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Linguistic capital in Taiwan: The KMT's Mandarin language policy and its perceived impact on language practices of bilingual Mandarin and Tai-gi speakers

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ABSTRACT

From 1945 until 1987, the KMT (Nationalist) government enforced its strict Mandarin Language Policy in schools throughout Taiwan, and students were forbidden to speak local languages or dialects. Recent reversal of this policy allows schools to teach these formerly forbidden varieties. Despite some attention from scholars, it remains to explore the impact of these policies on successive generations of bilingual speakers. This study explores the perceptions of parents, grandparents, and young adults. The data show that school-based policies have an impact on family-based speaking practices. They also demonstrate the complex interplay between public and private histories in the development of linguistic ideologies and language as capital. (Language ideologies, language revitalization, Taiwan, identity, bilingualism, language socialization)*

INTRODUCTION

> I am more than seventy years old. Having lived under different regimes, from Japanese colonialism to Taiwan's recovery, I have greatly experienced the miseries of the Taiwanese people. In the period of Japanese colonialism, a Taiwanese would be punished by being forced to kneel out in the sun for speaking *Tai-yü* [Tai-gi]. The situation was the same when Taiwan was recovered [by the KMT]: my son, Hsien-wen, and my daughter-in-law, Yueh-yun, often wore a dunce board around their necks in the school as punishment for speaking *Tai-yü*. I am very aware of the situation because I often go to the countryside to talk to people. Their lives are influenced by history. I think the most miserable people are Taiwanese, who have always tried in vain to get their heads above the water. This was the Taiwanese situation during the period of Japanese colonialism; it was not any different after Taiwan's recovery. I have deep feeling about this. (President Lee Teng-hui, quoted in Hsiau 1997:302)

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Citizens of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan in 1996, for the first time, cast their votes for candidates to the nation's two highest offices: president of the nation and governor of the island of Taiwan, which were won respectively by Lee Teng-hui and James Soong, the KMT (Kuomintang or Nationalist Party) candidates. Both men won their elections with similar strategies: They pitched themselves as men who, on the one hand, used the political and economic support of the mainlander-dominated KMT, but, on the other hand, latched onto the growing political power of the island's majority population of "Taiwanese" people. One way the candidates played both cards was through their strategic use of the island's languages. Linking themselves to the minority mainlander population, both candidates fluently expressed themselves in Mandarin Chinese, Taiwan's *Guoyu*[1] or "national language," brought to the island in 1945 by Chiang Kai-shek and his mainland supporters. Both men also linked themselves to the majority "local" population when they spoke the island's *bentu yuyan*, or "local languages" – Tai-gi (also called Taiwanese, Tai-yü, Southern Min, or Hokkien)[2] and Hakka, the mother tongues of the majority of the island's residents. For Lee, a descendant of Hakka and Tai-gi speakers who have lived in Taiwan for centuries, his ability to use local languages in stump speeches and televised appearances came naturally and fit well with his persona as a man rooted in Taiwan. Soong, the son of a Chinese mainland-born general, had to hire tutors to help him deliver speeches in Tai-gi and Hakka. Nevertheless, his less-than-fluent speech was appreciated by the populace, and he easily won the election with support not only from mainlanders but also from a majority of the population that speaks local languages.

Bourdieu 1991 claims that language is "symbolic capital" that producers use, most often unwittingly, "to maximize the symbolic profit" that can be gained in linguistic practices. For example, the mayor of a town in Béarn, France, gave a speech in the local mother tongue, Béarnais, in response to which "[t]he audience was greatly moved by this thoughtful gesture" (1991:68). That is, the mayor maximized his profit when the local market – Béarn – evaluated his use of Béarnais positively, when measured against the unwritten rule that French is prescribed "as the only acceptable language for formal speeches in formal situations" (68).

Ostensibly, the same can be said of Lee Teng-hui's and James Soong's speaking practices during their campaigns in Taiwan in 1996. Both men campaigned in a market in which, for reasons to be explained later, Mandarin Chinese was and is the language prescribed for public officials – especially officials of the KMT – for formal speeches on formal situations.[3] Nevertheless, both men violated this rule in their public speaking performances, and in response their audience, too, was greatly moved.

One question that arises from observing these speaking practices is: Why and how do linguistic markets develop such that one linguistic practice is evaluated as worth more than another? To address this, we look at Bourdieu's notion of HABITUS, which, defined succinctly, is "systems of durable, transposable DISPOSITIONS, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures" (1977:72). Habitus is a "system of schemes generating classifiable practices and works" (Bourdieu 1984:171). For instance, Taiwan's government classifies languages into a "national language" and "local dialects," and based on this scheme it prescribes one language – Mandarin – and proscribes others, the dialects. Habitus is also the "system of schemes of perception and appreciation (taste)" (1984:171) that makes and supports a classificatory scheme. For example, the national language is perceived as "high-class" and the dialect as "low-class." The language that speakers deem "acceptable" in practice emerges from the interplay between habitus and the market value assigned to a given practice, which in the case of language practices is most often learned unwittingly as a child growing up embedded in family speaking practices, as explained by Bourdieu:

> The definition of acceptability is found not in the situation but in the relationship between a market and a habitus, which itself is the product of the WHOLE HISTORY of its relations with markets. . . . We have not learned to speak simply by hearing a certain kind of speech spoken but also by speaking, thus by offering a determinate form of speech on a determinate market. This occurs through exchanges WITHIN A FAMILY occupying a particular position in the social space and thus presenting the child's imitative propensity with models and sanctions that diverge more or less from legitimate usage. (1991:81–82; emphasis added)

To understand why and how a given market, or society, evaluates the language used in a public speech requires one to look at the whole history of language practices in that market. For the mayor of Béarn, it is the product of tensions worked out between France's official language, French, and its local dialects, including Béarnais. For Lee Teng-hui and James Soong, it is the product of tensions worked out between Taiwan's official language, Mandarin, and its local languages. That is, to understand a moment of talk requires not only that one understand the speaking practices of the whole community (see Hymes 1974), but also that one understand the concern raised by Bourdieu – the HISTORY of that community's speaking practices. And as I will show, history is a matter of particular salience in Taiwan.

Although Bourdieu's theory of practice helps us see the importance of history as it shapes the habitus in which a particular speaking practice emerges, a weakness is that it tends to underplay the struggles that occur when speakers wittingly or unwittingly choose to hold onto a dispreferred speaking style or language (see Woolard 1985). This struggle is better addressed by seeing these choices about language as shaped by linguistic ideology, described by Kroskrity as a "cluster concept consisting of a number of converging dimensions" (2000:7) including:

(i) perceptions of what is “true” or “morally good” for a society or culture, (ii) multiple perspectives “within sociocultural groups that have the potential to produce divergent perspectives” (2000:12) or struggles in a society, and (iii), on the individual level, the beliefs about language “articulated by the users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use” (Silverstein, 1979:193).

A growing body of research demonstrates that speakers can articulate why they use a particular linguistic structure, and that this usage is linked to an ideology that in turn affects usage (e.g., Gross 1993; Hill 1998; Kroskrity 1998, 2000; Kulick 1992, 1998; Silverstein 1985). Among some people, such as the Gapun of Papua New Guinea, studied by Kulick 1992, 1998, one of the impacts of language ideologies is that young children learn from their bilingual parents to speak only the preferred, national language and thus lose the nonstandard, local one. Elsewhere, however – even in the face of hegemonic pressures to conform to a standard national language – a preference for a minority language may arise, as Woolard 1985 found with Catalan speakers in Spain, and Gross 1993 with Walloon speakers in Belgium. The result is that in multilingual communities, even where one language is promoted by the state over all others, “the process of language shift is not a smooth downhill slope toward oblivion” (Gross 1993:177).

The present study is designed to address both these issues. First, Bourdieu’s theory of practice directs us to explore speaking practices in Taiwan as a set of dispositions that wittingly and unwittingly produce structures and appreciations of those structures (or taste). It suggests that these dispositions are the product of history on two levels: first, the public history of changing and evolving governments and the classificatory scheme of languages, official and local, imposed on the populace; and second, the private history of everyday folk and the language practices that they enact in everyday talk. Second, studying language (or, in the present context, languages) as ideologies directs our attention to speakers’ articulations about language – their metalanguage – as indexing the tensions and struggles that are involved in everyday talk. Furthermore, to understand the linguistic situation in Taiwan requires an accounting of both the integrating force of the linguistic market and the divisive impact of contested ideologies. I will proceed by first addressing Taiwan’s history and ideologies on the broader, public level, and then looking at these issues on the narrower, private level.

