"The Syrian Opposition Gather in the US," by Joe Pace

Joe Pace attended the meeting of the Syrian Opposition across the Potomac in Northern Virginia at the Crystal City Marriott this weekend. It was organized by the Syrian National Council in the US, in cooperation with the Ahrar Movement and the Syrian National Council in Canada. I believe Joe was the only non-Syrian American to attend. He wrote this exclusive report for "Syria Comment." Thank you Joe, our intrepid man on the spot.

"Syria Opposition Meeting In Washington DC, January 29-30"
By Joe Pace
For "Syria Comment"
January 31, 2006

The conference, organized by the Syrian National Council and the Syrian Democratic Assembly of Canada, kicked off Saturday morning with speeches from prominent opposition figures who couldn’t attend, including Haythem al-Maleh (founder of the Human Rights Association of Syria), Najati Tayar (one of the founders of the Committee for the Revival of Civil Society) and Kamal al-Labwani (head of the Liberal Democratic Union who was arrested after returning from DC in November).

The conversation topics were human and women’s rights in Syria; coordination between the internal and external opposition for democratic change; strengthening dialogue with other Arab nations.

The most important moment came on the second day when the five recently release Damascus Spring prisoners and Suhar al-Attasi (head of the al-Attasi forum) made a conference call from Syria to address the Washington attendees. Former MP Riad Seif said referring to Syrian expatriates, “those outside of Syria are part of the Syrian people and there must be as much cooperation between us as possible.” Another former MP Mamum al-Homsi said “we need you to build Syria and to save the country.” The endorsement of coordination with expatriate groups by such prominent voices is going to weaken the contingent of the Syrian opposition that opposes any assistance from the West. An oft-repeated message throughout the conference was that expatriates need to make use of their proximity to elected officials and lobby for their respective governments to support human rights.

By most accounts, the conference was a success. The internal opposition figures came largely to scout out the opposition-in-exile since many activists in Syria remain skeptical about its agenda. I witnessed a pleasant surprise among all of them; one remarked that the most conservative Muslims at the conference were more enlightened and committed to democracy than many moderate Muslims in Syria. Others said that this meeting enhanced their faith in the Syrian opposition in North American and that they were convinced that further cooperation was crucial to pushing reform in Syria.

Six people from Syria participated: Samir Nashar who heads a liberal party in Aleppo; Jihad Masuti who is on the administrative committee for the Jamal al-Atassi forum; George Katan…..; Amar Qurabi who is the press spokesman for the Arab Organization for Human Rights; and Baheya Maradini who is a correspondent from al-Elaph (the website which is blocked in Syria because its main beat is the opposition). None of them wore fake nametags as reportedly happened at the Paris conference and none shied away from the cameras.

Opposition gatherings have a reputation of being hijacked by petty disagreements, clashing egos, and recriminations, but several participants expressed their pleasure at the cordiality and productiveness of this conference. “When I was in Germany for a meeting of intellectuals, nothing got accomplished because we couldn’t even bring people to sit down at the same table and talk to one another,” said one participant from Syria.

In fact, the only mudslinging came from a non-participant, Farid Ghadry, the president of the Reform Party of Syria who split off from the Syrian National Council last September, accusing the executive committee of being “Islamists loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood.” According to a story by the New York Sun, he impugned the Council’s credibility by pointing out that the father of one of its members, Husam ad-Dairi, was a Ba’thist and ambassador under Saddam Hussein. He also accused Husam of associating with Saddam’s two sons during his youth.

I had the following conversation with Husam ad-Dairi to clear up the accusations. (I requested an interview from Farid, but he declined.

Husam: Ghadry did not split off from the group because we are Baathists or Islamists. He split off because he was not willing to be part of the group; he only wanted to be a leader. He wanted to start a Syrian government in exile with 19 people in Washington DC. Who does that represent? So we opposed it. We said that we would not accept any attacks on religion. Many of us want a separation of religion and politics, but the Syrian National Council is a neutral assembly—it’s supposed to be a gathering of groups where everyone can discuss their viewpoint. We will not attack another opposition group, even if it has a religious orientation. It’s funny though that he should accuse us of being Islamists. I, for example, represent a liberal, democratic part.

Pace: What was your father’s relationship with the Iraqi Ba’ath party and your relationship with Saddam’s sons?

