and forensic speeches.  For the oratory of display aims solely at delighting the audience, and therefore develops all the resources of eloquence to aim solely at honor and glory.  But in statements of fact, adornment is unseemly.  Public trials demand a more exact style.  There is a certain loftiness of style in deliberations.  The style must be adapted to the matter at hand.  Since several words may have the same meaning (synonyms), some will be more distinguished and euphonious than others.  Words require to be used in different ways.  Horrible things are best described by words that are harsh in sound.  Use the most agreeable sounds and the most elegant words.  A cultivated man should not use coarse or low words.  Do not use mean words to describe great things.  Again, our style need not always dwell on the heights; at times it is desirable that it should sink.  For there are occasions when the very meanness of the words employed adds force to what we say.  Words are: 1) proper, 2) newly-coined, or 3) metaphorical. With respect to proper words, there is a special dignity conferred by antiquity, since old words give our style a venerable and majestic air.  But don’t overdo it.  Many new words have been coined in imitation of the Greeks.  The meatphorical use of words cannot be recommended except in connected discourse.  An acceptable style is defined by Cicero as one which is not over-elegant.  Avoid words to which a perverted usage has given an obscene meaning.  Avoid also unfortunate collocations of words (or division of words) that might produce an obscene suggestion.  Avoid indecency and meanness.  Meanness occurs when the grandeur or dignity of anything is diminished by the words used, as in calling small things by extravagant names.  Avoid meagerness and inadequacy of expression.  But meiosis (litotes [an understatement]) may be deliberately used as a figure, or tautology (the repetition of a word or phrase: “Judges, this judgment was not merely unlike a judgment”).  A worse fault is sameness, a monotonous style which has no variety to relieve its tedium (this is one of the surest signs of lack of art).  We must also avoid macrology (the employment of more words than are necessary (“they went back home, whence they had come”). However, periphrasis, which is similar to macrology, is regarded as a virtue.  Another fault is pleonasm, when we overload our style with a superfluity of words (“I saw it with my own eyes”). However, pleonasm might have a pleasing effect when employed for the sake of emphasis: “With mine own ears his voice I heard.”  But when the addition is not deliberate but merely tame and redundant, it is a fault.  Superfluous elaboration is a fault, as well as every word which neither helps the sense nor the style.  Cacozelia, or perverse affectation, is a fault, and it includes all that is turgid, trivial, luscious, redundant, far-fetched, or extravagant (when the mind loses its critical sense and is misled by the false appearance of beauty).  Corruption of style is revealed in the employment of improper or redundant words, in obscurity of meaning, effeminacy of rhythm, or in the childish search for similar or ambiguous expressions.  Further, it always involves insincerity, for it consists in saying something in an unnatural or unbecoming or superfluous manner.  Faulty arrangement is the faulty use of figures and the faulty collocation of words.  It is also faulty to use several dialects, or to make an indiscriminate mixture of grand words with mean, old with new, poetic with colloquial (this would be a monstrous medley).  It is a great gift to be able to set forth the facts on which we are speaking clearly and vividly.  Use vivid descriptions to move an audience [ECPHRASIS].  We shall secure the vividness we seek only if our descriptions give the impression of truth.  We may even add fictitious incidents.  A vivid impression may be secured by the mention of the “accidents” of each situation (“trembling mothers clasped their children to their breast”). Fix your eyes on nature and follow her.  “All eloquence is concerned with the activities of life, while every man applies to himself what he hears from others, and the mind is always readiest to accept what it recognizes to be true to nature.”  Similes are used to help our proof or arguments, or to make our pictures yet more vivid.  Similes serve to make oratory sublime, rich, attractive, and striking.  The more remote the simile is from the subject to which it is applied, the greater the impression of novelty and the unexpected which it produces (“As doctors ampute limbs, we must lop away foul criminals”).  Antapodosis.  Reciprocal representation.  Brachylogy is the brevity that says nothing more than what is absolutely necessary (“Mithridates is huge of stature, and armed to match”).  Emphasis (“Be a man!”  or “He is but mortal”).  The omission of a word (which is expected) is produced by aposiopesis (“becoming silent” [generally a dash is used with this figure to suggest the sudden “silence”]).  Copiousness (copia) consists either in wealth of thought or luxuriance of language.  Force.  Sublimity.  Imagination assists us to form mental pictures of things.  Finish produces completeness of effect (it reasserts our proofs and clinches the argument by repetition).  Vigor derives its name from action and its function is to secure that nothing that we say is tame.  Pungency may also be used when necessary, as well as abuse (“You, Sir, are an ignoramus!”). 