TAIWAN’S PUBLIC LANGUAGE HISTORY

Taiwan, an island of 35,980 square kilometers (about the size of the U.S. states of Maryland and Delaware combined), has been and continues to be the site of linguistic struggles. These are the outcome of historic patterns of immigration and colonial rule that both pull apart and push together the island’s various ethnic groups. Mandarin Chinese (also known as Beijing dialect) is the island’s sole

TABLE 1. *History of Taiwan's languages.*

Colonial/National Languages

Japanese: 1895–1945
Mandarin Chinese: 1661–1895
Mandarin: 1945 to present
Dutch: 1624–1661

Local Languages

Aboriginal languages: prehistory to present[a]
Tai-gi (Hokkien): late Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) to present
Hakka: late Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) to present
Mandarin: 1949 to present[b]

[a] Ferrell (1969) identifies nearly twenty aboriginal languages spoken in Taiwan at the time of first contact with the Dutch in the 1600s. Today, the ROC recognizes nine aboriginal tribes each with its own language: Atayal, Saisiyat, Bunun, Tsou, Paiwan, Rukai, Puyuma, Ami, and Yami.

[b] Mandarin became Taiwan's national language upon its transfer from Japanese to Chinese control in 1945, but it was not until 1949, when the KMT government was "removed" to Taiwan following the Communists' victory on the mainland, that large numbers of Mandarin speakers moved to Taiwan.

official language, promoted as the language of instruction in all schools since 1945; however, a majority of the island's inhabitants also speak one of a number of "local languages," including a number of Aboriginal tongues and the two "Chinese" languages Tai-gi (Hokkien) and Hakka.[4] The current language situation, in which one official language is urged by the government on "local people" who speak a number of other, local languages, should be understood as just the most recent manifestation of a centuries-long process of language struggles, as we see in Table 1.

Today just 2% of Taiwan's current population of 23 million are descendants of Taiwan's Aboriginal tribes, who came to the island as early as 4000 BCE, and who speak one or more varieties of Austronesian languages (Shepherd 1993). Another 12% are descendants of the Hakka people of southern China, who speak Hakka and came as early as the sixteenth century and as late as the nineteenth. The largest group, 73% of the population, traces its roots to settlers from China's southern Fujian province, who speak Tai-gi (also called Hokkien) and arrived at the same time as the Hakka. The most recent group of immigrants includes the remaining 13%, who came to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek as he fled the Communist mainland in 1949; the majority of them speak Mandarin as their first language (percentages are from Huang 1995). But as Table 1 also shows, one cannot understand Taiwan's language history purely in terms of populations of ethnolinguistic groups. Interacting with these local languages, ever since the arrival of the Dutch in the 1600s, have been a succession of colonial or national languages defined and promoted by the ruling authorities of their respective times.

When the Dutch arrived in Taiwan, most of the island's population consisted of various Aboriginal tribes; only a few thousand were "Chinese" traders, who lived in scattered settlements on Taiwan's western coast facing the mainland. The Dutch had limited impact on the island's population because they lived in a few forts and settlements on the island's western coast; their interaction with the local population was limited to trade, agriculture, and efforts to christianize the populace. Hence, the Dutch language had limited impact on local speaking practices.

In 1661, the Dutch were defeated by the Ming Dynasty general Zheng Chenggong (also called Koxinga), who wanted to make Taiwan a bastion from which to attack the Manchus who had taken over China. He controlled the island only for a short time. In 1683, Qing (Manchu) Dynasty forces took over Taiwan, remaining in control until the island was given to the Japanese in 1895. The impact of these events on Taiwan's language situation was in one way similar to that of the former Dutch period. The "officials' language" (*guanfang yuyan*) of the Qing Dynasty – Mandarin Chinese – had only minor effects on the speaking practices of the majority of Taiwan's population. Mandarin was used as the official language only by the relatively few officials sent from the mainland to administer Taiwan (see Mackay [1896] 1991:106). But dissimilarly, Taiwan's integration with the mainland was accompanied by a dramatic increase in the number of settlers from China, the majority of whom came from either Fujian province, the ancestors of today's Tai-gi speakers, or Guangdong province, the ancestors of today's Hakka speakers. These settlers displaced the Aborigines who lived on Taiwan's western coastal plain. Over time, Tai-gi and Hakka came to be identified by Chinese as Taiwan's "local languages" (*bentu yuyan*).

Following the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, Taiwan was given to Japan "in perpetuity" (Kerr 1965:6). The Japanese saw the island as their chance to prove to the world that they could be better colonial masters than the Europeans who were building colonies throughout Asia (Lamley 1999:204). Thus, unlike the Chinese – who devoted few resources to their "rebellious" outpost (Shepherd 1999, C. Chen 1999) – the Japanese gave the island much attention. First they subjugated the Aboriginal tribes who lived in Taiwan's mountainous region; then they built Taiwan's infrastructure in order to make the island a productive colony and help fuel Japan's expansion. In addition, the Japanese established the island's first public school system (during the Qing Dynasty, only a small number attended the island's private *Sishu* schools, which taught the Confucian classics), based on the model used in Japan. Universal education was available through the primary grades; advanced instruction was available to a much smaller number of students, who were trained to become doctors and lower-level bureaucrats (Tsurumi 1977). Through the public education system and the island's official media – radio and newspapers – Taiwan's "national language," Japanese, was effectively promoted. Beginning with the outbreak of war in 1937, speaking Japanese as well as adopting a Japanese surname were important parts of the *kominka* movement, which aimed to transform Taiwanese into imperial subjects (Lamley 1999:236) through "a total transformation of indigenous 'languages and customs' (*gengo fuzoku*)" (Ching 2001:93). By the end of World War II, an estimated 40% of the total population could speak Japanese, and 70% of Taiwan's school-age children were literate in Japanese (Kerr 1965, Hsiau 1997).

Return to Chinese rule in 1945 after 50 years of Japanese colonial rule did not mean a return to the same laissez-faire language policies of the former Qing Dynasty. In one of his first acts as newly appointed Governor-General of Taiwan, the soon-to-be-hated strongman, Chen Yi, in 1945 announced the following:

> Now that I have arrived on Taiwan, I intend to first bring [from the mainland] teachers of the national language [Mandarin] and national characters [Chinese characters, not Japanese kanji], [to] prepare them for the purpose of coming and enabling our Taiwanese comrades to comprehend and understand [their] ancestors' culture. This task [must be pursued] with hard resolve, the same as my experience in Fujian Province when I promoted National Language Mobilization. (Huang 1995:106, author's translation)

In 1945, the former national language, Japanese, was replaced with a new national language, Mandarin, better known in Taiwan as *Guoyu* (literally 'national language'). The Nationalist government aggressively promoted *Guoyu* by banning Japanese in schools, government, and local media, and by bringing teachers from the mainland who could teach the new national language. Local languages – Tai-gi, Hakka, or Aboriginal – were defined as *fangyan* 'local dialects'.

Disillusioned by these and other acts, many educated Taiwanese leaders, who had longed for the day when the Japanese would leave and Taiwan could regain its dignity, expressed their dissent in the famous uprising of February 28, 1947. (The KMT responded by sending mainland troops and killing unknown thousands of people in the months that followed; see Kerr 1965.) This was followed by decades of political repression, known as the *baise kongbu* 'white terror', when dissenters either kept quiet, were imprisoned, or fled in exile to places such as Japan or the United States (Kerr 1965, Peng 1972).

The KMT justified their actions by claiming they were necessary for the war to recover the mainland from the Communist bandits; and it was necessary that Taiwan's population learn to speak the national language, Mandarin, so that it would be prepared to rule on the day it "recovered" the mainland. Therefore, like the Japanese with their *kominka* movement, the KMT linked speaking practices with loyalty to the government, declaring that it was unpatriotic to speak *fangyan* (Hsiau 1997).

In the last years of President Chiang Ching-kuo's (the son of Chiang Kai-shek) life, after a career as his father's hatchet man and staunch opponent of dissent (see Kaplan 1992, Taylor 2000), he began a process of political liberalization. In 1986, he legalized the opposition political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and in 1987 he lifted martial law. These political changes and Taiwan's rapid economic growth are two reasons for the well-known "Taiwan miracle" (Rubinstein 1999). But less known is a another change that occurred in the summer of 1987, just months before Chiang Ching-kuo's death: Taiwan's Provincial Bureau of Education proclaimed an end to the longstanding practice of punishing students for speaking *fangyan* at school:

> At every junior high school and elementary school in the province [of Taiwan] it is not permitted to continue the practice of using physical punishment, issuing fines, or using other such improper means to punish students for speaking dialects on school grounds. . . . The Bureau of Education points out that in recent years . . . in implementing the national language policy, their methods have gone astray. Toward dialect speaking students the means of punishment have been to hang the placard, hit heads, issue fines, and use other degrees of punishment. These measures have provoked people to falsely believe that the purpose of the government's national language policy is to eliminate dialects. (Huang 1995:57–58, author's translation)

In January 1988, Chiang Ching-kuo died; he was replaced by his hand-picked successor, Lee Teng-hui, who furthered reforms and ended the government's battle with "local dialects."

