Read Farid Esack, Qur'an, Liberation & Pluralism, Introduction (pp. 1-18) and Chapter 2 (pp. 49-81). Here he sets up the rationale for his whole theology. Things to think about:
Farid Esack (FE) argues that theology (i.e. Qur'anic interpretation) should be "responsive," because:
The Qur'an itself was "responsive."
Interpretation is inevitably shaped by the situation and agenda of the theologian.
Do our studies so far suggest that theology is always responsive to the situation of the theologian, rather than a neutral working out of the implications of reason or revelation?
How will FE's own situation and agenda make his theology different from others we have studied?
Does the situation-relative, responsive nature of theology imply that all theologies / interpretations are equal, or are some theologies / interpretations better than others?
Notes from class
FE is pluralistic in three different senses:
Interreligious pluralism: his experiences with some Jews and Christians led him to believe that, contrary to what he was taught, they are not damned to hell.
Intrareligious pluralism: there are multiple possible Islamic theologies, and interpretations of the Qur'an, because they are (and should be) shaped by Muslims' experiences.
Interreligious influence: one's own theology and even one's religious identity should be changed by one's contact with people of other religions. Religious "others" should not just teach us to articulate our own views more clearly; they should actually change who we are and what we believe.
FE's own identity shifted from being a Muslim to being a social justice activist (alongside other non-Muslim activists); but rather than give up his Muslim identity, he seems to have redefined Islam as a struggle for social justice, so that now all those who are struggling for social justice are in the truest sense Muslims--even if they are Christians--while those Muslims who accomodate the oppressive status quo are not true Muslims.
Has FE just redefined Islam (and God) in his own image, to fit his own experiences--rather the way `Abd al-Jabbar did? This would seem to miss the point of Islam--of submission to an absolute God. We think FE would answer that question like this:
God is absolute and independent of human understanding.
God also reveals himself to humans in the Qur'an (FE is agnostic about the Hadith).
But the only way God can involve himself in the world, and reveal himself to humans, is through the medium of human language, experience, presuppositions, and mental constructs.
Consequently, human understanding of God is always shaped by humans' particular experiences and presuppositions.
Consequently, humans understand God in different ways.
This is unavoidable and quite legitimate; God intends for humans to understand him through the lens of their own experiences.
This means that all theology is tentative, never final or absolute truth.
This does not mean, however, that all understanding of God (all theologies, all interpretations of the Qur'an) are equally valid.
FE takes his own experience, and his own commitment to social justice, as the criterion by which to compare and evaluate different theologies. Theologies that liberate people are better, and thus truer to who God really is, than theologies that support the oppressive status quo.
FE ends up being a lot like SQ: both want their theology to be practical, both want it to liberate people from oppression, and both believe their theology is better and truer to the Qur'an than other theologies. But SQ views his theology as the only possible interpretation of the Qur'an, whereas FE views his as just one possible interpretation, born of particular experiences. But FE still thinks his theology is in some sense truer and better than others, so is he too, like SQ, just claiming divine authority for his own views? Next class let's evaluate whether his "hermeneutical keys" for interpreting the Qur'an seem genuinely Qur'anic, or like his own ideas imposed on the Qur'an.
Does FE convincingly show that his six hermeneutical keys (taqwa, tawhid, the people, the oppressed, justice, and jihad) are objective Qur'anic principles that should govern all interpretation of the Qur'an? Or does he just select them as hermeneutical keys because they suit his agenda?
Note that theology, for FE, is primarily interpretation of the Qur'an. SQ likewise wanted his thought to be based on the Qur'an. Were our previous authors also trying to interpret and systematize the Qur'an's message, or are SQ and FE somehow more Qur'anic than the creeds, AJ, J, IS, or Gh? Are they genuinely Qur'anic, or are they just appealing to the Qur'an to bolster their own ideas?
Many of our previous theologians have discussed tawhid and justice, and at least SQ discussed jihad. How is FE's interpretation of tawhid different from views of tawhid we've seen before? How are his concepts of justice and/or jihad different?
