Can Syria Survive the Lebanon Debacle?

Can Syria survive the Lebanon Debacle?

Syria still hopes for a deal with the opposition in Lebanon, according to Muhammad Shuqayr, of al-Hayat. Under the title: “The Syrian Loyalists do not see a Solution without Syrian - American Negotiations,” Shuqayr explained that Syria’s loyalists in Lebanon are insisting on a government of national unity as a pretext for delaying the May elections.

The pro-Syrian camp in Lebanon is trying to consolidate its position and staunch the flow of parliamentary deputies out of its ranks. Syria does not believe that its position in Lebanon is untenable; rather, it sees its present control of the parliament as its first line of defense.

If the opposition refuses to enter into serious negotiations with the present pro-Syrian government, then elections will be delayed. The Syrians insist that the local struggle for control of the Lebanese government is but a mirror of the larger tug of war over Lebanon between Syria and the US. “The US is now of the opinion that Syria should just give up the ghost in Lebanon,” claimed one Syrian loyalist. “Washington assumes that Syria will act as a charitable foundation to organize the May elections without demanding anything in return or any price for its good deeds.”

Bashar has told the Americans on a number of occasions that Syria is not a charitable foundation; it expects something in return for its concessions. Damascus continues to insist on a dialogue with Washington as surely as its loyalists in Lebanon insist on a dialogue with the opposition. This is the meaning of the Nassrallah-Sfeir talks and the Jumblatt-Karami talks.

What the Syrians want is the formation of a national unity government that will ultimately agree on the selection of a president to replace Lahoud. If they don’t get it, they will delay the elections and deepen the present crises. At the very least, Damascus and its Lebanese loyalists calculate, they can paralyze government and freeze the political process, which will lead in turn to further chaos and costs. Who will the Lebanese people blame for this? Damascus believes it has the stronger hand and can paint the opposition as unreasonable, unwilling to compromise, and, ultimately, as too dependent on Washington and Paris if it continues to refuse a deal.

Damascus is counting on this pressure and its control over the interim government and election process to convince Washington to come to terms. If the government crisis persists, Lebanon’s economy may collapse. Only a week ago the head of the Central Bank said he would not be surprised to see the collapse of the pound as foreign currency reserves ran out.

Is Damascus’ hope for a deal with Washington realistic given the enmity between Bush and Bashar?

Not likely, although, much will depend on the position of France. President Chirac is really in charge of the Western position. Without a military solution to the Lebanese problem, Washington is confined to multilateral politics. The only real stick it possesses will come from future UN resolutions and the willingness of the European powers to place economic pressure on Syria. That is one reason why the Fitzgerald report recently delivered by the UN was so important to Washington. By including a section on the history of the crisis and the deterioration of relations between Hariri and Bashar that preceded the Prime Minister’s assassination, the authors of the report sought to establish the motive – one that points to Syria. So far, that is the most damning part of the opposition’s case against Syria.

The other day, I spoke with a member of the Baath Party and prominent analyst here in Damascus who told me that Syria and its supporters in the Lebanese parliament could still win a majority in the May elections.

Other analysts here, who have good contacts in Lebanon, no longer believe it is possible for Syria to maintain its authority in Beirut. They recognize that the Lebanese have undergone a true revolution of thought and that Syria’s position has been damaged beyond repair by the Hariri murder. Not even Hizbullah can save Syria in Lebanon now, they suggest. The Sunnis have really gone over to the Christian and Druze side. Damascus can still hope to pick off a handful of Christian and Sunni deputies, but not enough to assure success in the elections and preserve its command of parliament.

But if they cannot win the elections, they can delay them. Several well placed Syrian friends have explained that officials in Syria are convinced that Washington is out to get them one way or the other. “Ultimately, the US will go after the president,” they insist. Thus Syria has nothing to gain by a rapid withdrawal from Lebanon or by relinquishing what influence remains to it without a struggle. Better to delay and throw up as many obstacles in front of the enemy while Syria still has influence with the Lebanese Prime Minister and President, they argue, than to concede too much ground too rapidly. If Washington is going in for the kill, Syria must be serious about defense. It has nothing to lose.

Is this a reasonable assumption on Damascus’s part? Is George Bush intent on bringing down the house of Asad?

I think it is. Bashar has become the anti-Bush in the Middle East, despite his early intentions to be a reformer. He champions stability; Bush champions revolution. He champions authoritarianism, Bush democracy and elections. Bashar argues Levantine society is too tribal and religiously divided for radical experiments and large doses of freedom; Washington says anything is better than the status quo and the evil of Baathism. “Stuff happens,” but the end result will be a new Middle Eastern consensus, one that will end terrorism. The Greater Middle East is prepared for democracy and will prove liberal, Bush insists. Bashar insists that Bush’s polities will lead to the death of many Arabs, increased terrorism, increased instability, and the loss of more Arab land in Palestine. Bush increasingly sees Bashar as the problem, standing in the way of the fourth wave of democratization. Bashar says Bush is the problem.
There will be no compromise deals or true dialogue between Syria and the US so long as the neo-conservatives hold sway in the White House and Bashar refuses to insist on radical internal reform. Bashar’s miscalculations in Lebanon have done great harm to his position in the Arab world and perhaps, more importantly, at home.

Syria’s Baath leadership is correct to assume that sooner or later president Bush will embrace the notion of regime-change in Damascus. It is not Washington’s official position to date, but all signs suggest preparations are being made to adopt it down the road. New bills put to the house spearhead this change of policy by insisting on the “democratization” of Syria. They will work their way up the policy chain without significant opposition. Who in Washington will now defend Bashar?

Reformers here believe that Syria’s only winning strategy is to get out of Lebanon as quickly as possible, thereby reversing the increasing momentum of anti-Syrian sentiment in Lebanon and the international community.

Most importantly, they argue, Bashar must jump start internal reform by calling the Baath Party Congress as soon as possible and insisting on real changes to each element of the party slogan – “Unity, Socialism, Freedom.” He can still exploit the crisis to his end, they suggest, if he openly appeals to the nation in this moment of challenge with a clear vision of reform and forward movement. The people will rally around him and a reform vision, many believe, because Syrians are extremely worried about their country’s present isolation. They feel unjustly attacked by the West. They blame the West and not Bashar for Syria’s present predicament. They are ready to sacrifice if they believe the president has a plan to see them through this onslaught.

Only by changing course can the present regime save itself, reformers argue. If Bashar continues to present himself as the anti-Bush, he will be isolated and eventually squashed. Four years is a long time, they insist, and Bashar will not be able to retrench and delay until the end of the second Bush term. Anyway, they ask, “will the next US president really be different?”

What are the chances of Bashar changing course and throwing his weight behind reform?

They don’t look good. Pessimists argue that Bashar has taken no strong initiatives in the past to suggest he might do so in the future. They point out that he has a track record of making blunders and misjudgments and will continue to do so in the future. He is a product of his education, etc. Dictators don’t learn.

I don’t believe this – at least, not the part about dictators being incapable of change. Dictators can learn and strike out in new directions. We have seen it many times. Saddat, Gorbachev, and Pinochet did it. Admittedly such dramatic reversals are not easy. The minority status of the Alawites makes it even more difficult for Bashar to liberalize. Syria is not Chile, where the erstwhile dictator and generals can retire to secure senate seats. Syria more closely resembles Egypt, where the dictator ended up dead. Even if Syria’s leaders didn’t end up dead, the fear of revenge is real. One only needs look at the present predicament of the Baathists in Iraq. Of course, Syria’s Baath government is very different than Iraq’s was. Some say there will not be revenge.

Most discouraging, perhaps, is to witness how the old guard is being brought back into Bashar’s circle, now that he is embattled. Vice President Khaddam went with Bashar to the Arab League. Mustafa Tlass, the recently replaced defense minister, was nominated recently to head a committee to investigate General Ali, head of the People’s Army, who recently called for the dismissal of the national leadership of the Baath Party.

When President al-Asad moved to extend the presidency of Emile Lahoud five months ago, he effectively shoved aside the old guard (see earlier post), who counseled against the move. It was a way for Bashar to consolidate his authority around his family members and his new group of foreign policy advisors. As I argued at the time, this was a mistake.

The president is now resurrecting the old guard. On the one hand, this may signal the beginning of a new consensus and an important reevaluation of his policies over the last months; on the other hand, it may just be a sign of his present weakness and need to bring all the pillars of the regime – past and present – back into the tent.

It is too early to tell how Bashar will respond to Syria’s failure in Lebanon. The reformers here are still counting on him to move decisively on domestic issues. They believe it is Syria’s best option for long term stability. The pessimists keep repeating, “The more things change, the more they remain the same.” Many believe that the chance of Bashar pushing for reform in the present atmosphere are very small indeed. Others say he never wanted reform in the first place. They believe that the chances of his surviving more than five years are slight.

Bush Administration Probes Syria's Future With Assad's Opposition

The following Post article is interesting for what it tells us about Washington's desire to turn up the psychological pressure on Syria. Ghadry's Reform Party of Syria has no authority in Syria. Murhaf Jouejati is right to say, "It's almost unheard-of in Syria."

The RPS has sent around an email note with the Post article. The add:

The reference in the article "Its membership is extremely thin and is not taken
seriously. It's almost unheard-of in Syria" has been quoted by a Syrian whose
father served as Syrian Ambassador to the United States under Hafez al-Assad.
Amb. Jouejati was known for fairness and intellect. His son has never talked to
RPS, probed RPS membership, or attempted to analyze our popularity inside Syria
as far as we know. All the same, the Syrian newspaper Tishreen two days ago ran
an interview that Ghadry gave an Israeli paper not long ago. Such stories are
part of the Syrian press' new policy of writing about the bad news as well as
the good. The EU invited Ghadry to address it as well.