In the 1990s, the newly legalized opposition party, the DPP, campaigned on a platform of reviving Tai-gi and starting programs in bilingual education at the local level (Hsiau 1997). Once elected, these officials directed educators to develop curricula offering instruction at the elementary level, for a few hours per week, in each region's *bentu yuyan* 'local language' – Tai-gi, Hakka, and Aboriginal languages – corresponding to the language spoken by the majority of residents in a school district. (These politicians and educators replaced the KMT's term, *fangyan*, with the terms *muyu* 'mother tongue' or, more often, *bentu yuyan* 'local or vernacular languages'. Today it is uncommon to hear people in Taiwan refer to Tai-gi, Hakka, or Aboriginal languages as *fangyan*.) Bilingual education spread further in the summer of 1999, when Taiwan's Ministry of Education (under Lee's KMT administration) announced that, starting in 2001, *bentu yuyan* curricula would be developed for each local language and offered in elementary schools throughout Taiwan (Learning Mother Tongue 1999).

In sum, Taiwan's public language history has been one of struggle and change. The language practices of a particular group or individual, especially in public fields, have been politicized – that is, evaluated positively or negatively by the powers in charge; and definitions of what is a "national language," "local dialect," or "local language" have changed and continue to change in response to political and historical developments. Combined, these "structured structures" have affected the habitus in Taiwan, of which language practices are a part. Hence, as shown in surveys by Young 1988, Huang 1995, 2000, and Tse 2000, just because a young person grows up in one ethnolinguistic household (Aboriginal, Hakka, Tai-gi, or mainlander) does not mean that in adulthood that person will be a fluent speaker of his or her "mother tongue." Instead, fluency in Mandarin has increased as fluency in vernacular languages has decreased, especially among young people – ironically, during the period when the political climate and evaluation of *bentu yuyan* has changed.

Having sketched Taiwan's language history, we will now briefly examine the layered ideologies that have shaped this history. One ideology, perhaps the oldest, comes from traditional, dynastic China. In a tradition stretching back millennia, scholars and government officials shared a common language through the written, literary Chinese called *wen yan wen* (Norman 1988). But this shared literary, official language did not correspond to a common spoken one. In the seventh century CE, compilers of the first known pronouncing dictionary of Chinese, the *Qieyun*, recognized that even scholars from different parts of China read Chinese characters with different pronunciations (Norman 1988). Speaking practices among the illiterate majority varied even more from region to region, much as the language in one part of the former Roman Empire, French, differs from the language in another part, Italian. On those infrequent occasions when an illiterate peasant conducted official business, such as appearing before a judge or magistrate, language differences were overcome by the use of translators who spoke both the official language (*guanfang yuyan*) and the local "dialect" (see MacKay [1896] 1991:106). The dynastic ideology promoted – through civil service exams based on Confucian texts – a shared written language among officials and scholars, but "tolerated" or perhaps was "unconcerned" by the diversity of speaking practices among the general populace (Norman 1988:253). That is, one's identity as "Chinese" was not linked to the language or dialect one spoke.

A different language ideology, however, spread to China with the arrival of the Europeans. Forced at gunpoint by European powers to make unequal trade agreements, China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw its power and stature fall (Spence 1999). Scholars in China questioned this state of affairs: Why has China become so weak? Why are the barbarian Europeans so strong? One answer was that China's hope was to adopt what made the West strong – e.g., science – and at the same time to preserve what had made China strong in the past, such as its cultural tradition (Wu 1994). A key part of this "strengthening" movement was to unify the nation by adopting one language as the standard. Hence, in 1913 the Ministry of Education directed Wu Ching-heng, one of the founders of the ROC, to replace written, literary Chinese (*wen yan wen*) with a written vernacular (*baihua*), and to select one spoken version (*Guoyu*, based on the Beijing dialect) to be promoted throughout China (Norman 1988). It was in this fashion that the European, Herderian ideology of one language for one nation (Woolard 1999: 16–17) was adopted by China in the early twentieth century. In 1945, the Nationalists brought this ideology with them to Taiwan.

Taiwanese, however, were familiar with the one language-one nation ideology before 1945. After Japan was forcibly opened to the West, during the Meiji period Japan embarked on a crash course of self-strengthening, borrowing from Western models of science, industry, and education. During the *kominka* movement (1937–1945), Taiwanese subjects were encouraged to speak Japanese and adopt Japanese surnames to demonstrate their Japaneseness.

Today's Taiwan, as described by former President Lee Teng-hui in the quote reproduced above, is "influenced by history." Ostensibly democratic Taiwan could restore the "older" Chinese ideology that identity is determined by things other than language (e.g., race, religion, residence) and replace the monolingual Nationalist/Japanese ideology with a multilingual one. To some extent, this is happening, as seen in language-based changes in Taiwan's education and media (see S. Chen 1998). Its history still influences Taiwan, however, as many still ascribe to the ideology that language is equated with nation. For example, the Taiwan Solidarity Union – the political party created by Lee Teng-hui after he was expelled from the KMT in 2001 – in March 2002 proposed that Tai-gi (Hokkien) become Taiwan's second official language (Lin 2002). Taiwan's military, traditionally a stronghold of the KMT, produced its first television advertisement for military recruitment using Tai-gi instead of Mandarin (Hsu 2002). Ironically, we see in Taiwan an emerging debate over how to recontextualize the former ideology of one nation-one language – "I am Japanese/Chinese if I speak the national language of Japan/China" – with a similar one, "I am Taiwanese if I speak the (native) language of Taiwan, Tai-gi."

This narrative of Taiwan's language history and ideologies, though important, does not address a second important question: What has happened, and what is happening, in private fields of discourse, to the folk who have lived through these politicized and changing linguistic policies? This question gets closer to the second component of habitus, the structuring structure, or the way "taste" develops (Bourdieu 1984) to say one language is better than another. It also addresses Silverstein's definition of language ideologies as "any sets of beliefs about language articulated by the users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use" (1979:193). That is, do folk in Taiwan articulate reasons why one language structure is used instead of another? Answers emerge when we look at Taiwan's private language history, the story of "words exchanged by friends . . . [and] exchanges within a family" (Bourdieu 1991:77,82). This is the focus of the next section.

TAIWAN'S PRIVATE LANGUAGE HISTORY: METHOD

The history of Taiwan's private language practices comes from data collected as part of a study examining folk theories of child-rearing by caregivers of young children (average age 3;0), in two communities, Centerville and Chhan-chng (pseudonyms), the former in the United States and the latter in Taiwan. Interviews were arranged sensitive to the call of Briggs (1986) that they be designed and interpreted as “communicative events” involving locally based rules of talk that vary across contexts. (See Miller et al. 2002 for a discussion of interviewing procedures and the two communities.) In both sites, interviews were conducted by a team including Su-Hua Wang, a native of Taiwan, and Todd Sandel, a native of the United States who is fluent in Mandarin and Tai-gi and has lived in Taiwan for nearly a decade. Sandel was assisted in Chhan-chng by his wife, Donna Ching-Kuei Sandel, who grew up in that community. In Chhan-chng and other places in Taiwan, interviews were conducted in the local languages, both Mandarin and Tai-gi (quite often mixed together), depending on the participant’s preference. Questions exploring language practices and ideologies were framed as an issue relevant to child-rearing. Some questions (e.g., “How did you learn to speak Mandarin?”) probed a parent’s personal language learning experiences; others (e.g., “Which language or languages do you speak with your child?”) indexed present practices. The goal was to uncover the ideologies that parents perceive to guide present speaking practices with their children.

Data for this study are from interviews with 25 participants, including 17 parents, 5 grandparents, and 3 young adults, all bilingual speakers of Mandarin and Tai-gi. All participants grew up in Tai-gi-speaking homes; all began school after 1945, when Mandarin was the language of instruction. Interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed verbatim (Mandarin utterances in Chinese characters, and Tai-gi in a combination of characters and romanized orthography), most by the author and some by a research assistant, Susan Chou. Each interview was then checked by a second person, Donna Ching-Kuei Sandel, to correct for errors and accuracy. Analyses of transcripts were conducted by the author in the original language(s). Interview excerpts presented in this article were translated by the author with assistance from his wife, Donna Ching-Kuei Sandel.[5]

RESULTS

Participants discussed two issues: (i) personal experiences of learning to speak Tai-gi at home and Mandarin at school; and (ii) the languages parents use (or used) in the home with their children and the reasons, or language ideologies, that support this language choice. These two issues played out in complex ways across what I identify to be three successive generations of bilingual speakers. The first generation started or attended elementary school from 1945 until the mid-1970s. As children, they spoke Tai-gi at home and learned Mandarin at school. All were subject to the strict measures of the KMT’s Mandarin Language Policy (MLP) intended to teach students the “national language”; for example, they were fined, hit, and/or forced to wear a placard if caught speaking a word of *fangyan* ‘local dialect’. The second generation started or attended school in the 1970s and 1980s; the strict MLP was still in effect until the latter half of 1987. But unlike the former group, this generation learned to speak Mandarin at home as their parents (of the first generation) taught them (second generation) Mandarin. Also unlike the first generation, members of this generation in general are not as fluent in Tai-gi as they are in Mandarin (see Young 1987, Huang 1995). The third generation started school after 1987. (Only one member of this generation, a 16-year-old adolescent, was interviewed. Most of the data pertaining to this generation come from observations of children's speaking practices while interviewing their parents, and from the perceptions of these practices and ideologies as reported by parents.) They are growing up after the lifting of the MLP, although Mandarin is the still the language of instruction. This generation faces new challenges as the present language learning environment allows, and in some ways encourages, children to speak Mandarin AND Tai-gi.