Husam: I left Iraq for the last time in 1988. For the last year and a half, I was not aloud to exist in the same vicinity as the sons because I had a personal conflict with Udday Hussein. This was an order by Saddam Hussein himself. As for my father, he was the Ambassador to Switzerland and he resigned in 1991 because he opposed the invasion of Kuwait. He never returned to Iraq.

Abdu ad-Dairi’s [the father] history is an open book. He stood against the Ba’ath party as it was under Saddam. If we want to talk about fathers, how about we open the book on Farid’s father? I’d like an open conversation about that. [he is referring to the fact that Farid’s father still has connections with the Syrian regime]

Of course, Mr. Ghadry, who heads the Reform Party of Syria is no novice at mudslinging. According to Riad at-Turk, Mr. Ghadry tried to secure his support but Riad refused. A month after an interview was published in which Riad called Ghadry’s analysis of the opposition “nonsense” and said that he had “absolutely no support” in Syria, Ghadry published an op-ed in the Washington Times calling Riad—one of the most liberal, vocal advocates for democracy in Syria—a “Stalinist.”
[end]

On the opposition:
Ammar Abdul Hamid, who participated in the conference wrote this summary on "Amarji."

Concern Mounts on Syria As Opposition Gathers - January 27, 2006 - NY Newspaper... The conference, to be held this Saturday and Sunday across the Potomac in Northern Virginia at the Crystal City Marriott, will gather about 100 activists against the dictatorship of Bashar Assad, drawing opposition leaders from America, Canada, France, Germany, and inside Syria. According to organizers, the summit - sponsored by an umbrella organization, the Syrian National Council - is meant to address, among its principal topics: cooperating with the West in order to bring about a peaceful democratic transition; highlighting and ending the human rights abuses of the Assad regime, and prompting the various parties of opposition operating in exile to "get together and get to know each other."

In phone interviews yesterday, Messrs. Aljbaili and Ghadry expressed concern and disappointment about their non-participation and the divide in the reform movement, tracing it to their opposition to a Baathist or Islamist Syria.

See this interview with Riad Said.: An Nahar Exclusive: Interview with released former Syrian MP Riad Saif (An Nahar) -1/2006. It has been translated, and is one of the three free translated articles offered by MidEastwire.com each day. This is an important new service. Check it out.

Why Lebanon Should Repair Relations with Syria

“Why Lebanon should accept Saudi mediation to end its cabinet crisis and repair relations with Syria”
By Joshua Landis
January 28, 2006

Many in Lebanon found my last post: “Hariri in US: What will he Get?" objectionable. Kais, who writes at “From Beirut to the Beltway,” said this:

I found Joshua Landis's commentary on Saad Hariri's visit to the US rather insulting. Joshua continues to interpret events through the Syrian regime's prism, which is unfortunate. This particular piece contained many presumptions and factual errors.

According to Landis, "Hariri wants to go back to Beirut. He will need Bush's help to do it, unless he is to accept the Jeddah formula and make peace with Bashar al-Asad and Hizbullah, which seems to be off the table for now. Junblat undercut that move quickly, but it looked as if Saad Hariri was ready to sign onto the Saudi deal and bow to Hizbullah."

Of course Joshua is conflating two separate things: the Saudi proposal to end the "crisis" between Lebanon and Syria and the Jeddah agreement to settle the cabinet crisis, which has to do with Hizbullah's status in the country. Saad may have backed out on the second after giving what could best be described as a conditional approval, but he never agreed to the Saudi proposal, which would have given Syria control of Lebanon all over again.

I appreciate Kais’ refusal to see the Jeddah agreement to settle the cabinet crisis in Lebanon and the Saudi attempt to broker a modus vivendi between Syria and Lebanon as being of a piece; nevertheless, I believe that the two are intimately related; one cannot be achieved without the other. Clearly Saudi Arabia sees them as two cars pulled by the same engine, meant to pull us out of the Lebanon crisis. Hizbullah does as well. So, undoubtedly, does Hariri.

To make peace with Hizbullah means accepting two conditions. First, Hizbullah demands that its "resistance" to Israel and its military status be recognized by the Lebanese government as legitimate national policy. Second, it “rejects agitation in Lebanon for any war against Syria,” referring to calls for regime change in Damascus.

