Can the US control Syria?

Moshe Maoz, perhaps Israel's top Syrian affairs expert, said the Khalil killing in Damascus may have been "done deliberately" by Sharon "to undermine" mounting pressure by Israel's military establishment to restart peace negotiations with Syria. Ofer Shelah, writing in the Forward, explains:

the assassination comes amid a flurry of contradictory signals. Syria has indicated repeatedly in the past year that it is ready to renew peace talks with Israel, which collapsed in February 2000. Israel refuses, accusing Syria of harboring and sponsoring Palestinian terrorism. Israel heated up its rhetoric last month, after the deadly August 31 double bus bombing in Beersheva, which Jerusalem blames on Syria. At the same time, the Khalil assassination punctuates an escalating war of words within Israel's political and security leadership over how to respond to the Syrian peace feelers. On one side is the top army command, much of which favors sitting down with Damascus and has been unusually open about saying so. On the other side are Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his top political allies, who call the Syrian offers a ploy to win favor with Washington. In a reflection of the intensity of the debate, some figures close to the defense establishment were hinting this week that the Khalil assassination might have been carried out by the Mossad secret service, which answers directly to the prime minister, as a way to sabotage the Syrian peace opening.

Syria, for its part, has declined to take the bait, pointedly refraining from criticizing Israel directly for its presumed role in the assassination. Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk A-Shara appeared before the United Nations General Assembly and attacked Israel for a host of sins, but killing a Hamas leader in Damascus was not among them.

Now all eyes are on Kofi Annan's UN report evaluating Syria's compliance with resolution 1559 passed last month. Powell has stated: "I hope it's a tough report," demanding respect for Lebanese sovereignty that says Damascus must do more to meet the world body's demands. Powell said Washington did not think Damascus had done enough to meet the requirements of the resolution which calls for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. "I'll wait for the secretary general's report before characterizing what score the Syrians get on their compliance with the resolution." Michael Young in the Daily Star is not holding his breath for a tough report. "We'll be looking out for the Annan report tomorrow. The only definite thing one can say about it is that, unless it clearly recognizes, identifies and warns against the many ruses now being deployed by the Syrian and Lebanese authorities to undercut Resolution 1559, then it will be terribly deficient," he writes. All the same, he suspects that the UN officials responsible for drafting the report are too sympathetic to Syria's problems and may listen to Prime Minister Hariri, who has been lobbying them not to give the US too much latitude to stick their boot into the affairs of the new government he must construct. He is now in Paris to trying to get Jacques Chirac to "alleviate negative French input into the report," Young surmises. A recent al-Nahar article suggests that the Security Council is bent on forming a 4-nation committee to monitor a total withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon, the disarmament of Hizbullah, and any other armed militia operating on Lebanese territory, Lebanon's Vice Premier Issam Fares has warned. "The Security Council effectively wants to hold a sword permanently hanging over the necks of Lebanon and Syria by forming this committee," Fares told President Lahoud and Premier Hariri upon returning from the U.N. in New York, the Beirut media reported on Friday. The Security Council is determined to "place Lebanon under permanent international surveillance even before Secretary-General Kofi Annan submits his report Friday on Lebanon and Syria's disobedience to resolution 1559." As-Safir said the monitoring committee, which the Security Council is bent on setting up, will be made up of the United States, France, Lebanon and Syria. Fares says the Council is inclined to ask Syria by name to withdraw its entire army troops from Lebanon without delay, overruling the two countries' linkage of the withdrawal to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Will Hariri's new government include Hizbullah? That is the subject of Celina Nasser's Daily Star article. Hizbullah MP Mohammed Raad, who heads Hizbullah's 12-member Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc, senior party officials believe that taking part in the next government will reinforce the legitimacy of the resistance even more. All the same, Raad said, "We don't want to lose our credibility," by joining a government that is ineffective. "We are still in the evaluation process."

Raad said his party - along with Lebanon and Syria - is willing to fully implement resolution 1559, but only after Israel complies with all UN resolutions calling for it to pull out from occupied Arab land. "UN Resolution 1559 could have been dispensable if Israel had implemented previous resolutions adopted a long time ago," he said. Raad was referring to resolutions such as 446 of March 1979, 465 of March 1980, 471 of June 1980, 497 of December 1981 and others that called on the Jewish state to end its occupation of Arab territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights.

Despite growing international pressure on Syria to stop supporting Hizbullah, which is on Washington's list of terrorist organizations, the Hizbullah official did not seem to be worried about his party's relations with Damascus.

"The resistance seeks to liberate (land), and it constitutes a pressure card on Israel, and is a factor that keeps vital the issue of the occupied Golan Heights. ... There is a common interest between Lebanon and Syria to keep the resistance as is."

Asked if Hizbullah was considering retaliation following the assassination of Hamas activist Izzedine Sheikh Khalil, which took place in Syria, Raad said: "Our duty is to condemn these Israeli actions and declare our solidarity with Syria and the Palestinian intifada."

Unlike repeated rhetoric in support of the Palestinian resistance in the Occupied Territories, Hizbullah remained silent throughout the clashes between followers of Iraqi Shiite leader Moqtada Sadr and U.S.-led troops in the Iraqi holy city of Najaf that ended in a peace deal last month. Raad said Hizbullah "rejects American occupation in principle, but we do not interfere in the details of the Iraqi performance when dealing with this occupation."

Just as important to Syrian-US relations as 1559 are the negotiations about border security with Iraq, where things are going better. On US Embassy official stated that negotiations were "constructive and positive." In Washington, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher urged Damascus to implement these actions, adding that the United States "will measure the Syrian commitment to the stability of Iraq by the concrete steps that it takes." However, American officials have not set the specifics of the Syrian border security commitments. But Boucher said there are "fairly concrete understandings, particularly between the Iraqi government and the Syrian government, on things like communications activities, how they can deploy forces, how they can move together to cut off the border traffic."

National Public Radio's Steven Kenyon is doing a series of reports on the Iraqi-Syrian border that explain why it remains a "Byway for Insurgents Entering Iraq" All Things Considered audio. Although salaries for Iraqi border guards have been raised to $300 from the $20 a month they used to be, corruption is still rife and old habits die hard. One Syrian truck driver explained that he still has to tip everyone as he goes through and he has no clue who they are.

Moral amongst the Iraqis is terrible. In this mornings report, Kenyon interviewed a number of Iraqi border guards at a new "fort" the Americans had established. The only thing the soldiers wanted to talk about was how they were all wearing plastic slippers because the boots they had been promised failed to be issued. They had no showers, no proper weapons and complained that their pay was well below that of police in Baghdad. "Why would we work hard for nothing?" one officer asked? So much for the new national spirit being instilled in the new army. Obviously, the US is more interested in complaining about Syrian non-compliance than doing anything about it.

For Syria, it will be imperative to get high level American military officers on the ground in Syria. Damascus will have failed to take advantage of the new military mission if they allow the US to staff the new agreed boarder liaison with Iraqis and international staff. The only assurance that it will be effective from a political point of view is if top American brass are directly responsible for it. Then if Israel bombs Syria or Washington alienates Syrians, they will feel the drop in moral at the border and hostility from their Syrian counterparts. Only American officers will have the clout to shape Pentagon policy.

I have been to Iraq's border with Syria a number of times and seen how easy it is to cross. Once I went with a Syrian-Kurdish friend who fought with Barzani forces for 3 years in Iraq during the 1980s. He explained to me how he had crossed back and forth easily, either by taking a boat across the Tigris - every night people cross the river - or by going through the desert, where there is no fence or surveillance of any kind. Syria had never tried to control the border. It depended on the secret police to intimidate those it suspected of illegal activities. My friend was ultimately arrested by the mukhabarat for six months. It was not an experience he will forget.