One outcome of the former policy was that the generation that moved through Taiwan's school system quickly became fluent in the national language, which was the government's goal. But a second, unintended outcome was that this generation carried into adulthood memories of unpleasant, even traumatic language-learning experiences. Seventeen of the people I interviewed in 1998 and 1999 talked with me at length about their experiences learning to speak Mandarin at school. All but one (a 16-year-old adolescent of generation three) recalled that they were punished or witnessed others punished for speaking Tai-gi at school. These people attended elementary school in various parts of Taiwan, from Taipei and Yilan counties in the north to Changhua, Po*-li, and Chhan-chng in the center, and to Pingtong in the south, which suggests that punishment was administered throughout all of Taiwan. My data also show that punishment ceased after 1987. The 16-year-old, who began first grade in 1988, told me that teachers in his school did not punish anyone for speaking Tai-gi. However, a 20-year-old and a 19-year-old, who started first grade in 1984 and 1985 respectively, recalled a time when teachers would punish students who spoke Tai-gi, though after a few years such punishment ceased.

The following discussion maps perceived experiences and ideologies across three successive generations of bilingual speakers. The first two generations inhabited a field where the rules of the language "game" (Bourdieu 2000:150–152) – the MLP – were strictly enforced. Generation one participants recall that success or failure depended on one's ability to practice self-censorship and avoid uttering *fangyan* at school. Generation two participants faced the same pressures to self-censor but were aided by their parents, who practiced overt language socialization with their children by teaching them Mandarin at home. Generation three inhabits a field with the least restrictive language practices; teachers use both Mandarin and Tai-gi (or perhaps other local languages). Ironically, though, this is the generation that (in urban but not rural contexts) appears least benefited by the change in the MLP: Many young children are growing up monolingual Mandarin speakers – a result of the history of former generations.

Generation one: Parents' memories of learning Tai-gi and Mandarin

The majority of children who attended school between 1945 and 1975 spent their early years communicating with family and friends in one language, Tai-gi, but suddenly, at the age of 5 or 6, they entered an environment where it was strictly forbidden to use that language with the same friends; instead, they were expected quickly to learn another language, Mandarin. First-grade students were expected to follow the instructions of teachers who spoke to them in Mandarin, and none was offered the Chinese equivalent of an ESL class to help with the transition. By the second grade, students were expected to have mastered the school's language. Students caught speaking Tai-gi or other local and/or forbidden languages (e.g., Hakka, Japanese, Aboriginal languages) were subject to a variety of punishments: They were fined or hit, wore a "placard of shame," stood in a corner, cleaned out the school's lavatories, and so on (see Wolf 1972).

Mr. Dyoo (all participants are referred to by pseudonyms) explained to me that when he was a child in the 1950s, the slogan he often heard was that people must "take back the mainland" (from the communists), and that learning to speak Mandarin was an important weapon in this fight. He also told me that if a child were caught speaking Tai-gi on the school grounds, he would have to wear a placard around his neck that said "I am a dog." A first-generation woman who began school in the early 1970s, the daughter of monolingual Tai-gi speakers, described conditions that were much the same. Once while playing on the school grounds, she momentarily forgot the prohibition against speaking Tai-gi and called out to her classmate using her Tai-gi name. Another classmate heard this and quickly hung the placard on her neck. This woman said that at the end of the school day, students caught speaking *fangyan* would be lined up on the school grounds and punished: The principal and/or teachers would walk by and hit each student on the mouth or hand, or command the offender to clean the school's lavatories. (See Sandel 2000 for a more complete account.)

The account that most clearly exhibits what Bourdieu (1991:78–79) calls the "euphemism" or self-censorship of language was narrated by Mr. Lim. I have known Mr. Lim for many years. He is one of my wife's uncles and someone I have met on many occasions. He has a great sense of humor and loves to tell jokes, but rarely does he talk or tell jokes in Mandarin, even though he is fluent in the language. (He graduated from high school in the late 1960s.) When I interviewed Mr. Lim, I asked a friend of mine, "Brian," who is fluent in both Mandarin and Tai-gi, to help translate for me. (At the time of the interview I was studying Tai-gi, but not yet able to conduct an interview in that language without assistance.) In the following excerpt, Brian at times translates Mr. Lim's responses into Mandarin for my benefit, and at other times he takes the lead and questions Mr. Lim himself. (In this and following excerpts, participants' code-switching is marked by italicizing the translation from Mandarin and underlining the translation from Tai-gi.)

(1) Mr. Lim avoided hanging the dog placard.

T. Sandel: I know that you can speak Tai-gi and Mandarin, but you're not used to speaking Mandarin. *Right. Is there an*y [reason]?
Mr. Lim: No. [I] have no *bias*.
Brian: When you went to school, didn't you speak Mandarin?
Mr. Lim: Right, right. At that time when [I] went to [start] elementary school I couldn't speak [Mandarin]. Had to put on the dog placard, *"Please speak Mandarin."*
Brian: [translating] *He said, when he was young, at school you had to speak If you didn't speak* [Mandarin]*, would have to, on your neck, there would be hung a placard that said, "Please speak Mandarin." And also were fined.*
Mr. Lim: [laugh] I had no money to pay a fine, [so] I'd wear the placard.
T. Sandel: *Did you ever wear it?*
Brian: *Did you ever wear it?* . . . Did you ever have the dog placard put on you?
Mr. Lim: I never had it put on me.
T. Sandel: *Oh, never did.*
Mr. Lim: I never talked. At school I was like someone who is dumb
Brian: . . . [laugh] Is it that you didn't like to talk? Or when the teacher would ask you [a question] what happened? Would you then talk?
Mr. Lim: Yeah. I was afraid of speaking Tai-gi, and then would have the dog placard put on me. I'm used to speaking Tai-gi.
Brian: Oh, so you were afraid, afraid that if you talked, Tai-gi would come out.
Mr. Lim: Right [laugh] . . . Hang the dog placard.

Mr. Lim's talk about school-based language experiences was prompted by my comment about his language practices, that even though he can speak both Tai-gi and Mandarin, he rarely speaks Mandarin. I asked him if there is any particular reason why he does not speak Mandarin. Mr. Lim responded claiming that he has no bias (*chengjian*). Brian then asked Mr. Lim if he spoke Mandarin when he went to school, to which Mr. Lim responded "*Right, right*"; then Mr. Lim commented on the punishment that was imposed on students such as himself who could not speak Mandarin: "*At that time when* [I] *went to* [start] *elementary school I couldn't speak* [Mandarin]. *Had to put on the dog placard*, '*Please speak Mandarin.*' " Most noteworthy is Lim's evaluation of his own speaking practices when he was a student – delivered humorously: "I never talked. At school I was like someone who is dumb." That is, the market value of Tai-gi was set so low that it literally muted the voices of people like Mr. Lim, who were afraid of suffering the market's (i.e., school's) adverse evaluation.

Generation two: Bilingual parents taught Mandarin to their children

Four of the fourteen bilingual parents I interviewed have children who started school prior to 1987, and who are members of what I call the second generation of bilinguals. The parents of these children are like many first-generation bilinguals: They went to school when the MLP was strictly enforced; they first spoke Tai-gi at home and learned Mandarin at school; and they are the first generation of adults who are bilingual in Mandarin and Tai-gi (or other local languages).

Most noteworthy, however, is that they are the first (and apparently last) generation of bilinguals to raise children – the second generation – who faced the same strict MLP as the first. Unlike their mostly monolingual (or Japanese-educated) parents, these parents knew what language pressures their young children would face at school. They knew that when their children passed the school gate that separated the outer, Tai-gi dominated field from the inner, Mandarin-only field, their children would face great pressure to conform to the school's language policy. Thus, these parents did what they felt and knew from experience was best – they taught their young children to speak Mandarin.

"So at that time I taught them to speak Mandarin." Mrs. Liao is a mother of two children, ages 19 and 20. Both of her children began first grade before the lifting of the MLP in 1987. I have known Mrs. Liao and her family for many years – she is my wife's oldest sister – and have observed that although her two children can understand and speak some Tai-gi, they usually speak Mandarin. (In a separate interview, they told me that their Mandarin is much better than their Tai-gi.) In the following excerpt, we see that Mrs. Liao links the following three experiences: (i) She faced difficulties when she was a child learning to speak Mandarin at school; (ii) her past difficulties influenced the way she later raised her own children; and (iii) today she encourages her children to speak more Tai-gi.

