CREEDS

CREEDS

Faith and works

Assignment

First read quickly through the Longer Hanbalite Creed (in Handout 1, pages 33-40). Mark any especially interesting items that you want to bring up in class - especially things that relate to our prior discussions.

Then study more carefully the statements about faith and works in the following sections of creeds:

• Longer Hanbalite Creed ("LH"), paragraphs #1, 3-5 [add 7]
• Testament of Abu Hanifa ("TAH"), paragraphs #1-5, 14, 25, 27 (in Handout 1 on pages 57-60)
• `Abd al-Jabbar's Kitab al-usul al-khamsa ("AJ") paragraphs #13-14, 45-57, 63-67 (in Handout 2)

As you read through these sections, start to fill in for yourself the Blank Table of Views from Creeds (handed out in class) with notes on what each author or group believes about each the following questions:

• What does faith consist of - actions? belief? speech? ...
• Can faith increase and/or decrease?
• Can one be certain about one's faith?
• If one comits a (grave) sin, is one still a believer? still a Muslim? an unbeliever? a non-Muslim? doomed to eternal hell? ...

Our task in class will be to figure out what the main views on these questions are, and why they matter. Let's also try to determine how each creed answers the question we were unable to answer from the Qur'an in last Tuesday's class: exactly which religious status is required for avoiding hell and getting into heaven--submission (2) , faith (3), true faith/struggle (4), or some other status?

Notes from class

Our chart became too complicated and mixed up to do us much good, because the creeds did not answer our questions in quite the same way that we had framed them; but in trying to fill out our chart we came to some pretty simple conclusions:

• Who gets into heaven? Muslims have come to a remarkable agreement on this:
  • The Qur'an, we found, was quite ambiguous on this point: we could not agree whether it required islam (submission in one's actions), iman (a faith attitude), or a higher degree of struggle (action motived by absolute commitment).
  • But those Muslims who came to be considered orthodox (including both Hanbalites and Murji'ites) agreed that what is required is only inner belief or attitude combined with verbal profession of that belief.
    • They defined faith differently - the Hanbalites said works are part of faith while the Murji'ites said works are something in addition to faith - but they agreed that salvation did not depend on achieving a certain level of works or on avoiding certain sins.
    • Both said the Prophet's intercession would keep all believers out of hell, or at least get them out eventually, regardless of their deeds or sins.
    • The only exception is that the Hanbalites said certain sins (such as drinking wine) that the Prophet (in a hadith) had said make one an unbeliever can land one in hell, so they did set a few behavioral limits on believers.
  • Some Muslims, including the Mu`tazilites and Kharijites, said that committing a grave sin puts one in hell forever (unless one repents, according to the Mu`tazilites). These groups eventually came to be regarded by most Muslims as heretics.
  • Following up on our "big question #6 - internal diversity": The Qur'an's ambiguity did allow for some diversity of interpretation about who reaches heaven, and Muslims originally interpreted it in different ways, but that diversity was reduced as only one view came to be regarded as orthodox.
• Who should be treated as part of the Muslim community on earth? Again, remarkable agreement:
  • Hanbalites, Murji'ites, and even the Mu`tazilites all agreed that anyone who professes faith should be treated as part of the Muslim community, regardless of what sins he or she may commit.
  • This implies political quietism: even unjust rulers should not be killed or deposed as long as they profess faith.
  • Only the Kharijites said grave sin makes one an unbeliever and puts one outside the community, so that one's life and property can be taken by Muslims. The Kharijites frequently fought against the Umayyad caliphs, but they largely died out and came to be regarded as radical heretics.
  • Those modern militant islamist Muslims who believe they can (and should) kill nominally Muslim rulers because they have sinned and aren't really believers are resurrecting the defunct minority Khariijite position.
  • The majority position is still that (at least in principle) one should never question the faith of another Muslim, or rebel against even an unjust Muslim ruler.
  • This question of defining the boundaries of the Muslim community is thus not just an archaic theological debate; it is quite relevant to contemporary practical concerns (our big question #5).
• So why did the Hanbalites and Murji'ites dislike each other so much, if they agreed on both those questions?
  • Their difference seems to have been almost purely terminological: they defined faith differently, but because the Hanbalites said only the lowest degree of faith was required for heaven, they admitted even lax Muslims into heaven, just like the Murji'ites, who required perfect faith but said it did not require works. The only practical difference was that Hanbalites said a few specific sins such as drinking wine could make one an unbeliever.
  • But we suspect their different definitions of faith did matter, if not for deciding who gets into heaven, then for another practical reason: the Hanbalite definition encouraged people to be constantly concerned about increasing their faith through pious action, whereas the Murji'ite definition allowed people to feel confident about their faith even if they were quite lax in their deeds, like the new converts on the fringes of the empire who did not even pray.
• On one important question all our creeds were in such complete agreement that they did not even need to state their position explicitly: they all assumed that Judaism and Christianity are compeletely distinct traditions (our big question #3) whose members refuse to believe (though they should know better) and are therefore destined for hell. This was less clear in the Qur'an, but by the time these creeds were written several hundred years later, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity had come to perceive each other as totally separate religions.