Syria and the Baath in the Squeeze

Bashar al-Asad's head must be spinning. Just when he thought he had smoothed the waters after imposing the Lahoud extension on Lebanon and provoking France and the US to gang up on him in the UN, he is discovering that a tsunami is headed his way. The US is not offering any carrots. Quite the contrary. This morning, he is looking at a forest of cudgels held at the ready. Bashar may have thought that Under Secretary of State Burns' visit and Powell's soothing remarks about the "positive" role Syria is playing meant he had successfully negotiated the rapids of his Lebanon gambit, but everything has changed since the Israeli assassination of the Hamas official in Damascus on Sunday - an attack which everyone believes had a US green light. Some even speculated that with the neocons embarrassed by their Iraq miscalculations and President Bush distracted by his election campaign, Powell would be back at the helm of the US foreign policy ship. This was assumed to mean that Syria could look forward to at least a few months of "positive engagement" from the US. This does not seem to be the case. Syria is so weak and Washington emboldened by French support, that it is pressing its advantage wherever it can. With Iraq and Libya pacified, at least temporarily, Syria is the low hanging fruit ripe for the plucking many believe. al-Hayat claims (09/26/04) to have gotten hold of a Pentagon report on American-Israeli planning for Lebanon and Syria. It says that Israel has identified 64 military and civilian sites to bomb in Syria. 40 Palestinians are identified for assassination outside of the territories. Hamas was compared to the Mahdi Army of Muqtadda al-Sadr. Its headquarters and bases needed to be destroyed. The report argues that Hizballah has been active in Iraq, where it works hand in glove with the Iranians. For this reason, the report concludes that it is imperative to destroy the effectiveness of Hizballah in order to deny it influence in Iraq. 1559 may be the instrument for this increased pressure and possible action. If Kofi Annan prepares a condemning report October 1 and the US continues to win France over to its side, it may have the diplomatic cover to take action in Lebanon. It is not clear, how significant this pentagon report is or whether it is just one possible proposal. Christian Henderson writing in al-Jazeera in an article entitled, "Syria in Washington's, crosshairs" Quotes both Murhaf Jouejati of the Middle East Institute in Washington and Rim Allaf, associate fellow at the Royal Institute for International Affairs in London, to say that: "The Syrians have bent over backwards and the Americans still don't pay attention." Both Jouejati and Allaf poured cold water on Israeli and US claims that Hamas and Islamic Jihad's wings in Syria direct operations inside the Palestinian territories. They don't believe that its the way Hamas works and they think the US and Israel know this. Their interest is to use Syria's protection of the groups as an excuse to slam Syria. "Israel is trying to embarrass Syria by portraying Damascus as a safe haven for terrorists at a time when Syria appears to be inclined to meet US demands on several issues including support for Palestinian groups," one Arab diplomate concluded. Michael Young of the Daily Star claimed that, "There is a feeling in Israel and in some places in Washington that Syria is so weak that it is possible to narrow Damascus' margin of maneuver with little chance of backlash." In conclusion Allaf said the Syrians had miscalculated the international reaction to its support for an extension for a renewed term for Lahud. "I think they are a bit surprised that Europe and the US are coming towards one line," she said. Allaf suggested that despite its concessions, Syria's support for Hizb Allah was risky given the realities of the post-September 11 world. "Three years later the Syrians don't understand. It's not the same game any more. Israel left Lebanon and Hizb Allah is still active," she said. "The Syrians have a lot of just causes but they are getting lost." Hamas is accusing Jordan of assisting Israeli intelligence in the Khalil assassination. "This is the work of the Jordanian mukhabart [intelligence]," a Hamas official told Palestinian reporters. "We have been warned in the past that Jordan was stepping up its security coordination with Israel not only against Hamas, but also against other Palestinian groups. Hamas will find a way to punish the traitors." Another Hamas official claimed that initial investigations have indicated that the Mossad agents who allegedly carried out the assassination entered Syria from Iraq. "The Mossad is very active these days in Iraq and has many agents working there," he said. "They had no difficulty smuggling the explosives from Iraq." Kim Ghattas of the BBC in Damascus writes an interesting article - Syria feels pressure to reform - recording the opinions of Damascenes about the government's on-going problems, which gives a good sense of the mood on the ground. She describes a popular play, "The Night Baghdad Fell," that has been showing in Damascus for almost a year. "Syrian state television is ridiculed on stage for the way it dealt with the war in Iraq. While statues were being brought down in Baghdad, Syrian TV was showing cultural documentaries. Humam el-Hout, the playwright, says that without rocking the boat too much, he is trying to send a message to Arab leaders: that they need to wake up and heed the fate of Saddam Hussein's regime. He says Syria might be the next target, and leaders of the country need to gain the support of their people to confront the threat." I am copying a Washington Post article by Scott Wilson in its entirety because it is important and reflects a rare glimps into the inner debate amongst leading Baathists about the future role of the party. Syria's Baathists Under Siege: Party Reformists Seek to Reduced Size, Influence As editor of the Baath Party newspaper, Mehdi Dakhlallah has risen to a position of rare power within the institution that has dominated most elements of public life here for more than four decades. Now the balding, rotund intellectual is trying to tear his party apart. In sober editorials, Dakhlallah has argued that the party is too big, too meddlesome and too removed from its founding principles of social justice, socialist economics and Arab nationalism. The young people who are joining today, he laments, are drawn only by the promise of preferential treatment in university admissions and lucrative jobs in Syria's largely state-controlled economy. He wants the party to return to its ideological roots by becoming smaller, more democratic and, most controversial to his colleagues, less influential in government. "The Baath Party is not going to change the world," said Dakhlallah, 57, who joined amid the revolutionary fervor of the late 1960s. "Right now we're fighting to separate the party from government. This is an essential step in changing and developing this country." A year and a half after Iraq's Baath Party vanished with the U.S. invasion, Syria's branch is under siege from within its own ranks. Dakhlallah is among a vanguard of intellectuals trying to reduce the party's influence with the blessing of President Bashar Assad, who during four years in power has grown frustrated with the opposition many of its members are putting up to his plans for economic reform. Since the revolution that brought it to power 41 years ago, the nearly 2 million-member party has grown into a parallel government, monitoring education, political and economic policy through a network of committees from the national to the village level. Assad is slowly dismantling the system of privileges the party has accumulated, allowing him to set the pace and extent of change at a time when Syria is in the cross hairs of the Bush administration's push to bring democratic reforms to the Middle East. Assad, the party's titular head, has selected more than a quarter of his cabinet from outside party ranks since inheriting the presidency on the death of his father, Hafez Assad, four years ago. He is purging the Baath-dominated military of senior officers by enforcing for the first time regulations on mandatory retirement age, and he may push to remove the article of the Syrian constitution that guarantees his party "the leading role in society and in the state." At the same time, fewer young people are joining the party. But as Assad, an ophthalmologist by training, works to remove the party as an obstacle to reform, he is also trying not to upset the political base that sustained his father for three decades. He is facing strong resistance from a group of septuagenarian holdovers from his father's administration and from provincial party leaders accustomed to influencing everything from teacher promotions to the price of vegetables in the market. Those pushing hardest for reform within the party are primarily political ideologues, such as Dakhlallah, who do not hold posts with influence over state industry or the powerful intelligence services, where most of the opposition to change is coming from. A smaller party might be more amenable to Assad's economic reforms, and a new set of leaders could emerge from among those pushing hardest for change. "Assad encouraged introspection within the party, and it is having a big conversation with itself that is not yet resolved," said Peter Ford, the British ambassador here. "But as of now you still can't ignore the party. You must work with it." Hani Murtada, a soft-spoken pediatrician, is fighting the party from the outside at the president's direction. A year ago, Assad appointed Murtada minister of higher education, making him one of seven members of his 25-person cabinet who is not a party member. Murtada was given control of a system comprising four public universities and 225,000 students but with a shortage of qualified teachers, classrooms and curricula. Since then, he has licensed Syria's first private universities, created e-learning programs in a country that still blocks certain Web sites, and dismantled the privileges extended to teachers and students who belong to the party. Soon, he said, "all 17 million people in this country will be treated the same." In the past, 25 percent of university admissions went to party members whose test scores did not meet minimum standards, usually by only a few points. Murtada said he cut that to 10 percent this year and will eliminate it altogether for the next school year. A knowledge of English, he said, is a better ticket to promotion than party membership. He allows the party's education committees to comment on appointments but not to dictate them as in the past. "Many look at the party now as an important symbol. But as something that controls the country, that is over," Murtada said in a recent interview. "The general vision of the country has changed completely in the last three years. They once thought the state should manage everything, and we have seen this is nonsense." Assad, according to Syrian officials and Western diplomats, is increasingly concerned by the demographic challenge facing the country. Each year 300,000 young Syrians enter the labor market, while the economy grows at only 3 percent a year, not nearly fast enough to absorb the new job seekers. So far the most notable economic change has been the recent licensing of three private banks, a step Assad proposed three years ago. Party leaders, many of whom have substantial stakes in the state-run banks and other government-controlled entities, resisted the move until party doctrine was amended to allow Assad to proceed. Many opposing the changes are in their seventies; the president, a generation younger, is waiting them out. He is also enforcing mandatory retirement, commonly waived for powerful military officers in the past. Western diplomats here say several hundred party members in the officer corps will be out over the next eight months, including the directors of four intelligence services. "The end result will be to get the Baath Party out of the government and, particularly, out of making economic policy," said Waddah Abdrabbo, editor of the Economist, an independent weekly newspaper. "These people know that change is coming. They can fight it for a year or two, but in the end they will not be able to do anything about it." Damascus University was once fertile ground for party recruiting when Soviet-style socialism and Arab nationalism captured the imaginations of many students across the Middle East. Today a broader range of political opinion is reflected in its sunny courtyards. Dima Bawadikji, 18, said she joined the party in high school because she believed "any party member would have an easy life." A freshman studying library science, Bawadikji was the only one among five children in her family who joined the party, which in high school meant special picnics and sports days for members. Sitting next to her on the shady steps of the journalism building, Amer Hassan, a 24-year-old student of English literature, said he joined the party a decade ago even though he "didn't know anything about it." Only a few people from his high school class in the southern province of Daraa didn't join, and he said he feared that failing to do so would hinder his ability to travel abroad, which he hopes to do some day. "This party has been around for more than 30 years, and it's done nothing for us," Hassan said. "This president is a good one, and I respect him. But he can do nothing against these people because they run everything." On the streets of Daraa, 70 miles southeast of Damascus, Yasseen Damara's smoky waiting room fills with men in military uniform and in the red-checked kaffiyehs of Bedouin farmers. He is the province party boss, and he is a busy man. His calendar is filled with the weddings and funerals of provincial notables, and he is in constant contact with the provincial governor, another party member, for consultations ranging from the status of medicine in the hospital to problems with the electricity grid. Assad, father and son, look down on him from his wall as he works through committee reports on youth, economics, politics and education. If vegetable prices in the market are too high, a party member will tell the vendor they should come down. The education committee recommends teachers for promotion, though Damara insists ability is the deciding factor. Despite his post, he said, two of his children were recently denied admission to the highly competitive local nursing school. The changes being proposed by the intellectuals in Damascus make little sense to Damara, 51, a beneficiary of the party for decades. Land reform that followed the 1963 Baath revolution quadrupled the size of his father's tiny wheat, barley and garbanzo fields in the village of Maarea, making the farm profitable enough to sustain his family of eight. He joined the party in high school and never left. "The party is still close to its principles, even though some individual members have made mistakes," said Damara. "It will always be the leading party. Why? Because its goals will always be supported by the people." A contrary view of the Baath is given by the Washington-based Syria Reform Party. It writes that President of Syrian Parliament confirms one-party system. The president of the Syrian parliament Mahmoud al-Abrash, confirmed, in a meeting he made with the Syrian press, that the Ba’ath party is the only party that will be allowed to rule Syria and that Clause 8 of the Syrian constitution, which provides the Ba’ath Socialist Party with absolute power, will not be amended nor changed. What amounted to a rebuff to all political parties that have been pressuring the regime for pluralism in Syrian politics, the latest salvo confirms that the Ba’athists are unwilling to reform the country or allow voices of dissent to participate in the political process. In reference to other parties, Al-Abrash said: "Parties made up of 10 people will not be allowed to change this regime. They were born to subvert this nation". It is believed he was referring to the Reform Party following many past accusations that RPS is made up of "few" people. "Anyone who wishes to participate in the political process (under the Ba’ath umbrella) is welcome to Syria" he added. He also reiterated that the Ba’ath Party owns the Syrian street and that the party enjoys the support of the majority of Syrians. The last election won by Assad gave him 99.99% of the votes. In February of last year, al-Abrash forbade any Syrian parliamentarian to address the media in any form or shape setting a new precedent in unilateral dictatorship. This new attack on political parties comes at the heels of a new initiative by William Burns of the U.S. State Department that is providing the Ba’athists with political cover. Analysts expect that the Syrian regime will become bolder in the weeks to come and will revert back to methods and tactics of oppression that will, in one way or the other, provide Syrians with excuses to support terrorism. A Syrian-made documentary critical of the Damascus regime has been applauded on its first showing in Lebanon - a country still dominated by its powerful neighbor - but attacked elsewhere in the Arab world as part of a Zionist plot. Omar Amiralay's "A Flood in Baath Country" is a harsh indictment of the regime, portraying the devastating effects of 35 years of rigid Baath Party rule on Syrian society.