Clearly France and Washington will turn up the heat. Washington knows very little about the internal workings of Syria, however, as I explain in an earlier post, From 1559 to Regime Change in Washington Think. The suggestion that the Syrian regime is about to collapse or Chirac's statement "that the Damascus government was unlikely to survive the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon," are either spin or pure ignorance. Probably the former.

Here is the post article:

Bush Administration Probes Syria's Future With Assad's Opposition
Washington Post
By Robin Wright and Glenn Kessler
March 26, 2005

The Bush administration is reaching out to the Syrian opposition because of growing concerns that unrest in Lebanon could spill over and suddenly destabilize Syria, which borders four countries pivotal to U.S. Middle East policy -- Israel, Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey, U.S. and Syrian sources said.

In an interview, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said yesterday that the United States is talking to "as many people as we possibly can" about the situation in Syria, as well as in Lebanon, to ensure that Washington is prepared in the event of yet another abrupt political upheaval.

"What we're trying to do is to assess the situation so that nobody is blindsided, because events are moving so fast and in such unpredictable directions that it is only prudent at this point to know what's going on," Rice told Washington Post editors and reporters, citing "the possibility for what I often call discontinuous events, meaning that you were expecting them to go along like this and all of a sudden they go off in this direction, in periods of change like this. So we're going to look at all the possibilities and talk to as many people as we possibly can."

A meeting Thursday, hosted by new State Department "democracy czar" Elizabeth Cheney, brought together senior administration officials from Vice President Cheney's office, the National Security Council and the Pentagon and about a dozen prominent Syrian Americans, including political activists, community leaders, academics and an opposition group, a senior State Department official said.

The opposition group comes from the Syria Reform Party, a small U.S.-based Syrian organization often compared to the Iraqi National Congress led by former exile Ahmed Chalabi. The INC, which led the campaign to oust former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, had widespread U.S. financial and political support from both the Clinton and Bush administrations, as well as Congress.

U.S. officials, however, yesterday denied that the meeting was intended to coordinate efforts to oust Syrian President Bashar Assad's government.

"That would be a monumental distortion," a senior State Department official said. "But it was a discussion about supporting reform and change in the region and specifically Syria -- and how we can help that and work with people in the region and Syria to support that process."

The U.S. outreach is a direct result of President Bush's discussion last month with French President Jacques Chirac, said U.S and European officials. Advising against any discussion of "regime change," Chirac told Bush that the Damascus government was unlikely to survive the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. The French president predicted that free elections in Lebanon would in turn force change inside Syria, possibly unraveling Assad's government, U.S. sources said.

Since that Feb. 21 meeting, the Bush administration has begun looking at possible political options in Syria, said analysts familiar with the U.S. thinking. "They're taking seriously that a consequence of getting out of Lebanon will be the collapse of the Assad regime, and they're looking around for alternatives," said Flynt Leverett, former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council under Bush.

The Syrian Americans who attended the meeting urged the administration to take tentative steps to pressure Damascus, such as having Bush call for greater freedoms and release of political prisoners, said Farid Ghadry, president of the Syrian Reform Party.

The delegation also sought support for lawsuits in U.S. courts against Syrian officials engaged in human rights abuses, an option available under the Alien Tort Claims Act, Ghadry said. The 1789 law grants jurisdiction to U.S. federal courts over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."

Ghadry said the Syrian opposition was encouraged by the "open and constructive" meeting, which was attended by key players in the administration's democracy policy such as John Hannah from Cheney's office, Robert Danin from the National Security Council and the Pentagon's David Schenker.

"They wanted to hear from us how they can help in extending the message of freedom and democracy in Syria," said Ghadry, who left his homeland 30 years ago, when he was 10, and formed his party after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. "They listened and took a lot of notes. We felt from the responses that they understand these are important issues."

Some U.S. analysts and other Syrian Americans warned that the Syrian Reform Party and its allies are unrepresentative and too small to have any impact.

"Its membership is extremely thin and is not taken seriously. It's almost unheard-of in Syria," said Murhaf Jouejati, director of George Washington University's Middle East Studies Program.

On Lebanon, Rice said the United States is waiting to hear recommendations from U.N. envoy Terje Roed-Larsen on how to support spring elections there. "The main thing is just to help the Lebanese opposition and others, the entire Lebanese political space [and] people to get organized so that they can have a competitive, free and fair election," she said.

"I would suspect that if the U.N. comes back and says [do election] monitoring, people will be very supportive of that," Rice added. "Perhaps if there's need for nongovernmental organizations to do training or the kind of things that have been done in other places, I'm quite sure that people would be prepared to do that."

UN Fitzgerald Report Damns Syria

The Fitzgerald report of the UN is damning. Warren Hoge of the New York Times quotes the following bits from the United Nations report on the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri:
U.N. Cites Syria as Factor in Lebanese Assassination

By WARREN HOGE
Published: March 25, 2005

The mission said it had been told by a number of people close to Mr. Hariri that he had reported that in his last meeting with President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, the Syrian leader had threatened him with physical harm if he continued his campaign to assert Lebanese independence from Syria. The report said the Syrians had refused to discuss the meeting with the mission's investigators.

"It is clear that the assassination took place in a political and security context marked by an acute polarization around the Syrian influence in Lebanon and a failure of the Lebanese state to provide adequate protection for its citizens," it said....

The report said the explosion had been caused by a ton of TNT, detonated most likely above ground.

It said Mr. Hariri was unanimously described to investigators as the most important figure in Lebanese public life and his assassination was therefore an indictment of the poor protection offered by Lebanese security services. It said the security services ignored threats on the life of Mr. Hariri and other political figures. In what it called a case of "stark negligence," it noted that Mr. Hariri's security detail was cut to 8 people from 40 after he left office.

The report provided a breakdown of the security offices and said that, contrary to the assurances of its leaders, the Syrian services played a commanding role in the management of security affairs in Lebanon.

In a section detailing repeated errors and breakdowns in policing, the report said the investigation was deeply flawed, noting that the crime scene was not properly managed; the crater created by the bomb was allowed to fill with water from a broken main, destroying evidence; people were permitted to move freely in and out of the crime scene and remove objects; and vehicles involved in the blast were removed, preventing proper ballistic analysis.

It's your turn to pull out, Syria tells US: Syria's ambassador to Washington, in an attempt to underline that Syria is not the only occupation force in the region, said on Wednesday he hoped the United States and Israel would follow his country's example and withdraw from Iraq.

Husni Mubarak says Syria will announce its pullout timetable shortly


The BBC reports on the state of media reforms and how the new permissiveness cannot be turned back in Hoping for media freedom in Syria. Despire Syrian government promises of even greater reform, however, censorship is still widespread. (Not of this blog, however)

George Thomas of CBN quotes me at some length in his article, Losing His Grip: Syrian President Struggles to Retain Power

Bashar al-Assad is the public face of the Syrian regime. But how much control the 39-year-old has over his country has always remained a mystery.

The question of Assad's grip on Syria has dogged him ever since he took over from his father, the late president Hafez Assad.

U.S. intelligence believes that since taking power shortly after his father's death in 2000, President Bashar al-Assad has been an ineffective leader. The reality is that the generals and the secret service are in total control of the country.

Five years later, most experts agree that the young Assad still lacks the killer instincts that his father was once famous for. But the question of control has taken on greater importance today, in light of the unfolding events in the region.

Like most Syria-watchers, Joshua Landis, an American professor living in Damascus, believes that authority in Syria is increasingly turning into a family affair.

Landis said, “The Assad family is very much in control, and what we have seen over the last four months is a consolidation of power within the family.”

But the family firepower has done little to shield the young and inexperienced leader from facing the toughest test of his presidency. Some speculate that the tensions between Lebanon and Syria have weakened the House of Assad and diminished Syria's influence in the region.

Landis stated, “It has always punched above its weight in the Middle East, in Lebanon, in Palestine issues; this is going to reduce its geo-strategic interest quite significantly.”

Those around him with entrenched agendas may view the crisis as a danger to their country and are liable to act against him. The daily images of tens of thousands of Lebanese people demanding freedom are not helping the man and his regime either.

Experts say some of that Lebanese "people power" could spill over into Syria.

There's no doubt that there's a large effect,” Landis remarked. “Every Syrian has been saying, 'Look, here are people overthrowing government.' There is a clear desire for reform in the country and many Syrians are dissatisfied.”

Syria's crumbling international support has left the country isolated. And experts warn that the impeding loss of Lebanon will be a huge economic loss for Syria. But supporters of the regime feel this whole ordeal is part of a U.S. conspiracy to blacken Syria's image around the world.

Edward Awabdeh is a dentist who lives on the west side of Damascus.

“I feel hurt, commented Awabdeh, “I feel the pressure is not fair on Syria and the Syrian government, and nothing is satisfying the West, and in particular, the U.S.”

The uprising in Lebanon and the uncertainty in Syria comes at a time when the Bush administration is pushing hard to bring democracy and freedom to the Middle East.

The Syrian regime has been under fire for its occupation of Lebanon, its support for terrorism and its role in sending insurgents to fight American soldiers in Iraq.