These demands are also Syrian demands for they would have the result of undercutting UN resolutions 1559 and 1663, which target Syria. Resolution 1559 targets Syria, despite the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, because it calls for the disarming of Hizbullah (see Bolton's most recent demand that “Syria disarm Hizbullah” in compliance with 1559). 1663 targets Syria because it demands compliance with the Hariri murder investigation under threat of economic or military punishment. Hizbullah withdrew its members from the government in protest over Siniora’s demand to broaden 1663 to include all the recent assassinations as well as to establish an international court to convict the guilty. In order to end the cabinet crises and get Hizbullah to return its ministers, the March 14 alliance and Hariri are being asked to go easy on Syria. Syria’s main foreign policy goal is to get out from under these two UN resolutions, which could result in further economic or military harm to it.

It will be very difficult for Hariri to end the present cabinet crisis without consenting to these two Hizb demands (and also Syrian demands), both of which will put him at odds with the US, with his own followers, and with his conscience. I fully appreciate the difficult spot he is in.

I also do not believe that General Aoun is pro-Syria in the sense that he welcomes Syrian occupation. We all know of his long, and yes, honorable stand for Lebanese independence. On the other hand, his actions make it clear that he distinguishes between independence and accommodating Syrian interests. Now that Syrian troops are out of the country, he is looking for an accommodation. This is aided by his desire to become President, for which Shiite votes are crucial, being that he does not have the backing of either the Future Current or the US. In this sense, Aoun is seen to have become pro-Syrian by American authorities because he is proposing a "temporary" accommodation with Hizb, which puts him at odds with both Hariri’s and US policy. Syria appreciates Aoun’s position; the US does not. Hariri is the odd man out in this combination, hence the pressure on Hariri to come to an accommodation with Hizb and thereby push Aoun aside. Both Aoun and Hariri need to woo Hizb, Syria's ally, which brings us back to the connection between Saudi's two related attempts to patch up a truce between Hariri and Hizb and Hariri and Syria. Saudi wants its Lebanese ally, Hariri, to win by going back to Lebanon and dominating politics there. It wants Lebanon to prosper. We should not forget that Saudi Arabia is the country that will be footing the bill for Lebanon’s debt renegotiation and not the US.

Syria will not let Hariri return to Lebanon and dominate politics there unless Hariri separates himself from the two UN resolutions which target Syria.

Here we get back to Saad Hariri's dilemma. He has two choices. He can go back to Beirut if Asad is overthrown or placed in prison, or he can go back to Beirut if he accommodates Syrian and Hizb demands. In the first instance, he will have complete justice for his father's murder, in the second, he will not.

Now we must consider the likelihood of both outcomes. Will Resolution 1663 and the UN investigation of his father's murder result in Asad's downfall or imprisonment, which would be 100 percent justice? The probability is very small. Moreover, it is not clear that Washington is actually interested in Asad's downfall or imprisonment. Most analysts suggest Washington hopes only to weakening Asad, which - let us say - is equivalent to 70 percent justice. (By weakening, we would have to mean ensuring that Syria was not strong enough to threaten Saad on his return to Beirut and could not prevent the disarming of Hizbullah - both highly unlikely outcomes.)

What do the Saudis offer Hariri if he patches up relations with Hizb on the one hand and Syria on the other? They are offering him 50 percent justice. The UN investigation will go forward and continue to isolate, embarrass, and discomfort Syria, but President Asad will not be asked to testify and presumably he and his family members will avoid conviction, and Syria will avoid UN sanctions. This is what most Middle East states seem to be pushing for and what is most likely to be the outcome of the investigation. Let us suppose that Syrian security chieftains, such as Ghazale and Juma Juma, will be convicted. Hizbullah will also be allowed to keep its arms into the immediate future, and Hariri will have to write off the remaining articles of Resolution 1559. He will also have to soften his demand for an international court even though Western leaders believe, Mehlis has stated, and most Lebanese aver that Asad ordered his father’s death.

This may seem like scant justice to many Lebanese for Rafiq Bey’s murder, and they will argue that it is not equivalent to 50 percent justice. But we should also take into account that Rafiq was killed because he supported resolution 1559, which called for the complete withdrawal of Syrian troops and the disarming of Hizbullah and an end to resistance against Israel. Syrian troops are out of Lebanon and the country is no longer occupied, which is a lot. Rafiq’s death had a great deal to do with Syria’s withdrawal. It mobilized the Lebanese against Syria. Many see him as a martyr who gave his life for Lebanese independence, which in many respects he did. Syria paid a large price for Hariri’s death; it was not in vain.

