Atassi 8 Freed

The Atassi 8 have been freed.

Here is Ammar Abdulhamid's comment about it:

Another Demonstration of Weakness and Confusion! A few hours ago, the Atassy 8 were released. International and internal pressures seem to have paid off. As such, and rather than coming as a demonstration of strength, as it was intended to be, the entire move came as a further demonstration of the Regime’s weakness, confusion and lack of resolve.

Mr. Ali Abdallah, however, the leftist activist that had read the Muslim Brotherhood statement in the Forum is still under arrest and will reportedly be tried under Law 49 outlawing the Brotherhood and prescribing the death penalty against those who collaborate with it. The same fate seems to await the lawyer and human rights activist, Muhammad Raadoun.

Meanwhile, yesterday, the government arrested another well-known lawyer and activist, one Habib Salih. No reason was given for the arrest. Also, the official spokesman for the Atassy Forum, Mr. Habib Issa, jailed two years ago, is still in jail and is not expected to be released anytime soon. So are the MPs Riyad Seif and Mamoun Homsi. The same applies to scores of Kurdish, Islamist and secularist activists that have been arrested over the last few months and years. The promise that the President made less than a year ago to end the file of political detainees still goes unfulfilled, and still witnesses unexplained reversals.

Patrick Seale had this to say about the Atassi 8 arrest:
The harsh response by the authorities is regrettable and counterproductive. Bayanuni himself had long since persuaded his branch of the Muslim Brotherhood to renounce violence and extremism. He has repeatedly called for national reconciliation and the healing of wounds. He has even won the support of Syria's "Mandela," the veteran Communist Riad Turk, who spent 20 years in jail. Turk, whose new party name is the People's Democratic Party of Syria, advocates cooperation with a range of political groups, including Baathists and reformed Muslim Brothers.

Before her arrest last week, Suhair Atasi, daughter of the founder of the Atasi salon, was also campaigning for a national dialogue involving Baathists, communists, Kurds, Muslim Brothers and civil rights activists, to thrash out a reform program helping Syria protect itself against foreign pressures. What distinguishes the strands of the Syrian opposition is that they are all resolutely "patriotic," refusing any collaboration with the United States, or any outside power, against their own country.

In this, they differ sharply from the U.S.-based Farid Ghadry, an "opposition" figure of little local credibility, who has been taken up by Washington and by some European officials in Brussels. The Damascus opposition derides him as the Syrian Ahmad Chalabi.

The Atasi group is not, however, the only victim of Syria's security services. There have been several arrests at Damascus airport and elsewhere, as well as reports of political kidnappings. Armed robberies have also taken place by criminal gangs, some of them linked, or so it would appear, to disorderly cousins of the president, or even to his brother Maher Assad, a commander of the Presidential Guard.

Mohammad Raadun, president of the Arab Human Rights organization in Syria, was seized from his office in Latakia on May 22 for advising Syrian exiles not to return home for fear of arrest or worse. Meanwhile, the former head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, Rustom Ghazaleh, and his three siblings, have been accused by the Medina Bank of Lebanon of defrauding it of tens of millions of dollars. The general impression is one of racketeering, lawlessness, and of unchecked security services, which Assad seems unable or unwilling to bring under control. The French daily Liberation described Syria as a "dictatorship without a dictator."

It is a fact of life, however, that when a small country is in danger of being overrun by an aggressive superpower, it would be wise for it to clean up its act in order to win some protection from the international community - and more importantly from its own nationals. For whom in the country today, apart from those profiteering from the regime, would rise in its defense?

Lebanon's Elections - What's at Stake?

The Lebanese elections being held today have created excitement because they have overturned the pro-Syrian status quo of the last 30 years. They have also produced great disappointment because the Zaim system has remained largely unchanged. All the old names and "feudal" lords are back. "Revenge of the Zaims" might be a good movie title. Also it would seem that Saad Hariri is set to become Prime Minister, or to name the future Prime Minister, even though he has no experience save being the son of his father.

I have just returned from several days in Beirut, where I gave a few lectures at AUB on Syria. But I also had time for a delicious dinner at Majana's with my favorite journalists: Michael Young of the Daily Star and Reason, Nicholas Blandford of the Christian Science Monitor, and Anthony Shadid or the Washington Post.

We had a long discussion about the meaning of the elections. We all remarked that there was a widespread sense of let-down about how little of the "New Lebanon" was being realized and how much of the "old Lebanon" had reemerged - the confessionalism, old families, horse trading, and deep seated distrust across communal lines.

Michael Young, a Maronite, and champion of Lebanon's confessional system, had little time for our grips about the old Lebanon. "What do people expect?" he asked. This is Lebanon. We are all part of the confessional system. Even if you scratch Aoun, you find a confessional minded person," he insisted. (Aoun is the politician who poses as the destroyer of the old system and champion of a new united Lebanon.) "It is 10 times better than the authoritarianism Lebanon is surround with." That is the real alternative to the Lebanese system. We should be grateful that we have real pluralist politics, and the Lebanese should stop bitching." So said Michael. By and large, the Maronites are happy with the present system because they are guaranteed 50% of the parliamentary seats, despite being around 40% of the Lebanese population. They see attempts to refashion the system as a threat to their constitutional guarantees under Taif and an attempt to marginalize them.

This did not stop Anthony or Nick from insisting that the Lebanese were disappointed. Anthony's article today is all about how the old Zaims are back. He focuses on Jumblatt, but it is about all Lebanon and how the communities remain divided:

Lebanese seek to map a future mired in past
By Anthony Shadid, Washington Post, May 29, 2005

It's politics as usual in Lebanon, more than two months after hundreds of thousands of flag-waving Lebanese poured into downtown Beirut this spring, furious over the assassination Feb. 14 of the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, which they blamed on Syria. In what they proclaimed the Cedar Revolution, they demanded the end of a generation of Syrian dominance over their tiny, mountainous country.

The Syrians have since left, but Lebanon is perhaps most remarkable for how little else has changed. "We gave an impression to the world that we were united again," said Sarkis Naoum, a respected columnist for An Nahar, a leading newspaper. "But this unity is still on the surface, this unity is still superficial, it's not deep. If the political classes and the politicians and the leaders of the religious communities don't deepen this national unity, it will melt like the snow.

[complete article]

Hassan Fattah of the New York Times also stresses how little has changed in his article, "New start in Lebanon is slowed by old rules." A large per cent of the candidates were assured of their success before the elections began because of the way election lists are hammered out in back rooms. It is not about campaigning. Many candidates ran unopposed.

The 128-member Parliament is evenly split between Christians and Muslims, while the country's demographic distribution is widely different. In effect it means that Christians, who make up less than 40 percent of the population, have far more influence in Parliament than Muslims, with almost 60 percent.

Reuters confirmed the disappointment felt by Lebanese in its article on the low turnout at the polls in Beirut today and total success of the Hariri ticket. "Hariri slate wins Beirut poll, turnout low: Candidates led by the son of slain former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri have won all the seats in Beirut polls, but turnout was low."

If there was one article that infuriated my Christian friends this week, it was:
Lebanon's election: Free but not fair
By Annia Ciezadlo, Washington Post, May 22, 2005

Every week, my husband and I take a rickety old taxi to Hezbollah country. The emerald city of downtown Beirut, with its glittering luxury towers, drops away behind us; ruined buildings, their shell-shocked hulks festooned with laundry, loom ahead like ghost ships.

We soon leave Beirut proper and reach the dahiya -- the dense and sprawling Shiite crescent, half suburb, half slum, that cradles the city's southern borders. In the dahiya, home to my in-laws and a large swath of Beirut's population, the recent anti-Syrian protests that became known as the Cedar Revolution seem like a fairy tale. "As an area, as dahiya, we're not concerned about what's happening in downtown," one college student told me in March while demonstrations raged in Martyrs' Square. "We regard what's happening as a joke."

Around the world, however, the candy-cane banners and multilingual college kids of the uprising caught the imagination of millions. Holding parliamentary elections on time, free of Syrian influence, became democracy's new rallying cry. President Bush cautioned against delaying the poll, scheduled to run on four consecutive Sundays beginning May 29.

But Bush and other well-meaning Americans are ignoring a fundamental problem: With Syria gone, Lebanon's elections will be free, but they won't be fair. In Lebanon, Muslim votes, especially Shiite votes, count less than those of Christians. Literally. During the last election, in 2000, politicians running in the primarily Muslim south had to get three times as many votes to win a seat as those running in some Christian areas.

Shiites, like the much smaller Sunni community, have 27 seats in Parliament as compared to the Maronites' 34 seats. The rest are divided among other sects.

This kind of argument makes Christians particularly angry. "But Nabih Berri, the speaker of the parliament, is very strong. He has been speaker for 15 years and nothing gets done in government with out his say so," Christians correctly point out. "Berri shut down parliament before the new election law could be discussed and, especially, before a vote on pardoning Geagea could go through. Why do the Shiites complain? It is just whining."

"Hizbullah is a scandal", my Christian friends insist. "What other country allows an armed militia to run around threatening people? We can't even visit some areas of the South because the Hizb won't let us. It is blackmail, worse, it is terrorism. How can they say they are working for Lebanon when they are only interested in themselves and are hurting Lebanon?" That is how my Christian friends see it.

UPDATE: Michael Young just sent me his written response to the
Annia Ciezadlo's article, which has been published by the Post. You can see whether I represented his argument correctly. Here it is:

Annia Ciezadlo missed the point about Lebanese democracy, which is based on the representation of religious communities as opposed to a "one person, one vote" model.

Yes, Christians are a minority in Lebanon, although the figure Ms. Ciezadlo cited of 23 percent was wrong. The CIA World FactBook estimates Christians at 39 percent of the population. Perhaps Ms. Ciezadlo confused the Maronite community with Christians as a whole.

And, yes, Christians received half the seats in parliament. Far from being "state-sponsored discrimination," however, this distribution was the fruit of a compromise among the religious groups and today is not challenged by any of them.

The logic was that all religious groups would have a role in a system of set-asides and that they would be reassured enough to remain a part of Lebanon. When the formula was agreed upon at independence in 1943, it was enlightened: By positing a weak central authority and strong sects, it allowed Lebanon to avoid the authoritarianism prevalent in the Arab world.