And according to U.S. intelligence reports, Syria has an active chemical and biological weapons program, and the ballistic missiles to deliver them. Some experts also believe that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction have a found a home in Syria or Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.

Bottom line: the U.S. regards Syria as a rogue state, and it has been put on notice.

Landis stated, “The Syrians are very aware that they have become a key particle in this greater Middle East. They know that there's a battle going on between reform in the Middle East and the status quo.”

All President al-Assad can do now is fight to preserve that status quo.

Landis said, “In many ways, President Assad is the anti-Bush in the region. Bush stands for revolution in the region, democracy and freedom, Assad says the Middle East is not ready for freedom. The Middle East is a complicated place, riven with tribal and sectarian differences. If we shake it, there's going to be war, there's going to violence, and there's going to be death.”

In Assad's world, America and Israel are the problem. In Bush's world, Syria is just one of several bad actors in the region.

Landis commented, “Bush says, no, revolution! We are going to kick down these doors of these regimes and we are going to bring democracy! That's the struggle going on.”

And so far, that struggle has yielded some dramatic changes across the political landscape of the Muslim world, changes that President Assad is keenly aware of.

Back on the streets of Damascus, Syrians watch daily as thousands of Lebanese continue to light the fuse of democracy. President Assad's main challenge now will be to keep those flames from spreading over into his country, while trying to get a better grip on Syria. The question is, can he do both and still survive?

Lebanon Upheaval, 2 Men's Fateful Clash

This article by MacFarquhar yesterday is a must read. It adds meat to the bones of the emerging story. Hariri was getting too big. The Lahoud extension was not about Lahoud, but about Hariri, who was already beginning to push for sovereignty - or Hariri's Lebanon. As one insider here told me a few weeks ago. The extension of Lahoud was made because if he had stepped down, Hariri was on his way to becoming the effective president of Lebanon. His ambitions were already clear. He wanted Lebanon for himself - or for the Lebanese, whichever suits your outlook.

It still doesn't explain how Syria hopes to retain influence. How hard is Syria willing to fight? How hard is the US willing to push back? There seems to be no possibility of deal making now between the US and Syria.

Behind Lebanon Upheaval, 2 Men's Fateful Clash
By NEIL MacFARQUHAR
March 20, 2005
The assassination of Rafik Hariri eliminated the one man potentially able to pressure Syria to release its grip on Lebanon.

"Bashar told him, 'Lahoud is me,' " Mr. Jumblatt recalled in an interview. "Bashar told Hariri: 'If you and Chirac want me out of Lebanon, I will break Lebanon.' " He was referring to the French president, Jacques Chirac.

In the month since Mr. Hariri was assassinated, members of Lebanon's anti-Syrian opposition have pointed to that Aug. 26 encounter in Damascus as fateful. Although opposition leaders acknowledge that they lack firm evidence tying Syria or its Lebanese agents directly to Mr. Hariri's assassination, they link that day to his slaying on Feb. 14.

"To tell you the truth, when I heard him telling us those words, I knew that it was his condemnation of death," Mr. Jumblatt said. (Read it all here without subscription)

Juan Cole argues the opposite of MacFarquhar. He writes: "The question of who killed Hariri is highly significant and it is important not to let our prejudices affect our judgment.

To the state of the case so far: 1) It seems likely that Hariri was killed by a powerful car bomb that pulled alongside his vehicle. 2) It seems likely that he was assassinated by a Palestinian radical Muslim fundamentalist named Ahmed Tayseer Abu Adas, even if someone else was driving the car. Mixing planners and "muscle" is an al-Qaeda modus operandi. 3) If Abu Adas was behind it, he made his motivation clear. He was striking at what he considered a major agent of Saudi influence in the Middle East.

Karfan Exposes Syria: A New Voice in the Blogosphere

A new magical blog has appeared written by Karfan, whose name in Arabic means disgusted. It is called "Syria Exposed," but is really the rant of a very funny and painfully honest radical sensibility.

Many will criticize Karfan for being a self-hating Arab? Syrian? Alawi? Shawi? Or perhaps Third Worlder? In fact, Karfan does not have a self to hate. That is why he is so huggable. Or perhaps he has too many selves to hate properly and that is why we love him.

Anyone who has wrestled with identity or sought to resist the pull of monotheisim will find a companion in Karfan.

Saeid the Pessoptomist, the wonderfully tortured hero of Emile Habiby, has nothing on Karfan for his twisted and ultimately winning self-mockery. Perhaps the biggest difference between Saeid and Karfan is the anger.

Take a look at this passage: (Karfan is all the rage see Charles Freund at "Reason Magazine, or see Tony at Across the Bay.

Myth No.2: We have an Identity
Not a single person below 40 years old who lives in Syria has a national identity of whatever sort!! Maybe our dick-head fathers who invented the Arab Identity that we have been hammered with all our lives pretended to believe in it, but we never did, we never even bothered to pretend. WE, here, means the vast majority of the generations of Syria who were borne after the Fucking Happy Revolution in 1963. That is what they call it: A Revolution. Karfan always thought when he was growing up that "The Revolution of 8th of March" was something like the French Revolution, where masses of poor people rose against the awful King. Only later in his youth, he learned that there was no king and no masses; just a group of gangster army officers who forcefully stole the lead from a group of gangster entrepreneurs.

Karfan never met a single young Syrian who actually believed in Arabism, in term of believing that we should respect other citizens from what is called Arab World just for the sake that they are Arabs. People who live in Syria never respected each other to begin with for them to respect outsiders. We have been conditioned to say that we want to be united with Arab countries in the Gulf, but call Gulf Arabs Dickheads and have the lowest esteem towards them. We have been conditioned to say that we want to liberate Palestine, but call Palestinians Manayek (Assholes) and treat them like shit in Syria most of the time or speak behind their back as if they are invaders from another planets. Ever visited the Palestinian Camp in Latakia or Aleppo?

Karfan is an Alawi, but an ignorant one. Up until the end of high school, Karfan was a geek who never really knew what the hell is going around him. That is why Karfan's best friend at high school in Damascus was a Sunni Damascene geek, who also did not know what the hell is going around him. When at university, Karfan tried to hang out with the only person he knew from before, a Christian friend from Tartous. But this did not go beyond the first couple of months. Karfan soon noticed a definite pattern of friendship groups' formation taking shape around him: Alawis, Sunnis from Daraa, Druuz from Sueida, Sunnis from Damascus, Christians. Students from each group would only hang out with each other and rarely have anything to do with the others besides formality greetings. Soon after, he learned that this pattern is actually a mere reflection of the society in whole.

The part about university life made me laugh as it so true. I lived in the dormitories of the University of Damascus in 1981-1982. They were a microcosm of rural Syria. Damascenes live at home and don’t take rooms at the University City. Every room was a village, where sects and students from different regions rarely intersected. Druze gathered in the Druze rooms, Hamawis in the Hama rooms, Dairis in the Dair az-Zor rooms, and so on throughout the dormitory. When the odd “other” did drop in, the conversation was transformed. It became stiff, polite and filled with banalities. Only when the foreigners left would it return to the ribald and free discourse of companions. Somehow, as a total alien from another galaxy, I didn’t impinge on the planetary action of my floor and hallway. After a time, I was accepted in the various rooms, each its own little planet.

It continues:

We live all our lives with sub-national identities that range across the
spectrum of whatever religions, sects, tribes, and gangs that existed in that land. All real-believer Sunnis have an Islamic Identity that does not have the "Syria" word in it and only has the "Arab" word in it as long as that Arab = Sunni. All real-believer Christians, Alawis, Smaeelis, or Murshdis have a Christian, Alawi, Smaeeli, or Murshdi identities, whatever the fuck is that. Kurds, Druuz, Bedouins, and all other weirdo groups in this land have their own identities. All the rest, that is non-real-believers of all the above, have absolutely no sense of identity that exceeds the sense of identity of bears. You want a proof: go ask any embassy of first-world countries in Damascus how many immigration applications they have. Actually, Karfan thinks he owes bears an apology, they do have more sense of identity since they usually don't try to get out of their area nor out of their fur as Syrians try to do.

Or this:

Karfan is convinced that all those dickheads preaching about the Dying of Arabism in Syria, obviously never lived in Syria. Or as he puts it, never took a stinky microbus from a stinky half-built-house in Eishh Elwarar (an area that is the perfectly precise opposite to Beverly Hills) to a stinky governemental Istehlakya (An ingeniously fucked-up Syrian version of supermarkets, or like..., forget it, you need to see it in order to know what the hell that thing is) and wait for an hour to get a stinky 2kg of rice from a stinky employer yelling in your face. Now, only then tell me if they can find a trace of Arabism in people. They assumed that there was Arabism and they are making a living out of writing bullshit on how it is dying. In light of the absence of the above-mentioned inspirational experience, they base their wicked revelation on two wicked sources:

1. The writings of some Syrian dickheads intellectuals from the "Failure Generation", that is our fathers'. Those people want to give meaning to their failed lives in which they could not achieve what others achieved in even Burkina Faso, not mentioning Asia and elsewhere, so they write shit saying that they ""succeeded"" in: Leaving us the Legacy of Arabism. Yes in deed, they have left us that in books; we have tons of those for lucky falafel makers to wrap their sandwiches.

2. The interviewing of people in the streets by journalists and academics, which goes like this:

Happy western journalist: What identity do you believe in?

Miserable fucked Syrian: I believe in Arabic identity. Oh, and by the way, we ALL love our president.

What the fuck do you expect us to say we believe in?