(2) Mrs. Liao's family languages practices.

T. Sandel: *Last I'd like to ask you about languages. When you were young, at home you all spoke Tai-gi.*
Mrs. Liao: *Right.*
T. Sandel: *And then went to school, and learned Mandarin.*
Mrs. Liao: *Right.*
T. Sandel: *And then Jinsong* [Liao's son] *and Peijun* [Liao's daughter] *they*
Mrs. Liao: *At home I will, directly speak Mandarin to them.*
T. Sandel: *Yeah, speak Mandarin. But brother-in-law* [Mrs. Liao's husband].
Mrs. Liao: *Speaks Tai-gi . . . .* [laugh] *His Mandarin is not standard.*
T. Sandel: [laugh] *Not standard. But do you have any regrets saying, "I hope they're Tai-gi." Because Peijun told me, she doesn't speak Tai-gi very well.*
Mrs. Liao: *They are speaking it right now. Sometimes when I'm at home, we will do our best, and speak Tai-gi. Because when we were in school during that period, your Mandarin, if you couldn't express yourself well, all your text book material was in Mandarin, and so in that case you would be punished. So at that time I taught them to speak Mandarin. You know that when we in school we were forced* [to speak] *Mandarin, would be punished. You know. They'd hang a placard on you, "Speak dialects"* [*Jiang fangyan*]. *Hang it on* [laugh]
T. Sandel: *Was it ever hung on you?*
Mrs. Liao: *Yes I had it hung on me. There were a few words that we didn't know how to say like mango* [*mangguo*], *in the past we didn't know what thing a mangguo was. Ah that mangguo in Tai-gi is soai^{n}-a, right?*
T. Sandel: Soai^{n}-a
Mrs. Liao: *We just didn't know that is* soai^{n} *zi, you know?* [laugh] *Oh, I didn't know what that thing is so I just added on a "zi" like that, "*soai^{n} *zi." . . . Oh, just anyway those that* [you] *didn't know add a "zi" onto it. I'd just speak Mandarin. . . . Ah, so we suffered that kind of bitterness, were punished, really were punished, until the fifth grade. Although what was in the textbooks, the meaning I'd understand, I*

could read it, but when [you] *had to use that language for every facet of life that was really painful. . . .*

T. Sandel: *So you would, when caring for them when they were very young, when they were young you'd purposely use Mandarin to talk to them?*

Mrs. Liao: *Right, I'd speak it. . . .*

T. Sandel: *Then Jinsong* [son], *when he was young probably spoke Tai-gi?*

Mrs. Liao: *Jinsong spoke more because* [he] *would sometimes go back to the countryside* [where his grandparents on both sides live], *be there for a time. . . . Then Peijun* [daughter] *is, because we've always been together so she speaks Mandarin. . . . Because I'd read stories to them, ah, for example in the evenings before going to sleep, or else in the afternoons before taking a nap. Then we'd buy those, colored picture story books. Then, each time before they'd sleep I'd read a story or two, let them turn the pages and let them, the two of them would be beside me like that, looking, reading along. Ah, let them see just one character at a time, hoping that they would learn to recognize* [read] *the characters . . . Ah, so, most of the time,* [I] *would use Mandarin when talking with them.*

Mrs. Liao learned to speak Tai-gi at home and later learned Mandarin at school. In that field, she experienced at first hand the effects of the government's strict MLP, and to illustrate, narrated an account explaining why she was punished for speaking "dialects." When she did not know how to say the name of a fruit, mango, in Mandarin, she said it in Tai-gi, (soai^{n}), but added a Mandarin morpheme, (*zi*), to it – "soai^{n}*zi*." She evaluates these experiences with the following clauses: *so we suffered that kind of bitterness* and *but when* [you] *had to use that language for every facet of life that was really painful*.

Years later, when Mrs. Liao was married and had children of her own, these "bitter" memories emerged and influenced the way she raised these children, members of generation two. She read stories to them at bedtime, a literacy practice familiar to mothers worldwide. But what is perhaps unfamiliar is the sense of urgency associated with this practice: *Then, each time before they'd sleep I'd read a story or two, . . . Ah, let them see just one character at a time, hoping that they would learn to recognize* [read] *the characters and then also help them understand the meaning of the story*. That is, early literacy practices were a time to invest her children with the linguistic capital – Mandarin literacy – needed to avoid the same linguistic sanctions she faced as a young child.

A third issue frames this discussion: It is my observation (and children's self-reported claim) that Mrs. Liao's two children speak Mandarin better and more often than Tai-gi, with which Mrs. Liao concurs. However, she reframes the issue by saying that now, in recent years, she has made a conscious effort to speak more Tai-gi at home, and that her children can speak some Tai-gi. (Mrs. Liao's husband has always spoken more Tai-gi than Mandarin. His Mandarin is "not standard.")

Mrs. Liao does not explain why she wants her children to speak better Tai-gi. However, I suspect that this desire is tied to changes in Taiwan's politics and languages policies discussed earlier, and to the underlying, changing ideology that Taiwanese children of Tai-gi ancestry should be able to speak Tai-gi. This ideology we find more clearly expressed when we look at what the next person, Teacher Tan, says about languages in Taiwan.

"Ducks listening to thunder": A changing ideology. In the summer of 1998, I studied Tai-gi six hours a week for two months at a private, government-certified language school in Taipei. In addition to instruction in Tai-gi, this school offered a number of other languages, such as Mandarin, English, and Japanese. Most of the approximately 80 students at this school studied Mandarin. I was the only Tai-gi student. It was in this context that I found Teacher Tan to be not only a good language teacher but also articulate about the ideology associated with Tai-gi. Thus, I asked her if she would consent to being interviewed and she agreed. I talked with her during lunch hour during my final week of class.

Teacher Tan told me about her life experiences. She grew up in a Tai-gi-speaking family in Yilan County, northern Taiwan. After graduating from high school, she moved to Taipei City to attend college. There she met her husband and had children who started school before 1987 and are members of generation two. Eight years before our interview, she had begun her career as a language teacher, first teaching Mandarin and then later both Mandarin and Tai-gi. Then she told me the reasons behind a shift in her own language ideology – why in the past she wanted her children to speak Mandarin, but then decided that they should also learn Tai-gi.

(3) Teacher Tan talks about her experiences of languages.

T. Sandel: *I'd like to ask you about the future, . . . you believe that in the future, in Taiwan the conditions for speaking Tai-gi you think . . .*
Teacher Tan: *I think that because Taiwan has already been set through the efforts of* [President] *Lee Teng-hui, bentuhua de* [*localized*]. *And then, has received other people's confirmation. For example, we of our generation, who came to study in Taipei after graduating from high school. . . . it seemed that to speak Tai-gi was a shameful thing; speaking Tai-gi just seemed to mark you as the level of people, who have not been educated. . . . That was the condition then. Then it was about 10, or 14, 15 years ago,. . . my husband went to work in Thailand* [to do business]. *So we moved to Bangkok. . . . And then I discovered, over there were people who were also Taiwanese. But because they weren't necessarily like us from Taipei City, some were from Tainan, Kaohsiung* [southern Taiwan]. *All the children, spoke such fluent, such fluent Tai-gi. Only our children, ah, were* "Ducks listening to thunder" [Ah-a thia^{n}-lui], *couldn't understand a thing. I felt that that really was my problem, my own responsibility. Because when I was in Taipei I thought if, you, they couldn't speak Mandarin before going to preschool that would be a problem. Right?*
T. Sandel: *Yeah.*
Teacher Tan: *So everyone speaks Mandarin. But over there I discovered,* Taiwan people who can't speak Tai-gi, *that is really very shameful. Actually it wasn't necessarily because* [I wanted] *my children to go out* [of the home] *speaking Mandarin, it was that I felt that their parents were educated.* [But] *I believe that this concept is very wrong. Right, a wrong concept.*
T. Sandel: *So at your home you usually, speak*
Teacher Tan: *Afterward when in Thailand we spoke Tai-gi*
T. Sandel: *Spoke Tai-gi*
Teacher Tan: *Right, slowly started to speak Tai-gi . . . And so the children slowly started to understand.*

Teacher Tan describes two parallel changes, one national, the other personal. On the national level, in the past, when she and many others *of our generation* moved from the countryside to study in Taipei City, they felt *that to speak Tai-gi was a* *shameful thing; speaking Tai-gi just seemed to mark you as the level of people, who have not been educated*. But now, under President Lee Teng-hui, conditions have changed. His efforts to *localize* (*bentuhua*) Taiwan have been confirmed (*rentong*) by others. She implies that a major component of President Lee's localization has been to revalorize Tai-gi. Therefore, it is Teacher Tan's perception that the language ideology associated with Tai-gi has changed dramatically at the national level.