Further, the alleged Christian advantage is far less simple than Ms. Ciezadlo presumed. For example, since the constitutional changes of the Taif Accord in 1989, the presidency, which goes to a Maronite, has lost much of its power, while the longest-serving senior official since war's end has been the Shiite speaker of parliament.

Finally, the election law that Ms. Ciezadlo lamented was imposed in part through an alliance between Hezbollah and another Shiite group, the goal being to marginalize their Christian and Shiite opponents in south Lebanon. The law actually discriminates against Christian voters, although, as a remnant of Syrian rule, it surely will be changed.

Despite its flaws, the Lebanese system merits more sympathy than many in the West accord it.

MICHAEL YOUNG

Of course, the greater threat may be that Hizbullah will only trade in its guns if the Christians give up their 50% share of power. Hizbullah may try to upset the Lebanese apple cart by insisting on re-write the Taif Accord and by demanding closer to a 40% share of seats in Parliament, a share that better represents the actual number of Shi`is in the country. The other sects, particularly the Christians, would be asked to give up power to the Shiites. This is the long-term threat of Hizbullah and it is why the party makes Christians so nervous. It is also why Taif has become a sacred script to Christians, while it is seen as antiquated by many Shiites.

So long as the Shiites are the only group to carry guns, they will have more than their constitutionally allotted power. To give up their guns, Hizbullah may demand a larger number of parliamentary seats and more constitutional power as recompense.

These thorny constitutional questions loom in the future. The 1975 civil war was fought over the issue of communal representation. Lebanon's "new" unity will be put to the test when it comes to renegotiating communal representation once again.

Economic Growth in Syria - Or Not?

I recieved two very useful comments on my post "Would it be Better for Syria to have Regime-Change Now or in 5 Years?". (By the way this article appeared translated in Arabic and slightly pared down on Syria-news.com, which is co-funded by Firas Tlas. Click here).

Correction: I originally wrote that Syria-News.com is owned by Firas Tlass, the eldest son of Mustafa Tlass, who was Hafiz al-Asad's long-time Minister of Defense. This is not true.

Nidal Maalouf, the General Manager of the Syrian Economic Center and Editor of Syrian-News, recently wrote me to explain that

Syria-News site is run by the Syrian Economic Center, a limited partnership that is co-funded by Mr. Tlass. SEC was established in 1995, and Mr. Tlass became partner in 2004.

I would like to thank Mr. Maalouf for correcting me and to apologize for my misattribution.

The first comment came from:
Maurice Saade
Agricultural Policy Officer
FAO Regional Office for the Near East
Cairo, Egypt

I beg to differ with your conclusions regarding economic growth rates in Syria. The data in the FAO report that you have quoted can be very misleading if you do not read it correctly. The growth rates calculations are made in Syrian Pounds (SL) and not in $US. Keeping in mind that the exchange rate until the early 1980s was around 3.5-4.0 SL per $US (compared to 50 S per $ since the early 1990s), so you can imagine how distorted the analysis can be if it is based on SL. Unfortunately, I couldn’t find GDP figures from the 1960s or 1970s. But I recall very well that in 1975, the per capita GDP in Syria was around US$ 1500, compared to World Bank estimates of $1160 in 2003, and this is measured in current terms, i.e. not taking inflation into consideration. So in real terms, $1500 in 1975 is equivalent to at least $3000 (probably much more) in today’s terms. Therefore, the real per capita income DECLINED by more than 60% in the past 30 years. Needless to point out that in 1975 there were very little oil revenues and Syria was still reeling from the 1973 war with Israel. It is this long-term trend that most Syrians have felt over the past few decades, particularly the middle class which has seen its purchasing power steadily decline since the early 1970s until it was almost wiped out during the hyper-inflation of the late 1980s. The relative very modest improvements in income during the 1990s may look somewhat impressive, but this is only when they are compared to the abyss rates of 1985-1990.

Best regards, Maurice Saade
P.S. The above remarks reflect my own personal views and not the official position of FAO.

The second comes from:
Jihad Yazigi
Editor-in-chief
The Syria Report
Rue du Paradis, 75010 Paris, France Tel/Fax: 01 43 27 05 14
editor@syria-report.com http://www.syria-report.com

There are a number of factors you have to take into account when you talk of Syria's GDP or in general of the statistics in the country.

The paragraph of the FAO report you mention is referring to GDP growth in Syrian Pounds. This is not very significant data as the rate of the Syrian Pound to the dollar has plunged dramatically since the mid-eighties. So, as a rule and in order to compare with other countries you should use the dollar rates.

In practice, for the last twenty-five years, the Syrian economy has stagnated, with the exception of the first 5 years of the nineties (1990-95). These five years witnessed a conjunction of factors: a surge in production of oil, three successive years of good rain and of growth in agricultural production (which makes up around 25-30% of GDP), capital inflows from the Gulf (following Syria's opposition to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait) and also to a lesser extent private capital inflows that followed the enactment of investment Law N°10. However, in practice, Syria's current per capita GDP stands very much at the same rate as it was in 1980, around US$1,000.

For your information, the seventies witnessed an extraordinary period of economic growth. This was accompanied by a growth in literacy and life expectancy and if I remember well (I have to check the figures here), Syria had during the seventies the third highest average annual growth rate in the world in HDI (Human Development Index).

Another thing you have to take into account is that the economic figures published by all international institutions are based on local Sryian statistics. These statistics grossly underestimate private sector production. Syrian business owners do not report the correct earnings of thier companies in order to escape taxation. According to national statistics the private sector made up around 70% of industrial GDP (outside the oil & gas sector) in 2002. So you can imagine that there is a large gap between what the statistics indicate what reality really is.

Finally, just one remark on relates to unemployment, a subject you did not cover, but which I think is interesting. If GDP growth is higher than population growth you get an increase in per capita GDP. That's all fine but you have to know that in order to obtain a fall in unemployment rates, it is simply not enough to have growth in per capita GDP, because with time comes also growth in productivity, that is the increase in the production produced by every single person.

In France for instance, annual increase in productivity is 2% per annum. Population growth there is 0.5% per annum. As a result, in order for unemployment to fall, the French need a rate of at least 2.5% per year. If the same rate of 2% applied in Syria and you add up around 2.7% in population growth, you actually need a per capita GDP growth of at least 4.7% before unemployment can fall. As long as it isn't the case, unemployment keeps rising.

Best, Jihad

Thanks to both Maurice and Jihad for helping us to understand the long-term economic growth rates in Syria. To someone who has lived off and on in Syria since 1981, it does seem like the economic situation has improved for many people and not just the upper-class. All the same many Syrians have insisted to me that things are actually worse and that the average Syrian is poorer now than in the 1970s. I find that hard to believe. Maurice thinks so. Jihad says they are roughly the same, but that Syrian state statistics may under-report national wealth.

Syria Arrests Many and Stops Cooperating with US

The Syrian government has begun what seems a sweeping crack down on civil society leaders and opposition members. This is coordinated with cutting off CIA and intelligence cooperation with the United States.

It comes at the time of the UN announcement that the United Nations team has verified the pullout of all Syrian troops and (as far as anyone can tell) intelligence officials from Lebanon. Secretary General Kofi Annan announced Monday, "We have verified all the withdrawal, including the border area," he told reporters.

At dawn this morning, the Syrian authorities, represented by the Political Security Apparatus headed by Mohammad Mansoora, arrested the Board of Directors of the Jamal Atassi Muntada (Forum). Early reports are that the people arrested were: Mrs. Souhair al-Atassi, Dr. Hazem Nahar, Mrs. Nahed Badouiah, Mr. Hussein Al-Oueidat, Mr. Youssef al-Jahmani, Mr. Jihad Masooti, Mr. Abdul Nasir Kahlous, and Mr. Mohammad Mahfoud.

On May 22, Mohammad Mansoora's security people raided the office the Arab Human Rights Organization and arrested its leader Mr. Mohammad Ra'adoun.

DOUGLAS JEHL and THOM SHANKER of the NYTimes report that "Syria Has Stopped Cooperating With U.S. Forces and C.I.A. Published: May 24, 2005

WASHINGTON, May 23 - Syria has halted military and intelligence cooperation with the United States, its ambassador to Washington said in an interview, in a sign of growing strains between the two nations over the insurgency in Iraq.

The ambassador, Imad Moustapha, said in the interview on Friday at the Syrian Embassy here that his country had, in the last 10 days, "severed all links" with the United States military and Central Intelligence Agency because of what he called unjust American allegations. The Bush administration has complained bitterly that Syria is not doing enough to halt the flow of men and money to the insurgency in Iraq.

Mr. Moustapha said he believed that the Bush administration had decided "to escalate the situation with Syria" despite steps the Syrians have taken against the insurgents in Iraq, and despite the withdrawal in recent weeks of Syrian troops from Lebanon, in response to international demands.

He said American complaints had been renewed since February, when a half-brother of Saddam Hussein, who was once the widely feared head of Iraq's two most powerful security agencies, was handed over to the Iraqi authorities after being captured in Syria along with several lieutenants. The renewal of complaints caused Syria to abandon the idea of providing further help, he said.

"We thought, why should we continue to cooperate?" he said.

Bush administration officials said Syria's stance has prompted intense debate at high levels in the administration about new steps that might be taken against the Syrian government. The officials said the options included possible military, diplomatic or economic action. But senior Pentagon and military officials cautioned Monday that if any military action was eventually ordered, it was likely to be limited to insurgent movements along the border.

"There's a lot of discussion about what to do about Syria and what a problem it is," said the administration official, who works for a government agency that has been involved in the debate.

Relations between Syria and the United States have been souring for months, and some Bush administration officials said Syria's level of cooperation had been dwindling even before the latest move.

Lawrence Di Rita, the Pentagon spokesman, said there have been occasional low-level military-to-military communications along the border. He said the Defense Department had received no official notification of a change in that status, nor that the status of American military attachés in Damascus had been altered.