     CHAPTER 4: Amplification (“murdered” [instead of “beaten”]) and Attenuation  (“touched” [instead of “struck”]).  There are four different methods of amplification: 1) augmentation (the most impressive method, effected  by one step or several, carried to the highest degree or beyond), 2) comparison (seeks to rise from the less to the greater, comparing whole with whole and part with part), 3) reasoning (it is by reasoning that our hearers are led on from the first point to the second which we desire to emphasize), and 4) accumulation ([CONGERIES] by an accumulation of words and sentences identical in meaning, the climax is reached by the piling of words instead of by a series of steps).  The heightening of effect may also be produced by making the words rise to a climax (insurgentibus).  Attenuation is effected by the same method, since there are as many degrees of descent as ascent.  Hyperbole is a species of amplification.
     CHAPTER 5: Sententia is a felling or opinion. The ancients regarded sensus as referring merely to the senses of the body.  But modern usage applies sensus to concepts of the mind, while sententia is applied to striking reflections such as are more especially introduced at the close of our periods, a practice rare in earlier days, but carried even to excess in our own.  The oldest type of sententia is the aphorism.  Such utterances resemble the decrees or resolutions of public bodies.  Aphorisms are reflections which form part of the enthymeme (a reflection drawn from contraries); at times they form part of the conclusion of an epichireme (an epiphonema [an epigrammatic summary] or exclamation attached to the close of a statement or a proof by way of climax).  Some are cast by opposition, others in the form of a direct statement.  Such reflections are best suited to those speakers whose authority is such that their character itself will lend weight to their words.  A noema (“an obscure and subtle speech”) is a conception expressed in such a way as to make itself understood without actually stating it (“You deserve to have all your fingers” = “You deserve to be a gladiator all your days”). A clausula (a close, conclusion, end) is a conclusion [what follows] in a logical sense: “You must, therefore, first confess your own offense before you accuse Ligarius of anything.”  There is a type of reflection that depends on surprise for its effect.  Others are of an allusive type.  We may also double a phrase.  We may contrast opposites.  Those which turn on play upon words will always be bad.  Every reflection is isolated and consequently a fresh stat is necessary after each.  This produces a discontinuous style.  Keep epigrams to a minimum for maximum effect. 
     CHAPTER 6: Tropes (modes).  A trope (tropis) [“a turn” in Greek] is the artistic alteration of a word or phrase from its proper meaning to another. Some tropes arise from words used properly and others from words used metaphorically.  The changes involved concern not merely individual words but also our thoughts and the structure of our sentences.  The commonest and most beautiful of tropes is the metaphor (translatio).  It serves to provide a name for everything (for which we might not have a proper name).  A noun or a verb is transferred from the place to which it properly belongs to another where there is either no literal term or the transferred is better than the literal. We do this because it is necessary, or to make our meaning clearer, or to produce a decorative effect.  We say that a man is “hard” or “rough,” there being no literal term for these temperaments.  Metaphor is a shorter form of simile: in the latter we compare some object to the thing which we wish to describe; in the former this object is actually substituted for the thing.  Metaphors fall into four classes: 1) in the first we substitute one living thing for another (“Cato barked [like a dog] at Scipio [a human being]”); 2) Inanimate things may be substituted for inanimate (“And gave his fleet [an inanimate object] the rein [ditto]”); 3) An Inanimate object may be substituted for an animate one (“Did the Argive bulwark fall by sword or fate?”); 4) Or animate for inanimate (“The shepherd sits unknowing on the height / Listening the roar from some far mountain brow”).  These four kinds of metaphor are further subdivided into a number of species, such as transference from rational beings to rational and from irrational to irraional and the reverse; and from the whole to its parts and from the parts to the whole.  But don’t overuse metaphors, for then the style will become obscure and our audience weary.  Our language will become allegorical and enigmatic.  A metaphor must not be too great for its subject or too little or inappropriate.  