On a personal level, her own practices and ideology associated with Tai-gi have also changed dramatically. When her children were young, she (like Mrs. Liao) believed it important that they should know how to speak Mandarin before they started preschool. However, about 15 years ago, when she moved with her family to live in Bangkok, she came to a new realization. In that field she saw that children who came from other cities in Taiwan could speak fluent Tai-gi. Only her children did not understand. They were like ducks listening to thunder. Thus, she reflected on her own practices and beliefs; and she realized that her motivation to teach Mandarin to her children was not necessarily for their benefit; rather, it was a way of showing other parents that her children's parents were educated. And given this new frame of reference, she saw that it was not shameful to speak Tai-gi, but rather shameful to see Taiwan people who can't speak Tai-gi. Consequently, she changed her speaking practices with her children and began to speak more Tai-gi with them at home so that they, too, could understand.

If we compare Teacher Tan's reported speaking practices with those of Mrs. Liao, we find a similar development. Both mothers, believing it important for their children to learn Mandarin at a young age, consciously taught them to speak Mandarin, but in recent years both have changed their practices and now try to speak more Tai-gi at home. However, the reasons for these reported changes differ. While Teacher Tan bases her change on her personal change of mind – a language ideology – Mrs. Liao does not mention any such change. Perhaps Mrs. Liao has consistently valorized Tai-gi, and what ostensibly has given her the freedom to change has been an ideological change at the national level. Consequently, both mothers, albeit for different reasons, are changing their speaking practices at home.

If we look at the expressed beliefs and practices of the parents in these four families, we see a consistent portrait. Under the pressure of the government's strictly imposed MLP, parents who were bilingual and experienced this policy at first hand believed it important that they give their children the necessary skill – the ability to speak Mandarin – to avoid the kind of "bitterness" they once had at school. The effect on this second generation of schoolchildren was that most grew up speaking Mandarin better than Tai-gi. But political and educational reforms enacted just prior to and during President Lee's administration changed this policy, and now parents are making a conscious effort to improve their children's Tai-gi.

Generation three: Rural versus urban variation in language ideologies

The third generation of bilingual Mandarin and Tai-gi speakers includes today's children and young people, all of whom have attended or will attend school after 1987. Data from the present study reveal little about the perceptions of these young people because most are still very young. However, interviews conducted with 10 parents of children of this third generation provide perceptions of the language practices and ideologies that guide this youngest generation. These parents all agree that their children should learn to speak both Mandarin and Tai-gi. Differences, however, emerge; half (5) believe it important actively to teach their children to speak both languages, while the other half (5) believe that their children will naturally learn both languages, and thus that it is not necessary actively to teach these languages. These differing perceptions correspond to what I find to be a rural-urban split. Four out of five of the parents who claim that they need to take a more active role in teaching their children live in a city. All five of the parents who take the latter view live in the country (in Chhan-chng). In the following discussion I present evidence that shows these different perceptions, beginning with those expressed by parents who live in the country.

Children naturally learn to speak both Mandarin and Tai-gi. The five parents who believe that their children will naturally learn to speak both Mandarin and Tai-gi share a number of similarities. One is that all live in Chhan-chng, a mainly agricultural community of approximately 30,000 people in central Taiwan; another is that all have young children who have not yet begun first grade; and a third is that all live in households where children have frequent contact with their Tai-gi speaking grandparents – in four families the children live with their grandparents, and in the fifth the grandparents live next door. These children are all growing up in an environment where Tai-gi is the primary spoken language and where children learn to speak Tai-gi as their first language. Hence, these children are learning to speak much as their parents learned to speak a generation ago. But there are also differences.

Today’s children grow up in homes with cable television that broadcasts two 24-hour cartoon channels (Disney and TNT) dubbed into Mandarin Chinese – stations which, I have observed, children love to watch. Another difference is that the parents of today’s children are fluent in both Mandarin and Tai-gi. A third difference is that nearly all of today’s children attend several years of preschool, where teachers use Mandarin as the language of instruction.

Perhaps these differences help explain why some parents are not anxious about their children’s development of the two languages. One father told me that he did not learn to speak Mandarin until he started the first grade. In contrast, his daughter is like other children: “Today’s kids, when they first learn to talk, they can speak in Mandarin.” A mother I interviewed expressed a somewhat different opinion. When I tried to talk to Mrs. Iu^n’s oldest daughter in Mandarin, I discovered that she did not understand me. Mrs. Iu^n then explained, *She hasn’t yet learned to speak Mandarin*. I then asked if she were concerned and planned to teach her child Mandarin before beginning school.

(4) Mrs. Iu^{n} is not concerned.

T. Sandel: *So Mandarin, like you said they, can't really speak it.*

Mrs. Iu^{n}: *Can't speak it yet, can't.*

T. Sandel: *Do you think that before she* [oldest daughter] *starts elementary school, you should, with her, speak more Mandarin?*

Mrs. Iu^{n}: *Mandarin. I think, today's kids learn Mandarin really fast, because like they watch TV. . . .*

T. Sandel: *She should understand.*

Mrs. Iu^{n}: [I'm] *sure she can. . . . has the opportunity, and could talk. Her* [preschool] *teacher should use Mandarin when teaching her.*

Mrs. Iu^{n} is not overly concerned for two reasons. First, she claims that *today's kids learn Mandarin really fast,* linking this to their TV-viewing habits. Second, she believes that her children have the opportunity to listen to and speak Mandarin while attending preschool because their *teacher should use Mandarin when teaching her*. Therefore, Mrs. Iu^{n}, like the other five parents who expressed a similar opinion, is not anxious about her children's Mandarin.

The flip side to the language-learning process is for children to learn to speak Tai-gi. Mrs. Iu^{n} did not talk about this because it was apparent that her children spoke Tai-gi. However, with the four other parents I directly raised this topic. They told me that their children will learn to speak Tai-gi at home; and they say their children's grandparents play an important role in teaching Tai-gi; as one mother said, *Because my father- and mother-in-law* [her son's primary caregivers] *both speak Tai-gi. We all speak Tai-gi to him*.

Mrs. Cho works full time during the day while her mother-in-law, who speaks Tai-gi, takes care of her young daughter. I asked Mrs. Cho if she felt it important to teach her daughter to speak Mandarin before entering school.

(5) Mrs. Cho does not want to teach Mandarin directly.

T. Sandel: *Like, you say going to school, are you preparing, that you want to use Mandarin to talk to her, so that when she goes to school.*

Mrs. Cho: *I feel that, using Tai-gi and Mandarin like that, you don't want to, don't directly teach her Mandarin. Then when you're grown up, if you, if when you're outside and you meet, meet some of those, those who are older, and then they talk to you and if you don't understand. That is just, not so good. So Mandarin and Tai-gi you want to teach both.*

T. Sandel: *Want to teach both.*

Mrs. Cho: *. . . Right. Don't directly teach her, that Mandarin, like that.*

T. Sandel: *Do you feel, there's a mother who told me, she works in the daytime. And then, she has a babysitter for the daytime. She has a waishengren* [mainlander] *to be* [her son's] *babysitter, to talk to her son in Mandarin. And then, in the evenings, her mother will care for him. Her mother can speak only Tai-gi. So he will, the child, will learn Tai-gi from his grandma, and then learn Mandarin from his babysitter.*

Mrs. Cho: *Like that. You look at that, there's a lot of pressure. Right. I feel that it's better to learn both Tai-gi and Mandarin together. . . . And then there are some grandmothers who don't understand* [Mandarin]. *Most older people don't understand.*

T. Sandel: *Right. . . . Here in the countryside it's more. That* [mother] *lives in Taipei, Taipei County.*

Mrs. Cho: *Oh, that, city. . . . concept is different.*

Mrs. Cho explains several beliefs about how and why children are taught to speak Mandarin and Tai-gi. The first is that a child should learn to speak both, and that a parent should not directly teach Mandarin to a child. She then supports her claim: If a child grows up unable to speak Tai-gi and meets an older person, who presumably cannot understand Mandarin, this is not good. She implies that young people should be able to talk to their elders in the language that elders understand – Tai-gi. Second, Mrs. Cho says it is better to let a child learn Mandarin and Tai-gi together. Her remark responds to my description of what another city-dwelling mother has done to help her son learn Mandarin from one person – a mainlander – and Tai-gi from another, a native Taiwanese. (This mother's comments will be discussed below.) Mrs. Cho's opinion is that this is too much pressure. (Perhaps this puts too much pressure on the child to learn or parents to teach; her meaning is not clear.) Finally Mrs. Cho says that there are differences between the concept (presumably in regard to languages) of country folk such as herself, and that of city folk such as the mother I described. She does not elaborate on what this difference might be. However, an indication of this difference emerges when we look at what city folk say about teaching their children Mandarin and Tai-gi.