The American officials declined to provide an on-the-record response to Mr. Moustapha's statements on halting intelligence cooperation, citing the delicacy of the issue.

American intelligence officials have said Syria has provided important assistance in the campaign against Al Qaeda since the Sept. 11 attacks. In recent months, senior Pentagon officials and military officers say, cooperation between the two nations has included low-level communications across the border between captains and field-grade officers of the American-led alliance and their Syrian counterparts.

One senior military officer said those communications had been helpful in mitigating a number of "cross-border firings" of artillery that have occurred between Syrian forces and the American-led military in Iraq. Any further scaling back of cooperation there or between Syria and the C.I.A. could have a tangible impact, officials said.

American military officers in Baghdad and intelligence analysts in Washington say militant cells inside Iraq draw on "unlimited money" from an underground financial network run by former Baath Party leaders and relatives of Mr. Hussein, many of whom they say found safe haven to live and operate in Syria.

Those officials say Damascus has done very little in its banking system to stop the financing, nor has it seized former Iraqi Baathists identified by the United States as organizing and financing the insurgency.

In presenting Syria's case, Mr. Moustapha said his government had done all it could to respond to American complaints, including taking steps to build barriers and add to border patrols.

He declined to comment on any role Syria might have played in the capture of Mr. Hussein's half-brother, Sabawi Ibrahim al-Hassan al-Tikriti, No. 36 on the American list of 55 most-wanted Iraqis. But the ambassador said Syria had jailed some 1,200 foreign fighters who sought to enter Iraq from Syria, and had returned scores of others to their home countries.

On the day of the interview with Mr. Moustapha, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Syria was "allowing its territory to be used to organize terrorist attacks against innocent Iraqis."

A senior American military officer acknowledged that "the Syrian government has in some cases been helpful" in building border berms and otherwise taking action against people involved in providing support to the insurgency. But the officer added: "Our sense is that they protest a bit too much and that they are capable of doing more. We expect them to do more."
----

Comment: Embassy officials in Damascus have been repeating for some time their key phrase: "Pressure works."

Clearly Bashar has taken the decision that he must attempt to stop that montra which has become dangerous. He may believe that with the withdrawal from Lebanon, Europe will no longer side with Washington on ratcheting up the pressure. America has few good options now for raising the heat.

The Baath Party Congress will probably be a let down. Bashar has been telling people for some time "not to expect too much" from it and that people should lower their expectations. The crack-down would seem to suggest that he is neither planning surprises nor expecting that anything done at the conference will relieve US pressure.

He may believe that the reduction of car import tariffs has "drugged" the people, as some are saying.

Opposition members were trying to organize. The Atassi group recently held a meeting at which different parties read out their agendas. Someone even read the program and demands of the Muslim Brotherhood, based in London, and was promptly arrested, causing the group to become scared. A week ago, Sabine Lubbe Bakker, a Dutch graduate student, wrote a report on the meeting, which she had attended. Initially she wanted me to publish it, but quickly changed her mind and asked me not to because members of the Atassi group were frightened and wanted to keep a low profile.

Many opposition members and reformers have been calling for a broad front to be created, which would include the Muslim Brotherhood. This is clearly not permissible and has spooked the government. So long as individuals complain, there is no threat. If they begin to organize, as they have been tentatively doing, there is a threat.

See the article By Azme Bashara in al-Ahram, which suggested that relations between the US and Syria were headed down hill. It is an interesting read and may well have had an influence on decision making here, although, the present crackdown would seem to have already been in the works.

The Survey of Baathist Political Tendencies: A Hoax?

Several people have emailed me about the alseyassah article article that describes an opinion poll taken of Baath Party members. The most interesting part is the claim that roughly 25% of the Baathists said they would vote for Muslim Brotherhood or Muslim Brotherhood backed candidates in an election. Over 50% said they would vote Islamic-Nationalist.

This article is based on a report that was written and circulated by Nazir Nayouf. He is based in Paris, an Alawite, who was imprisoned for a long period under Hafiz al-Asad. He describes his group as: "SYNATIC is a NGO, founded in Damascus on 14 July 2001 by world-well-known human rights advocator Nizar Nayouf and other former prisoners of opinion. It struggles for exposing and documenting the crimes done by the dictatorship ruling in Syria, and building a secular democratic state."

How reliable is Nizar Nayouf? He circulated a report claiming that Iraq's WMD had been smuggled into Syria and was hidden in three places in Syria, which became a central basis for US Defense department claims that Syria was the hiding place for Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. He included a map of the locations with his report, which has been published on the web. (I wrote about this long ago.)Although some of his reports seem to be based on reliable information, he is frequently wrong or partly wrong.

About his latest report on the Baathist poll, my hunch is that it is completely fabricated. I have asked several people here to ask about the story. None of them could come up with anything. One good journalist said, "Don't believe it. No Baathist would say he supported the Muslim Brotherhood on a poll done by the secret police, even if he secretly did support the Islamists."

That is the best I can come up with. Here is his original report

دمشق ، 17 أيار / مايو 2005
تقرير صحفي
المخابرات العامة تنهي عملية " المسح التقويمي الشامل " للبعثيين المدنيين 77 :
بالمئة يؤدون واجبا دينيا واحدا على الأقل ، و 53 بالمئة يذهبون إلى الجامع بشكل منتظم

أنهى فرع الكومبيوتر في مبنى قيادة إدارة المخابرات العامة ( أمن الدولة ) قبل حوالي أسبوعين تحميل المعطيات المسحية الخاصة بأعضاء حزب البعث " الحاكم " من غير العسكريين واستخلاص النتائج الإحصائية التقويمية التي ستقدم للرئيس السوري بشار الأسد قريبا . وقال مصدر مقرب من أحد مهندسي المعلوماتية الذين تولوا عملية تحميل هذه المعطيات " إن عملية المسح التقويمي ـ الإحصائي كانت بناء على طلب الرئيس بشار الأسد الذي أوعز لإدارة المخابرات العامة القيام بها قبل حوالي عام من اليوم . وذلك بهدف معرفة التركيب الحقيقي الشامل لحزب البعث من مختلف النواحي ، ليصار بعد ذلك ( وهو ما تم فعلا الأسبوع الماضي ) إلى تحليلها وفق برنامج صمم بمساعدة تقنية يابانية . وأشار المصدر إلى أن إدارة المخابرات العامة أوفدت ثلاثة من ضباطها المهندسين إلى اليابان من أجل اكتساب المعرفة التقنية الخاصة بهذا المشروع من خلال دورة استغرفت ثلاثة أسابيع ، وبموجب اتفاق مغطى بوثائق أصدرتها وزارة التعليم العالي ، باعتبار أن المهندسين الثلاثة " يعملون في كلية المعلوماتية التابعة لجامعة دمشق " !! وطبقا للمصدر فإن " عملية المسح هذه تعتبر الأولى من نوعها في سورية وربما في العالم العربي كله . وقد شكلت نتيجتها صدمة حقيقية للمعنيين رغم أنها كانت متوقعة بالنظر لمعرفتهم أن الحزب لم يكن له من ذلك إلا الاسم ، وأنه تحول إلى تجمع هيولي مائع منذ أواسط السبعينيات الماضية حين اتخذ الرئيس الراحل قرارا بإنهاء سلطة الحزب على أرض الواقع وتحويله إلى مجرد ماشطة ( وصيفة ) مهمتها رش المساحيق على وجه السلطة ونتف الشعر الزائد في حاجبيها " حسب تعبير المصدر . وفيما يلي ملخص إجمالي لهذه العملية وفق ما ذكره المصدر لـ " المجلس " .
قامت عملية المسح على أساس نموذج استبياني تولت فروع إدارة المخابرات العامة في المحافظات تعبئته ، سواء مباشرة أو بالتعاون مع شخصيات علمية وثقافية حزبية تجيد هذا النوع من العمل وتتعاون مع إدارة المخابرات . وقد ضم النموذج أكثر من أربعين سؤالا أو " مفردة استبيانية " ، بالإضافة للمعطيات الشخصية الأخرى ( معطيات الهوية الشخصية كالعمر والمهنة .. إلخ ) . ومن بين هذه الأسئلة / المفردات : الأصول القومية والدينية والمذهبية ( عربي / كردي / أشوري / شركسي / مسلم سني / مسلم علوي / مسلم درزي / مسلم اسماعيلي / مسيحي /.... ) ؛ هل يؤدي الفرائض الدينية ( صلاة في الجامع ، الصيام ، الحج ، الذهاب إلى الكنيسة .. . ) ؛ هل يميل إلى دمج الفكر القومي بتوجهات إسلامية ؛ هل سبق له أن اعتقل لسبب سياسي ، وعلى أي خلفية ( يسارية ، ماركسية ، قومية ، إسلامية ) ؛ هل سبق له أن انتمى لحزب آخر قبل عضويته في حزب البعث ؛ إذا جرت انتخابات برلمانية حرة ، لصالح أي اتجاه سيصوت ( قائمة / مرشح شيوعي ، قائمة / مرشح اسلامي ، قائمة / مرشح بعثي .. ) ؛ هل يقبل بمبدأ فصل الدين عن الدولة ( أن يكون رئيس البلاد غير مسلم ) ؛ هل يقبل بمبدأ زوجة واحدة ( يرفض مبدأ تعدد الزوجات ) ؛ هل يقبل بالزواج المدني ( زواج مختلط الطوائف ) ؛ هل يقبل بقيام سلام طبيعي مع إسرائيل وفق قرارات الأمم المتحدة ؛ هل هو مع مبدأ إلغاء التأميمات التي قام بها الحزب ( في الستينيات ) ؛ هل يملك مصدر رزقه الأساسي ( موظف ، تاجر ، محامي ، طبيب .. ) ؛ إذا كان موظفا حكوميا ، هل يملك مصدرا آخر للرزق ، وهما هو إن وجد ... إلخ .
وطبقا للمصدر ، فإن عملية المسح شملت مليون ومئة ألف عضو في الحزب . ومن بين النتائج التي توصل إليها المسح ، والتي أمكن معرفتها ، ما يلي :
ـ 64.3 بالمئة من أعضاء الحزب هم من المسلمين السنة ؛
ـ 19.7 بالمئة من المسلمين العلويين ؛
ـ 9.8 بالمئة من المسيحيين ؛
ـ 7 بالمئة من باقي الأقليات القومية والدينية .
ـ 77 بالمئة من البعثيين يؤدون واجبا دينيا واحدا على الأقل ( صلاة ، صيام .. ) ؛
ـ 53 بالمئة يذهبون إلى الجامع بشكل منتظم ؛
ـ 63.2 بالمئة يرفضون مبدأ فصل الدين عن الدولة ( أن يكون رئيس الدولة مسيحيا ) ؛
ـ 6.7 بالمئة من أعضاء الحزب ينتمون إلى التيار اليساري ( ماركسي ، صلاح جديد ) ؛
ـ 53.4 بالمئة سيصوتون لقوائم أو مرشحين ذوي اتجاه قومي ـ إسلامي ؛
ـ 24.3 بالمئة سيصوتون لقائمة جماعة الإخوان المسلمين أو لمرشحين مدعومين من قبل الجماعة في أي انتخابات ديمقراطية ؛
ـ 9 بالمئة سيصوتون لقوائم يسارية أو مرشحين يساريين وشيوعيين ؛
ـ 71.5 بالمئة مع إبرام اتفاقية سلام مع إسرائيل على أساس قرارات الأمم المتحدة ؛
ـ 28.5 بالمئة ضد السلام مع إسرائيل بأي شكل من الأشكال ؛
ـ 83 بالمئة من الموظفين لهم مصدر دخل واحد على الأقل عدا مرتبهم الوظيفي ؛
ـ 57 بالمئة يؤيدون إلغاء التأميمات التي تمت خلال السبعينيات ؛
ـ 9 بالمئة سيصوتون لقوائم يسارية أو مرشحين يساريين وشيوعيين .
هذا وقد أشار الباحثون " المخابراتيون " إلى أن نسبة الارتياب ( هامش الخطأ ) تتراوح بين 1.5 و 2.2 بالمئة ، وذلك تبعا لكل مفردة استبيانية من المفردات المشار إليها .
وإذا أخذنا بعين الاعتبار الدقة العلمية لهذا المسح ، يمكننا أن نتوصل إلى النتائج الأولية التالية :
أولا ـ إن البنية العامة للحزب هي بنية محافظة .
ثانيا ـ إن الحزب ، وفي حال فصله عن السلطة ( أي إلغاء المادة الثامنة من الدستور التي تكرسه حزبا قائدا للدولة والمجتمع ، وتشريع التعددية الحزبية والسياسية وسن قانون أحزاب )، سيتشظى إلى أربعة تيارات / أحزاب أساسية ( أو تلتحق بأحزاب تحاكي هذه الاتجاهات ) ، وهي حسب حجمها : التيار القومي ـ الإسلامي ؛ التيار الإسلامي ؛ التيار الليبرالي ؛ التيار اليساري . ويمكن ، تقديريا ومن خلال عملة إزاحة معينة فيما بين هذه التيارات ، أن نستخلص تيارا خامسا هو التيار " القومي الصرف " ، الذي ـ مع الاحتفاظ بنسبة معينة من هامش الخطأ ـ من الصعب أن يتجاوز 15 بالمئة في أحسن حالاته !