Synecdochè gives variety to our language by making us realize many things from one, the whole from a part (pars pro toto), the genus from a species, things which follow from things which have preceded (ferrum [steel] may be used to indicate a sword).  It is where numbers are concerned that synecdochè can be most freely employed in prose (“The Roman [i.e., Romans] won the day”; “We [i.e., “I”] have spoken”).  When an omission of a [n expected] word occurs, it is called an ellipse.  Metonymy (meta + onoma [change of name]: denominatio, transmutatio, transnominatio) consists in the substitution of one name for another and is called hypallage (“interchange”) by the rhetoricians.  These devices are employed to indicate an invention by substituting the name of the inventor, or a possession by substituting the name of the possessor (i.e., Vulcan for fire, Mars for fight, Venus for coitus; or “harvest” in the expression “Ceres [i.e., the harvest] by water spoiled”).  It is permissible to describe what is possessed by reference to its possessor (as when we speak of Virgil when we mean Virgil’s poems: “I’ve read Virgil” instead of “I’ve read Virgil’s poems”).  We sometimes indicate cause by effect (“Pale death knocks at the poor man’s door”).  Antonomasia occurs when we substitute something else for a proper name: we substitute an epithet to the name which it replaces (“The Philosopher” [Aristotle], “The Poet” [Petrarch], “The Madonna” [St. Mary]), or by indicating the most striking characteristics of an individual (“The gray-eyed goddess” [Pallas Athena / Minerva]).  Onomatopoea is the creation of a word to suit the sensation which it expresses (hiss, murmur, roar).  It is unbecoming for Romans to use this figure (although the Greeks like it).  Catachresis (abuse) is the practice of adapting the nearest available term to describe something for which no actual term exists (Equum divina Palladis arte / Aedificant: “A horse they build by Pallas’ art divine” [it is an abuse to use the term aedificant, which means literally to make a house]; or to call a tyrannicide a parricide [a term which includes the murder not only of a father but also of a mother, a brother, and a tyrant]).  Metalepsis (“to change the sense”) or Transumption (transumptio) is a trope that involves a change of meaning (“he is a lead foot” [he drives fast]).  It is the nature of metalepsis to form a kind of intermediate step between the term transferred and the thing to which it is transferred, having no meaning in itself, but merely providing a transition.  It’s useful only in comedy.  The remaining tropes are employed solely to adorn and enhance our style: the epithet (appositum, sequens) is redundant (“white teeth,” “liquid wine”).  Allegory (inversio) presents one thing in words and another in meaning, or else something absolutely opposed to the meaning of the words.  It is a series of metaphors.  When an allegory is too obscure it becomes a riddle, hence, a blemish.  An allegory whose meaning is contrary to that suggested by the words, involve an element of irony, called illusio by the rhetoricians.  It is permissible to censure with counterfeited praise and praise under a pretense of blame.  We may employ allegory and disguise bitter taunts in gentle words by way of wit, or we may indicate our meaning by saying exactly the opposite (sarcasm, urbane wit, contradiction, mockery).  Periphrasis is when we use many words to describe something requiring only a few.  It is a circuitous mode of speech.  It is sometimes necessary, as when one conceals something that would be indecent if expressed in so many words (“To meet the demands of nature”).  When circumlocution passes into excess it is called perissology (Gr. perissos = redundant; logos = speech), for whatever is not a help is a hindrance.  Hyperbaton (pl. hyperbata) is the transposition of a word often demanded by the structure of the sentence and the claims of elegance.  “For our language would often be harsh, rough, limp or disjointed, if the words were always arranged in their natural order.”  It is impossible to make our prose rhythmical except by artistic alterations in the order of words.  When the transposition is confined to two words only, it is called anastrophe, that is, a reversal of order (inversio, reversio).  It is the transposition of a word to some distance from its original place, in order to secure an ornamental effect, that is strictly called hyperbaton.  Hyperbole is a bold figure, an elegant straining of the truth, employed for exaggeration of attenuation.  We may say more than the actual facts (“faster than a speeding bullet” [Superman]).  Hyperbole lies, though without any intention to deceive.  Hyperbole will often cause a laugh.  Everybody has an innate passion for exaggeration or attenuation of actual facts, and no one is ever contented with the simple truth.