Predestination

Assignment

First read the Testament of Abu Hanifa (in Handout 1, pages 57-61). This is by followers of Abu Hanifa, and reflects Murji'ite views.

Then study more carefully the following sections of creeds:

• Longer Hanbalite Creed paragraphs #2 and 6 (in Handout 1, pp. 33-36)
• Testament of Abu Hanifa # 6, 7, 11-12, 15, 17 (in Handout 1)
• al-Ghazali's creed #8, 12-13 (in Handout 1, pp. 75-77)
• `Allama-i-Hilli's creed page 101 #2 (in Handout 1)
• `Abd al-Jabbar's Kitab al-usul al-khamsa, #12, 28-33, 62 (Handout 2)

As you read, make notes for yourself on your copy of the Blank Table of Views from Creeds, focusing on the following questions: 

• Who creates human actions?
• Do humans have the power to act freely?
• Does God will for evil to happen?
• Does God have to treat humans justly?
• Whose views seem most compatible with what we read in the Qur'an?
• Are you aware of any parallel views in other religious traditions?

Notes from class

First we had a quick reminder of who all these authors are:

• AJ: `Abd al-Jabbar, a Sunni Mu`tazilite theologian. Mu`tazilites were the ones who really got technical theology (kalam) going.
• AH: `Allama-i-Hilli, a Shiite Mu`tazilite theologian. Mu`tazilism eventually came to be regarded as heretical among Sunnis, but it survived among Shiites.
• Gh: Ghazali, an Ash`arite theologian. The Ash`arites responded to Mu`tazilism by using kalam-style arguments to defend Traditionalist views; they came to be regarded as orthodox by many Sunnis.
• LH: Written by a member of the Hanbalite school, a Traditionalist movement opposed to all kinds of kalam-style theological argument.
• TAH: Named after the early legal scholar Abu Hanifa, this creed was written by a follower of the Maturidite school of theology, which, like the Ash`arite school, was a response to Mu`tazilism, and came to be regarded as orthodox by many Sunnis. Its views on faith also basically agree with the Murji'ites,

We started with a basic division that, I suppose, comes from the way Christians usually talk about this problem: free will vs. predestination. We divided our creeds into two groups:

• the free will people: AJ and AH, who are both Mu`tazilites.
• the predestination people: Gh, LH, and TAH.

We didn't get into any finer distinctions between the creeds within each group, which is fine--things were complicated enough as it is--so we just articulated two sides of each issue.