"Kurds in Syria are joining the Baath party": what does Happy western academic 1 make of that? That Arabism is sooo convincing it would make people change their skin and blood.

"Kurds in Syria are revolting": what does Happy western academic 2 make of that? That Arabism is dying.

Karfan never met a single so called "Arab" that has a sense of unity or brotherhood with any other inhabitant of the other so called "Arab Countries". People who really want to fight Israelis are driven by religious animosity toward Jews not by Arabic enthusiasm. People who really want to unite with Gulf countries are driven by the wealth they think they can share not by Arabic enthusiasm. Didn't Iraqi soldiers rape and fuck every Kuwaiti woman and man while still ""saying"" that they were doing the glorious deed of Arabic Unification? (Unless they were taking that word literally). Still, Happy western journalists and academics ignored the deeds, looked at the words, and interpreted that Kuwaiti Fiesta as a product of Arabism. But wait, good news is coming: Arabism is now dying.

Who said that only Hollywood makes stories out of nothing?

It is true that we have been drummed up day and night continuously with Arabism shit, but the only successful result of this policy is that we became conditioned to speak about it. We are Arabs, we love Arabs, Arab World, Urubaa, Blablabla, Just wards! In reality, a person from Tunisia might as well be from Honolulu and it wouldn't make a damn difference for us. Syrians will tell you that they are Arab because:

1. It is the only thing we were taught to say we are. What else is to say? We never been taught or allowed to learn anything else, we never knew any other vocabularies to say.

2. It is the only thing we were allowed to say. We all know that we are just Sunnis, Alawis, Murshdees, Druuz, etc to the end of the glorious list, but we are not allowed to utter that. It is the existing truth that no one is permitted to voice.
We were not even taught or allowed to say that we are Syrians, as this would be considered a deviation from the Holy Message of our Holy Arab Homeland-to-come. Only recently under the rule of "King Lion the 2nd", God Bless His Dynasty, people were allowed to say that they are Syrians!!

This Arabism might have had its glorious days back at the time of the big idiot Shareef Hussein and his clueless sons, or back in the days of Naser Don Kichote, maybe. But for us, the Happy Generations of Syria who were borne after the Happy Revolution of 1963, it existed in words in books and is now dying in blogs. Poor Arabism!

What can one say to this, but “Arabism is Dieing!!!”

Commander of People's Army demands End to Baath Pan Arab Leadership

New bits added at end (21 March 2005)
Andrew Tabler of Syria Today, just alterted me to this interesting new development announced by Ayman Abdulnour's "All for Syria," newsletter.

Syria: an investigation committee with leader of the people's armySyria, Politics, 3/19/2005

The Syrian "all for Syria" website said that the regional leadership of the Baath party has formed a committee to investigate the leader of the People's Army lt. gen. Ibrahim al-Ali. General al-Ali, during an interview on Syrian TV, called for the abrogation of the Baath Party Pan Arab national leadership of the Baath Party, which has two leaderships: the Regional and National.

The website said on Friday that "the Regional Leadership of the Baath Arab Socialist Party issued a decision to form an investigative committee to look into the remarks of Lt. gen. Ibrahim al-Ali (the commander of the people's army, who also has the rank of Minister, a title confered on the position when the Baath party assumed power in Syria in 1963). Al-Ali's statement was made during an interview on the popular TV show, "Madarat" ( circles), a program hosted by Nidal Zaghbour who is also a secretary for the Baath party group in the Syria Radio and TV station.

The news bulletin "all for Syria" added that the investigative committee is composed of the chairman of the party's military committee Lt. Gen. Mustafa Tlass, chairman of the party regional party preparatory committee Ahmad Dargham and the chairman of the regional organizational office Ghayyath Barakat.

Al-Ali, who is also member of the Party's central committee, not only demanded the abrogation of the party's pan Arab Leadership, but also accused the party's regional leadership of being frozen.

It is not clear whether this is important. The People's Army is some militia group of doubious importance. We shall see if this is a tempest in a tea pot or more.

Ibrahim Hamidi writes in Al-Hayat (20 March 2005) that the exicitement caused al-Ali is a sign of tension caused by the Lebanon debacle. He points out that the substance of al-Ali's remarks are nothing new. Information Minister Dakhlallah called for the elimination of the "National Leadership" of the Baath before he became minister. some thought his remarks would lead to his being removed as editor-in-chief of the Baath newspaper, his position at the time. Instead he was appointed Minister.

Evidently, the Baath Party confress is still due to be held in June, according to Hamidi's article. Party elections should begin "next month." As I reported in an earlier article, the Baath Party hold two tiers of free elections, each of which takes aproximately three weeks to complete, before the new Regional Baath Leadership Council is appointed from the winners, by the President.

Bashar Consolidates His Power

Hassan Fattah of the New York Times has an interesting article on how "Syria's Leader Moves to Consolidate His Power". He quotes yours truly.

"Bashar is learning that his father did things for a reason," says Joshua Landis of the University of Oklahoma and the Web site Syriacomment.com, who is spending 2005 in Damascus. "If you're going to be a dictator you're going to have to act like one."

Beginning last summer, analysts and diplomats here say, Mr. Assad purged the ranks of the military, sidelined prospective opponents and wrested control of foreign policy, especially the "Lebanon file," from his vice president.

It was clearly a gamble. When Mr. Assad decided last fall to push the Parliament of Lebanon to extend the term of Émile Lahoud, the pro-Syrian president, tensions rose. Rafik Hariri, Lebanon's longtime prime minister, quit and began to ally himself more solidly with the growing anti-Syrian opposition.

The assassination of Mr. Hariri last month produced a political explosion in Lebanon, with opposition forces blaming Syria and with governments throughout the Western and Arab worlds demanding that Syria withdraw its armed forces and intelligence officials from Lebanon.

Mr. Assad has promised to do so and has begun the withdrawal. Whether he will complete it and whether Syria will simply maintain its control through other means remain matters of keen debate here.

It is widely felt that maintaining control is central to his long-term survival, because of Lebanon's importance to Syria's economy. At the same time, there is no real challenge to Mr. Assad from the opposition.

In his five years in office he has worked to balance the security, military and business elements that make up the government against some new blood he has brought in. Though seen as weak, he has stood unchallenged against a fragmented opposition made up of intellectuals, Islamists and businessmen.

"The problem with the opposition is it's not changing with the times," said Riad al-Turk, widely regarded as the grandfather of the opposition movement. "Ultimately both sides are weak - the regime and the opposition. That means there's a vacuum and outside forces will enter to solve the problem."

More recently Mr. Assad's vulnerability became a point of discussion in Syrian back rooms, diplomats say, and that was cause for alarm.

So last July Mr. Assad reached for power. He began enforcing a longstanding age limit in the military, sending some 440 senior officers into retirement. He also managed to push out his army chief of staff, Gen. Imad Ali Aslan. He kept his confidants and young friends on the margins of the government, awaiting an entry, while actively playing the last remnants of the old guard against the new guard.

The result, many say, is a more inward-looking stance, less focused on the strategic implications of foreign policy. This is a change from his father, who viewed Syria as the most important frontline Arab state standing up to Israel.

"We are a generation that doesn't feel we have to justify what is happening in the entire Middle East," said one prominent government insider. "But there are still forces in Syria who don't understand what is happening in the world and don't know how to read the situation."

That misreading, analysts say, has led to numerous errors in judgment, epitomized by events in Lebanon beginning last August with the push to extend Mr. Lahoud's term as president.

In the latest crisis, the government here has shown signs of a siege mentality, cracking down on hard-won freedoms, censoring publications and communicating in words that kept much of the international community wondering what its real intentions are.

Behind the scenes, though, the crisis appears to have helped Mr. Assad frame his campaign more clearly.

In fact, despite his foot-dragging, the pullout - if it occurs - may end up being one of his less fraught decisions. Mr. Assad and his advisers are betting that Mr. Lahoud and Hezbollah, the militant Lebanese Shiite party nurtured by Syria, will oversee Syria's interests even after it withdraws. Meanwhile, Damascus will have staved off international sanctions, pinning responsibility for disarming Hezbollah on the United Nations.

In his speech announcing Syria's eventual pullout from Lebanon, Mr. Assad aimed a few barbs at his advisers, blaming them for some of his mistakes and pointedly announcing plans for a new regional conference of the governing Baath Party, which some analysts say signals the start of a shake-up.

In effect, Syrian analysts say, he must devise a split between the party and the government, cutting the party's decades-old cronyism and control over the government. But since the party is now his prime base of support, Mr. Assad must tread carefully and invent a new loyalty mechanism outside the party.

Ultimately, several prominent Syrians say, he must build his personal leadership and strengthen his rule enough to be ready for negotiations with Israel over the Golan Heights.

"There's simply no more room for mistakes now," said Samir al-Taqi, a researcher at the Damascus Center for Strategic Studies.

Nicholas Blanford and others have also written an important study of the events surrounding Hariri's murder and the subsequent investigation, which all but places the blame at Syria's feet.

'Something was going to happen - it was going to be me or him'

Days before Rafik Hariri's assassination last month, the Lebanese politician had played host to Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader, at his mansion in west Beirut. Mr Hariri had a warning for his old friend: the Syrians were after them. (Thanks to Paul at War in Context)

"He told me that in the next two weeks it was either going to be me or him," Mr Jumblatt told The Times. "Clearly he thought something was going to happen."

Something did. On February 14 Mr Hariri was killed when 600lb of explosives apparently buried in the road outside St George’s Hotel in Beirut blew up beneath his car.