Would it be Better for Syria to have Regime-Change Now or in 5 Years?

The other evening I argued with a Syrian friend - a smart and established journalist - over whether Syria should have regime-change now, or sometime in the future, let's say in five years.

I argued that regime-change now would be a mistake and would hold many unforeseen and unpredictable dangers. My friend argued the opposite. He said the sooner there is regime-change the better. "You are out of touch with real Syria," he said. "Who do you see? The wealthy and well off. Look at the growing number of poor in the suburbs of Damascus" he suggested. "Look at the poverty in the countryside, the growing number of unemployed, etc."

I argued that Syria has no organized opposition that has any experience. The ethnic and sectarian divisions among Syrians are real and wide. There is very little "liberal" consciousness among the broad masses. "If there is revolution or regime-change now," I argued, the chance of Syria heading toward chaos or even civil war is high - too high to risk."

I came home and looked up the numbers. In Syria there is a growing absolute number of poor, but a declining number of poor as a percentage of the population. Anyway, the elites are more important than the poor in governing the country successfully. They must be prepared to take power.

In a report written six years ago, the poverty in all MENA (Middle East and Near East) countries was summed up like this:

We calculated the number of poor people in MENA in 1985 and 1994 according to different poverty lines ranging from spending per-capita of $21 to $60 per month. One conclusion that emerges is that, irrespective of the choice of the poverty line, the actual number of poor in MENA has increased between 1985 and 1994. If instead of measuring the number of poor, we measure the proportion of poor in the population, we observe that the percentage of poor people has decreased between 1985 and 1994, again irrespective of the choice of the poverty line.

In conclusion, my friend is right: there are more poor people. But he is wrong to argue that the problem is getting worse. It isn't. The percentage is declining, although too slowly.

In terms of the rate of annual growth, Syria has been in the middle of the MENA pack since the Baath revolution of 1963, but much of that growth has been wiped out by the high population increase. (Syrian growth rate in the 1950s was much higher.) Here is what FAO has to say:

During the last four decades economic growth in Syria has advanced at a rate of 4.6 percent per year on average (between endpoints of the 1963-1999 period). This is a good rate of growth in the long term for many countries. Unfortunately, the growth in population in Syria is also quite high (3.3 percent average over the same period). Growth has accompanied the rapid growth in population, which is a real achievement, but per capita income has remained stagnant in the long-term, alternating ups and downs. The economy has progressed on a cyclical pattern of periods of rapid growth followed by periods of stagnation or decline. The 1990s have been a period of growth, but a decreasing rate,

More up to date figures (1990-2001) also give a fairly high rate of growth. Here is what the UN says according to the Globalis World Indicator Information on Syria

Indicator: GDP per capita annual growth rate - 1990-2001
Description: GDP per capita annual growth rate: Annual GDP growth per person. Least squares annual growth rate, calculated from constant price GDP per capita in local currency units.
Source: Human Development Report (UNDP)

Syria is squarely in the middle of GDP per capita annual growth rates for 1990-2001 at 1.9%
Syria is below the following countries (the figure is the rate of growth)
Lebanon 3.6
Sudan 3.2
Tunisia 3.1
Egypt 2.5
United Kingdom 2.5
Yemen 2.4
Canada 2.1
United States 2.1
Iran 2
Syria 1.9
Turkey 1.7
France 1.5
Germany 1.2
Jordan .9
Morocco .7
Oman .6
Algeria .1
Chad -.5
Kuwait -1.0
Saudi -1.1
UAR -1.6

It should be added that Syria's population growth rate has been falling sharply in the last decade. Today it is 2.7% and not 3.3%, as it used to be.

Growth in the last few years has also been down. In 2002 it was around 4%. It fell dramatically to 2.5% in 2003 because of the US invasion of Iraq, but picked up again to 3.9 estimated in 2004 and is supposed to grow even faster in 2005 (projected 4.3).

The basic picture for Syria is improving because the country is getting population growth under control. Non-oil growth should be good in the coming years because of Asad's financial, tourist, diplomatic (think Turkey) and investment reforms. It should be added that the withdrawal from Lebanon may also end up having a positive effect on the Syrian economy in the long term. Remittances are sharply down because of the return of Syrian workers, but overall foreign investment is growing.

The UAE investment firm, Majid al-Futtaim, is beginning the single largest investment project in Syria - a series of hotels, Mall, restaurants, playgrounds for kids, movie theaters, etc. on the road to Beirut. Initial investment is 300 million dollars, but the plan is to eventually invest 1 billion in the coming years. The firm's outlook is good because tourism was up this spring by 30%. Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon should not hurt the project, which will rely heavily on Gulf and Lebanese consumer tourism. As one person, knowledgeable about the project, suggested to me, "these sorts of mega-projects will transform the face of the Syrian economy in five years. Syrians will develop a new consumer culture."

Of course, Syrian oil production is due to decline in the coming decade, so that is bad news, but it isn't perhaps as dire as some suggest it will be.

All the same, Syria's per capita income is not good. The country is poor compared to other MENA countries. This is due to bad management. Here are the UN figures provided by Gobalis. Indicator: GDP per capita - 2002

Syria is ranked country 96 out of 152 countries listed. Its adjusted GDP per capita is $3,620

Egypt is #94 and Morocco is #95 on the list. They are immediately above Syria at $3,800. Jordan is country #91, Lebanon is #89 at $4,360 GDP per capita.

The only Arab countries that are poorer per person are Sudan and Yemen, which are well below Syria. This is why Congressman Tom Lantos (D-California) told Yale University students recently

that Syria is now the third poorest country in the region, behind only the Sudan and Yemen, and that its economy is "desperately" in need of foreign investment. "What Syria has is disinvestment," Lantos said. "Any Syrian with money gets it out of the country."

Another reason to expect Syrian growth rates to be below potential is its on-going battle with the US.

About US-Syrian relations, Lantos was not as optimistic as he was about US-Libyan relations. He recounted a visit he made to the country in the spring of 2003, in which he met with President Bashar Assad and proposed a "road map" for stabilizing relations with the United States. Lantos urged Assad to close down terrorist offices in the country, withdraw its 17,000 troops from Lebanon, quell "vicious" anti-American propaganda in Syria and
close down its border with Iraq.

"He was shown evidence of Syrians supplying everything anti-American forces need," Lantos said.

Unfortunately, said Lantos, "Assad has chosen not to follow the path of Libya." Hence, he told his audience, he is recommending that U.S. policy toward the country be "the exact opposite course" of what he proposed for Libya.

The point I am arguing here is that the state of the Syrian economy is not a reason to wish immediate regime-change. It is growing, contrary to the belief of many.

The reason for sticking with President Asad is because of Syria's institutional and ideological weaknesses. If change comes before Syria has real institutions, capable of guiding the country, the government may collapse as did Iraq's. There would be chaos and possibly civil war as we saw in Lebanon.