Israel kills Hamas official in Damascus

The New York Times reported Israel blew up Mr Khalil, a mid-level official of the militant organization Hamas, on Sunday. His sport utility vehicle exploded in Damascus in a neighborhood heavily populated by Palestinian refugees. Raanan Gissin, a spokesman for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, said that "just because Hamas leaders are operating from Damascus, this does not grant them immunity.'' Zeev Shiff explains that the direct rational for the killing was that Khalil helped financed the Hebron terror cell whose members carried out the double suicide bombing in Be'er Sheva. But he also placed the strike in the longer term Israeli strategy of stepped up pressure on Syria, a policy begun at the outset of the US invasion of Iraq. Israel killed Ghalib Awali, a Hizbullah leader in Beirut earlier this year. In one case, the Israel Air Force destroyed a Syrian radar station in Lebanon. In another, a training camp not far from Damascus, known to be uninhabited, was bombarded from the air. There were also unarmed responses in the form of IAF flyovers that broke the sound barrier over the Assad family home in Latakia. The strike on Khalil raises the anti because it took place in Damascus, the Syrian capital. For its part, Syria interprets the killing as an Israeli attempt to halt the growing cooperation between Damascus and Washington over Iraq. Foreign Minister Sharaa claimed that U.S.-Syrian relations "are complicated, with Israel being a constant source of negativity, giving false facts about the region and fabricating Syria's reputation in it." He explained Israel's continuing campaign against Syria as an effort to scuttle Damascus' efforts to restart peace negotiations in the region or to keep Syria out of the terrorism headlines. SANA, the official Syrian news agency, stated that "This terrorist operation reaffirms Israel's intentions to destabilize security and stability in the region at a time that both international and regional efforts are being exerted to ease that tension." Washington will most likely try to exploit its unusual position in this affaire. Both Israel and Damascus are eager to win Washington's favor. Israel is worried about Powel's recent remarks that Syria is being cooperative and positive. Israel must fear that any rapprochement between Syria and the US will inevitably lead to increased US pressure on Israel to give up the Golan and restart regional peace talks. Damascus is eager to rehabilitate its image in the West. With pressure being placed on Syria by UN resolution 1559 ordering it out of Lebanon, US economic sanctions, and constant Washington assertions that Syria is a rogue state, President Asad is willing to make important concessions to the US, to avoid further sanctions. Damascus made a major concession to the US last week when it ordered the top Hamas leaders, Khaled Mashal and Imad al-Alami, to leave Damascus. This is something Washington has been demanding of Syria for well over a year. The fact that Israel would strike Damascus only days after Asad made this concession, is a sign that the US will keep the pressure on. Washington of course needs Syrian help at the Iraqi border and is sending a further military mission to Damascus this week. But by using its Lebanon card and continuing to sanction Israeli strikes, Washington is able to begin a dialogue with Syria without seeming to make any real concessions. Damascus, although furious at the Israeli strikes, has been careful not to blame the US, as it ordinarily would, for fear of jeopardizing the talks and playing into Israel's hand. In this way, Washington is sitting pretty. It can squeeze Syria in Lebanon, demand cooperation in Iraq, and still allow Israel to strike it at will. Damascus, which claimed the Burns visit as an important diplomatic victory, must be wondering what it really gained. Israel's ability to infiltrate the Hamas leadership in Damascus is likely to further rattle the group after Israel killed Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and his successor as Gaza leader, Abdel Aziz Rantisi, in missile strikes earlier this year. "They (Hamas leaders) have to take more precautions than they are doing now," said Ali Jarbawi, a Palestinian political science professor. "[The Israelis] are trying to reach Hamas everywhere."Last week, the London-based Al-Hayat newspaper reported that in response to a request by Mossad chief Meir Dagan, an Arab intelligence service gave Israel information on Hamas leaders abroad, including where they live, what their hobbies were and even what food they eat. Syria ordered top Hamas leader, Khaled Mashal, and another senior official, Imad al-Alami, to leave Damascus, their longtime base, according to a Palestinian close to the group. Syrian officials told Mashal and al-Alami they should find safer territory, and Alami reportedly went to Iran while Mashal surfaced briefly in Cairo and then disappeared. But Israeli analysts say the killing of Khalil was more than retribution. Operationally, it deprives Hamas of a key military leader, they say, while sending a strong signal to Syria that Israel will not tolerate its hosting of Hamas and other radical groups in Damascus. "Also, this attack inside Syria’s capital shows the authorities in Damascus that it cannot be used as a hiding place. This is a blow to the prestige of the regime." Michael B. Oren, a historian at the Shalem Center, a research institute in Jerusalem, said he believed that Israel would become more active in Syria. "I think this is something we'll see more of because there is a paucity of Hamas targets in the West Bank and Gaza." Another item reported recently is that Syria is brokering a secret deal to send atomic weapons scientists to Iran, the Sunday Telegraph reports. A group of about 12 middle-ranking Iraqi nuclear technicians and their families were transported to Syria before the collapse of Saddam's regime, the Telegraph claims. The transfer was arranged under a combined operation by Saddam's now defunct Special Security Organisation and Syrian Military Security, which is headed by Arif Shawqat, the Syrian president's brother-in-law. Western intelligence officials believe that President Asad is desperate to get the Iraqi scientists out of his country before their presence is used by Washington as a further reason to target Syria as part of the war on terrorism.

Jumblatt and Hizballah React to 1559

I would prefer to be "a garbage collector in New York rather than an Arab leader," Walid Jumblatt stated on Lebanese national TV yesterday. The Druze za`im has reached new rhetorical heights in his campaign against recognition of the Lahoud presidential extension and Damascus meddling in Syrian constitutional affairs. To al-Nahar, he has called the Syrians the "Janjaweed" of the region and promised to fight their meddling "on land and in the air." Verily, he is the Shakespeare of the Lebanese opposition. He has promised not to join in any cabinet so long as Lahoud is president. The opposition groups met recently at the Bristol Hotel in Beirut. About 200 prominent opposition politicians, including members of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, the Progressive Socialist Party, Metn MP Nassib Lahoud's Democratic Renewal Movement, the Democratic Leftist Movement, Jumblatt's Democratic Gathering parliamentary bloc, the National Bloc and others looked for common ground in denouncing the extension of Lahoud's presidency. They hope to give France and the US something to work with in their efforts to pressure Kofi Annan to denounce Syria on October 3rd when Annan must file his follow-up report on resolution 1559. The opposition called their meeting "Carlton II" referring to a meeting held three years ago at the Carlton Hotel in Beirut to denounce the mass roundup of anti-Syrian activists and students on Aug. 7, 2001. Pro-Syrian politicians were quick to react in an attempt to undercut the opposition. The next day, they met at the Meridien-Commodore Hotel to issue an unexpected call on Jumblatt and the opposition groups to join them in dialogue, unity and reform. Despite his rhetoric, Jumblatt is keeping a toe in the Syrian camp. Beirut MP Beshara Merhej, who attended the Commodore meeting, said: "We will not stop calling on the opposition to join our position." He said that Jumblatt's stance on Thursday was not the step they had hoped for, but indeed it was a step in the right direction, as although Jumblatt's opposition regarding the extension of Lahoud's term did not change, "he did not break the ties with Syria, and has shown a will for discussion." Jumblatt has not come out in favor of dismantling Hizballah, as his Christian allies would like him too. He still believes the "resistance" is legitimate. He will not get into a fight with Hizballah while tangling with Damascus. Moreover, Jumblatt asserts that he is not against Syria, but only against the extension of President Emile Lahoud's term and Syrian interference in the intricacies of Lebanese affairs? In the old days, Syria would have knee caped Jumblatt for his outspoken opposition - or just offed him, as they presumably did to his father Kamal in the 1977. Today, however, under the glair of international attention and under the leadership of the less iron-fisted Bashar, Damascus is determined to woo him back with emoluments and threats. Some of Jumblatt's supporters were arrested last week after his 17-member parliamentary bloc voted against the constitutional amendment that allowed the extension of Lahoud's term. One of Jumblatt's supporters, Baabda MP Bassem Sabaa, said that "the history of Kamal Jumblatt forbids us to be listed on the black lists" of those who have given up on democracy and who did not vote against the Lahoud extension. Damascus needs Jumblatt on its side in order to smooth over the Lahoud affaire. It is quite possible the Druze leader will be able to exact a hefty price for his neutrality, doing well for himself at the same time as demonstrating to Syria that they will have pay for pushing Lebanon around. Nicholas Blanford writes that Hizbullah is not dismissing Resolution 1559 with the same initial bravado of some Syrian officials. He explains two deals American officials have recently offered Syria in an effort to curtail Hizballah.