But we did notice that for these authors, the issue isn't really free will vs. predestination. They're not just concerned about a person's destiny (heaven or hell); they're concerned with whether God predetermines everything that ever happens in the world. They aren't asking the question from the human perspective of "is my destiny sealed or am I free to choose it?" They are more concerned with these four issues:

• Is God's will effective?
  • The determinists want to insist that whatever God wills must happen, otherwise God would not be allpowerful.
  • The Mu`tazilites respond that whatever God "wills to do" must happen, but that if God "wills someone else to do something" and it doesn't happen that doesn't negate God's omnipotence.
  • In fact, it is obvious that there are plenty of people who don't do what God wants and commands them to do.
  • The determinists respond that "what God wants and commands people to do" is one thing, and it does not always happen; "what God wills people to do" is another thing, and it always happens.
  • So the two groups disagree over the meaning of "will."
    • The Mu`tazilites think will means want and desire, and they say that since God is just and loathes evil, he cannot will evil or disobedience.
    • The determinists say that will basically means "decree," so even though God loathes evil, and does not want or command it, he can nevertheless will it to happen.
  • Consequently, the determinists say everything that happens, including evil, is willed by God, while the Mu`tazilites say that only good is willed by God.
• Is there any creator other than God?
  • In Arabic, every verb (e.g. to pick up) has a corresponding noun of action (an act of picking up); so do something (to pick up a pen) is to create an action (to create an act of picking up a pen).
  • The determinists are horrified by the idea that a human being could create anything, because God is the only creator. LH says that if a human can create a sinful act such as adultery, then humans are creating the child born of adultery, which obviously only God can do.
  • The Mu`tazilites argue that people must create their own acts, because it would be evil for God to create an evil act.
• Does anyone other than God have power?
  • The Mu`tazilites would also say that if I don't create my act by my own power, then it isn't really my act, so I can't be rewarded or punished for it.
  • The determinists (at least Gh and TAH) respond that that an act is my act even if I don't create it, as long as it occurs by my power. So they admit that humans do their acts by their own power. But they only have the power to do that very act, not any other; and they only have that power because God creates it in them at the very moment that he creates their act. The act is theirs because it occurred by their power, even though they had no power to do otherwise. [This is the famous doctrine of kasb, "acquisition": humans do not create their acts, but they "acquire" them in the sense of having power over them and responsibility for them.]
  • The Mu`tazilites respond that God can only command me to do something if I already have the power to either do it or not do it, at the moment when I am commanded to do it, before I actually do it. Having in advance he power to do or not to do it is what gives me the choice.
• Is God just?
  • The main motivation at the root of all the Mu`tazilite arguments is the premise that God must be just, so he cannot do evil, will evil, or punish people for doing things he willed them to do.
  • The determinists respond that God is above justice; the idea of God committing injustice is simply meaningless; whatever he does is just by definition, so if he creates people's evil actions and then punishes them for that evil, this is justice on his part.

We also came up with one other issue that these authors did not address, but which seems relevant for understanding the history and contemporary situation of Muslims:

• Is this whole debate really a debate between activism and fatalism?
  • The doctrine of predetermination seems to make personal effort and risk and social struggle pointless.
  • Some have argued that the doctrine of predetermination has made Muslims fatalists, and that this explains why they have been subject to so many dictators, rather than rebelling against them.
  • Others have argued that this is why Muslim countries have not developed into strong capitalist economies.
  • One could even argue that Islamic civilization ceased being a world leader precisely when the free-will Mu`tazilites lost their influence and predeterminist Ash`arites and Traditionalists became dominant.
  • Of course, this is all a gross misrepresentation: there have been many Muslim revolts against unjust rulers, there are plenty of Muslim entrepreneurs, and there are many reasons why Islamic civilization ceased to be the world leader it once was.
  • Besides, most Muslims today - especially in the West - actually believe in free will; some don't realize how heretical their belief would seem to "orthodox" classical Sunni theologians.
  • Still, we shouldn't entirely dismiss this idea just because it's a stereotype. Even some Muslims have thought there was more than a grain of truth in the idea that belief in determinism has been harmful to Muslim societies.