Of course, some will argue that gaining independence from Syrian occupation is not sufficient. Why? Because Hizbullah remains armed, the resistance against Israel continues, and Syria retains residual influence over Lebanese politics through its Lebanese allies. Thus, Hariri’s goals were not fulfilled, they will argue.

The only response to this is that Hariri was never opposed to Syrian influence, as such; rather, he was opposed to Syria hindering Lebanon’s development and prosperity. That is why he worked closely with Syria during the 1980s, when Syria offered Lebanon a security umbrella and assisted its resurrection from civil war, and why he began to fall out with Syria during the 1990s, when Syria’s occupation became stifling.

It is clear where I am going with this argument, and we needn’t argue about percentages, no matter how distasteful they are in discussing justice. I don’t believe Lebanon will get 100% justice. I don’t believe it will get the 70% justice that some believe the US can deliver. I don’t think the US has a plan for getting Saad back to Beirut or for unseating Asad. I believe Bashar al-Asad is in a fairly strong position and will be ruling Syria for some time to come. One Lebanese said to me: “Washington is willing to fight Syria to the last Lebanese.” This is a glib summation, but it contains an element of truth. Some of the reasons the US is trying to weaken Asad have nothing to do with Lebanon or its present interests. The US did a tremendous favor to Lebanon by helping to push Syrian troops from its soil. It is not doing Lebanon a favor by pursuing the conflict with Syria ad-infinitum.

I think Saad Hariri should accept the 50% justice that Saudi Arabia believes it can attain. This will mean a big compromise on Hariri’s part, but it is one, I think, his father would have approved of. First, it will bring Saad back to Beirut where he is needed. Only the Sunnis can lead Lebanon now, but they must come to an accommodation with the Shiites. To do this, Saad must also find a way out of his war with Asad, which the Shiites insist he do. This will be the hardest part, but it can be done because Syria needs Hariri if it wants to get out from under the intense pressure of the UN, the threat of sanctions, and US cross hairs. Syria may have Hariri boxed out of Lebanon, but Hariri has Syria boxed out of world affairs. An accommodation does not have to be surrender. Syria will never control Lebanon as it did when its troops occupied the country. Hariri has bargaining power.

What is more, only Saad’s return and an end to the cabinet crisis will mean progress and prosperity for Lebanon, two things that Rafiq held higher than even his own welfare and safety. Those are the goals that Saad should be willing to sacrifice a hundred percent justice for. In the end, they are achievable and they are the ultimate recompense for his father’s death. The welfare of Lebanon is justice. That was Rafiq Bey’s goal and wish.

Some commentators have claimed that my suggestion that Saad Hariri compromise with Hizbullah and Syria is motivated either by a perverse love of Asad or hatred for Bush and American policy. It is neither. I do think that US policy is misguided because it is unrealizable. I believe that by pursuing confrontation and demanding 100% achievement of American goals, the US will attain much less, than the 50% it could get if it were willing to bend and compromise. Force is sometimes necessary. I don’t dispute that. But in this instance, it will fail.

By creating the sharp dichotomies between good and evil and by constantly relegating whole nations to catagories like the “axis of evil,” the United States has lost chances to reach accommodations that are acceptable. It has made perfection the enemy of the good. This was the case in Iraq with the disbanding of the army and demonization of Baathists. This uncompromising policy caused needless bloodshed and the likelihood of failure because it radicalized so many and created more enemies than America can defeat. Recent elections in Iran, Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt have demonstrated that the extremists have multiplied, not decreased. American militancy has provoked greater extremism. In all likelihood, Washington and Tel Aviv are now making the decision to cut crucial subsidies and funding to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, which will starve Palestinian society further. This will make a mockery of democracy. It will incite more radicalism. It will strengthen support for Hizbullah and Damascus and make them more certain of their success.

Sometimes, it is better to accept half a loaf than to insist on a whole one. Unilateralism cannot always work. That is why I believe the deal Saudi Arabia and Egypt are trying to obtain for the Lebanese and Syria is worth pursuing. I think the Lebanese who shoot it down are being unrealistic. They will not topple Bashar or disarm Hizbullah by fiat. Setting such goals is to court failure. Saad Hariri, I think, understands this. His supporters need to give him the maneuvering room to make a deal, come home, and continue his father’s legacy and vindicate his death by fixing an independent Lebanon.