The counter-example is Egypt. Egypt's state institutions are growing in strength and independence. They are exploiting the political opening being offered the country by President Mubarak to assert their corporate identity and independence. A week ago, 2000 Egyptian judges said they would not oversee the elections unless they were given independence and legal autonomy. Read this article in today's NYTimes by Hassan Fattah:
Egyptian Judges Are Entering Growing Reform Movement

CAIRO, May 19 - When thousands of Egyptian judges gathered in Cairo last week to demand greater independence from the government, they highlighted the entry of a powerful new force in the country's growing reform movement: official institutions.

Long taken for granted as appendages of the government, some institutions are less willing to tolerate business as usual this election year. The judges' extraordinarily public step is perhaps the most obvious display of resistance, and builds on a similar call by judges in Alexandria weeks earlier.

In small ways, institutions like Parliament and the state-controlled news media have begun to show a degree of independence too. While small groups of protesters demanding greater democracy and an end to President Hosni Mubarak's government are now taking to the streets, the greatest potential for change may lie in those official institutions.

"The return of real politics has put many institutions back in the limelight, and these institutions are beginning to work for change," said Abdel Monem Said, director of the Ahram Center for Strategic Studies, a government-backed research and policy organization.

The institutions are presenting Mr. Mubarak with an unexpected challenge from within, one that will be difficult to dismiss. "The fact is, major changes in this country are going to come out of those institutions, not from the streets," Mr. Said said.

Syria is at least 5 years behind Egypt in developing independent institutions, maybe ten years. Some will argue that as long as the Baath is in power in Syria, the country will never be allowed to develop independent institutions or free thinkers.

I disagree. This last month we witnessed a minor uprising in the ranks of the Baath Party itself over the irregularities of the Party elections. A petition was circulated by Party members such as Ayman Abdul Nour and signed by many highly placed Baathists complaining about the corruption of the elections and demanding that 100 qualified reformers be added to the Party Congress, which has roughly 1,200 members, and from which the Command Council of 21 members will be selected.

Many argue, and I think convincingly, that Bashar is trying to build more professional ministries - that he is, in effect, an institution builder, who is trying to replace patronage and clientele networks with well qualified personnel in legally based institutions.

Bashar's distaste for the security institutions of the country and his veering away from reliance on the military is evident. I will recount one story which underlines his alienation from the Military and traditional pillars of the regime.

A good friend recently retuned to Syria for a three week visit to see if he wants to bring his family here and start a business. He has lived abroad for nine years and is a successful engineer working for a multinational corporation. He is Alawite and a son of a retired minister.

He said he visited 14 school friends when he traveled up the coast to Tartus and Banyas, and added:

You know how most everyone on the coast (Alawites) depends on the Army, either directly or indirectly? Well, they all said that the present regime no longer respects the army, and people follow suit. In the old days everyone knew that Hafiz was "ta’ifi," sectarian. They supported him because they knew he was pulling for them and was helping them. They no longer feel that way. They said the moral in the army was zero. They said that this president might as well be a Kurd or Sunni because he no longer favors the military and doesn't reach out to his people (Alawites).

I have heard similar stories from many others. When I asked my mother-in-law (wife of a retired general) if this was true, she raised her eyebrows, as if to suggest I was an idiot son-in-law for asking such a stupid question. "Yes, of course. They used to respect the army but now people look at us with dislike and sometimes even loathing."

I asked why.

"Because we lost 4 wars," she quickly answered. "We haven't received any new arms in ten years. The training is nothing. No one cares about the army anymore. People don't believe in Baathism or in the government. The officers are not like they used to be. There are no longer any great men among them whom people respect; they are corrupt. It is not like the old days when everyone looked up to the military and the officers sacrificed to build their country and believed in Syria."

I have no clue whether this "Golden Age" of military heroism ever existed, but I suspect there is something to Umm Firas' comments. She is smart and a keen judge of men. A picture of Abu Firas shaking President Nasser's hand on the day of his graduation from the UAE Naval Academy in 1960 hangs proudly in their living room. They look at the 1960s as a time when military men were giants. Of course, they were young then and idealistic. But I doubt many young men going into the army today are as idealistic.

Anyway, the moral of this story is that Bashar has abandoned the military. My friend and mother-in-law believe this is dangerous. It probably is, although, I don't believe the dispirited military is likely to cause Bashar real problems. It does suggest, however, that the president is not doing business as usual. He was not brought up in the military like his father and brother, Basil. He is counting on the work of his reformist ministers - Planning, Economy, Tourism, Finance, etc. - and not on the security forces to build a new Syria and create support for his presidency and regime.

Many believe Bashar's strategy is foolish and will lead to eventual collapse. It may be, but it should be supported. The longer he gives reformers a chance and keeps the intellectual environment open for people to criticize, question and debate, the better off Syria will be.

If the West squeezes Syria too hard and too quickly, causing premature collapse, Syria may end up in chaos. The new institutions are not ready to take on the responsibility of running the country or guiding it through real turbulence. They are not as mature as Egypt’s institutions. All the same, they are headed in that direction. Very few people in government believe in Baathism. Given time, they will chose independence and honesty over corruption and slavish obeisance to the regime. There are many good people in the government. Syria needs them working on its side. They will in time.

Ideology

The bankruptcy of present ideological thinking in Syria is the second reason why regime-change today is a bad idea. Syria has no developed national consciousness or clearly articulated national idea. Having a developed and well defined sense of the nation is crucial to the success of democracy. There can be no setting the "rules of the game" of democracy or establishing a national social contract if citizens cannot agree what game they are playing. They must know where their borders are and embrace fellow citizens as legal equals. Syrians must want to be Syrians.

Since its inception in 1918 following WWI, Syrians have denied the legitimacy of their national borders and a Syrian national identity. Instead they chose Arab nationalism - the unity of the Arab countries. This has failed. In the meantime, all reference to a Syrian national identity has been practically outlawed. Schoolbooks from grades 1 to 12 do not include the word Syria. I wrote an article about Islamic education in Syria for which I read the required books students must read in every grade. There is not one mention of Syria. The word does not appear in the curriculum.

The Syrian National Party was outlawed until last week. It has been since 1955. President Quwatli in 1946, when the French left the country, stated that he "would never raise the Syrian flag above the flag of Arab nationalism." Every Syrian president has made good on that promise since. The Syrian constitution says that Syria is a "region" of the "Arab nation." Syria exists as a geographical entity, but not as a national identity. Syrians love their country, but they deny that there is such a thing as a Syrian nation or particularity that is Syria.

As Karfan (an Alawite) recently wrote on his blog:

No one believes in the Arab identity joke anymore and our Kings have made all efforts to erase and destroy any attempt of creating a Syrian Identity that gathers all of us. Eventually people find that those stupid sectarian and religious identities are the only way to belong... What is left for them to believe or belong to? Nothing.

Karfan is right. Without Arabism, Syrians have only their sectarian communities to fall back on, because Syrianism has been denied to them. The strength of sectarian identities in Syria is potentially very dangerous should there be sudden regime-change. Syrians would do well to work out a national identity that is at peace with their borders before facing into political uncertainty.

Syrians are beginning to back into a Syrian national identity. The withdrawal from Lebanon has forced the issue. So has Bush's campaign against Arabism; so has the "me first" campaigns of Jordan and all the other countries of the Arab world. The Jordan first, Egypt first, etc. campaigns are killing political Arabism. Syria is not far behind, but it is behind.

If the present Damascus Spring is accomplishing anything, it is changing the way Syrians see themselves, the way they relate to other Arab countries, and the way they see their own destiny.

The political opposition in Syria has failed to articulate a Syrian national identity and is still caught in the web of Arabism, although there are some nascent parties that have adopted a purely Syrian-democratic platform. (Riad al-Turk's old Communist wing just renamed itself the "Syrian Democratic Popular Party" three days ago to great fanfare. It is happening.

But there is still no real opposition. There are only talking heads and mini groups. They are not organized, nor are they ready to lead a country.

Syria needs time. The West should squeeze but not break.

Change is Coming - but How?

Change is coming to Syria - there is no way to deny it. How it will happen and how controlled it will be, no one can say. As one Syrian friend said to me, "Will it be in five years, ten years, or next year? I cannot say, but it is coming."

The signs are everywhere. One top Alawite official joked to a Sunni friend, "Will you treat us well in the future?" This kind of remark revealing the anxiety of regime figures about the future, but still couched in a joke to indicate insouciance, would not have been heard a year ago.

Everyone at the dinner table had a story like the one related above, indicating that that the elite is anxious and beginning to take evasive action to prepare for change - what kind of change? Who knows?

Some top officials are beginning serious campaigns to improve their images, carrying out high-minded social projects to beautify Damascus or support cultural life. Others are finding ways to deny their connection with and involvement in the darker chapters of regime history. They are pondering judgement day and vacuuming the house, putting out flowers, and making themselves presentable.

Sami Moubayed's excellent article "Soft de-Baathification in Syria," published in al-Ahram Weekly points out that "The Baath Party Conference, scheduled for June, is expected to pave the way for a general amnesty, releasing political prisoners and permitting the return of those banished for political reasons."

One of the reasons driving this reconciliation project, directed at healing the old wounds caused by Syria's long years of political turmoil and dictatorship, is undoubtedly the fear of revenge. Sami points out that it was begun by Basil al-Asad in 1994, but that others, such as Mustafa Tlas, have been pushing it hard by getting the portraits of Syria's past leaders added to the Parliament walls. They had been "airbrushed" from Syrian history, as Sami wrote.

If Syria is to have a soft transition to a new political order, and avoid sinking into the sort of bloodletting and vendetta driven chaos that has overtaken Iraq, a reconciliation process is crucial. Only by making amends, can the present power-brokers hope to secure their safety in the future. To truly make amends, there is still much reconciliation to come.

All the same, the rapid augmentation of the reconciliation process indicates that people at the top are getting nervous and thinking of the day when they may no longer be in power.

Washington is upping the heat on Syria about supporting Iraqi insurgents.

In an angry indictment, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Friday broadened US accusations that Syria was contributing to violent insurgencies in Iraq.