The blast has echoed round the world. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese have demonstrated in Beirut, the world has united in demanding Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon and the drive for democracy in the Middle East has been given a huge boost.

Syria has repeatedly protested its innocence and no irrefutable evidence of its involvement has yet emerged. But a reconstruction of events leading to Mr Hariri's murder, and interviews with at least a dozen Western, Lebanese and even Syrian officials, leave not the slightest doubt that the plot was hatched in Damascus. [complete article]

Riad al-Turk Interview: 11 March 2005

I interviewed Riad al-Turk in Homs 11 March 2005, the day after he protested with the Syrian opposition in central Damascus. Hassan al-Fattah and Katherine Zoeph of the New York Times and Salim Abraham of A.P. and I drove up to Homs to speak to him at his family house. Hassan organized the trip and he and Katherine were kind enough to invite me along. They wanted to find out how organized and strong the opposition is.

I was happy to get the chance to meet al-Turk, who is the Amin al-`Amm (Secretary General) of the Syrian Communist Party - Political Office. He has been a fixture in the enlightened opposition for 55 years and is respected for his fearlessness and humanity. Although he has spent over 20 years in prison, Riad is still hail and sharp at 75. His first stint in jail was under Adib Shishakli in 1954. He spent another 15 months in jail under Nasser in 1960, then under Assad from 1980 to 1998, and finally under Bashar for another year and three months. He has recently undergone heart surgery, but he still smokes on occasion and is surrounded by a loving wife, beautiful daughters and grandchildren. He greeted us in his comfortable apartment in the center of Homs.

When asked if the opposition in Syria is weak:

He was quite frank about admitting to the weakness of the opposition, but insisted that most people are against the government. "The terrorism of the Asad regime over the last three decades," he said, "has turned the country into a prison of the mute."

Since the late 1990s, the opposition has been growing. The government hasn’t been able to govern well. The weakness goes back to the government terrorism of the 1980s.

“Yes, the opposition is in a terrible state,” he confessed, “but the future is on the side of the opposition.”

“The flames are under the cinders. Can I tell you when the earthquake will hit? No. Look at Lebanon. Could anyone tell when that would break out? Our resistance and opposition began well before that in Lebanon. You never know. This mute society wants to get rid of this government. Look at what happened to Saddam Hussein. The army didn’t fight and the people wanted a divorce.”

When asked what proof there was that the people wanted a divorce in Syria, he said:

You will find in every city and town sadness and horror at what happened in the past. Go into the houses of the people and close the doors and ask them. They will laugh at the slogans of the regime.

Look at our incomes. The average household earns seven or eight thousand pounds ($140-$160) a month. These are the complaints of the people. The system doesn’t offer them the ability to realize their dreams and capabilities. Everyone hurt by the system is considered part of the opposition.

On Lebanon:

The Lebanese opposition is not over. The Hizbullah demonstration was made to intimidate the Lebanese. If Nasrallah was aware and smart, he would change his political direction. Hizbullah would know that the role of the Syrians has ended in spirit and not just in terms of the troops. Who is Nasrallah trying to show his muscle to? Jumblatt, Gemayel, the followers of Hariri? If so, it is because he wants civil war.

The Sunnis and Druze came out of the civil war in Lebanon the losers – that is why they accepted the Ta`if Accords. Syria is following the politics of a child. Taif no longer has any meaning. It is broken. Syria broke it when it didn’t pull out in 1992. Syria wanted to make Lebanon into a Syrian province.

The question of Lebanon is the essence of the regional problem and the Syrian internal problem. Syria made every side the loser so it could rule in Lebanon. The government has done the same here. The government lives on the divisions of the people. It must divide the people in order to stay in power.

We asked about the Damascus Spring – the brief opening that followed Bashar’s coming to power in 2000.

He denied there had been a spring. “It was always winter,” he joked. “And that was before the coming of the American winter.”

I asked about the protest organized by the opposition last Thursday, the day after the large pro-government protest, which brought several hundred thousand people onto the streets of Damascus.

He explained that the security did not allow the protesters to gather in one place in front of the Hijaz Rail Road Station, as they had planned. “That is why most observers believed there were only one or two hundred protesters,” he explained. “Instead they were divided in two groups behind the station and at Marje square. Also we were not very organized. Many people came late and dribbled in at different times.” He insisted that 1,000 people turned up over all. “The organs of the state were ordered to suppress the peaceful demonstration. They hit several of its leaders and tried to force one to announce into his microphone,"With my soul and blood, I sacrifice for you, Oh Asad."

He did not speak of "incredible brutality." But he did say that the regime has learned nothing and will collapse on its own from internal contradictions and trying to suppress the opposition rather than taking their demands seriously, lifting emergency rule, defending human rights, and opening the way to democracy.

He compared the Syrian regime to Saddam Hussein's, which learned nothing after the 1991 War. "Rather than fix its mistakes, it persisted in its bad ways and ultimately weakened the country such that the US invaded and conquered it without a real struggle. The Iraqi people and army, as we saw, did not stand by the regime," he explained. "This is why I blame Saddam, first and foremost for the American invasion. It is his duty to protect the nation." He warns that the same could happen in Syria, but does not believe that the US government really wants regime change in Damascus. "The question [of what America wants] is foggy," he said.

I asked him if he sides with George Bush and if he agrees with the American president that the Middle East is ready for democracy.

“Hey Brother,” he responded, “We were there before him. In 1979, we formed the tajummm`a al-dimuqrati or Democratic Association. Our main slogan was al-taghayyur al-demuqrati al-jazri or “radical democratic change.” But we were a sick organ because of the terrorism. The terrorism of the state killed any political instinct in the people, and we had no support from the West.

When Asad came to power in 1970, we opposed him. We didn’t side with the dictator. But the USSR was on Asad’s side because he promised to fulfill 242 (the UN resolution demanding “land for peace” as a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict). Salah Jadid did not want 242. He wanted revolution. Asad’s coup came with international support.

We wanted democracy. We had had enough of military coups. We recreated our politics. We didn’t want the demagoguery – “unity, Arabism, and Baathism.” We face it with the demand for democracy. Asad played the conflict between the USSR and America and the Baath party of Asad was the winner.

We considered Asad and not the Muslim Brothers the #1 terrorist organization in the country. Israel and the US have weakened the opposition to a terrible point. We need to get rid of dictatorship.

The US protest against Hama was very small and completely inadequate. Now, Bush protests in a very loud voice.

I recognize that countries change their politics. At that time, the US was allied with the state and happy with the government. If the US administration were really democratic it would have condemned the government for Hama.

But if Bush attacks, I will hold Bashar the number one person responsible. All the same, democracy must come from the inside, not from traitors working with the outside, like Chalabi. Democracy cannot be brought on the back of a tank. The stick is used by those who want to provoke and not by those who wish good things for their people.”

“Yes I believe the Middle East is ready to go down the road toward democracy. We are ready to reject dictatorship. We agree with the Americans on this.”

“Nowhere in the Middle East has the acceptance of democracy been greater than in Syrian and Lebanon. The enlightened classes from the beginning of the last century studied in Europe and brought back ideas of democracy. We have been at this for a long time now.

I mentioned the recent free elections in the Engineers’ Syndicate, which resulted in only Sunni candidates being elected to leadership positions, despite a high percentage of Christians in the profession. Sunnis wouldn’t vote for Christians. I asked if Syria needed a confessional system as in Lebanon in order to protect minorities. (Riad al-Turk is a Kurd, so I was interested in his take on minority rights in a country where religious and ethnic identity is so paramount.

Confessionalism has gotten worse under this system. Yes, there is a reaction among Sunnis against Alawites. When the Alawites came to power they took many of the good jobs in the state and privileged their coreligionists.

In order to weaken the religious factor, we have to build a stronger sense of national identity, reinforce national instruction, and uphold the constitution.

A state of law must be our goal. Law treats everyone the same way – Sunnis and Alawis, the rich and the poor. Only the law can solve this problem.

If the regime fell, is there any power or organization that could rule? Is there an alternative?

The crisis is one of slaves and masters just as in ancient Rome. The problem was that when the slaves took over, they reproduced the same system and just became masters themselves. You can’t see the opposition here as you would in the West. No one is getting trained in the opposition while one party is in power. This regime of slaves can’t allow anything to grow.

Also, many of the opposition parties are selfish. The leaders look after their own interests and those of their party to the exclusion of the national interest or the opposition goals in general. This has come about for several reasons: one is because of the oppression of the government, the second because of the parties’ own corruption, (most of the opposition parties entered into the Progressive Front, becoming “loyal opposition” groups with seats in parliament and no followers.) and the third is because of the opposition’s inability to grow and change with the times. The country has changed over the years and their slogans are the same.

All the same, the government will collapse of its own contradictions and the future is on the side of the opposition. The state has no power to reform and open up to the people. Bashar has not learned the lesson of Iraq. He is like Saddam who had 11 years from 1991 to 2002 to change, but couldn’t. The US would not have entered Iraq if Saddam had been capable of change.

Why did the Byzantine and Persian empires collapse in front of the Arab invasions in the seventh century? Because they were weak and incapable of reform.

Before getting up to go, I had to ask Riad about his famous remark on being let out of jail this last time under Bashar. In his first interview after his release, he had said that the jails under Bashar were like a “five star hotel.” So I asked him, “Were they really five stars?”