Hariri in US: What will he Get?

Here is a tough condemnation of Syria by Bill Frist, (copied below) the Senate majority leader. He wants more action from Europe to force Syrian influence from Lebanon.

Part of the reason for Frist’s tough words is that Saad Hariri has been in Washington to meet President Bush. Yesterday he spoke at the Woodrow Wilson Institute in Washington DC. I couldn't make his talk as I was speaking at the Middle East Institute in DC at the time and then at Georgetown University with many other Syrianists, in what turned out to be an interesting series of panels organized by Michael Hudson and the Arab Studies Center.

One reporter told me that Hariri had asked George Bush for weapons and equipment to build up the Lebanese military. (A Daily Star article says he may get it.) Hariri spoke about Democracy and how important it was for Washington to support him and the Future Movement if it hoped to make any progress with its Reform of the Greater Middle East project. Hariri wants to go back to Beirut. He will need Bush's help to do it, unless he is to accept the Jeddah formula and make peace with Bashar al-Asad and Hizbullah, which seems to be off the table for now. Junblat undercut that move quickly, but it looked as if Saad Hariri was ready to sign onto the Saudi deal and bow to Hizbullah.

So Hariri came to Washington after Junblat and Dick Cheney scuttled the Saudi attempt to broker a truce between Shiites and Sunnis in Lebanon. Saad wants to know what George can do for him. He gets Frist's article for his troubles. And a nice statement by Rice -- see this: Rice vows to keep pressure on Syria. Rice said: "We will continue to make sure there is no intimidation of the Lebanese people."

Frist blames the Europeans for going soft on terror. He is asking the Europeans to get tough on Syria and Hizbullah. I guess America feels it has done about as much as it can in the way of unilateral sanctions, although I am sure it will find a few more measures to add to the long list it has already come up with to squeeze Syria and Hizbullah. Maybe Washington will give Hariri more arms so he can fight Hizbullah? What else can US authorities do other to send Hariri back empty handed. I guess it can ask Europe to get with the sanctions train. Good luck. A sad day for Saad. Saudi and Egypt have been running interference for Syria with the UN and the Hariri investigation.

There seems to be a consensus in the Middle East that Syria should be forced to pay a price - such as cutting loose a few security chieftains such as Ghazale - but that it shouldn't be destabilized by having the Asad family targeted, which Asad has made clear would lead to a direct confrontation with the international community. Europe has not declared Hizbullah a terrorist organization, which Frist is quick to point out in his finger-wagging article.

The fact that regional sentiment is blowing in Asad's direction was made clear by the Saudi attempt to broker a sulha between Syria and Lebanon. It was confirmed by General Aoun's recent statement that "his Free Patriotic Movement's closest ally in Lebanon was Hizbullah, as the two held similar views with regards to reform and other internal issues."

This statement by the most powerful Christian in Lebanon drove supporters of the Future Movement crazy. See Michael Young's recent op-ed in the Daily Star, in which he lambastes Aoun for all sorts of sins. It is a good example of the ire Aoun has stirred up. Aoun's biggest sin is clearly that he believes that the international community is going to hang the anti-Syrian Lebanese out to dry. I guess Aoun has some experience with the fickleness of the international community when it comes to supporting Lebanon against Syria. Aoun wants to be president of Lebanon, not to join Saad in exile. I guess Aoun is saying to himself - "Been there. Done that. Hariri, you take the high road this time and I will take the low road. Your dad was PM for over a decade. It is my turn before I join him in the great Baabda in the sky.

Aoun confirmed his stand on Thursday when he said the government should resign if it was unable to end a political crisis that has paralysed decision-making. Here is Reuters quoting Aoun:

"The government crisis ... is building up and we do not feel it is being remedied in a way that can bring results," Aoun said in an interview at his home in the hills above Beirut.

"What does a government do in this situation? If you ask me what I would do, I would resign."

Lebanon's government, dominated by anti-Syrian politicians who won a majority in parliament in elections last year, has been in crisis since five Shi'ite Muslim ministers began boycotting sessions last month. The boycott began after the cabinet voted for an international trial for suspects in the killing of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri last February.