After a meeting with Iraq's planning minister, Barham Salih, Rice again accused Syria of supporting terror. To that she added an allegation that Syria may also be providing financial support for insurgents as well as "allowing its territory to be used to organize terrorist attacks against innocent Iraqis."

Last week, saw a major campaign to choke off the infiltration of foreign fighters along the border with Syria. There are plans to move much of the U.S. Army's 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment to the border from the Baghdad area. Lt. Col. Steven Boylan, a spokesman for coalition forces in Iraq, said: "It's really now a war against the Iraqi people conducted by foreigners," said

Zarqawi in Syria?

"Zarqawi and his top-level administrators met at least five times outside Iraq," an American official who prefers to remain anonymous said. He added that the last meeting was held in Syria one month ago. The same source claimed Zarqawi had ordered an increase in the number of suicide attacks in Iraq after the meeting in Syria as he was concerned over the stability and decrease of resistance in Iraq following the elections. No meetings had been held in Iran according to the same source, who said they received this information through Al Qaeda members under arrest.

General John P. Abizaid, commander of the U.S. forces in the Middle East, said, "it is obvious that insurgents have some kind of activities in Syria and the administration should do its best to prevent these."

Never trust and anonymous official. If US intelligence has good information about Zarqawi traveling to Syria, General Abizaid would have said so. He seems fairly trustworthy.

A number of American officials hate Syria and will say anything to promote US hostility toward it. We saw how Bolton do this over and over again, and he was Under-secretary of State for Arms Control, no little chicken. He inflated claims about WMD development in Syria; he claimed Syria was developing nuclear weapons when CIA and State clearly warned him against such allegations; he insisted that Syria was hiding Iraqi WMD for a year after US officials knew this was false, having established from debriefed Iraqi scientists and politicians that Iraq had destroyed its WMD. He said Syria was part of the Pakistani nuclear racket, which Baradei had to deny.

Sec. of Def. Rumsfeld and V.P. Cheney protected Bolton and encouraged him to spin. I don't know whom one should trust from the US government, but if a statement is made by an “anonymous American official,” and not someone willing to back it up with his name and reputation, it is wise not to believe it.

Syria denied the accusations immediately. A Syrian official told Reuters news agency that the claims are a part of the political pressure campaign applied on Syria administration.

Who are the suicide bombers of Iraq? According to the web-sites of radical Muslim organizations who provide lists of martyrs, they are an internationalist brigade of Arabs, with the largest share in the online lists from Saudi Arabia and a significant minority from other countries on Iraq's borders, such as Syria and Kuwait.

The roster of the dead on just one extremist Web site reviewed by The Washington Post runs to nearly 250 names, ranging from a 13-year-old Syrian boy said to have died fighting the Americans in Fallujah to the reigning kung fu champion of Jordan, who sneaked off to wage war by telling his family he was going to a tournament. Among the dead are students of engineering and English, the son of a Moroccan restaurateur and a smattering of Europeanized Arabs.

There are also long lists of names about whom nothing more is recorded than a country of origin and the word "martyr."... U.S. military estimates cited by security analysts put the number of active jihadists at about 1,000, or less than 10 percent of the number of fighters in a mostly Iraqi-dominated insurgency. But military officials now say the foreigners are responsible for a higher percentage of the suicide bombings.

The Blogging Association of Syria

I met with the Association of Syrian Bloggers last night at Leila's Cafe next to the Umayyad Mosque. What a truly wonderful crowd. Ten bloggers showed up. Ayman Haykal, who keeps the Damascene Blog, is the organizer of the association. (His site lists most of the blogs.) Two women bloggers were among the 10 who showed up; most are university students and write in English because of a few technical difficulties caused by writing in Arabic. It seems they are easy to overcome, so we can expect more Arabic blogs quickly.

There were a mere 5 blogs or so in Syria at the beginning of 2005. Now there are some 34 or 35. "A veritable blog explosion is going on," Ayman announced. All the same everyone was dismayed at the small number of Syrian blogs. "It is because we are afraid of the written word," one explained. "We base our blogs around photos. They can say a lot." We spoke about many subjects: Syrian identity, Arab nationalism, democracy, US policy, and, of course blogging as it related to each. Almost everyone said he was optimistic about Syria's future and believes the country is changing quickly and for the better.

It was one of those evenings that make you feel good to be alive. Leila’s cafe is on the roof of one of tallest buildings crouching up next to the Umayyad mosque. We had a view of the entire old city. A cool breeze was coming off Casioun Mountain, the swallows were swooping around the minaret of the mosque and countless ovals of pigeons circled in the distance, following the urgings of unseen keepers. As dusk slipped down over the city lighting up the green minarets sprinkled to the horizon, all was well in blogger world.

Ayman and I will give a lecture on "Blogging in Syria" at the US cultural center, which is near the embassy on Tuesday, May 31 at 6:30. Everyone is invited. It will be short with question an answers.

Tom Spender wrote an excellent article for the Christian Science Monitor on how Damascus is becoming "A new 'Mecca of Arabic studies." It is used in an al-Hayat article by Jihad al-Khazin on the same subject in Arabic here. (I am quoted; you are warned - vanity)

Anthony Shadid, the Pulitzer Prize winning correspondent of the Washington Post, is in town for a few weeks and has written a fine article on the reforms expected from up-coming Baath Party congress Syria Heralds Reforms, But Many Have Doubts Party Weighs Gradual Moves Toward Democracy. Ammar Abdulhamid says we should expect nothing. Others see some light coming from the conference, but not enough. The positive remarks are from those who see reform as a long slow process.

SUSAN TAYLOR MARTIN of the Times has also written an interesting article on reform: "Assad: Syria's man in hot seat." The most memorable quote is by Samir al-Taqqi:

"Six months ago, you could have said Bashar is not a power generator, he's an intersection of power," says Dr. Samir Altaqi, an adviser to the government. "Then he began to interfere directly and decide many things."

Hizbullah's Sheik Muhammad Kawtharani answers some important questions about his party's participation in Lebanese politics in a question and answer article, also by Martin in the "Times." (Thanks Tony)

Flynt Leverett has an interesting interview with Rami Khoury of the Daily Star: "Syria must speed reforms to thwart outside pressure."

Related is Patrick Seale's article: "A new struggle for Syria is in the making." about Leverett's new book. He writes: "For Syria's main enemies in Washington, forcing Syrian troops out of Lebanon was only a means to an end. The real objective was the destabilization of Syria itself as a step toward the overthrow of the regime."

Hariri and Asad - What Went Wrong? Mashnouq and Moubayed

The most interesting and important article on Lebanese - Syrian relations has been published in two parts by "al-Hayat" in Arabic. It is an interview with Nihad al-Mashnouq, Hariri's advisor on relations with Syria. As one Lebanese friend wrote me:

Mashnouq was indeed in the "inner core" of the Hariri pantheon, and he has a score to settle with the army and Lahoud, who forced him into exile, accusing him in a smear campaign, as I recall, of homosexuality. Whether there is any truth there, I don't know, but it was one of those accusations designed to blacken him, with no evidence.

He explains what went wrong, and why relations between Hariri and al-Asad collapsed well before the Lahoud extension. Already by 2000, "the door closed" between Hariri and Asad, he writes, because the Syrians did not want Hariri to become Prime Minister again.

President al-Asad told Allawi of Iraq that he insisted on extending Lahoud's presidency because it would be better to have the situation deteriorate with Lahoud there, than to have it deteriorate without him. Clearly, Bashar was convinced that Syria was going to lose Lebanon if he allowed Hariri to have his way. This is the best explanation why he extended Lahoud's presidency, even though the Americans had made it perfectly clear that they would not allow it. Bashar understood Hariri was working against Syria's interests in Lebanon long before the Lahoud extension.

Mashnouq says Bashar al-Asad had promised Sec. of State Powell that he would withdraw Syrian forces from all of Lebanon except the Baqa`a during their meeting in December 2003, but he never did it. At that point, Washington crew a line in the sand. Allawi tried to warn Bashar not to extend Lahoud's term, according to Mashnouq, but President Asad was determined to try and keep Lebanon.

Mashnouq claims Harir was murdered according to some larger plan for the Middle East, in which no powerful Sunni of Hariri's stature would be allowed take power. What exactly this means, you will have to determine for yourselves. Here are the links and a bit of the first part in Arabic.

تفاصيل أسوأ اجتماع عقده الرئيس الشهيد في حياته (1 من 2) ...نهاد المشنوق: سورية قتلت الحريري سياسياً... وخدام لم يكن يرغب بعلاقة بينه وبين بشار الأسد

بيروت – حازم الأمين الحياة 2005/05/12

ما الذي حصل في سورية وجعل من الرئيس الحريري هدفاً للسياسة السورية في لبنان؟

- انا أعتقد بأنه اذا كان لا بد من الكلام عن طبيعة النظام السوري التي نشأت في العام 2000، فلا بد من التأكيد ان الرئيس بشار الاسد وصل على حصان ابيض، ليس بسبب تسلمه السلطة، وانما بسبب تقبل المجتمع الدولي له باعتباره صورة حديثة عن سورية التي امضت وقتاً طويلاً في تراتبية سلطوية دائمة لم تتغير. وفي البداية ظهر ان لديه ميول تحديث، ورغبة بالتغيير وتفهماً لحاجات المجتمع الدولي واعترافاً مطلقاً بالشرعية الدولية. وكان معه في الوقت نفسه إرث والده الذي يمكن تقسيمه جزأين، الجزء الاول هو ثقل نظام عمره 30 سنة والجزء الثاني هو القيم والثوابت.

الذي ظهر بعد سنتين من حكم الدكتور بشار انه امسك ارث الوالد من دون اي تعديل. كان واضحاً ان ليس لديه الافق الدولي والنظرة الدقيقة لتغيرات العالم التي كانت متوافرة لوالده طوال 30 عاماً. ظهر ارتباك كبير في السياسة الخارجية مثلاً، وظهر ان هناك لغتين تتحدث بهما الخارجية السورية.