Notes from class
We focused on four aspects of this chapter:
FE reinterprets tawhid in a very ideological way.
Our previous theologians have interpreted tawhid (God's oneness) in many different ways.
FE takes it to mean that just as God's nature is one, humanity should be one, i.e. not racially divided.
This clearly results from his experience of struggle against apartheid.
He says that indeed social issues and struggle should be integrated with theology, because another meaning of tawhid is that theology should be holistic: abstract theory should not be separated from social reality.
FE's argues that the Qur'an should be read with a bias in favor of the oppressed.
The prophets all sided with the oppressed, and the Qur'an itself invites us to read it with a bias in favor of the oppressed.
This means that objectivity is not the goal; in fact it is a sin! We cannot be guided by the Qur'an unless we read it in a biased way!
We pondered whether the academic study of religion, and college education in general, might not be sinful according to FE because they are too detached and neutral. I found it reassuring to think that this class, at least, is designed to address two social issues: the specific problem of fear of Muslims, and the more general and fundamental issue of the quality of human interaction and listening.
So is FE's hermeneutic Qur'anic or ideological?
He clearly says theology and interpretation are and must be ideological, that is, based in and biased toward the struggle to liberate the oppressed.
Yet he also wants his theology and interpretations to be Qur'anic. He doesn't want to be just following his own whims!
His solution to this dilemma is to say that interpretation is never final, but is a dialectical process of back and forth between the experience of struggle and reading the Qur'an.
Okay, so we never know whether our theology is true, but how do we know our dialectical process is going in the right direction?
Taqwa is the key that FE believes can keep interpretation from being entirely ideological.
Taqwa (God-consciousness) means being true to oneself and to God at the same time.
We questioned whether a sense of being committed to listening to the Qur'an can really keep one's interpretations of it from being self-serving.
Perhaps the experience of having one's interpretations result in suffering--because they disrupt our prior comfortable beliefs, or because they literally result in our being imprisoned or poor or persecuted--is an indication that our interpretations are not entirely self-serving.
Compare Esack's conception of faith (iman) with the definitions of faith we found in the creeds, and with Sayyid Qutb's view of faith as mainly action. Whose definition does Esack's most resemble?
Is Esack's definition motivated by the same concerns that motivated the authors of the creed(s), or SQ?
What role does Esack give to belief (doctrine) in his definition of faith, and why?
Notes from class
I think we traced pretty well the logic of what FE is doing in this chapter:
He begins with his experience of solidarity with non-Muslims and his premise of religious pluralism.
This premise requires him to say that iman (faith) and islam are not community labels.
So he defines faith as personal.
He is the first of our theologians to do this; the others saw faith as defining the Muslim community.
This view of faith makes sense for him because since the Enlightenment, and particularly since the existentialist and postmodern movements in the 20th century, religion, theology, and therefore faith are understood to be personally constructed and defined, rather than absolutes given by one's community or other authorities like revelation.
That's probably one big reason why FE resonates with many of us.
If we view this as the true and proper nature of religion, then there is nothing objectionable about FE and others creating their theologies and even their views of God to fit their own experiences and agendas.
He also defines faith as essentially active.
He does not seem to finally decide whether actions are an integral part of faith or merely correlate with faith, but he thinks the former is at least very defensible, and he says the effect is the same: faith is inextricably bound to action.
By action, of course, he means above all the struggle for social justice.
This focus on action, ethics, and social justice resonates with contemporary American values.
By defining faith this way, he is rejecting the Murji'ites, who achieved a very inclusive definition of the community by saying belief and verbal profession were enough.
In this FE is like SQ, who said faith is all about action; the difference is that SQ saw faith as communal rather than personal.
Like the Kharijites, FE seems to think that certain actions (oppression, and silence in the face of oppression) can actually make a person an unbeliever. Oppression seems to be his equivalent of a "grave sin."
He calls faith a response
rather than a set of beliefs.
He says doctrines matter, but only a little bit. (Let's see whether this will help him to get around the problem of Christians' belief in the divinity of Christ.)