The former U.S. official Martin Indyk reportedly relayed one suggestion two weeks ago to Syrian President Bashar Assad. According to reports, Indyk proposed that Israel withdraw from the Shebaa Farms and retreat from the Golan Heights by 5 kilometers in exchange for Hizbullah's pulling back from the Blue Line by 25 kilometers. Another proposal, reputedly floated by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State William Burns, is for Lebanese soldiers to jointly patrol the Blue Line with UN peacekeepers, a move that could be considered a confidence-building measure in lieu of a full deployment of Lebanese troops along the border.

He concludes that: "Unless Syria is offered some very tasty carrots along with the diplomatic beatings it has endured in the past two years, it is difficult to see a significant alteration in Hizbullah's status, Resolution 1559 notwithstanding."

Powell Praises Syria

Secretary of State Colin Powell on Wednesday praised Syria for its willingness to do more to control its border with Iraq and its apparent redeployment of some troops in Lebanon, the first significant easing of tensions between Washington and Damascus in months. Powell spoke after a rare meeting with Syria's foreign minister, Farouk Shara, whose country is under growing international pressure to change its behavior toward Lebanon and end its tolerance of terrorism. The outcome of the meeting, which Powell called ''a rather positive development,'' is important because Syria has been mentioned by some hawkish advisors to the Pentagon as a possible next target for ''regime change'' by the United States. A senior State Department official briefing reporters said Syria has redeployed 3,000 to 4,000 of its roughly 20,000 troops in Lebanon away from their positions south of Beirut. ''They're talking about redeploying troops out of Lebanon'' altogether, he said. 'We're very much in a `we'll see' kind of attitude.'' "It's a tough military mission and a tough political mission, but I sense a new attitude from the Syrians, but of course, it all depends on actions, not just attitudes," Powell said. A US delegation is expected in Damascus later this month to discuss concrete ways of securing the border, across which Washington alleges militants are crossing to destabilise the interim Iraqi administration. He said his conversation with Shara was "a good, open, candid" and "rather positive discussion" that focused on a range of US concerns about Syrian policy on Iraq, Lebanon and its support for alleged terrorist groups. ''I think the Syrians are anxious to do more,'' Powell said. Italy also expressed appreciation over Syria's efforts in combating terrorism, pointing to its important role in foiling a terrorist attack that was targeting the Italian and Western interests in Lebanon. In a statement issued Wednesday, Italian Defence Minister Antonio Martino underlined the importance of Syria's role in cooperation with the Lebanese and Italian authorities to thwart an attempt to blow up the Italian embassy in Beirut, and its cooperation to foil a series of other attacks on the Western interests in Lebanon and other states. 'Top Al Qaida Operative Captured in Lebanon Lebanon said Wednesday it had arrested 10 members of a Qaeda-linked group planning to blow up the Italian Embassy in Beirut using a car packed with 300 kilograms of the explosive TNT. Interior Minister Elias Murr told a news conference that Ismail Mohammed al-Khatib, a Lebanese man whom he described as "the head of a network linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist movement," had been arrested Friday in the predominantly Sunni Muslim area of western Bekaa. "It is the first time Lebanon has arrested an Al Qaeda network," he said, adding that Khatib's role was "to recruit fundamentalist youth to carry out operations against coalition forces in Iraq." Michael Young writing in the Daily Star explains why he thinks Syria has overplayed its hand in Lebanon and may be sent packing home, if America and France continue to put the squeeze on him. He writes: Assad's mistake may be in assuming that American necessity can, somehow, be translated into strategic sympathy. His stalling may work for a few months, but it won't do away with the myriad other problems the U.S. has with Syria. Even the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks only brought Damascus some respite, as the Bush administration blended cooperation and threats. A Syrian redeployment in Lebanon does nothing about Hizbullah, about Syrian support for Palestinian groups the U.S. considers terrorist, or (and Resolution 1559 cannot simply be filed away) about Lebanese sovereignty and independence. Another Assad mistake would be to assume that his redeployment of forces will arrest the steady disintegration of Syria's position in Lebanon. While nothing may soon change with regard to Syrian domination, in time, assuming serious redeployments take place in the coming days, a Syrian Army replaced successfully by Lebanese units will imply that a full withdrawal won't lead to carnage. The Syrians risk marginalizing themselves on Lebanese security, even as their continued presence means they will still be held responsible for Hizbullah's actions. Using the logic of Taif, since that is what Lebanese and Syrian officials have held up as the rationale for the pullbacks, the Syrians must move to another stage. Taif specifies that after a withdrawal to the ridges of the Bekaa (or anywhere else they and the Lebanese decide), "the two governments shall also agree on the size and duration of the deployment of the Syrian forces in the locations mentioned above..." In the Syrian mind this terminology is hazy enough to allow an open-ended stay; but in the context of a significant shift in Syrian forces, it can easily be turned into an instrument mandating talks on a full withdrawal. Reportedly, when Assad met with his Egyptian counterpart, Hosni Mubarak, last week, he was told the game was up on the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Mubarak is said to have proposed that the matter be "Arabized," so it could be taken out of the hands of the UN and the U.S. In that way Damascus could maintain a hold on things, if less solidly than before. The redeployment is surely Assad's way of saying, "No thanks." He is keeping Lebanon entirely in his own pocket. Okay, but that means Syria alone will have to navigate through the long-term repercussions of Resolution 1559. If Assad is too clever by half in Lebanon, his adversaries will be tempted to push him off the edge. The redeployment, no matter how limited or broad now, may turn into a sprawling one-way ticket home. I don't see the weakness of Asad's position in Lebanon. The government and military officials that count have gone along with Asad. Should they stop cooperating, that would be a severe blow to Syria's position, but there is no indication they will. Morally, Syria's position has been eroded. But so has America's. The two cancel each other out to a large degree. When most of the leading government officials cast the struggle to be one between American and Syrian interests in Lebanon, many Lebanese continue to chose Syria over America, even if they are fed up with foreign intervention and occupation. The tense situation throughout the Middle East, created by the US occupation of Iraq, does not help America's moral purchase on the conscience of most Lebanese. What is more, America has no military muscle to flex so long as it has yet to break through the wall of its Iraqi marathon. On the contrary, it is seeking US help on Iraq's border. Should Europe seriously consider joining America in the imposition of economic sanctions, Syria would be doomed, but Europe is unlikely to embrace US policy with such zeal. I think Bashar has calculated correctly on that score. To see if resolution 1559 has real meaning, we will have to await Kofi Annan's follow up report in a month's time. Maybe Michael is right? Maybe Annan will slam Syria. I am not sure who is responsible or the mechanism in place for assessing the degree of Syrian compliance, or what sort of measures will be recommended should it be found wanting. My suspicion is that Annan will be hesitant to embroil the UN in another confrontation in the neighborhood. Israel is the one state that could effectively pull the rug out from under Bashar's feet. By engaging in talks with Syria and agreeing to quit the Golan, it could accomplish the sort of revolution many in the region dream about. Every Lebanese official has justified his pro-Syria stand by pointing to continued Israeli occupation and threat. So has every Syrian official. Without that justification, the moral calculus of Syria's occupation would be completely thrown off. There would be no more excuses, no more talk of a Syrian "presence" or of "cards" to be played. The notion that Syria was somehow protecting Lebanese or Arab honor and its own territorial integrity against the depredations of the "West" would evaporate. The occupation would be just that - an occupation in all of its nasty detail and ugliness. It could be caste as nothing else. Without a regional settlement, Syria may continue to win the sympathies of many Lebanese - and even a few Europeans - for sometime to come.

Have Peace Talks between Israel and Syria Begun?