Teaching children to speak Mandarin and Tai-gi. Five of the parents of young children told me that they should take active measures to teach their children to speak Mandarin and Tai-gi. Four of these parents share a number of similarities: They live in cities (one in Taipei County, two couples in Tai-tiong, and one in Chiong-hua); they live apart from their child's grandparents; they told me that their children speak better Mandarin than Tai-gi; and they said their main concern is to help their children speak better Tai-gi.

The fifth parent is exceptional in that he lives in the country in Chhan-chng and is more like the other five parents described above: His children live with their grandparents, and he says they speak Tai-gi better than Mandarin. His concern is to help his children speak better Mandarin, and to this end, he told me he sometimes purposely uses Mandarin when talking to them. However, language learning was not a major concern for this father, and most of his views about language more closely resembled the views of the parents described above. (He claimed that the phenomenon of children learning Mandarin as their first or only language is one of the effects of *dushihua*, or urbanization, that contrasts with country-raised children.) Hence, I will not discuss this father's views further.

The four parents who live in cities expressed views that are representative of the increasing complexity of Taiwan's changing language practices and ideologies. In the past, the situation was much simpler: Parents of generation two children believed that the way to help their children perform better in school was to teach them Mandarin. But today the situation is much more complex: On the one hand, children who grow up in the city are more likely to learn Mandarin as their first language owing to the influences of Mandarin-language television programming, exposure to the preschool environment, and interactions with bilingual parents; on the other, with political change has come a revalorization of Tai-gi. But these city children are less likely than their peers in the countryside, or children a generation ago, to grow up in a home with monolingual Tai-gi-speaking grandparents or parents, and they are less likely to speak Tai-gi as their first or "mother" language.

So how do parents navigate this changed language environment? They talked about it in two ways. First, they want to foster a better Tai-gi language-learning environment for their children. Second, they want their children to speak Tai-gi with the correct "accent" – a concern that indexes changes in Taiwan's linguistic market.

Children's exposure to Mandarin language television programs. Parents say that two factors can help children learn better Tai-gi: expose them to more Tai-gi language television programming, and have them spend more time with monolingual Tai-gi speakers, i.e., grandparents. Regarding the former, one father, Dr. Ong, told me that when he was a child he enjoyed watching Tai-gi language movies, but now his 10-year-old son mostly watches Mandarin language cartoons. Hence, he wishes that cartoons would be dubbed in Tai-gi. Another father, Mr. Chng, said something similar: The programs that children today like to watch – cartoons, children's educational and variety shows – are broadcast in Mandarin; Tai-gi language shows are mostly traditional operas, enjoyed by older people but unappealing to children. These city parents' perceptions of television as a language-teaching medium are much the same as country parents' perceptions, but while country parents look on this function positively – exposing their children to a SECOND language, Mandarin – city parents look upon it negatively as exposing their children to a FIRST language, Mandarin, and limiting their exposure to a second language, Tai-gi.

Children's exposure to monolingual Tai-gi speakers. Parents talked about a number of ways to increase their children's exposure to monolingual Tai-gi speakers. One city mother, referred to in ex. (5), Mrs. Kho, works full time during the day and has two caregivers care for her young son, strategically chosen for their respective language abilities. One is Mrs. Kho's mother, who is a monolingual Tai-gi speaker and from whom her son learns Tai-gi. A second is a *waishengren*, or mainlander, a monolingual Mandarin speaker from whom her son learns to speak Mandarin with the proper mainland accent (discussed later). A father, Mr. Chng, told me that weekends and summer vacations are times to send or accompany his children on visits with his parents or his wife's parents, monolingual Tai-gi speakers, in the countryside. (Most of the time his children live in the city, where Mandarin is more frequently used.) Another father, Mr. Go*, also told me that he will take his children to visit his father in the countryside. In addition, he has asked his wife to speak Tai-gi with his children, but is frustrated because his wife speaks Tai-gi with an unpleasant-sounding mainlander's accent.

The "standard" Mandarin accent. When the KMT government taught Mandarin, or the "national language," to Taiwan's mainly Tai-gi- and Hakka-speaking populace, it promoted a single, officially determined pronunciation system called *Biaozhun Guoyu* 'Standard National Language'. However, people who learned to speak Mandarin as adults, or children who grew up in monolingual Tai-gi-speaking households and learned Mandarin at school, found some sounds of Standard Mandarin difficult to pronounce. For example, Standard Mandarin has many words that feature retroflexion, for which Tai-gi speakers substitute alveolars. That is, many replace the voiceless retroflex fricative [ʂ] (pinyin *shi*) and the voiced retroflex fricative [ʐ] (pinyin *zhi*) with the alveolars [s] (pinyin *si*) and [z] (pinyin *zi*). Hence, instead of saying *shi bu shi* 'Yes or no?', people say *si bu si*. (See Kubler 1985 and Li 1985, for a linguistically accurate but ideologically biased – the KMT's version – analysis of this phenomenon.) But rather than treating this phenomenon as simply a matter of pronunciation, under which *shi bu shi* and *si bu si* are equivalent forms of expression, before the 1990s teachers and government officials politicized, or ideologized, a speaker's ability or inability to speak Standard National Language: "standard" pronunciation indexed a person's intelligence and patriotism (Hsiau 1997, Huang 1995). In other words, the government explicitly marked pronunciation as linguistic capital. Recent years, however, have witnessed a revalorization of "local languages."

Turning our focus to parents in Taiwan, we ask: Have national, ideological changes affected parents' perceptions of accents and/or of their children's speaking practices? The short answer is yes. But closer analysis indicates that parents' beliefs vary. On the one end of the spectrum lies Mrs. Kho, who has made arrangements for her son to be cared for by two caregivers who speak two different languages. She explained that she has made this arrangement with the problem of accents in mind. It is based on her personal experience. She told me that she feels that her own Mandarin is not *standard*, and that when she talks to "real *waishengren*," or mainlanders, she feels *nervous*. Therefore, Mrs. Kho wants her son to learn Mandarin from the babysitter in the "standard" style of a *waishengren*. (Mrs. Kho did not comment on the value of learning to speak Tai-gi with the proper "local" accent.) Ostensibly, Mrs. Kho's concern that her son learn to speak "standard" Mandarin is linked to the dominant ideology of her generation as promoted by the KMT.

Speaking Tai-gi with a "waishengren" accent. Mr. Chng and Mr. Go*'s concern about accents (and that of their wives, who also participated in an interview) lies on the other end of the spectrum – their children's ability to speak good-sounding Tai-gi. Bad-sounding Tai-gi is what a *waishengren* sounds like when he or she speaks Tai-gi. (The interview was conducted at Mr. Go*'s home in the city. He and Mr. Chng and their wives are neighbors and longtime friends. Donna Sandel's brother was Mr. Go*'s elementary school classmate and long-time friend.) We see their concern in the following.

(6) Speaking Tai-gi like a *waishengren* (mainlander).

Mr. Go*: *This* [matter of languages] *is really strange, like I tell my wife . . . "Speak Tai-gi to the children." I can speak it. But because she spends more time with them, ah I ask that she use Tai-gi when talking with them, but the problem is*
Mrs. Chng: *She, she can't speak it?*
Mr. Go*: *No. She, she sounds like a waishengren. My wife, when people talk with her and she talks, she is like a waishengren.*
D. Sandel: *You know I think that, we of this generation, is it because subconsciously there is a concept that is, ah speaking Tai-gi is like, . . . When we were young were all forced saying, "Must speak Mandarin." So feel that, . . . speaking Mandarin is more high-class, and speaking Tai-gi is low-class.*
Mr. Chng: This was maybe in *Elementary School.*
Mr. Go*: *It should be that this mentality still exists.*
Mr. Chng: *By the time I was in Junior High I didn't feel* [this way]. . . . I feel that it was *Junior High,* after that I didn't. But now there is this problem. *My oldest child, my daughter, this year she is going to enter the first grade,* when she speaks Tai-gi, other than the few phrases that she can say [well], she already has a Mandarin accent. . . . [S]he has a strong waisheng accent. So if you took a survey at school, it's not only waishengren *who can't speak Tai-gi*. It's that [Taiwanese children] don't necessarily have someone who talks to them [in Tai-gi]. . . . *That accent is just like when we were young,* would hear waishengren speak Tai-gi, *virtually* the same.

Mr. Go* opens this discussion of accents with a comment about his wife, who at the moment is in another room. He has asked his wife to speak Tai-gi with the children because she is the one who spends more time with them, but the problem is that *she sounds like a waishengren*.[6] (Later in the interview, Mrs. Go* explained why she has a *waishengren* accent. She said that while she comes from a Tai-gi-speaking family, she grew up in a community of primarily Hakka speakers and a few *waishengren*. Hence, her Mandarin and Tai-gi speech is influenced by the accents of these other speech communities.)