God's attributes

Assignment

First read the creed of al-Ghazali (a very famous Ash`arite) (in Handout 1, pages 73-79).

Then study more carefully the following sections of creeds: 

• Longer Hanbalite Creed paragraphs #9-10 (in Handout 1)
• Testament of Abu Hanifa #8-9, 24 (in Handout 1)
• al-Ghazali's creed #1-14 (in Handout 1)
  
• `Allama-i-Hilli's creed, pp. 99-100 (in Handout 1)
• `Abd al-Jabbar's Kitab al-usul al-khamsa, #11, 18-27, 44 (in Handout 2)

As you read, make notes for yourself on your copy of the Blank Table of Views from Creeds, especially focusing on the following questions:

• How does each author say we should we interpret Qur'anic statements that describe God in anthropomorphic (human-like) terms?
• Which authors think God can be described meaningfully and accurately using human language?
• To use the ideas we came up with while reading the Qur'an, ask this question: where would you place each creed on the continuum between the following two positions?
  • A) God can be understood in terms of human categories such as justice. When the Qur'an says "vision cannot encompass him," it just means God is not a visible body.
  • B) God is not limited by human concepts, and his actions cannot be explained in terms of human concepts like justice. When the Qur'an says "vision cannot encompass him," it means our minds can't grasp him, and we should not ask "why?"
• Alternatively, where would you place each creed on the continuum between the following two positions, which we came up with the first week of class?
  • A) God is connected to the universe, and humans can know him and relate to him directly through their own intellect and experiences.
  • B) God is transcendent and humans can only know him and relate to him through intermediaries like imams and texts.

Notes from class

Starting with our basic dichotomy betweeen A) God is comprehensible in human categories and B) God is above human categories and understanding, we quickly found that our creeds do not fall neatly into these two categories; each creed days some things that sound like A and some that sound like B. So we split our A/B dichotomy into three subquestions, with each creed giving its own answer to each subquestion:

• 1) Is God physical and spatial?
  • LH seems to say YES: God resembles humans who are created in his image; he is literally on a Throne above and not below the heavens; he is in some sense limitless, but that does not mean he is everywhere; he is not near humans unless he literally comes down toward earth; he can put his foot in hell.
  • Gh and AH [and AJ] say NO: God is not a body, has no location, and cannot be seen in a physical sense or met in a "directional" sense.
• 2) Is God comprehensible in terms of human words and concepts?
  • LH says YES: God is described positively using very human and even physical language.
  • AH and AJ also say YES, but they think only abstract concepts like power and justice apply to God, not physical language.
  • Gh and TAH say NO: When we say God is on the Throne or that we will meet him in paradise, we say this without saying how this is so; we do not know what those statements mean. God can be described using positive terms such as "powerful" and "king," but many of his attributes are explained only negatively: he is not a body, his sight is not like human sight, etc.
• 3) Can humans experience or know God directly?
  • Here the sides are reversed!
  • TAH and Gh say things like this: God is understood through revelation; God's speech is part of his essence yet is still known and recited by people; people will see him and meet him somehow in paradise. We suspect that TAH and Gh may be thinking of a kind of direct mystical experience of God, since they agree that the words of revelation to not really capture who God is.
  • LH, on the other hand, presents God as so far above humans that even though they are like him in many ways they are just too small to grasp how limitless he is. Human language does describe what God is like, but it does not describe him as big enough because humans are too limited to imagine that.
  • I think AH and AJ would side with LH on this: people can have a conceptual understanding of God, but they cannot see him in paradise, and when they hear his speech they are just hearing part of creation, not an aspect of God himself.
  • We noted that God's speech is a key bridge by which humans have contact with God, just as Jesus is the eternal Word who becomes incarnate and connects humans to God in Christian thought. Muslims picture that bridge differently: the Ash`arites (including Gh) and Maturidites (including TAH) think God's speech is one of his eternal attributes that humans hear expressed through the words of the Qur'an, whereas the Mu`tazilites (including AH and AJ) think God's speech is just a string of Qur'anic words that God created in time and space

We closed by noting that many Muslims today - including some who know the history of Islamic thought quite well - insist that the differences of opinion we are studying are insignificant terminological disagreements, or unnecessary complications of the simple unified message the Prophet Muhammad taught. Here we are trying to understand all the differences between them so that we can understand Muslims better, but many of the Muslims we want to understand think all these differences don't matter! Is it pointless for us to work so hard on understanding all these different Muslim creeds?