You can be sure that Bashar is enjoying the Lebanese mud fight. He is also enjoying the Hamas victory in Palestine even if it means one more secular nationalist movement loses to Islamists. Like Mubarak, Asad will be smirking at US discomfiture as Washington sees its desire for democracy fulfilled. But Asad better not smirk too long, for the Hamas win also underscores what will happen to him should real elections be allowed in Syria.

Rice, speaking of a possible Hamas win, said last week, "there should be no place in the political process for groups or individuals who refuse to renounce terror and violence, recognize Israel's right to exist, and disarm." Now Washington will have to add the PA on its growing list of governments to sanction and call evil.

So what did Saad Hariri get from Washington that may permit him to return to Beirut? It doesn't seem like much besides words - and perhaps some arms. My guess is that Washington will have to start sending arms to show that it is willing to support Hariri with more than words. He has to be able to deliver something to his supporters to prove that Washington hasn't abandoned him. What will Washington do about Hizbullah if it won't let Hariri compromise with the militia backed party? Building up the Lebanese army is a risky strategy, but one that will have to be undertaken if Washington is going to fight "terror."

Economy

Meanwhile, Asad is making a number of smart economic moves. Syria has recently announced a few new large development contracts meant to boost tourism and investment.

Investors from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria received Wednesday an official approval to build a resort in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo with a total cost of $140 million. According to Kuna, the resort which includes three, four and five star hotels containing 900 beds. Recently, the largest tourism project in Syria was launched by Kuwaiti’s Mohammad Abdul-Mohsen Al-Kharafi Company and Syria’s InterContinental Hotel with a total cost of $236 million.

Dardari opened the Audi Bank main Branch in Syria. He also announced that several new Islamic banks would be opening shortly.

Syrian authorities also announced that the economy grew by %4.5 in 2005, which was slightly faster than expected and pulls Syria out of its recession, but isn't near the %7 figure needed to begin reducing its widespread unemployment.

Syria's three main ports in Banyas, Tartus and Latakia have seen increases in tonnage on the order of 25% this year. Tartus and Latakia are the big winners. The overland trade to Iraq is driving it. In 2004, Syria transported half of all the grain imported into Iraq though the Tartus port. A special WFP program managed by my brother-in-law, Mohamed el-Kouhene, was responsible for that.

The big economic news this past week, however, is that gas and cement prices were dramatically increased.

Syria raised the price of gasoline 24 percent on Thursday, largely to counter smuggling to neighboring states, the official Syrian Arab News Agency reported.

SANA said the price of a liter rose from 24.35 Syrian pounds (48 US cents) to 30 pounds (60 US cents). However, at 60 US cents a liter, Syrian gasoline is still relatively cheap. In Lebanon a liter costs 70 cents and in Turkey US$1.72. In Jordan a liter sells for 61 cents, almost the same as in Syria.

This hike in basic commodity prices has caused an uproar by Syrians. See the blogs and comment section of Syria-news. Readers of Syria Comment have been reporting on this in the comment section. But raising prices of gas and cement are necessary, if painful, adjustments Syria must make if it wants to balance its books, slow smuggling, and rationalize its economy. It is a sign that Asad is finding some political courage on the economic issues. These price hikes will certainly increase the gap between rich and poor and will spark some inflation in the short run. But in the long run, they should help reduce government expenditures and promote growth. They are long overdue.

Syria's new five year economic plan was officially launched this week. World Bank people that I have spoken to, who were involved in its gestation process, say it is a good plan if it is implemented. We will see.

Here is the Frist article:

Moving Toward Democracy

Washington DC, January 26, 2006/The New York Sun -
By Bill Frist, Majority leader of the US Senate

A year ago this month, a car bomb killed the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafic Hariri. An ongoing U.N. investigation has implicated the Syrian government in the murder. The Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, may have played a personal role. Several additional high-profile bombings have occurred in the last several months.

Enough is enough: Syria's actions in Lebanon have proven that it has no desire to play by the rules of civilized nations. Now, the United States and its partners need to ramp up the pressure on Damascus. We need to push Syria away from its homegrown brand of Arab fascism and toward democracy, peace, and an authentic end to its interference with Lebanon's affairs. We should start by increasing and expanding our funding for prodemocracy groups in Lebanon and Syria. In the coming Congress, I plan to support legislation that will do just that.
During my travels in Lebanon last year, I visit the late prime minister's grave and met with many of the political opposition leaders who rallied to end the overt Syrian occupation of Lebanon. These leaders have the support of the Lebanese people and at least some Syrians. Now, they need assistance from the international community.