Donna Sandel, who is of the same generation as the other participants and as a child was Mr. Go*'s neighbor, then offers a possible explanation for Mrs. Go*'s *waishengren*-accented Tai-gi. She wonders if the pressure put on their generation to speak Mandarin at school has made it a habit for them to speak Mandarin – implying that this carries over into interactions with children; and also if this practice subconsciously has given rise to the ideology that Mandarin is a high-class language and Tai-gi low-class. Mr. Go* agrees. But Mr. Chng says that by the time he was in junior high school, he rejected this. (We can see from his speech pattern – speaking more Tai-gi than Mandarin – that there is evidence that in this communicative context, at least, he rejects the practice of speaking "Mandarin only.") Mr. Chng then turns the conversation back to the problem of accents.

Mr. Chng says that his daughter, who will soon enter the first grade, sounds like a *waishengren* when she speaks Tai-gi. He frames his daughter's problem as one common to many other young children today: Many Taiwanese children, who presumably should speak fluent Tai-gi (their "mother tongue"), can speak Tai-gi no better than *waishengren* children. He links this to the urban household arrangement, implying that unlike children in the countryside who live with their monolingual, Tai-gi-speaking grandparents, city children do not.

When we compare Mr. Go*'s and Mr. Chng's concerns with Mrs. Kho's, we find evidence that even in these smallest and ostensibly insignificant interactions – between adult and young child – there exists an effect, or perhaps cause, of the dramatic changes in Taiwan's linguistic market. On the one hand, we find the vestiges of the KMT's formerly dominant (Chinese mainland as opposed to the localized party of Lee Teng-hui) language ideology guiding people such as Mrs. Kho; on the other, we find a new language ideology emerging in people such as Mr. Chng and Mr. Go* – one that valorizes properly accented Tai-gi.

CONCLUSION

This study indicates that in Taiwan, bilingual speakers of Tai-gi and Mandarin perceive that there are links between school-based speaking policies decreed by the government and family-based speaking practices. These links are both intrapersonal – affecting personal perceptions of the value assigned to a language – and interpersonal, affecting which language is spoken in interpersonal communication, especially between parent and child. These data also reveal the impact national language policies have on language practices at the personal level as effected through evaluations of the linguistic market, i.e., the sense of "taste"; and they show that, at least for some people, the liberalization in Taiwan's political environment that occurred in the 1990s under the leadership of President Lee Teng-hui has led to a revalorization – a new market value – attached to local languages. And just as language practices, market values, and ideologies have changed in the past, so it seems likely that they will continue to change in future generations, affected by a rural/urban split in which the city is the field for speaking Mandarin and the country that for speaking Tai-gi. In sum, these data indicate that in Taiwan, language practices and ideologies are salient on both public and private levels.

As we look at these data through Bourdieu's (1991) theory, we find that they validate his claims and move his theory in new directions. These data support the claim that language is linguistic capital affected by market sanctions and by habitus. From 1945 until 1987, the KMT government strictly sanctioned the use of "local dialects" in fields it could control, the media (S. Chen 1998) and the schools. Speakers who violated this sanction paid a heavy price, an EMBODIED price in the form of beatings and shaming, which led to self-censorship in order to avoid future payments. But these data also stretch Bourdieu's theory by finding that the value of linguistic capital extends across generations as it was passed on from parents who suffered from a lack of linguistic capital – Mandarin – to children, who were provided with the linguistic capital of Mandarin to avoid sanctions at school. This transfer across generations was motivated by the social structure of the time, concurring with Bourdieu's claim that the "whole structure is present in each interaction" (1991:67). These data also indicate that when an individual moves into a context dominated by a new habitus with a different set of market values, as happened to Teacher Tan who moved to Bangkok, or as happened to the parents of young children (post-1987) who are no longer subject to the strict MLP, but instead will be learning "local languages" at school, these individuals' speaking practices and their evaluations of such practices can also change. Finally, these data support Bourdieu's claim that the habitus, of which language practices are a part, is the product of the WHOLE HISTORY of its relations with markets, or, in Taiwan's situation, with succeeding colonial and ruling governments that defined the values of the language market.

As pointed out by Bucholtz, however, one of the problems of Bourdieu's theory of practice is that its insistence on the unconsciousness of practice "reflects a general attenuation of agency" (1999:205). In other words, his theory explains why individuals RESPOND to changing market values and unconsciously instantiate the dispositions, or habitus, of Taiwan, but it does not explain how or why individuals can consciously conform to, resist, or moderate a set of dispositions. It does not explain why language practices and associated values appear to be changing, nor does it help us understand why different language practices appear to have developed over time across the fields of city and country. The answer suggested by these data is that language practices, at least in Taiwan, are not always unwittingly enacted, but can often be wittingly enacted, even in cross-generational talk between parents and young children. Moreover, this kind of witting talk is linked to ideological issues, so that parents today claim that it is wrong to see the next generation lose the ability to speak local languages. As Teacher Tan phrases it: "Taiwan people who can't speak Tai-gi, that is really very shameful."

Thus, we also need to consider the situation in Taiwan through the lens of its language ideologies. In doing so, we find evidence that a cluster of concepts is at play on this island, including perceptions of what is "true" or "good" for society, divergent perspectives within society, and individuals' articulations of beliefs that rationalize or justify language structure and use. Since the lifting of martial law and the harsher features of the MLP in 1987, the formerly simple and integrated ideology summarized in the form of a command to "learn the national language," first Japanese and then Mandarin, has been replaced by a more complex, conflicted ideology posed in the form of a question: "Should children learn both the national language and local languages? And if so, which local language?" What we see is a society struggling with its history, not sure if it should continue the policies of the past or try something new, and in this hearkening back to something not so new – a multilingual society.

NOTES

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[1] Mandarin Chinese words are represented in pinyin without tone marks. Tai-gi (see following note) words are represented in the romanized orthography, minus tone marks, of Taiwan's Presbyterian Church (see also X. Chen 1991), except for the rounded half-close back vowel [ɔ], which I mark as o* instead of o·.

[2] The issue of what to call the language (other than Mandarin) spoken by the majority of the people in Taiwan is controversial. Most people simply call this native language of Taiwan "Taiwanese." However, some argue that this implies that the other native languages of Taiwan – Hakka and the Aboriginal tongues – are somehow not "Taiwanese." I find this argument persuasive. Another term commonly used is "Hokkien." That solution has its merits, given that it is the term used by Chinese in many communities throughout Southeast Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines) who speak a language very similar to that spoken in Taiwan. However, one problem is that the "Hokkien" spoken in Taiwan – with its many Japanese loanwords – differs from the Hokkien of other places. Hence, this term glosses over regional differences. Another alternative is to call the language "Tai-yü" (Hsiau 1997), but the biggest drawback is that Tai-yü is a Mandarin term. Hence, the solution I offer is to call the language "Tai-gi," which is taken from the language itself and is an emic term that indexes Taiwan alone.

[3] I do not mean to imply that Tai-gi is a language infrequently used in Taiwan's society now or in the past. On the contrary, the language is widely spoken in homes, markets, and places of business. During elections, many candidates, including those of the KMT, deliver stump speeches in Tai-gi. But it is uncommon to hear mainland-born officials speak Tai-gi, and it is uncommon for officials, even those born in Taiwan, to deliver formal speeches, e.g., presidential addresses, national broadcasts, or inaugurations, in Tai-gi.

[4] While Mandarin, Tai-gi, and Hakka are called Chinese "dialects" by linguists because they share a common root – Proto-Chinese – they are not dialects in the sense that many Westerners think of dialects, i.e., versions of a language that though dissimilar are mutually intelligible. Instead, Mandarin, Tai-gi, and Hakka are all mutually unintelligible. Tai-gi and Hakka descend from a common southern Chinese ancestor and differ from Mandarin, a northern Chinese dialect, lexically, phonologically, tonally (e.g., Tai-gi has seven tones and Mandarin four), and grammatically (Norman 1988). In addition, Tai-gi and Hakka are mutually unintelligible. If we were to compare these "dialects" with European languages, we could say these are dialects just as Spanish and French are Latin dialects, or German and English are Germanic dialects.

[5] Excerpts are translated from the original languages into a colloquial style of American English, similar to the convention of Kulick 1992, but with pauses, fillers, false starts, and overlaps deleted.

[6] There are no studies of *waishengren*-accented Tai-gi. My observation is that speakers with this accent find it difficult to correctly speak the seven tones of Tai-gi and instead compress them into the simpler four-tone schema of Mandarin. This problem is compounded by the phenomenon of tone sandhi (see Hung 1990), which is more complex in Tai-gi than in Mandarin. That is, in Mandarin, phonemes with the high first tone, rising second tone, and falling fourth tone are stable and do not change when spoken before other tones. Only the low rising third tone changes, and it changes only when spoken before another low rising third tone. Tai-gi, however, is much more complex. For example, a high long first tone changes to a middle long seventh tone, a high falling second tone changes to a high long first tone, a low falling third tone changes to a high falling second tone, and so on. People who have not mastered this tonal system as young children and learn it in adulthood find it difficult to speak these tones in a smooth and natural-sounding manner. Hence, this is what "*waishengren* Tai-gi" sounds like.

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