He laughed and so did his daughters and son-in-law, who were sitting at the edge of the room. “Yes, it is true,” he said. The people who went to jail this last time had no clue how bad things were under Hafiz. The rooms were big with windows on both sides. We had mattresses and regular food.

During Hafiz’s time, the cells were two meters by two meters with no windows. You were beaten, there was nothing to read, and the food was miserable. You could hardly breath in the summer. I never saw the sun for 10 years. You can’t imagine what it was like.

Yes, it is five stars now. I got into a lot of trouble for that remark. All the opposition members wanted me to lie and say that it was hell, but it is important to tell the truth. I upset two organizations with that remark – the opposition and the jailers of Hafiz’s time.

So does that mean that Bashar is more human than his father?
No. No. Things are not better because Bashar is more human or wants to reform. It is because the regime is weak.

After thanking his family for tea and coffee and for being so kind to us, we started down the stairs. Riad insisted on showing us out to the street and making sure that we headed back in the right direction. I wanted to ask a few more questions that have always troubled me. How many prisoners are there left in Syria’s jails?
There are 300 to 500 hundred. Most are Muslim Brothers.

What about the Kurds?
Yes, there are Kurds too, but most have been let out.

Is that all?
Those are the ones that we can visit. Maybe there are 15,000 others unaccounted for.

Do you think most of those are dead?
Maybe. We don’t know.

How many were killed at Hama?
The Muslim Brothers said 48,000. But if you subtract the wounded, perhaps 15,000 to 20,000.

We thanked Riad again and set out on our return trip to Damascus. We didn’t arrive until 2:00 in the morning as our old Lada taxi overheated six or seven times and our two hour trip turned into a six hour odyssey. The driver was greatly embarrassed, but none of us seemed to mind, as we told stories and laughed most of the way back.

Several people have asked how badly the opposition protesters were intimidated:
Here are three articles from an-Nahar in Arabic sent to me by Tony at Across The Bay who wrote:

by the way, you didn't post any of this. You should. It involves Riyadh al-Turk and the opposition demos in Syria that were crushed by the youths and the security forces with incredible brutality beating up women and children.
(One - Two - and Three)

(Tony has complained bitterly for the last several days that I have hidden news about the opposition - supposedly because I have gone over to the dark side. Not so Tony, yee of little faith. Have patience man. I beat you to the punch and headed up to Homs to do some hard reporting – just needed time to write up the interview. I still have a life to attend to.)

The Reform Party of Syria - Farid Ghadry's group in the US, writes:
Peaceful Demonstration in Syria is Met with Beatings

Washington DC, March 10, 2005/RPS/ -- The Arab Human Rights Committee in Syria, led by Dr. Ammar Qurabi, called for Syrians to peacefully march to the Ministry of Justice today to object the lack of freedom and expression and to free prisoners of conscience in Syria.

Upon arrival to the Ministry of Justice, about 100 marchers were met by intelligence and security personnel who used sticks and batons to beat the marchers back and to disperse them. Some people sustained injuries.

False Reports of a Coup in Syria and Analysis

"I spent most of my day trying to deny that a coup had taken place in Syria." That is how one diplomat, accounted for himself yesterday when he came to dinner with a lively crowd. I was gratified he didn't bring his bullet-proof vest.

If anyone is interested in how a blogger's hoax can cause a stir, the Syrian coup alarm is a good starting place. Here is the email that greeted me as I began my morning rituals following my first thimble-full of Turkish coffee.

Hi everyone,
Some of you may know me, some of you may not. I'm Robert Mayer from the blog Publius Pundit. I am emailing you all because you are either inside Syria, within the region, or are experts on the region. There are reports on this side of the Atlantic that there has been a possible military coup in Syria, but it is not hitting the newswires. Can any of you confirm this and send me additional information and observations? Everyone here is watching and is desperate to know. This would be a big help if any of you can confirm or deny this. Thank you all,

Robert Mayer

The Lebanese Foundation for Peace is reporting that a military coup has swept Assad’s regime because of disputes over the withdrawal from Lebanon.

A Coup d’ Etat took place in Damascus late last night. Intelligence reports coming from within the Syrian Military Command indicate the following:

A rebellion split The Syrian Army in two factions.

Since yesterday , Damascus is under the de facto control of the Syrian Army, under the command of Syrian Interior Minister Ghazi Kanaan, and supported by Syrian Intelligence General Rustom Ghazaleh, Syrian military General Ali Safi, and Firas Tlass son of former Minister of Defence, Mustafa Tlass. The group rebelled against the decision of President Bashar el Assad to withdraw from Lebanon and seized the Damascus military yesterday.

Around 3 am, Damascus time, the Syrian Air Force bombarded two military airfields around Damascus, the Air force base of Dumair, and the Air force base of Katana. Also, late night around 3 am, the Syrian Air force bombarded military positions of the Syrian Army west of the city of Homs.

President Bachar el Assad retreated secretly to the city of Aleppo where he is temporarily holding ground. He is massing special forces troops loyal to him and preparing himself to take back Damascus by force .

The Syrian President left in Damascus his brother in Law, Syrian Military Intelligence Chief General Assef Shawkat to negotiate a settlement with the dissidents. The situation within the Syrian military was very tense for a week and exploded yesterday. The dissident group took control of Damascus as they were very upset at the Lebanon withdrawal for they left behind a billion dollar industry.

see: http://www.free-lebanon.com/index.shtml

I wrote back:

Dear Robert,
Someone has a rich imagination. All is normal here as far as I can tell. Sunny spring day and everyone is bustling about happily. One diplomat just emailed about what he should wear to dinner tonight - casual or formal? Didn't suggest bullet proof vest, so I assume all is normal.
Best to you from Damascus.
Joshua

All the same emails kept coming my way - from Stratfor intelligence unit, local reporters, and other bloggers asking me for information about the "coup" and The Lebanese Foundation for Peace, which turns out to be a LFP site. Sasa from The Syrian News Wire, explained that "they are the post-Phalange group (the Israeli army’s proxy in Lebanon during the Civil War) presently in exile in Israel.

To follow how the story unrolled and how Nagi Najjar, who maintains the LFP site responded, read the post and particularly the comments at Robert's site.

Najjar defended his coup information by writing:

If the shooting didn’t started yet or Joshua Landis was invited at a dinner
party with the Military Attache there without a bulletproof vest doesn’t mean
that the situation is “normal” within the Syrian Regime.

There are things happening they are not aware and the Baath Regime is
not going to tell a US journalist nor brief the Embassy and the CIA station
there what is going on within. We are expected to receive additional information
soon, we will publish it.

We believe our “sources” are good and never betrayed us before…

A comment by "blue" reads:

Josh Landis may have been right about this, but he often appears to be
nothing but an apologist for Assad’s regime. Sad, really, that an academic in
the US turns to propaganda for an authoritarian ruler.

Another added:

Josh Landis’s agenda would seem to be to maintain this myth that the brutal Syrian regime is good for the Syrian people.

News flash: it’s not! It’s killing innocent Syrian people.

Quite frankly I don’t believe news that comes out of Syria, whether from LFP, The New York Times, or SNW; the country’s too tightly controlled.

This morning Robert wrote me another email:

Hi everyone,

Just following up with you all. Thanks to all of your emails, this story has effectively gotten around the whole blogosphere and has been debunked.

The original offending information, which is STILL being propogated, is located here: http://free-lebanon.com/

Thank you all very much for helping dispel the rumors. If any of you in particular know about the Lebanese Foundation for Peace, it's purpose, etc.... as they are the ones dispensing this information, please let me know. I am very interested to learn about them.

All the best,
Robert Mayer
http://www.publiuspundit.com

Comment:

Najjar and a few others will be disappointed to learn that information does get out of Syria fairly easily, despite ham-fisted attempts by the government to control the news flow. Bashar liberalized the control of information in Syria and promoted much freer debate He will have a hard time restricting it even if he wants to.

Bashar seems to have consolidated his grip on power internally, even as Syria took a beating on the Lebanon front. In fact, by undoing Hariri in Lebanon and shunting aside his supporters here in Syria, the president has been tightening his control over the internal situation.

This strategy may back-fire in the long run because the president will have narrowed his social base around his family. But in the short run, he is firmly in control.

Yes, there are members of the military who are upset that the president didn't get out of Lebanon five years ago. Most were not upset that they had to withdraw. They complain that business interests kept Syria in Lebanon too long and set the military up for this humiliating withdrawal. They are not about to make a coup over it, however.

The Sunni business elite of Damascus is clearly upset at how Hariri was undone. Many had connections to him and to those around him who were doing well in Beirut. He was a towering example of Sunni business and political success, not only for the Lebanese, but also for the Syrians. Even people who had no connection to him viewed his success as a symbol of what can be accomplished with good leadership and economic acumen.

Whether his murder will have "confessional" fallout in Syria, as it has in Lebanon, has yet to be seen. I suspect it will harden the wall of distrust that has always divided the Alawite ruling elite from the Damascene business community, which largely controls the economy in Syria. There are some signs of that already.

All the same, the Sunni business elite is not organized for formal opposition. Damascene business leaders will sulk in their tents. Many must be worried that Bashar is becoming more like his father and less like the reformer they were hoping for. Some will resent the fact that he has strengthened himself and his family. Perhaps they saw in Hariri's rise to power in Beirut an example which they hoped to follow in Damascus?

Much will depend on how Bashar treats reform going forward. So far, his record is one of little dramatic achievement. If he does not become his father, content to hold power tightly and rely on stability to keep him in power, but rather uses his newly won authority to make so important changes, the Hariri affair may actually turn to his advantage.