Those who favor Syrian democracy have a difficult task. Since it invaded Lebanon in 1976, the government in Damascus has earned a place for itself on the roll call of the world's most dangerous regimes. The Assad regime funds terrorists, supports groups seeking to undermine the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, seeks weapons of mass destruction, and maintains a domestic police state based on the same fascist Baath ideology that animated Saddam Hussein's regime. Along with its ally in Iran, Syria funds Hezbollah bases in Southern Lebanon that the terrorist group uses to launch rocket attacks against Israel. Syria has also allowed Al Qaeda fighters to enter Iraq through its territory.

Despite the withdrawal of its regular military forces last year, Syrian intelligence agencies remain deeply involved with Lebanon's government, banks, and commercial enterprises. Prime Minister Hariri worked hard to end this interference in his nation's affairs. Like many others, he paid for these efforts with his life.

To honor his memory and restore full Lebanese sovereignty, the U.S. has to broaden its efforts in Syria. Since 2003, we have maintained a tough set of sanctions and restrictions on Syria that have helped isolate the nation. Increased funding for pro-democracy groups isn't enough by itself, however, and sanctions work best when they involve more than one country. To begin with, we need to redouble our efforts to force Syrian cooperation with U.N. investigators and bring Hariri's murderers to justice. And if Syria fails to respond and won't comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions, we need to press our allies to also place tough sanctions on Damascus.

Our allies in Europe have a stake in this effort, and the Bush administration should look for ways to strengthen our partnership with them. The European Union remains Syria's largest trade partner, sends foreign aid to Syria, and has yet to label Hezbollah a terrorist group. The Assad regime interprets this sort of half-hearted diplomacy as a sign of weakness: It's unlikely to modify its behavior as a result.

In the long term, I am convinced that the Syrian and Lebanese population will move their own nations toward democracy if given the chance. Without strong international backing, it may take decades for real change to happen. With support from the international community, however, we can compel Syria to disentangle itself from Lebanon's affairs, move toward democracy, and eventually take its rightful place in the community of nations.

Dr. Frist is majority leader of the United States Senate.
[end]

"Islamism in Syria" by Ibrahim Hamidi

Ibrahim Hamidi has the best articles on the spread of Islamism in Syria. See these articles from the January 4 issue of al-Hayat

4/01/2006 London-based paper argues Syria moving towards "Islamism"
Syrian society is moving increasingly towards Islamism, Ibrahim Hamidi has argued in an article published by London-based Arabic paper Al-Hayat. He said that there had been doubts about reported operations against militant cells by Syrian forces, noting that the timing often coincided with international pressure on Syria. But he went on to argue that these incidents and others point to a developing trend in which Syria is departing from a secular socialist past and witnessing increasing signs of an Islamist future. The following is the text of part one of a two-part report headlined: "Islamist streams on the march in Syria. The authorities launch 'pre-emptive strikes' against takfiri dens", published by London-based newspaper Al-Hayat website on 4 January; subheadings inserted editorially unless otherwise indicated:

The Syrian government's announcement that it recently uncovered and broke up several "takfiri cells" [Muslim trend that considers other Muslims as apostates] raises numerous questions. The first question pertains to the level of the Islamist threat to this country, whose "secular" political system has relied on a pan-Arab socialist-leftist ideology for many years. The ultimate question is how successfully the Syrian authorities can keep the Islamist genie in the bottle.

For the first time since the end of the violent clashes between the authorities and the Islamists in the mid-1980s the government announced at the end of April 2004 that it had foiled a "saboteur group's" attempt to attack a building formerly used as a UN office in Al-Mazzah neighbourhood in south Damascus. A few days later Syrian state television broadcast interviews with two of the culprits, during which they said that their motive was to "lift the injustice imposed on the Muslims". Official sources declared that three of the group's four members had gone to Iraq to fight after Saddam Husayn's regime collapsed in the spring of 2003. Among the group members was a man called Ayman Shlash who had run as a ruling Ba'th party candidate in the parliamentary elections in the spring of 2003.

The Al-Mazzah incident was a warning bell about the potential danger of the "Iraqi Arabs" like the "Afghan Arabs" before them, who had returned to their various Arab countries after their "jihad" experiment against the Soviets.