Epistemology

Assignment

Read the creed of `Allama-i-Hilli (a Shi`ite and a Mu`tazilite) (in Handout 1, pages 98-105).

Then study more carefully the following sections of creeds:

• Longer Hanbalite Creed #16-17.
• Testament of Abu Hanifa #16.
• al-Ghazali's creed #1, 5, 14, 16, 25b.
• `Allama-i-Hilli's creed - review p. 98, and p. 101 #1.
• `Abd al-Jabbar's Kitab al-usul al-khamsa, #1-9, 16-28, 43-44, 61 (in Handout 2).

As you read, make notes for yourself on your copy of the Blank Table of Views from Creeds, especially focusing on each creed's answer to the following questions about epistemology (the theory of how we know things):

• Can God's attributes be known by reason alone?
• Can actions (including God's actions) be evaluated as good or bad by reason alone?
• Can revelation alone give us knowledge of God?
• How does one know revelation is true?
• To return to our A/B dichotomy, where would you place each creed on the continuum between the following two positions?
  • A) Humans can know God directly through their own intellect and experiences, using their own categories of understanding.
  • B) God is so transcendent that humans can know him only through revelation, and even then they do not really comprehend his nature.

Notes from class

We were able to pin down pretty clearly most of our creeds' positions on these four epistemological questions:

The big divide in this table is between the views in green and those in red:

• "We put God in a box." This view is shared by the Mu`tazilites AH and AJ.
  • Reason tells us that God exists and that we must obey him.
  • The only way we can learn who God is and how to obey him is to start from reason itself.
  • Once we have established by reason what good and evil are, and that God can only do good (because he knows what is evil and can't possibly need to do it), then and only then can we be sure that when God performs miracles to validate his prophets, they really must be prophets, and what they say must be true.
  • Only then we can rely on revelation to teach us more about God.
  • But we must always interpret revelation so that it accords with reason, because if reason isn't reliable then revelation isn't either.
  • So in order to know anything about God, through either reason or revelation, we have to first put God in a rationally constructed box.
• "God puts us in a box." We think this view is shared by the Qur'an and by the Ash`arite Gh, who spells it out more clearly.
  • In principle, anyone should be able to figure out by reason that God exists and that we must obey him.
  • In fact, however, only those people whose eyes and hearts God chooses to open actually realize this.
  • God then reveals his attributes and his requirements to them by giving them revelation and enabling them to understand it.
  • They are obligated to believe what God says about himself at face value, and to regard everything he does and commands as good, not because reason tells them his revelation is true and his commands are good, but simply because he says so.
  • So God has put humans in a box: he decides, in his own inscrutable way, what each person will know, believe, and do; and their duty is just to accept that, and submit their beliefs and their actions to his decree. Knowing God, and doing theology, are just a matter of accepting what God does and says.

Understanding these contrasting attitudes should help to explain a lot of what we find in our next set of readings.

We are now done reading creeds. We have two observations about them:

• Like the Qur'an, the creeds say much about God, but in the end are mainly about humans: they are tools for defining the boundaries of who is and who is not a believer, or at least who should be treated as a Muslim.
• All together they present just as wide an array of theological views as the Qur'an did, but each one individually presents a more coherent and simpler interpretation. Each one interprets all the Qur'an's ambiguous and even conflicting statements so that they fit into a single coherent way of thinking about God and humans.