Middle East analysts are still trying to assess the reasons behind Syria's insistence on having Lahoud's term extended, and regional politicians are positioning themselves to either make the most of or deflect the impact of the resulting UN resolution. Scott Wilson of The Washington Post reports that the British ambassador in Damascus believed that in the final jokeying for position in Lebanon between Washington and Damascus, it came down to a question of za`ama. Wilson writes: "Several Western diplomats here expressed dismay over the heavy-handed approach taken by Assad, who several weeks earlier had told a delegation of U.S. members of Congress that several other candidates would be acceptable to Syria. "It became a matter of arm-wrestling over who was calling the shots in Lebanon: Syria or the United States," said Peter Ford, the British ambassador here. "Once it became that issue, Syria couldn't back down, even if it wanted to." Are peace talks getting started between Israel and Syria? Gabriel Ben-Dor, director of the University of Haifa's National Security Studies Center, speculates that "despite the predominantly cosmetic nature of the Syrian troop redeployment in Lebanon, he did not rule out the possibility of a connection with the plethora of reports of a pending resumption of peace talks with Israel."

There have been persistent rumors that negotiations are going to be renewed, that the groundwork is being prepared very meticulously, or that talks might already have started surreptitiously," he said. "There could be a link between the Syrian moves and the possible renewal of serious contacts with Israel, although this is unlikely to happen until after the US elections. "If the administration of President Bush survives, it is conceivable there might be a turn to the Syrian track because the situation with the Palestinians is a mess and the Americans, to counter criticism over Iraq, would probably like to demonstrate they have not given up on trying to bring peace and stability to the Middle East," said Ben-Dor.

Farid Khazen, chairman of the political science department at the American University of Beirut, said the fact that this redeployment is occurring under U.N. scrutiny is more significant than its size. Although Syria has redeployed its forces in Lebanon several times in recent years, Khazen said that doing so under international pressure made Tuesday's pullback the most significant to date. "Of course, this should have happened back in 1992," Khazen said. "Even though there were partial deployments before, today they come under completely different circumstances. This is no longer a Lebanese issue or a Syrian issue, but an international issue." Syria first sent troops to Lebanon in 1976 in an unsuccessful attempt to calm mounting sectarian violence, and at times had as many as 35,000 troops in the country. The 1989 Taif Agreement that ended Lebanon's civil war gave Syria two years to withdraw its troops from the time Lebanon incorporated the terms of the accord in its constitution, a deadline that lapsed in September 1992. About 15,000 Syrian troops will remain in Lebanon. Mahmud Hammud, the Lebanese defense minister, said a full pullout would occur only after an Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab lands. (AP, AFP) Randa Takieddine of Al-Hayat has a thoughtful article on the consequences of Asad's Lebanon stumble. She writes that Syria has now signed the EU's WMD clause without any modifications and will be subject to continued Foreign Pressure now that it has united France and the US against it. She asks: "Will Syria continue in the same conduct of letting by the diplomatic opportunities which will ultimately subjugate Syria to further international pressure?" French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier, while contacting the Arab leaders, found out that not a single Arab leader agreed with what Syria is doing in Lebanon, and not a single Arab leader agreed with what Syria ventured lately in Lebanon, especially concerning the amendment of the Lebanese constitution. About 15,000 Syrian troops will remain in Lebanon, said Mahmud Hammud, the Lebanese defense minister. A full pullout would occur only after an Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab lands, he added. Troops are to move out of the towns of Aramoun, Chouiefat, Damour, Doha and Khaldeh, south of Beirut, and Dhour El Choueir to the north. The troops' destination is thought to be the Bekaa, an area near Syria's border, where a majority of Syrian forces are deployed. In Washington, a State Department spokesman, Adam Ereli, said: "We remain deeply concerned about Syrian intervention in Lebanon and reiterate that, in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1559, Syria withdraw all of its forces from Lebanon." In Israel, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon cast doubt on the value of the Syrian pullback. "We don't at this point see a change in Syria's position," Sharon told Israel Radio. "Syria is under U.S. pressure these days because it is helping Iraqi terrorists. They have an interest in taking steps that will take off or weaken the pressure." BBC news monitor writes that in Israel, a commentator in the leading daily Yediot Aharonot sees the Syrian move as a cynical ploy "aimed mainly at easing US pressure". " President Assad can allow himself to reduce the number of his soldiers and officers in order to con President Bush." Writing in Lebanon's Al-Safir, Sami Kalib asks: "Is Syria's redeployment the beginning of a Syrian-US deal? What Washington is asking Syria entails much more than just the Lebanese problem," he believes. Saudi Arabia's Al-Jazirah writes, "The redeployment should have coincided with an Israeli withdrawal from the Shabaa farms region. Syria is not occupying Lebanon!", reads the headline of an editorial, which feels that Israel should have matched the move. Omar of "IRAQ THE MODEL" blog, writes (September 21, 2004) that 6 Syrian terrorists were arrested in Iraq just as they were preparing to set off a bomb.

Some good news! A group of Iraqi citizens in Al Karkh/ Khidr Al Yas arrested 6 Syrian terrorists after placing a land mine at the gate of Bab Al Mu’a dam bridge from Al Karkh side. According to New Sabah newspaper, after a road side bomb exploded missing an American convoy that was patrolling in the area, a group of citizens who happened to be there noticed a bunch of young men who looked foreigners (turned out to be Syrians) that were gathering near the place and that looked suspicious. The citizens found their atittude very suspicious and they were not from the area, so they jumped on them and kicked them until some of them started to bleed and then turned them on to the American forces. Eyewitnesses said that the citizens were shouting “Terrorists. You are targeting our children and families. You are killing our youths” This incident that took place near Haifa street comes after many attacks that terrorist Arabs were accused of carrying against American forces and Iraqi police stations.