INSTITUTIO ORATORIA:
     BOOK 9:
     CHAPTER 1: “In my last book I spoke of tropes.  I now come to figures.” For many authors, figures are identical with tropes.  They are also called motions (motus), for they add force and charm to our matter.  The resemblance between them is so close that it is not easy to distinguish between them.  Both involve a departure from the simple and straightforward method of expression.  E.g., irony belongs to figures of thought just as much as to tropes; periphrasis, hyperbaton, and onomatopoeia have been ranked as figures of speech rather than tropes.  The name of trope is applied to the transference of expressions from their natural and principal signification to another, with a view to the embellishment of style.  A figure is the term employed when we give our language a conformation other than the obvious and ordinary.  Therefore the substitution of one word for another is placed among tropes, e.g., metaphor, metonymy, antonomasia, metalepsis, synecdoche, catachresis, allegory, and hyperbole.  Onomatopoeia, periphrasis, epithet, antonomasia, hyperbaton: none of these are figures.  For a figure does not necessarily involve any alteration either of the order or the strict sense of words.  Irony is both a trope and a figure.  The term figure is used in two senses: 1) in the first it is applied to any form in which thought is expressed; 2) in the second and special sense, in which it is called a schema, it means a rational change in meaning or language from the ordinary and simple form.  A figure is a form of expression to which a new aspect is given by art.  A figure of thought may include several figures of speech, for the former lies in the conception, the latter in the expression of our thought.  The two are frequently combined, however.  Hence, there are two classes of figures: figures of thought (of the mind, feeling, or conceptions) and figures of speech (words, diction, expression, language, style).  Figures of thought will be discussed first.  Figures serve to commend what we say to those that hear us, whether we seek to win approval for our character as pleaders, or to win favor for the cause which we plead, to relieve monotony by variation of our language, or to indicate our meaning in the safest or most seemly way.  Dissimulation.  Hesitation.  By the introduction of fictitious personages we may bring into play the most forcible form of exaggeration.  As regards diction, this may either be employed like weapons for menace and attack, or handled merely for the purpose of display.  Sometimes the repetition of words will produce an impression of force, at other times of grace.  The same words may be repeated sometimes at the beginning of a sentence and sometimes at the end, or the sentence may be made to open and close with the same phrase.  Asyndeton, paral[e]ipsis (occultatio), correction, exclamation, meiosis (litotes: “the pond” for the Atlantic Ocean), hesitation, immutation (change).  The same word may be reiterated, either at the beginning or at the conclusion, or may be repeated, but in a different sense.  Antitheses, gradations, asyndeton. 
     CHAPTER 2: Questions admit of infinite variety.  There is the practice of putting the question and answering it oneself.  A different method is to ask a question and not to wait for a reply, but to subjoin the reply at once yourself.  This is a figure which some call suggestio.  Again, a question may involve comparison.  Anticipation (prolepsis) is used to forestall objections and is of great use in pleading.  It is especially useful in the exordium.  Confession.  Prediction.  Self-correction.  Preparation.  Qualification.  Hesitation may lend an impression of truth to our statements, when, for example, we pretend to be at a loss.  Communication is when we actually take our opponents into consultation.  Suspension.  Paradox or surprise.  Concession occurs when we leave some things to the judgment of the jury.  The figures best adapted for intensifying emotion consist chiefly in simulation, for we may feign that we are angry, glad, afraid, filled with wonder, grief, or indignation.  Exclamation.  License.  A bolder type of figure is impersonation, a device which lends wonderful variety and animation to oratory.  By this means we display the inner thoughts of our adversaries as though they were talking with themselves; or without sacrifice of credibility we may introduce conversations between ourselves and others, or of others among themselves, and put words of advice, reproach, complaint, praise, or pity into the mouths of appropriate persons.  We are even allowed in this form of speech to bring down the gods from heaven and raise the dead.  Dialogue.  Sermocinatio.  Parody.  We often personify the abstract.  To impersonation we add the figure known as ellipse, which in this case consists in the omission of any indication as to who is speaking.  At times impersonation takes the form of a narrative.  Apostrophe consists in the diversion of our address from the judge; it is wonderfully stirring.  There is another figure that Cicero calls ocular demostration, when we proceed to show in full detail how something was done.  Quintilian calls this figure vivid illustration. This appeals to the eye rather than the ear.  We are not bound to imagine only past or present actions.  We can present a picture of what is likely to happen orr might have happened [ECPHRASIS].  This involves a transference of time.  Topography is the vivid description of places [ECPHRASIS].  Irony as dissimulation. In irony we find a figure by which we understand something which is the opposite of what is actually said.  A man’s whole life may be colored with irony, as was the case with Socrates, who was called an ironist because he assumed the rôle of an ignorant man lost in wonder at the wisdom of others.  A continued metaphor develops into allegory.  Akin to irony also are the following figures, which have a strong family resemblance: confession (of a kind that can do our case no harm), concession (when we pretend to admit something actually unfavorable to ourselves by way of showing our confidence in our cause), agreement (when we agree to something which is really likely to tell in our favor).  Aposiopesis (reticentia, oblicentia, interruptio) is used to indicate passion or anger (“Whom I— But better first these billows to assuage”), or to give an impression of anxiety or scruple.  It may also be used as a means of transition (“Comi