على الصعيد الداخلي وفي البداية ظهر وكأن هناك انفراجاً في سورية. ففتحت المنتديات الثقافية وأتيح لبعض المعارضين الكلام، ولكن فجأة صدر قرار باغلاق كل هذه المنتديات، وتم بعدها اعتقال نائبين منتخبين. اعتقد بأن الرئيس بشار وبدل ان يتخلى عن اثقال والده وان يحتفظ بقيمه فعل العكس اذ احتفظ بالأثقال وتخلى عن القيم ما عدا مسألة تحرير الجولان ولكن بالطريقة التي يعرفها.

في فترة الانفتاح السياسي في البداية، شكل الامن في سورية اول طوق على حركة الرئيس الاسد تحت شعار ان الامن سيد الاحكام. وبعد فترة تدخَّل سوسلوف حزب البعث عبدالحليم خدام وبدأ ينظر الى مسألة الاعتقالات وكأنها طبيعية، ونسي انه وأولاده كانوا لفترة ليست بعيدة معرضين للاعتقال. وانطلقت نظرية تماسك الحزب في وجه الرأي العام وليس لاقناع الرأي العام. انا تقديري انه عندها وضع الطوق الثاني حول الرئيس بشار وهو الطوق الحزبي، اذ أقنعوه بأنه لا أمان من دون الطوق الامني اولاً والطوق الحزبي ثانياً فيبقى الشعب السوري خارجهما، فاختار الاسد الأمن العام بدلاً من الرأي العام.

طوقان في الداخل وقراءة خاطئة للتطورات في العالم، فكان طبيعياً ان جزءاً من هذه السياسة لبنان، كما كان طبيعياً ان تصاب علاقتهم السياسية بلبنان بتدهور. وأصبحوا يعتقدون بأن في امكانهم فعل ما يريدون. ويقول الدكتور اياد علاوي عندما كان في بيروت انه اتصل بالرئيس الاسد قبل التمديد الاخير للرئيس لحود وقال له ان الاميركيين غير موافقين اطلاقاً على مسألة التمديد، وبعد جدل قال له علاوي ان اصراركم على التمديد اشبه بانتحار سياسي، فرد الاسد حرفياً: «انتحار سياسي مع تمديد افضل من انتحار سياسي من دون تمديد». الرئيس حافظ الاسد كانت لديه ميزة انه في اصعب الاوقات لا يقفل كل الابواب، فانتقلنا الى سياسة اخرى معاكسة تماماً. فعدم التمديد لم يكن رضوخاً للضغوط الاميركية وانما اعترافاً بالشرعية الدولية التي نشأت، وفي الواقع.

أنا معلوماتي انه عندما جاء وزير الخارجية الاميركي كولن باول عام 2003 الى سورية وقابل الرئيس الاسد وأجرى معه محادثات حول مسائل عدة منها المفاوضات العربية – الاسرائيلية ومنها لبنان ومنها مكاتب «حماس» و»الجهاد الاسلامي» في دمشق، ومنها العراق، يؤكد الجانب الاميركي انه تم الاتفاق على نقاط محددة منها الانسحاب من لبنان ما عدا البقاع قبل نهاية العام 2003.

وطبعاً هذا الامر لم يتم، ولم يتم الالتزام بمعظم بنود التفاهم. وبعدها اقتربنا من موضوع محاسبة سورية، وبعدها وصلنا الى القرار الرقم 1559. ثم جاء ارميتاج وبعده وليام برنز، وكان الرد السوري ان ما حصل في الجلسة هو استماع وليس اتفاق، ففقد الاميركيون صوابهم، فهم بحوزتهم محضر الاجتماع.

هذه هي المقدمات الفعلية لانهيار العلاقة بين النظامين اللبناني والسوري والتي سنشهد فصولاً اخرى منها.

Part Two: About the future of the Hariri family and Lebanon.

لهذه الأسباب أُبعدت من مكتب الحريري... وطه ميقاتي أعادني الى بيروت (2 من 2)... المشنوق: لحود أراد ردم الحفرة في اليوم الأول فنصحته بتولي التحقيق اذا لم يكن هو الفاعل
بيروت – حازم الأمين - يجيب نهاد المشنوق في الحلقة الثانية والاخيرة من الحديث معه عن أسئلة تتعلق بمسألة إبعاده عن مكتب الحريري ثم يعطي رأياً او توقعاً في مستقبل زعامة آل الحريري، ويختتم بحكاية الانفجار الذي أودى بالحريري وبزيارة قام بها للرئيس لحود، بعدما هاله الاهمال المتعمد في عملية التحقيق.


Another very good article in English placing General Aoun in historical context is by Sami Moubayed.

Michel Aoun comes home to roost
By Sami Moubayed

Aoun returned to Lebanon on the offensive, hateful of everyone and everything that kept him in exile for so long, promising destruction of the existing order and sweet revenge. The Beirut he entered last week was very different from the war torn one he left behind in 1990. That Beirut did not have a Rafik Harrri hallmark on it. Yet, all the actors of Beirut 1990 are still there.

Former president Amin Gemayel, who appointed Aoun prime minister in 1988, upsetting tradition in Lebanon because Aoun was a Maronite, is still there. Patriarch Man Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir, who worked for Aoun's downfall, is also still in religious office. Ex-prime minister Salim al-Hoss, who led a rivaling cabinet in 1989-1990, is there, and so is Samir Gagegea, who Aoun had viciously fought in the eastern districts of Beirut. The general who had been chief-of-staff and who had orchestrated Aoun's exodus from Baabda Palace, stands today in Baabda Palace, the legitimate and internationally recognized president of the Lebanese Republic.

Also see Sami's previous article: The waxing of the Shi'ite crescent.

DAMASCUS - Since the Islamic revolution took place in Iran in 1979, one of its prime objectives was to strengthen Shi'ites all over the Muslim world. Before that revolution, they were a disinherited, underprivileged and neglected community in Lebanon and Iraq.

This "Shi'ite emancipation" was first done in Lebanon, through the charismatic cleric Musa al-Sadr, who was funded and supported by the mullahs of Tehran in his "Movement of the Dispossessed" and its military branch, Amal, created in 1974 and 1975, respectively.

They later supported Hezbollah, a pure Iranian creation, that strove at first to establish a theocracy in Lebanon, similar to the one in Iran...

In Iraq, the mullahs began to fund, train, protect and harbor Shi'ite dissidents opposed to the regime of Saddam Hussein, where they were oppressed by the Sunni minority. Ibrahim Jaafari, the new prime minister, who is the de facto ruler of the new Iraq, spent the years 1980-89 as a fugitive in Iran.

After 25 years of underground struggle, this community succeeded in toppling Saddam, ironically, with the help of the US.....

Also see: No room for political Islam in Syria
By Sami Moubayed

Since pressure increased on Damascus in 2003, Syria has stressed that it wants to reach out to what it describes as "nationalist opposition", men who are not funded, allied, or in support of a US-engineered regime change in Syria, like the US-based Farid al-Ghadri. One week after the fall of Baghdad, the Doha-based al-Jazeera TV interviewed members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and all of them called for dialogue with the regime, rather than confrontation, stressing that there was no Ahmad Chalabi among the Syrian opposition, and pointing out that they would never side with the US against Syria, despite their history of conflict with the Ba'athists. The message was noted, and highly appreciated by the Syrian government.....

News Round Up

The Arab leaders are bringing Syria back in from the cold. Both Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah and King Abdullah II of Jordan have visited Syria this last week in an attempt to reward Syria for its withdrawal from Lebanon and to reassure Asad that they do not see eye to eye with President Bush's continued attempts to isolate Syria.

Of course, Saudi and Jordan will keep pressure on Damascus to stay out of Lebanese politics, as will the French, but they are all moving away from Washington's extremism.

The Syrians are trying to insist that they cannot be blamed for trouble in Lebanon anymore. As one Syrian spokesman said: "Syria has abided by the demands of the United Nations. If there are still demands from the UN, concerning disarming of militias and other issues, that is not the responsibility of Syria."

Undoubtedly, the Syrians are taking some pleasure in watching the Lebanese descend into their old bickering habits. Aoun's return has reopened many old wounds. As Lin Noueihed of Reuters explains:

Lebanon's most prominent anti-Syrian leader said on Sunday he had yet to hear from fellow opposition politicians, signaling deepening splits within the disparate front that helped end Syria's 29-year military grip.

A day after returning to Lebanon amid scenes of jubilation, Michel Aoun said his allies so far were the tens of thousands of youthful supporters who welcomed him home from a 14 year exile.

"Until now I haven't heard...I assume silence after a certain period means rejection," Aoun told reporters at his home just outside Beirut, where he received a stream of politicians.

Jumblatt and Aoun have already traded insults over who should be seen as the great liberator of Lebanon. Aoun claimed responsible for driving the Syrians out. Not content with insulting Jumblatt alone, he also attacked Hariri's martyrdom and hero status. It was Resolution 1559 that drove the Syrians out, he insisted, not Hariri, his murder, or Jumblatt's high-wire politicking. The engine of change came from the outside, he argued, with his [Aoun's] authorship of 1559 in coordination with Chirac and ultimately the Americans, and not from the inside.

The international resolution was the driving factor of the Syrian evacuation. It was taken before the extension of president Lahoud's term in office in September and before Hariri's Feb. 14 assassination," the general said at Beirut airport's VIP lounge. "Hariri was aware of this and I believe he was assassinated for contributing to this effort," Aoun said.

Jumblatt retorted, "The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon was brought about altogether by Hariri's blood, not by the returning Tsunami this afternoon."

Aoun wants to depict Hariri and Jumblatt as lowly handmaidens to a policy Aoun concocted from his Paris exile.

There is some truth to Aoun's claim. The Syrians share Aoun's view. They have insisted all along that the main force behind their exodus is a foreign conspiracy. In some respects Hariri and Jumblatt were Johnny-come-latelies. All the same, without their crucial support being thrown behind 1559, the Lebanese Lobby in France and the US would never have made 1559 work. Jumblatt and Hariri took the big risk by dragging their communities out of the Syrian camp and into the Paris pavillion. By belittling the role of the Druze and Sunnis, Aoun does the opposition a great disservice. It will undermine their unity. He is a narcissist of the highest order.