Criticism of My Za`im Posts

I have selected a few emails I received criticizing my za`im posts. The original posts are 1 here and 2 here. (I will try to answer some of these in a follow up za`im article soon.) Nicola Migliorino writes: Dear Dr. Landis, I wish to thank you for your website and comments - it is very useful indeed for all of us interested in Syria (and Lebanon). I have been trying, as many others, to understand the whole Lahoud-1559 affair, and I read with interest your views. Although I agree with the importance of the za'ama factor, I believe it leaves questions unanswered. In particular, if I understand the argument correctly, I wonder why the affirmation of za'ama had to be done necessarily by confirming Lahoud. Why not affirming authority in a way that could be similarly forceful, but at the same time save the face of Lebanon? Why not electing another pro-Syrian figure, making it strongly clear that it was Bashar's decision, but at the same time avoiding the "rape" of the Lebanese political system in full daylight? A lebanese friend has an opinion on the matter: he thinks that the Syrians (or Bashar) did not want to take risks: they were ready to place someone else on the chair, but they were afraid of surprises (iani that the guy could at some point fail in a loyalty test, particularly during these troubled times). This view seems to present the Syrian regime in a much more defensive position. On another note, can we assume that the decision on how to proceed was fully Bashar's decision? Or was it perhaps the result of a mediation with other figures of the Syrian regime? in this latter case, isn't this undermining the whole "affirmation of za'ama" argument (or leading to another question: who's the za'im)? many thanks again, Nicola Migliorino P.S.: A short note on me: I am an Italian national, I have just earned my PhD at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies of the University of Exeter (UK) with a political science thesis on the Armenian community and the state in Lebanon and Syria (1920-to date, supervisor Prof. Tim Niblock, external Prof. Ray Hinnebusch); I have lived in Syria Oct.1998- Dec 2000, where I was in charge of the Italian NGO Movimondo (working with Palestine refugees and UNRWA, but also with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour). I am currently looking for a job and working on developing my thesis for publication. Rayyan Souki writes: I've read a lot of your posts on your news blog and I found that your views tend to be sympathetic and apologetic towards the current Syrian Regime. You always try to highlight the "good benefits" of stability that the Alawi Minority has achieved in Syria without looking at the consequences that will arise from that artificial stability which was built on tyranny, oppression, and fear. In order to have a more "balanced" approach to the matter, I believe that you should keep these following points present in your analysis when discussing the contemporary Syrian political scene. These are: 1-Syria has never been a "real” nation state. For 400 years of Sunni Ottoman Occupation, it was divided into several Vilayets: Aleppo, Damascus, Homs, Tripoli, Akka, etc...There was NEVER a unified Syria. 2-The French drew the present political boundaries of Syria by sewing up 4 distinct regions: Aleppo, Damascus, Jabal Al-Nusyaria, and Jabal El-Duruz. 3-The population of Syria is a funny mixture of competing ethnic and religious groups: 63% are Sunni Arabs or Arabized Sunnis.(A lot of Sunni Syrians are the remnants of Turks and Mamluks who adopted over the years the Arabic language). The Sunnis in Syria are also divided between rural Bedouins and urban settlers. 10% are Kurds. These live in the Al-Hasaka Mouhafaza and aspire to join their brothers in Iran, Turkey, and Iraq. 11% are Nusayris or Alawis. These people live mainly in the Latakia Muhafaza. They are the current rulers of Syria and the Sunni's most hated and despised group. 10% are Christians. Syrian Christians belong to more than ten different churches. Of the Christian, between 3-4 percent are Armenians. 3% are Druzes and they reside mainly in the Swayda Province. 1.5% are Ismailis. 1.5% are other minorities. 4-The presence of the Alawi Minority on the top of the political pyramid in Syria is awkward and, in my honest opinion, temporary. They represent ONLY 11% of the population. Daniel Pipes, the prominent American Scholar, has described this very clearly when he said: "For an Alawi to be president of Syria is the same as a Jew becoming the Czar of Russia or an Untouchable becoming a Maharaja in India.” 5-The Alawis are considered by the Sunnis as Non-Muslim Heretics whose blood and property ought to be "fair game.” These convictions are based on centuries old religious "fatwas" and on antiquated social traditions which the Sunnis Still recall.(For example, the Wealthy Sunni landlords of Aleppo, Homs, and Hama still remember the days when the Alawis used to work as farmers in their Farms and when Nusayri Women used to work as maids --and sex servants-- in their homes). 6- The Strategy of the Alawi Regime to remain in power is three fold: a-Buy time and hold to power as long as possible by using tactics such as: terror, oppression, massacres, torture, bribes, etc... b- Try to appease the Americans and Israelis by convincing them that they are a more docile alternative to a Sunni-Dominated Syria. The Israelis and Americans are buying this argument FOR THE TIME BEING, but will eventually ditch the Alawis once they see that they are of no more use. c-Occupy Lebanon and divert the attention of the Sunni majority from the internal and domestic problems they are facing . By Doing That, the Alawis hope to take advantage of Lebanon's economic potentials and to correct the historical mistake that many Sunni Syrians believed was made when parts of Syria were "annexed" by the French and added to Mount Lebanon. 7-The Alawi ruling elite resemble a Mafia more than they resemble a ruling class. Most of the top shots in the regime are related to the Assad Family. 8-The Greatest catastrophe the Alawis fear is to lose power and to face a brutal and bloody Sunni retaliation on the crimes they committed..(Tadmour Prison Massacre, Hama Massacre, Torture, Detention...). As for " Stability" you are speaking about, Well it’s all based on weak foundations. A slight push by the Americans will cause a "Domino effect" and put the Alawis face to face with the dark days that they will eventually encounter. WOULD YOU LIKE TO BET??????? A final Note: On the long run I believe, it is in the Strategic interest of Israel and the US to DIVIDE Syria. A recent report by the Israeli Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya said that in the next 25 years, the population of Syria will double to 35 million. 5 million Syrians will be living in the region between Damascus and the Israeli Border. This demographic element in itself, will create huge difficulties for the advancing Israeli armored divisions that might push into Syria incase of an all-out war.(These war lessons were learned by the Israelis during the 1982 Lebanon invasion in which they were forced to advance in high population density areas. This made their armored division more susceptible to guerilla warfare.) In addition to that, the Jewish State WILL NEVER relinquishes the Golan Heights that control 30% of the Jordan's River water. Also, Israel would like to see a "castrated" Syrian Army. Despite the military weakness of the Syrians, they still pose an important threat to the security of Israel. Their Scud surface-to-surface missiles can't be dismissed. Nor can their relatively antiquated chemical warfare capabilities and their obsolete armored divisions. After the peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt, the dissolution of Iraq, and the destruction of the Palestinian authority, Israel has only Syria, on its Northern Border, to deal with. It should be noted also that the American Neo-cons in their Famous "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm" policy paper said that "Israel can shape its strategic environment, in cooperation with Turkey and Jordan, by weakening, containing, and even rolling back Syria." Gibreel Gibreel, a Lebanese businessman working in the United Kingdom, holds degrees from Buckingham and Edinburgh universities. He writes: Sir, I read your piece entitled ‘Was Lebanon Bashar's mini 1973 War?’ (Sunday, September 12, 2004). Who are you? Are you genuinely a professor in a real university? Are you published? I'm not convinced you know what you’re talking about; your entire view is so obviously constructed by the writings of people like Robert Fisk and Jonathan Randall, rather than any proper academic works. Your mistaken views are exactly why US administration after US administration gets it wrong in the Middle East. Living in Syria for a couple of years or so, or uttering a few choice words in Arabic doesn’t mean anything. Once you remove your prejudices from your writings you may actually start to know your subject. I apologise in advance if you feel I have offended you; I don’t mean too, but I have met so many people like you in my time. You get it wrong time and time again and then use the phrase "I’m not convinced of this, or not convinced of that" to cover up your lack of knowledge. I will make two points. First, how anyone can possibly be so optimistic about the Ba’ath dictatorship is beyond me. You would have thought that history would have taught the Americans, academics and governments, not to expect too much from the regime. I won’t labour this point because I am quite tired of trying to understand how seemingly educated and intelligent people ignore the behavioral history of the Ba’ath regime, the late Hafez el Assad, and now his son to argue that they are “misunderstood” and that the West should make an effort to try to see their point of view. You claim to have lived in Syria; did you ever bother to ask any Syrian not associated or benefiting from the Ba’ath regime whether he thinks they are misunderstood? Second, to address your point about the Christians of Lebanon, particularly the Maronites, with whom you seem to have an axe to grind. Take a look at the position of Christians in countries across the Middle East. Are they treated equally? Do they enjoy the same status as Muslims in those countries? For a Muslim being Arab is being Muslim, one cannot be separated from the other, no matter how westerners like you try to fudge the issue. In the opinion of Muslim / Arabs, Christians can’t be Arabs; even Muslims in Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc. have to abandon their history and culture and adopt Arab history and culture in order to be a proper Muslim. So can you blame the Christians of Lebanon for not wanting to be treated as second-class citizens? (Please see my analysis of the centrality of religion to Muslims in their public and private life at http://www.meforum.org/article/105.) I’m sure that if Lebanon’s Christians were able to believe that Muslims can separate their religion from politics, one man one vote would be welcomed, but the example of the surrounding countries don’t set a good example. My definition of democracy is not just a system of one man one vote, but a system in which every citizen is equal and his or her rights are protected. Therefore, Lebanon is a democracy; all its citizens are equal and their rights are protected under a constitution and legal system that was constructed by men for men, not by “god” for men and under which only those who adhere to a particular faith are considered equal beings. Sharia law would soon become the basis of a constitution and the dominant legal system in Lebanon if the president was a Sunni or a Shi’, a system under which non-Muslims are considered inferior and subject to the whims of Muslims. Under “Christian” rule in Lebanon, Muslims are equal and have more rights than their co-religionists in the surrounding Islamic or self-styled “secular” states. Sufficed to say that when a Muslim defendant is brought before a court in Lebanon he or she does not require two Muslim witnesses to challenge the evidence of one Christian or non-Muslim plaintiff. Under “Christian” rule in Lebanon at least a Muslim is permitted to walk up to the ballot box and cast his vote for a representative who is of the same faith as he or she, knowing full well that people of his or her faith can become government ministers, prime minister or speaker of the house and be involved in the decision making process. Where else do you see this in the Middle East? No, Mr. Landis, Lebanon is a democracy, however you choose to define democracy, and I’m sorry to say that it’s your prejudices that cause you to be so anti-Christian. Best regards, G. Gibreel

Will Washington abandon Lebanon for a stable Iraq?

Will Washington abandon Lebanon for a stable Iraqi border with Syria? That is the question raised by Adam Zagorin of Time Magazine in his Sept. 19 article, entitled: "Cozying up to Syria."

President Bush has always made it clear where he stands on the matter of terrorism: "You're either with us or against us." But the Administration is showing a surprisingly nuanced attitude toward one country long designated a state sponsor of terrorism: Syria. Desperate to stop the terrorists, money and weapons that the U.S. says are crossing Syria's border into Iraq and fueling the insurgency there, the U.S. has initiated talks with Syria to join in controlling the frontier.

A senior U.S. official tells Time the talks are aimed at creating a "military-to-military" relationship and that "joint border patrols" involving U.S. and Syrian troops "cannot be ruled out." Senior officials from the State Department and Pentagon met with Syrian President Bashar Assad for several hours in his grand palace in Damascus last week. Assad was "interested in cooperating" with military proposals under study by the U.S. Central Command, a State Department official tells Time, and more talks in Damascus will probably take place in a few weeks. Obtaining Syrian cooperation in stemming the insurgency in Iraq has been a priority for Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, who will visit Washington this week and who held his own discussions with Assad on the matter over the summer.

Syria has in the past drawn criticism from the U.S. for everything from human-rights abuses to developing weapons of mass destruction and acting as a conduit for Iranian support of Hizballah, the radical terrorist group. Earlier this year, the U.S. imposed economic sanctions on Syria, and a few weeks ago it backed a U.N. resolution condemning Syria's occupation of Lebanon. Damascus is looking for U.S. "leniency" on these issues, a senior State Department official says. A deal could depend on whether the U.S. is willing to look the other way in exchange for fuller Syrian cooperation to help stabilize Iraq.

Although friends in Damascus say the US did not give any carrots during the Burns visit. It is hard not to see the request by Burns and his crew for military cooperation on the Syrian border as a carrot. Perhaps, it is not a carrot and only a calling card? Nevertheless, opening a direct dialogue with Washington is something Bashar has been asking for over a year now. The Daily Star editorial today puts it like this:

The United States has directly engaged Syria via the visit to Damascus last week of Assistant Under Secretary of State William Burns and his extensive delegation; they have now been followed up by an American technical team that is in Damascus to promote Syrian-American collaboration on closing the Syrian-Iraqi border to the passage of undesirable men and materials. The Americans are not tourists in Syria; they are testing its commitment to work with the U.S. on important Iraq-related issues.

Syria would seem to be in a tight place, with the U.S., UN, France, EU and others monitoring it closely, even threatening it mildly over its Lebanon policy, Iraq ties and alleged support for terrorism and plans to develop weapons of mass destruction. Damascus also faces pressures on many other fronts, including economics, demographics, political reform, and the stalemated negotiations with Israel. The world's scrutiny that it has generated because of its Lebanon actions adds to the pressure.