From 1559 to Regime Change in Washington Think

A number of readers took exception with my 1559 is Finished - The Game is Up post of two days ago.

The struggle between Syria and the US is far from finished. Syria's role in 1559 is largely finished. The word from many western embassies here, the day Syria confirmed to Larsen that it was moving out its security forces completely and quickly from Lebanon, was that 1559 was over as far as Syria was concerned.

The only real leverage 1559 offered the US was European sanctions. When Bush went to Bruxelles, he got the European powers to agree to support 1559 to the extent that it required the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon - that meant sanctions, a big club.

With Syria's withdrawal, the club is gone. Europe does not support forcing Hizbullah to disarm in the immediate future or naming it a terrorist organization, which would require Europe to move with the US to shut it down. Europe has always been reluctant to join the US in the use of sanctions against Syria. Chirac's about face following the Lahoud extension shifted the balance of the EU against Syria. Now that Syria is withdrawing, Europe is returning to its former anti-sanctions position.

From the point of view of the embassies in Damascus, their leading role in Lebanon is over. The foreign reporters will eventually pack their bags and leave the Meridian and Sheraton hotels in down town Damascus and return to their main postings. Some will go to Beirut and follow the ins and outs of Lebanese politics. But the Syrian action is largely over. The spotlight moves from Damascus to Beirut. Many in Washington, however, will struggle to keep the focus on Damascus.

Washington must find another club. It will not forget Damascus and the Syrian regime, far from it. But 1559 and Lebanon will not be the principal weapons to use against Syria.

Everyone in Washington is now cooking up next-steps and other instruments to finish off president Bashar al-Asad. Those who want to continue the campaign against dictatorship, Baathism, the enemies of Israel, Arabism, or the "unfree" will now have to begin to address the question of regime-change and internal Syrian politics directly, something Washington has not done up to this point. They will have to convince President Bush and his policy people that it is in US interests to attack Bashar, not for his foreign policy, for occupying Lebanon, or for troublemaking in the region, but because he treats his people "egregiously" in the words of some Washington wonks.

To see how this shift is already taking place look at the recent publications of the WASHINGTON INSTITUTE for Near East Policy. It is perhaps the most influential Middle East think tank in Washington. Presidents Reagan, Bush Sr., and Clinton, largely farmed out Middle East policy making - in particular the peace-process - to the Washington Institute. Dennis Ross is its head.

Read the article: "ASSESSING THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY OF
'CONSTRUCTIVE INSTABILITY' (PART I): Lebanon and Syria"
By Robert Satloff, the executive director of The Washington Institute.
March 15, 2005

One of its main policy recommendations is for Washington to "Start talking about democracy, human rights, and the rule of law inside Syria. Once the Syrians depart Lebanon, Washington should turn the spotlight on Syria's egregious behavior toward its own citizens."

The Syria section of the report begins:

As the administration works through the daily diplomacy on Lebanon, it needs to keep one eye on events in Damascus. The Asad regime is probably the most brittle in the Middle East; while the Egyptian and Saudi regimes, for example, may bristle at U.S. pro-democracy efforts, there are built-in brakes on U.S. pressure as well as deep reservoirs of institutional support in both countries. Syria, however, is different. The United States has no interest in the survival of the Asad regime, which itself is a minoritarian regime built on the fragile edifice of fear and intimidation. Cracks in the Syrian regime may quickly become fissures and then earthquakes, in a way that the same cracks in other countries could be contained.

Given how remarkably puerile Syrian foreign policy has been under Bashar al-Asad, it would be useful for U.S. planners to dust off old studies of possible sources of domestic instability and their likely implications.

Its main policy recommendations and subtitles are:

1. Invest in intelligence about the dynamics of political, social, economic and ethnic life inside Syria.

2. Start talking about democracy, human rights, and the rule of law inside Syria.

3. Offer no lifelines to this regime.

Another interesting article recently published by WINEP is one on the Muslim Brothers by Michael Jacobson. It is interesting more for what it tells us about the debate in Washington over the question of regime change in Syria than for its content about the Muslim Brotherhood, which is minimal.

The major reason that regime-change for Syria has failed to catch on in the Bush administration is that everyone fears that the Muslim Brotherhood will come to power. Washington’s fear of the M.B. is Bashar al-Asad’s principal protector.

Farid Ghadry, the leader of the small Syrian opposition in Washington, understands this. Consequently he has been arguing for some time that the White House should not fear the MB. He insists that Syrian Muslims are more Sufi than severe and more liberal than extremist. The MB threat, he proposes, has been made up and marketed by the Asad regime in order to secure the friendship of the West.

Hence the concern at WINEP over whether the MB would come to power if there is regime change. It should be remembered that a number of fellows at WINEP, such as Daniel Pipes and Martin Kramer, have argued that Washington should not open a dialog with “moderate” Muslim organizations in the hope of isolating more extreme groups. They argue that most, if not all, Muslim associations drink from the same cup of intolerance and illiberalism. “There is nothing to discuss,” they suggest.

Michael Jacobson points out that since the murder of Hariri, there is an emerging alliance between some Syrian opposition liberals and the Muslim Brothers. For the time being it seems to be only a tacit alliance, but the question for Washington is whether to encourage and back such an alliance, much as it did with Chalabi and the Shiite religious groups in Iraq, or whether to stick with the Alawites and the present order in Syria. Perhaps the Muslim Brothers are weak and would not come to power if there is instability in Syria?

WHAT ROLE FOR THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN SYRIA'S FUTURE
By Michael Jacobson

In calling for a demonstration in Damascus on March 10, Haitham Maleh, an opposition figure with close connections to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, proclaimed, "We are 85 percent of the country" -- an apparent gesture of solidarity against Syria's ruling Alawite minority. The group of about 100 demonstrators who answered his call was reportedly dispersed by several hundred progovernment demonstrators. Along with President George W. Bush's rejection of Syrian president Bashar al-Asad's ambiguous proposal for a phased or partial withdrawal from Lebanon, the incident fed speculation on whether Asad's regime will survive the current tumult. Although few would mourn the regime's collapse, many are concerned that such a development would allow an Islamist group such as the Muslim Brotherhood to take control, which might be even less appealing to the United States than the current regime.

Will the Brotherhood Take Over?

Several factors have sparked concern about the prospect of Islamist groups such as the Brotherhood taking power in Syria following a regime collapse. Many jihadists are traveling from and through Syria on their way to Iraq, raising the question of how active Islamist extremists are inside Syria and how much Damascus tolerates or encourages their activities.

Syria's basic demographics are a key factor as well. As mentioned previously, much of the Syrian leadership, including Asad, hails from the Shiite Alawite sect. Alawites represent only 15 percent of the Syrian population, however, while Sunnis comprise more than 70 percent. Many Sunnis do not regard the Alawites as true Muslims and would prefer not to live under Alawite control.

Muslim clerics are demanding an increased role in the political process. In fact, Syrian vice president Abdul Halim Khaddam, a Sunni, recently issued a statement urging citizens to act more in accordance with Muslim laws and traditions. Given these factors, some have speculated that a religious Sunni organization such as the Muslim Brotherhood may be well positioned to take power if the regime falls.

Moreover, the Brotherhood recently released a statement that may indicate a reversal of the group's engagement strategy, though it is far too early to tell whether the move demonstrates an increased willingness to confront the regime. Following the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, the Brotherhood faxed a statement to the London-based al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper calling for an investigation into the murder and lamenting the sharp deterioration of relations between Syria and the "Lebanese people," who could be heard "shouting in unison 'Syria, get out.'" The statement noted that "Hariri's death might be the straw that will break the camel's back as far as Syrian-Lebanese relations are concerned," and that "no one can absolve the Syrian leadership from guilt."

The idea of the group taking power in Syria has generated considerable unease among Western observers, with some citing recent reports that Syrian Muslim Brotherhood members in Europe have been linked to al-Qaeda and the global jihad. Although it is certainly plausible that individual group members have joined the global jihad, this is not necessarily reflective of the views of the organization as a whole. By and large, members in Europe do not maintain close ties to the main organization in Syria. Moreover, the Brotherhood may realize that Western pressure on Asad will be helpful to their cause, making the organization unlikely to embrace the anti-Western jihad.

Not Well Positioned to Take Over

Despite all of the above factors, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood or any other Sunni Islamist group would have great difficulty filling the vacuum if Asad's regime collapsed.... In comparison to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Syrian Brotherhood has a far less educated membership, boasts a far less wealthy constituency (which is drawn primarily from the lower middle class), and poses a much less potent political threat. Other Sunni Islamist groups in Syria are even less well equipped to assume control.
Some Syrian liberals remain wary of a potential Brotherhood takeover. Yet, Kamal Labwani, an opposition leader released from prison five months ago, emphasized that the opposition is fighting on two fronts, and that "the fight against the government has . . . priority" over the fight "against the fundamentalists."

How Little We Know

Any speculation on succession in Syria must include the caveat that it is largely guesswork. In reality, little reliable information about such developments is available to researchers and analysts. Gauging the strength of Islamists in Syria is a particularly difficult challenge. The regime forbids any research on the topic, and Muslim Brotherhood members are reluctant to speak with outsiders. Increased understanding of such groups in Syria is vital for U.S. policy in the region.

Michael Jacobson, a Soref fellow at The Washington Institute, served as counsel on both the congressional and independent commissions investigating the September 11 attacks.