Having just seen the movie "Kingdom of Heaven," I cannot help but compare him to the fresh crusaders who arrive in Jerusalem and muck up the delicate entente-cordialle, which had been struck between the Christians and Muslims. Damascus has withdrawn. This is not a time for Christian chest thumping. Rather fence mending is in order, as P.M. Mikati has suggested.

President George W. Bush has decided to extend Washington's sanctions on Syria for another year, saying that "the Arab country was a threat to the United States." Washington insisted that Syria keep out of Lebanon's elections this month and allow the “disbanding and disarming” of militia forces in Lebanon.

Syrian Finance Minister Mohammad al-Hussein said Washington's sanctions were "unfair and illogical." He said his country would "continue to exert efforts for reform in the area of economy and other areas".

The Syrian government announced a cut in taxes on car imports from 255 to 60 percent on vehicles with medium and large engines, a step that is expected to facilitate the signing of a long-planned aid and trade agreement with the European Union.

The reduction of import duties on cars will probably do more to endear the average Syrian to the government than all the reforms due to be announced at the Regional Command meeting of the Baath Party. (By the way, the date for that meeting has been finally set for June 6.)How Syrian cities will support the flood of new cars that this reform is bound to engender is anyone's guess.

al-Arabia channel will conclude its three part series on "Syria: The View from Inside" at 8:00 tonight. It is a remarkable show, pitting three Syrian ministers against a very tough panel of Syrian reformers and opposition members: Ayman Abdul Nour, Michel Kilo, Thabit Salim, and `Isam Dari.

Last night's show had Minister of Information Mahdi Dakhlallah taking on the panel to talk about the up-coming Baath Party Congress. Evidently, Dakhlallah complained to the other guests before going on the show that he should not have been asked to speak for the Regional Command of the Party because he does not belong to it. He was ordered to appear on the show by the President after the actual members of the Regional Command refused to go on. Good for Dakhlallah. Bad for the Regional Command.

As Ayman Abdul Nour said on the show, Dakhlallah is one of the best Ministers and a real reformer. Dakhlallah called for eliminating the National Command of the Party before he became minister, because, as he argued, "no other Arab country wants to unite with Syria, let's face it."

The panelists spoke passionately and intelligently about the need for pluralism in Syria. They complained about the one party state. "How can the Baath Party be the only voice of the people," they argued, when so few belong to it and even fewer actually believe in it? All the principal slogans of the party are ripped from medieval history, they pointed out - "Unity, Socialism, and Freedom." None of them are relevant to modern Syria, except "freedom," which they were quick to point out the Baath continues to deny by maintaining emergency law.

At one point, Dakhlallah, overwhelmed by the onslaught, tried to turn the tables on his torturers by arguing that some of what they said verged on "un-patriotic" thought. The moderator quickly asked him if he was accusing them of treason. It was a delicious moment. Dakhlallah quickly pronounced, "It is their ideas that are not patriotic, not their persons." I could feel all of Syria jumping out of their seats and overturning the tea trays their wives had dutifully placed before them in order to shake their fists at the TV. Thank God the al-Arabia moderator was fast on her feet. She asked what the difference was. Dakhlallah looked sheepishly away from the camera. His heart was not in it.

Kilo took the defense, explaining that the panelists were the most patriotic of Syrians and had done more work and written more reports to reform the country than most government officials. "If Syria is to advance," he said, "the government must not turn against the people, but listen to them and respect them." Amen to that.

As an American who is tired of hearing his own politicians accuse others of un-patriotic behavior and "working against American interests" or being "anti-American" for speaking out against Washington’s policies, it was a satisfying moment. How many times have we had to hear, "It is not the sinner, but the sin we denounce?"

Tonight, the Minister of State Planning - Dardari - will be on to defend economic reforms. He is Bashar's main "reformer," very smart and good. I advise everyone to tune in at 8:00. I must salute al-Arabia for this series. Also, bravo to Bashar for ordering his ministers to take on such smart panelists. This is new for Syria. It is surprising how civil and constructive it all is.

Leverett on US Policy toward Syria

The following is an interview with Flynt Leverett, the author of the new and important book, “Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire.”

I have copied the entire panel discussion, which took place at the Brookings Institute, because it is important. It gives us the best indication we have so far of Washington’s intentions toward Syria. It short, the Bush administration seems determined to follow the strategy of “squeeze it until it pops.” Washington has concluded that it can pressure the Asad regime until it implodes, to be replaced by something else. What that “else” is, no one seems to know or care.

Those around Bush seem to believe that Asad is on his last legs. His withdrawal from Lebanon has weakened him and his government is corrupt and ineffective, they argue – so they will hasten his fall. This is why Washington refuses to promote peace between Israel and Syria and why it refuses to offer Syria any carrots for cracking down on the Iraq border crossings or for withdrawing from Lebanon. Washington is determined not to allow President Asad any successes in the eyes of his own people or the international community. They want him to fail.

In this context, a leading diplomat in town confirmed to me yesterday that Washington had intervened with the Austrian and Brazilian governments to have them rescind invitations to President Asad after they had invited him in both countries. The US failed to keep the Turkish President from visiting Syria a week ago despite its vigorous efforts to scotch the trip. Nevertheless, Washington has been successful in keeping Bashar from traveling to the West, it would seem.

Leverett’s argument is also important because he puts forward the smartest rebuttals so far offered for why Washington’s policy of refusing to talk to Syria or to offer Asad any carrots is wrong, and why it actually will hurt US and Middle Eastern interests, not to mention Syrian interests, rather than advancing them.

The French seem to understand this. The French ambassador in Damascus told a friend a few days ago that France did not support regime change or “constructive instability” as Washington has recently renamed it. This suggests that France will eventually repair its relations with Asad, now that it has succeeded in driving Syria from Lebanon. Most bets are that Chirac got what he wanted from 1559 and will resume traditional French policy in the region, which has always been anchored by good relations with its erstwhile Mandates: Lebanon and Syria.

Leverett believes the present Washington policy is misguided, first because it will fail. He argues that Bashar is popular with the majority of Syrians and that there is no reasonable alternative to him, at least not one that America should welcome. Furthermore, he argues that Washington could do a lot of good by dealing with Asad, both by bringing a final end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, where Syria and Lebanon are concerned, and also by enlisting Syria’s help in shoring up the new governments in Iraq and Lebanon. He argues that Bashar is a reformer, even if weak, and that America will gain more by positive engagement than "constructive destabilization."

Farid Ghadry - the US based leader of the Syrian Reform Party - disagrees with Leverett. He argued in a rather panicky circular today, that unless the US overthrows the Asad regime soon, both Iraq and Lebanon will turn into battlegrounds. In his view Syria is the source of evil in the region. He doesn't recommend sending in American troops but argues that if the US dropped leaflets over Damascus calling for a popular uprising, the people would rise up, overthrow the government, embrace democracy, and welcome American assistance with open arms.


THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
A BRIEFING BY THE SABAN CENTER AT BROOKINGS
"INHERITING SYRIA: BASHAR'S TRIAL BY FIRE"
Monday, April 25, 2005

MR. MARTIN INDYK [Head of the Sabban Center at Brookings]: We brought Flynt to write this book because of our commitment to indepth research and, in particular, the application of experienced policymakers to that task. Flynt himself has had decades of experience in the U.S. Government as an analyst and then a senior analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, then as a policy planner in the State Department, finally as senior director for Near East Affairs in the National Security Council in the first Bush administration. He brings a wealth of knowledge and experience to the challenge oftrying to decipher how Bashar al-Asad and the ruling Baath Party are coping with the legacy of Hafez al-Asad.

He will speak today first about the book and his main conclusions, and then we're honored to have two distinguished journalists, Sy Hersh and James Bennett, to open the discussion. Sy Hersh is probably well known to you all as one of America's, if not the premier investigative reporter. He first came to prominence in 1969, many of you will remember, as the man who wrote the first account of the My Lai massacre in South Vietnam. Since then he has gone on to break a number of important stories as a result of his extraordinary investigative work and publish a number of books. He worked for the New York Times for some time during the '70s and '80s. He is now a journalist for the New Yorker Magazine, where he was the first to break the story of the Abu Ghraib Prison treatment by U.S. soldiers and since then has published his latest book, "Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib."

James Bennett is currently a staff writer for the Sunday magazine of the New York Times. He served with great distinction as the New York Times Jerusalem bureau chief from 2001 to 2004, and he's an astute observer of the Middle East scene. So it's my pleasure to ask Flynt to give us a synopsis of the book, "Inheriting Syria." I must say that I'm biased, of course, but I think it's a fascinating read. And I'm very proud that we've been able to bring you, Flynt, to the Saban Center to produce this. Go ahead.

MR. LEVERETT: Thank you. Thank you, Martin, and let me add my own words of thanks to Sy Hersh and James Bennett for coming out today for this book launch.

Syria is facing a number of strategic challenges. As I have given interviews and done speaking engagements, I'm oftentimes asked if Bashar al-Asad is in charge in Syria. And I usually answer yes. Often, there is a kind of challenging follow-up: "Well, is he in charge in the same way that his father was in charge?" And to that I usually say, "Well, of course not, and why at this point in his evolution as a national leader would you expect him to have the same level of authority that his father enjoyed for the last 15 or so years that he was President?"

Hafez al-Asad, if you look at his career, didn't really become the uncontested master of Syria and this perceived brilliant player of the regional game until at least a decade or so into his Presidency after he had gone through a series of defining challenges. He established Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. He defended that hegemony against both Israel and the United States. He put down a challenge to his regime from Sunni fundamentalists. And he put down a challenge to his own position from his brother. It was after that that he was Hafez al-Asad, the Lion of Damascus, but not before.

Bashar, not quite five years into his Presidency, I don't think has gone through those kinds of defining challenges. I think he is going through one now. And how he handled that defining crisis will, I think, say a lot about his future as a national leader and about the future of Syrian politics and Syria's regional position. That's why I say it's a critical moment in terms of Syria's strategic situation. I also think it's a critical moment in terms of the evolution of U.S. policy towards Syria. Since I left government two years ago, I have often criticized the Bush administration for not having a Syria policy during its first term in office.