Yet, this is also an opportunity for Damascus, which suddenly has legitimate levers and tools that it can use to engage the world and its neighbors, and offer both compliance and trade-offs on issues of common importance. The Syrian leadership must find the ability to move constructively and in a linear manner on Lebanon and all other issues it faces, or else it is likely to suffer long-term pressure, problems and isolation in its increasingly problematic ties with the world.

Syria is making noises that it understands. Emile El-Hokayem of the Stimson Center sent me two bits of encouraging news. Al-Mustaqbal reports that the EU and Syria have agreed "in principle" on the wording of WMD clause that was holding up the Madrid Agreement. Now the EU ministers must vote on it. The second is that Syria's ambassador to the US, Imad Mustafa, insists that Syria will carry out a "major redeployment" of its troops in Lebanon now "that the situation is more secure." He wouldn't give any numbers or explain further. This sort of troop reshuffling will not impress Washington very much. It wants action on Hizballah and the deployment of Lebanese army troops along the Israeli border, which Lahoud said would not happen. "Lebanon will not ask for a Syrian withdrawal and will not send its army to the Israeli borders," Lahoud insisted, "unless the Arab-Israeli conflict is settled." When several opposition MPs wondered whether Lahoud's presidential extension would disrupt Lebanon's stability for decades to come, Lahoud replied that Lebanon's stability was due to the national and "strategic policies," he has enforced - i.e. close relations with Syria. Washington cannot afford to drop the Lebanon issue from its agenda, even if Syria is hoping it will do just that and is willing to work effectively with Washington to seal its border with Iraq. It would make a mockery of Resolution 1559. There is every sign that Syria has actually turned the corner in its Iraq policy. After the US invasion, Syria saw its interests to be aligned with the Iraqi resistance. Damascus wanted, at the very least, to contain the US military field of action to Iraq. At most, it hope for to see the US withdraw from the region without a permanent presence in Iraq or permanent base rights. But now that the US seems to have given up its more expansive ambitions in Baghdad and merely seeks to stabilize the situation, Syria is inclined to lend a hand. Al-Hayat newspaper reported in early September that Damascus played a role in helping end the fighting in the Iraqi holy city of Najaf in which the Mahdi Army of maverick Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr clashed with US and Iraqi forces. There can be little doubt that Syria shares a common interest with the US in keeping Iraq from descending into chaos. Should the Iraqi situation deteriorate further, Syria will be first in line to be hit by Jihadist blow back, not to mention a refugee problem that will overwhelm its exhausted economy. Syria needs a vital and economically viable Iraq more than the US does. Recent studies demonstrate that Syria needs $50 billion in investment over the next 10 years in order to jump start its economy and soak up growing unemployment. Updated studies show that 4 million of those able to work in Syria do not have productive employment. This is 45 percent of Syria's manpower. The estimated value of investments made since 1991 under law No. 10 amount to a paltry 30 percent of the $8 billion, which was anticipated. If Iraq should implode, Syria's economic goose will be cooked. Damascus has been counting on expanding trade with Iraq to entice much of that $50 billion into the country. The question of who would disarm Hizballah and the Palestinian militias in Southern Lebanon, if Syria were to withdraw, is explored by Timur Goksel, who was senior adviser and spokesman of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon for 24 years. He writes:

Resolution 1559 calls for the "disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias," without saying who would be doing this. Translated, it means disarming Hizbullah and Palestinian militias. The resolution also seeks the "extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory." That means the Lebanese Army must replace Hizbullah along the border with Israel. The reaction of Syria's envoy to the UN, who reportedly asked: "Who would disband Hizbullah? Who would send the Lebanese governmental forces to the South?" sums up the complexity of the issue.

The thorny matter of disarmament also has regional implications. Today, the Lebanese Army, if given political backing, is capable of disarming the Palestinian militias. Militarily, those gunmen who are not in the refugee camps can be handled with relative ease. But they are a minority. The bulk of Palestinian armed groups are in densely populated refugee camps, and this is not limited to the largest camp of Ain al-Hilweh in Sidon. Any large-scale operation by the Lebanese would mean not only heavy casualties among combatants on both sides, but also many civilian deaths. Can Lebanon today afford a bloodbath that would be universally condemned and, worse, that would put Lebanon in the same column as Israel?

Nicholas Blanford carefully and judiciously examines Hizballah's recent strategy and posturing in an excellent report on the group. He assesses the claims of both Hizballah's detractors, who claim it is the "A" Team of international terrorists, and its apologists, who claim that the organization has abandoned its anti-Western militancy of the 1980s, having evolved into a pragmatic mainstream Lebanese political party beholden to the interests of its Shiite constituency. He also explains the strategy Syria may follow in trying to finess the Hizballah issue with the United States. He writes:

Damascus appears to be planning countermeasures prior to the planned convention of the Security Council at the close of September to consider its degree of compliance with Resolution 1559. One includes a limited redeployment of Syrian troops from Lebanon. Another, according to the September 3 edition of Lebanon's al-Safir newspaper, is for the Lebanese government to formally incorporate Hizballah's military wing into the national defense structure.

Nasrallah addressed this theme the same day. "Today, in Lebanon there is an official Lebanese institution called the Lebanese army and a popular resistance organization called the resistance," he said in a speech aired on the party's al-Manar television station. "Within one strategy, these two complement each other. They cooperate and share the roles in protecting and forming a fence around the homeland." Establishing Hizballah formally, if not practically, as an adjunct of the Lebanese army would be an attempt to deflect the repeated calls of the US and UN Security Council for Beirut to deploy Lebanese troops along the border with Israel. It could also help to mollify Arab chanceries while allowing Syria and Hizballah to retain credibility as keepers of the Arabist flame in public opinion.

This would clearly be an elegant solution to Damascus' problem, but it is hard to imagine how it would be welcomed by either the Lebanese army or public. The best way to test Damascus' seriousness about withdrawing from Lebanon would be to pressure Israel to negotiate a Golan resolution. Such negotiations are unlikely, however, so long as Sharron remains Prime Minister and the Gaza issue preoccupies Israel's political agenda. As Sharron stated recently. There is "no possibility" of talks anytime soon. In the meantime, Washington must stabilize Iraq, which may require fudging its message in Lebanon for the time being.

Issa Touma: "Artists Still have Hopes"

I have been following the story of Issa Touma, a Syrian artist and gallery owner who has been battling the Baath Party, for some time in Syria Comment. After I printed the first story about him some months ago, I received a very kind email from Issa inviting me to Aleppo. I look forward to meeting him. In the meantime, I hope he will have gotten permission for his festival from the Baath Party. I noticed this article by Mr. Touma the other day published in (All4syria) : 16/9/2004. It is worth reprinting here because it speaks worlds about the courage of Syrians as they try to combat social and political conservatism. We Still have some Hopes Issa Touma Director of the Photo festival, Aleppo, Syria On Feb 2, 2003, as founder and director of the Le Pont Gallery in Aleppo, Syria and director of two highly successful annual international art festivals in Aleppo I received a written order and directive from the Baath Party of Syria, signed by one of the Board of Directors Baath Party in Damascus. The order stated that I was to cease all my cultural programs activities and forthwith submit all planned activities for the express approval of the Baath Party. This bureaucratic act has for over a year enmeshed me as an artist and curator, in a time consuming and dispiriting bureaucratic battle with faceless officials who fear, above all else, change in society and feel the knee jerk need to control the natural impulses and growth of the artistic community. Although this incident is specific to my life as an artist and curator in Syria, it symbolizes the artist’s predicament in the Middle East. If I may say so, my personal artistic history and problems I faced, in very general way, apply to the wider Arab world. By this I mean that my fellow artists across the Arab world, in all fields including photography are affected by and indeed constrained by the attitudes and responses to the modern world prevalent in Arab society and political life. I was born in Syria in 1962. My mother is a bilingual ethnic Armenian and my father is a Syrian Arabic speaker. Our family was by Syrian standards middle class. Although my mother’s family has a long history of important political activism, I did not follow in their footsteps and chose instead art. I started in jewelry design, painting and an early age began organizing small-scale art activities. My life changed forever when I discovered photography 1988 and found that it provided deep satisfaction and later provided challenges that formed my character and informed my beliefs. After some training I began my professional life in photography in 1992. In the beginning my professional development as an artist was impeded because despite the fact I was able to acquire the technical skills required in photography, as an artist I lived in an art milieu that was underdeveloped and isolated from the main stream of the art world in the West. I soon arrived at an understanding that I needed to have more contact with artists and intellectuals in the wider art world. At that time it was not possible for me travel and so my response was to find a way to bring foreign artists to Syria. I started a second career as a curator and gallery owner. I started with a small gallery that showed the work of local artists and began bringing in foreign artists. This eventually led to my founding the Aleppo International Photography Gathering and the Aleppo International Women’s Art Festival. These two annual events have over the years brought to Aleppo hundreds of photographers, painters, and sculptors from all over the world. The response from the public to this opportunity to see and meet foreign artist was overwhelming enthusiastic if not somewhat puzzled. The result was that not only was my life profoundly affected and influenced but the face of cultural life in Aleppo changed forever (for better or worse depending on who you talk to). The public in general was then engaged as I was in a learning process exploring and acquiring the language of art required for an appreciation of the trends in the art of modern photography and integrating these influences into our own experience. However change brings resistance and sometimes conflict. In my case the incomprehension and fear of change as expressed by the actions of Baath Party of Syria lead to my time and work being compromised almost daily by discussions and meetings of various representatives of authority in Syria. My position is clear, that is to say, I am an artist and curator not a political activist or public critic of the political authority in Syria and wish only to be free to create art and bring art and the artists from outside of Syria here for the benefit of the Syrian public, free from the interference of hostile, fearful and ignorant political officials. As for the public response, we have witnessed an evolving and maturing attitude. In the very beginning the public expressed a great curiosity tempered by a skepticism acquired by years of living in a deeply conservative society that lacks many freedoms. Over the years as we demonstrated our consistency and the public became more accustomed to the newness of modern photography and accordingly the general response has grown into one of solid support and indeed, expectations of more. In these exhibitions and festivals we not only showed the work of foreign artists but Syrian photographers and encouraged a free exchange of ideas and cultural experiences. The results have been fruitful and productive for both sides but more importantly it exposed Syrian artists and other Arab artists like me to an unprecedented number of foreign artists and the attendant influences. As I indicated earlier, artists in the Middle East have been insulated against the influences of the modern trends in photography outside the Arab world. The primary source of influence on photography has generally emanated from an earlier European influence sometimes described as Orientalism. Across the region in photography clubs and studios photographers produced and still in many cases produce technically proficient work depicting semi documentary scenes, landscapes and portraits. The artists who wished to move past this anachronistic work, found themselves on the fringe of society, few in number, without a support system and confronted with resistance born out two essentially traditionalist societal norms, namely religion and politics. The Islamic religion with its ancient prohibitions on the reproduction of human imagery still plays an important part in the daily lives and current attitudes of many Arab people. As a result the branches of the arts that are revered are traditional calligraphy and traditional painting. The person who pursues artistic endeavors through photography encounters indifference because the attitude is that in order to produce good photography all one needs is a good camera not an artistic approach. As for the political pressures on the population and the related effects on artists, there are a small number of photographers throughout the Middle East who have absorbed the influences from the west and exploring the creative potential of photography. Many of these artists however stay within the realm of what might be described as abstract art, an area of creativity that is firmly connected the current European forms and to large extent incomprehensible to their viewers in Arab world. Unfortunately few artists are willing to take the risks involved in producing images that are explicitly linked to the day-to-day realities of life in the region including political or social oppression. At this point in time hijab covered ladies conditions are far too intimidating for significant number of artists to face the consequences. These photographers are in this respect in the same boat as the other intellectuals and artists who in essence are unable to freely speak their minds or express their concerns in an open and free atmosphere. In 1996 the Le Pont Photography gallery opened to the public and was followed in 1997 by the first International Photography Gathering in Aleppo. Our aim was to bring to the public the art photographic imagery and the new ideas connected with it. In doing so we wished to reach a complete cross section of society disregarding ethnic, religious and differences of social classes. The cultural experience of viewing photographic art and meeting the artists was on this scale was something new for the people of Aleppo and I witnessed documented it happening in a situation where workers, ministry officials, hijab covered ladies and intellectuals all rubbed shoulders as they appreciated art. We have no difficulty reaching the public in Syria because the language of art crosses all social barriers and speaks to everyone. Photography is a unique and an accessible way to communicate. We ask only that the government of Syria communicate to the public clearly their intentions concerning artists and the right of the public to explore the art of photography by explicitly acknowledging their support and refrain from interfering in the world of culture and art.