Copyright 2005 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE for Near East Policy

New US Sanctions Bill Introduced

Just when you think it is all over something new happens. The opposition demonstration in Beirut yesterday, which gathered an estimated million participants, has thrown momentum back on the side of the anti-Syrian forces.

The opposition had some doubts about the extent of its appeal after the Hezbollah demonstration in a nearby square in Beirut on Tuesday. There have been rallies in the city center every Monday since former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated Feb. 14, a Monday, but organizers were determined to make this one especially large in response to the pro-Syrian march.

"This will counterbalance last Tuesday, and now we can sit and talk," said Mazen al-Zain, a 30-year-old financial analyst, noting that he himself was a member of an illustrious Shiite clan from southern Lebanon. "What is really important after today's gathering is that we all sit down at the same table."

The presence of such a large number of Lebanese put added pressure on the government of Syria to announce a serious timetable for the withdrawal of both its thousands of troops and its secret police officers in the country. Although President Bashar al-Assad has promised a withdrawal into the Bekaa region by the end of March and a further discussion with a joint Lebanese-Syrian commission in early April, there is still no clear timetable for a complete withdrawal.

A number of dangers still lurk for Syria.

One is the introduction of "H.R.1141 Lebanon and Syria Liberation Act" (Introduced in House, which is designed "To strengthen sanctions against the Government of Syria, to establish a program to support a transition to a democratically elected government in Syria and the restoration of sovereignty and democratic rule in Lebanon, and for other purposes."

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 8, 2005
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. MACK, Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS of Virginia, Mr. BOOZMAN, and Ms. BERKLEY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

One of the new features of the bill is:

SEC. 202. ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN SYRIA AND RESTORATION OF SOVEREIGN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LEBANON.

(a) Authorization- Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized to provide assistance and other support for individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to support a transition to a freely-elected, internationally recognized democratic government in Syria and the restoration of sovereign, democratic rule in Lebanon.

(b) Activities Supported- Assistance provided under subsection (a) shall, to the maximum extent practicable, be used to carry out the following activities:

(1) Democracy-building and civil society efforts in Syria and Lebanon, including the provision of assistance to organizations certified by the President to be independent democratic organizations, victims of political repression and their families, and prisoners of conscience and their families.

(2) Radio and television broadcasting to Syria and Lebanon to support democracy-building and civil society efforts in Syria and Lebanon.

(c) Authorization of Appropriations- There are authorized to be appropriated to the President to carry out this section such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2006 and each subsequent fiscal year.

There are other additional aspects to the bill, such as placing sanctions on foreign countries that sell Syria weapons, but the democracy section, if the bill is passed and accepted by the President, would signify an new strategy toward Syria - one that clearly moves toward regime change.

Another danger lurks in the Hariri murder investigation.

Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk reported that President George W. Bush "is expected to announce on Wednesday that Syrian - and perhaps Lebanese - military intelligence officers were involved" in the killing.

In his article, Fisk said the report of the United Nations inquiry team "will be so devastating that it will force a full international investigation of the murder of 'Mr. Lebanon' and his entourage, perhaps reaching to the higher echelons of the Syrian and Lebanese governments."

Speaking from New York, a UN spokesperson told The Daily Star that whatever President Bush would announce would not be based on the UN team's findings as the investigation is still ongoing.

He said: "We can neither confirm nor deny anything until the team returns to New York and presents its findings to the secretary general."

According to The Independent, The UN team, made up of Irish, Egyptian and Moroccan investigators and recently joined by Swiss bomb experts, has discovered that many of the vehicles from Hariri's convoy "were moved from the scene of the massacre only hours afterward - and before there was time for an independent investigation."

Syria seems to be decided to move troops out before the May elections in Lebanon, which should eliminate the threat of sanctions. Russia and Germany have suggested they are happy with Syrian progress so far.

The European Parliament on Thursday did not put Hizbullah on a European list of terror organizations, after a proposal to do so that was pushed by the US was dropped.

Syria's strong leverage in Lebanon still remains. The two armed groups in Lebanon - Hizbullah and the Lebanese army, the Commander-in-Chief of which I presume is President Lahoud, are both in Syria's camp. No opposition groups are armed or have malitias.
Secondly, the opposition must cooperate with Prime Minister Karami and President Lahoud to construct an interim government if it wants to get the election laws passed in time for May elections to be carried out.

It is still too early to calculate who controls Lebanon or who has "won" due to the recent crisis. The dust has not settled.

1559 is Finished - The Game is Up

"It's all over." That is how one reporter described the situation in Lebanon after touching base with Western Embassies in Damascus. "There is no more threat of sanctions. No use of force," he was told. Now that the Syrians have agreed to withdraw their troops, UN Resolution 1559 is dead."

The resolution demanding the disarming of Lebanese parties cannot be carried out. France and Russia have opposed it. Hizbullah demonstrated that it is much too strong.

In the American embassy in Damascus, the view is that the game is finished. Now everyone is trying to understand who won.

Did the US win because Syria pulled out its troops? Or, did it lose because it got too greedy with 1559 and insisted on stuffing in the articles on Hizbullah and local "terrorist groups," which no one else will now support.

Perhaps Syria won? Yes, it pulled out its troops, but they weren't really necessary to preserve its influence in Lebanon. Syria proved that it has plenty of local supporters in Lebanon. It is not out of the game by a long shot. All the chest pounding by Rice and US diplomats may be premature.

In many ways the struggle over Lebanon has been a classic battle between Syria and the US over who gets to own Lebanon. For 30 years it has been in Syria's sphere of influence and viewed as Syria's front door in the region. Israel and the US tried to take it back in 1982 but failed. Now they have tried to take it back again.

Bashar has been right about a few things, he would surely say. He claimed all along that Syria is not the source of Lebanon's problems. Rather, he explained that everyone blames Syria for Lebanon's problems, but in reality, he claims, "It is the Lebanese who keep demanding that we settle their disputes and who drag us into their local battles."

Perhaps he was telling the truth? We are now seeing that Lebanon is divided and that many more people that the opposition thought support Syria's influence and oppose American influence.

Lebanon has no strong or effective central government. In many ways it is made up of battling tribes, as Bashar insisted. Syria acted as the referee for 30 years. Only if the Lebanese can agree on how to build an effective central state will that job of referee become redundant. Right now Condalesa Rice is talking about a UN and Western mechanism to fill the "power vacuum." But maybe Syria will continue to play referee from a greater distance if its supporters in Lebanon prove stronger than America's. We shall see.

It is in Lebanon's hands now. The national debate has begun in earnest and it is exciting. Hizbullah made its statement in Riad al-Sulh square. "We are here. We are not just in the South." Unlike the Sunnis of Iraq, who didn't vote, the Shiites will vote. They want a place in society and won't repeat the mistake of the Iraqi Sunnis. They have been emboldened by the Iraqi example, where the Shiites have come to power, to get into the political arena and demand their share.

The Lebanese opposition is listening, too. It is very refreshing and will have a monster effect on Syria. If the Lebanese can work out at happy balance, Syrians will take heart. Minority fears keep Syria's dictatorship in place. Once they ease, things will begin to change rapidly.

Syria Reported to Accept Demand to Pull All Forces From Lebanon
By HASSAN M. FATTAH
President Bashar al-Assad of Syria agreed to carry out a resolution calling for a complete withdrawal from Lebanon, and offered to set a timetable for the pullout.

Lebanon Needs to Act First for Syria to Exit, Envoy Says
By STEVEN R. WEISMAN
Published: March 14, 2005

In their television interviews, Ms. Rice and Mr. Hadley repeated administration statements that the United States' priority was to get Syrian troops to pull out of Lebanon, and that they were willing to defer the issue of dismantling or disarming Hezbollah, which the United States lists as a terrorist group.

"First things first," Ms. Rice said on the NBC News program "Meet the Press." "When the Syrians go, you will see what the balance of forces really looks like in Lebanon. The Lebanese will be able to deal with their differences."

Ms. Rice said it was not clear what steps the United States might support in the event of a Syrian pullout, but she left open the possibility that an international force could fill the ensuing security vacuum and prevent the kind of sectarian fighting in Lebanon that Syria used to justify its military deployment there.

"I'm quite certain that the Lebanese people may need some help in what is going to be a period of getting ready for elections, and then we will see what is needed after elections," Ms. Rice said on "This Week." "But I can be certain that the international community is ready to provide an international framework, if that is what is needed."

Protests have been frequent since Mr. Hariri's assassination. On Sunday, hundreds of thousands of people gathered for a pro-Hezbollah rally in the southern city of Nabatiyeh, while in Beirut, a few thousand opposition demonstrators held a vigil in Martyrs' Square, Reuters reported. They held candles that spelled "Truth."
Hassan M. Fattah contributed reporting from Damascus, Syria

U.S. Pressure May Pose Problems for Assad
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS Published: March 14, 2005
Filed at 2:12 a.m. ET

CAIRO, Egypt (AP) -- Even if Syria does in the end fully withdraw from Lebanon, Syrian President Bashar Assad may not be off the hook. Instead, U.S. pressure is expected to shift to issues of reform, cross-border infiltration into Iraq and Syrian links to militant Arab groups.

Squeezing Assad further could present the young Syrian leader with serious domestic problems at a time when some question the extent of control he has over his Arab nation.

``The pressure will continue until Syria achieves every U.S. goal,'' said Ayman Abdel-Nour, a prominent member of Assad's ruling Baath party. ``Syria will be left alone only w