His "response to God" seems to involve an attitude of trust.
This response is variable--faith can increase and decrease.
LH and AJ made faith variable so that they could include actions in faith without automatically making sinners unbelievers.
FE's goal, however, is not to avoid calling anyone an unbeliever; he seems to want to be able to call oppressors unbelievers.
Instead FE's reason for calling faith variable seems to be that this makes it an active and personal trait, that varies from person to person and from time to time; this is what allows him to argue that some non-Muslims can be believers.
This definition of faith comes back around to support FE's starting point: pluralism.
The whole purpose of this chapter--of choosing to side with certain interpretations of faith, islam, and unbelief--is to enable FE to redefine the boundaries of the believing community, and to redefine Islam itself, so that it includes some non-Muslims and excludes those Muslims who oppress or even remain silent in the face of oppression
This pluralistic goal likewise resonates with many of us.
How does FE deal with Qur'anic verses that seem to condemn people FE wants to embrace?
What is FE's metatheology, i.e. his theological perspective on different theologies or religions?
Could FE's metatheology serve as a basis for dialogue, or conversation, or at least argument between members of different religions?
What have we learned about our question, posed at the beginning of the term, about whether Islam is a distinct religious tradition or part of a shared tradition? How would FE want us to answer that question?
I suggest you also skim through the remainder of the book, especially the last page of chapter 6, and the conclusion.
Notes from class
We wrapped up our study of FE by identifying which Jews and Christians he thinks the Qur'an affirms and Muslims can cooperate with, and which Jews and Christians (and even Muslims) the Qur'an condemns and should be opposed by true Muslims.
We had noticed that the Qur'an said conflicting things about Jews and Christians.
Earlier in the term we came up with four ways of reconciling those conflicts in the Qur'an:
The abrogation theory: exclusivist passages supercede earlier inclusivist passages. (FE rejects this explanation.)
The "earlier era" theory: the Qur'an affirms prior Jews and Christians but requires present ones to become Muslims. (FE rejects this explanation.)
The "cooptation" theory: the Qur'an says nice things about Jews and Christians to gain their favor, but then requires them to convert. (FE does not address this rather cynical explanation.)
The "imagined religions" theory: the Prophet did not seen any conflict between affirming Judaism and Christianity and saying Jews and Christians must become Muslims, because he assumed that these religions were essentially identical.
FE's own way of reconciling these conflicts is somewhat different. He interprets each Qur'anic verse about Jews and Christians as affirming or condemning a specific group of people with specific traits in a specific context, so those affirmations and condemnations do not automatically apply to all Jews and Christians.
FE goes on to identify two traits that the Qur'an really is condemning when it condemns Jews and Christians:
1) Their exclusivism.
2) Their oppression of the weak.
Note FE does NOT think the Qur'an is condemning their docrines, or at least is not principally concerned with their doctrines.
FE things the Qur'an affirms Muslims, Christians, and Jews who share two key traits:
1) Inclusivism.
2) An active response of submitting to God, which includes struggling against oppression.
FE's metatheology, therefore, a modified "spoke and wheel" model: religions are equal alternative paths to God, but only if they are inclusive and side with the oppressed; all other religions are detours that lead one away from God.
The goal of religion and theology, then, is God, or social justice--and FE seems to almost identify them.
Does FE's metatheology allow him to have good conversations and relationships with non-Muslims?
He can certainly agree and cooperate with those non-Muslims who share his inclusivism and struggle for social justice.
But his inclusivism seems a bit hypocritical in that it really excludes lots of religious people--all those who think their own religion is the only way, and all those who do not get involved in the political struggle against oppression.
With such people, the only kind of relationship or conversation he could have is one in which he tries to convert them to his version of Islam; otherwise he can only ignore them or struggle against them.
This makes it a bit difficult for someone who doesn't agree with his view of what religion is all about to converse with him; but even a simple, exclusivistic, and rather non-political religious person like me can see that this makes perfect sense from FE's perspective: he doesn't want to cooperate with me; he would only want to change me or oppose me.
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