Abdulhamid: The Syrian Opposition's Woeful Irrelevance

Ammar Abdulhamid, the director of the al-Tharwa Project in Damascus, who is presently a visiting scholar at the Bookings Institute, wrote this plea to Syrians to take action. Friday, September 17, 2004 The Syrian opposition's woeful irrelevance By Ammar Abdulhamid Special to The Daily Star One of the major problems of the nascent opposition movement in Syria is its adoption of attitudes and modes of discourse very much reminiscent of the regime it is supposedly opposing. The Syrian opposition does not seek to justify itself to the Syrian people or gain their support, and it fails to provide a vision for change in the country, be it political, social or economic. No wonder, then, that Syrians continue to be politically apathetic and inclined to pinning their hopes on the ability of President Bashar Assad to deliver on his long-promised reforms. The state, and behind it the regime, remains Syria's largest service provider. All important sectors in the country, including oil, agriculture, industry, communications and education, are under the regime's control. Despite a change in leadership in mid-2000, when Assad took power, the regime has so far failed to deliver a vision for change. The Syrian people are well aware that very little progress has been achieved in the last four years. They tend to blame the coterie surrounding the president for that, and have grown weary and dubious regarding positive developments in the future. So long as the opposition fails to fill the leadership gap in Syria, the people, though they may not rally behind the regime, will not do so behind the opposition, either. Apathy and obscurantism are the victors in this situation. If it is to have any future, therefore, the Syrian opposition needs to organize so that it can draw out the principles, specific programs and young voices capable of galvanizing popular support. In other words, the opposition needs to seize the initiative. By merely making demands on the regime to cancel the state of emergency and expand the sphere of political participation, opposition groups are ceding the initiative to a regime and state that have clearly shown themselves neither capable of introducing change nor really interested in doing so. Nothing could be more damaging to the opposition than this minimalist approach. This gap between words and deeds cannot be filled, and the opposition in Syria will not be worthy of the name, unless certain concrete steps are taken. Holding a national conference on reform, for instance, is one long-overdue step. Opposition parties need to get their act together, and there is no other way but through a process of mutual dialogue, culminating in such an event. The purpose of a conference would be to facilitate the adoption of a specific platform and a vision for change and reform, one that can satisfy the aspirations of all social strata. Furthermore, this reformist vision needs to be packaged in such a way that it can be understood and accepted by the Syrian people in their religious, ethnic and political diversity. More importantly, the conference should provide a platform for new leaders to emerge, young leaders armed with specific strategies meant to help them reach out to the Syrian people and build up a following. As is the case in all other countries, and as has been the case throughout history, people do not rally behind ghosts, but behind specific issues, promises and personalities. As things stand today, the only voices being heard and the only faces visible belong to a generation that is no longer credible or relevant in the eyes of a great majority of Syrians. This is another reason why people prefer to give the regime the leeway and excuses it needs, rather than risk anything by supporting an opposition that does not seem to offer something new or really different. By continuing to neglect its responsibility to explain and justify itself to the Syrian people, the opposition risks perpetuating its irrelevance. If it continues to take its cues, as it seems, from the existing political establishment, this will only consecrate the opposition's continued political insignificance. However, if the opposition wishes to outgrow these limitations, it should be the one reaching out to exiled Syrian communities abroad; it should be the one providing ideas and proposals for specific reforms and policies that could be adopted by the Syrian government or civil society; and it should be the one that shows it can slowly but surely take charge of the country and lead it to a better tomorrow. This is how credibility and popular support are cultivated. This is what democratization is all about. If the opposition is unwilling to take the risks involved in this process, then it is, in fact, not an opposition at all. But then, perhaps this is why opposition figures are today tolerated by Syria's regime. Indeed, perhaps this is what the opposition strategy is all about - grandstanding from a safe distance. Ammar Abdulhamid is a visiting fellow at the Saban Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington. He is a Syrian novelist and social analyst based in Damascus, and is the coordinator of the Tharwa Project, a program that seeks to bring greater awareness of the living conditions of minority groups in the Arab world. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR Copyright (c) 2004 The Daily Star

Za`imism in Lebanon

I recently recieved two comments on my za`ama article about Bashar and Lahoud. One suggesting that I "really understand the area," and the other that I "have an outsider's view" and get it wrong. I will comment after copying them below. Fares Bagh writes: Hi Joshua, Your article provides deep analysis that only a person that really understands the area can provide. Hafez had a big stick but also a lot of carrots for the people in terms of taking pride in Syria, opening the economy, allowing non political Islam to flourish, at least in comparison to Salah Jedid days. Our good ol boys forget these facts and focus only on Hama. Salutation from Austin. Thanks , Fares Bagh Rami does not agree. He writes: Professor Landis, With respect I take issue with several aspects of your message. It is clear to me that you have an outsider’s view and subsequent description of Middle Eastern habits and traditions. Moreover you tend to paint the whole region with one brush and one color. As the Lebanese proverb says “la’ita min danaba”, or “holding it by its tail”. In particular is your use and conceptualization of the term “za’im”. Although your definitions might apply in authoritarian settings such as Saddam’s Iraq or Assad’s Syria it definitely does not in Lebanon. As I understand it your concept of “za’aama” is a form of leadership that is widespread in the “Levant” and quite acceptable in such settings because of its apparent balance between ruthlessness and subsequent mercy. In Lebanon governmental office was only reached constitutionally (even during some periods of the war). Before the war leaders did not resort to “force” or “intimidation” to quell the opposition, which rendered that opposition the most effective method of policy change in Lebanon bringing presidencies to crashing halts most memorable of which are Khouri’s in 1952 and Chamoun’s in 1958. So the people of the Levant are not generally predisposed to only respond and be governed by the laws of “za’aama”. Secondly your examples of Assad’s “mercy”, “justice”, “generosity” and “wisdom” are laughable. (See the rest of Rami's comment in the comment section of the last post.) Landis replies: First, Fares, Thank you for your kind words. Second, Rami, thank you for your disagreement. I agree with the notion that there are important differences in the level of constitutionality and democratic political process observed in Lebanon and Syria. I don't agree that "za`ama" is not a useful concept for understanding Lebanese politics. To the contrary, it is central. Lebanon is the Noah's arch of za`ims (zu`ama pl. Arabic). The concept of "za`imism" in modern political science and anthropology has been hammered out using the Lebanese example. Arnold Hot