"Locally manufactured"
Several Western governments and some diplomats in Damascus cast doubt on the possibility that Syria was really in danger of "an Islamist terrorist threat". One US spokesman said that the operation had been "locally manufactured" to enable the Syrian government to claim that, rather than being a sponsor of terrorism as according to US terminology, it stood in the same trench as the rest of the world in combating terrorism.

These questions continued to occupy journalists and diplomats whenever an armed clash occurred between extremist groups and the Syrian "anti-terrorist squads" in the second half of 2005. There were reasons for these questions, namely, that all of the terrorist attacks were forestalled and foiled by the security forces and because the names of the "terrorists" who were captured or killed were generally the names of obscure individuals. Political timing was another factor for doubting the official Syrian accounts, for the announcements about these terrorist operations frequently coincided with mounting foreign political pressure on the country.


Jund al-Sham
The first operation, which was attributed to the "Jund al-Sham Organization for Unity and Jihad" occurred in mid-2005 when the security forces besieged a "terrorist cell" in Damascus' Daff al-Shawk neighbourhood. It was the first time that this group's name appeared in the official Syrian media.

In mid-June 2005 the state-owned newspaper Al-Thawrah and Syrian state television transmitted confessions by persons who were said to be members of the "cell". What was striking, however, was that the television station for the first time showed "Jund al-Sham" pamphlets that indicated that the organization embraces an ideological, political and military "project" against Greater Syria's political regimes and man-made laws. They also said that the group advocated violent means to establish an "Islamic emirate" or "caliphate" in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the Land of the Two Rivers [Iraq], currently under "Crusader" occupation. This was the substance of the pamphlets that Syrian government sources spoke of.

Ever since then Syrian official media has begun to make periodic announcements about "storming operations" to "break up" takfiri cells in Damascus, then Hamah, then Aleppo, and finally in Idlib at the beginning of December 2005. These were the cities that were the scenes of the most violent clashes between government forces and the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the late 1970s and early 1980s.


Reporting operations
The common denominator among all these operations is that the authorities have confined themselves to a terse official announcement broadcast by the Syrian News Agency, SANA, while television showed a few pictures of stores containing weapons, ammunition and explosive belts. Because it was difficult or impossible to "verify" these reports and exactly when each operation occurred, other media had to rely on the accounts given by official sources especially as eyewitnesses hesitated to tell their stories.

A striking point is that the official announcements altered their description of the extremist groups from "saboteur groups" to "terrorist cells" belonging to "Jund al-Sham". After the most recent incidents, official reports started calling them "takfiri cells" that had been planning to carry out "terrorist operations". The background behind this official change of terminology from "sabotage" to "takfiri" and "terrorism" remained obscure.

Arab experts who specialize in studying extremist Islamist groups believe that the "Jund al-Sham" organization was founded by Syrian, Palestinian and Jordanian individuals in Afghanistan in the 1990s and that it is linked to Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's "Al-Qa'idah of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers".

It is hard to know whether there is any connection between "Jund al-Sham" and other organizations that carry similar names. A group carrying the name "Jund al-Sham" claimed responsibility for a suicide operation in a British school in Doha in March 2005.

In 2004 a statement was released in Ayn al-Hulwah camp in Lebanon by a group carrying the name "Jund al-Sham". In April 2005 a group calling itself the "Group of Succour and Jihad in Greater Syria" claimed responsibility for Prime Minister Al-Hariri's assassination. It was not taken seriously by Lebanese, Arab and international circles.


A "takfiri" farm and the philosopher of doubt [subheading as published]
According to official sources, a recent operation occurred on a farm in Al-Hamidiyah village, close to the city of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, hometown of the famous Arab sceptic philosopher Abu-al-Ala al-Ma'arri in Idlib Governorate. It was very violent because it involved a "major headquarters of the fundamentalist groups". Eight died, three of whom blew themselves up with explosive belts in the same way used by Iraqi terrorists and the terrorists who carried out the simultaneous bombings in three Jordanian hotels in November 2005.

Informed sources said that the Syrian security forces arrived at dawn at the farm located on the side of the Damascus-Aleppo highway. The forces surrounded the place and asked all those who were inside the location to surrender. They refused. The security forces requested reinforcements and a helicopter arrived to show the fundamentalists that the government forces were serious. They were asked a second time to surrender but again they refused and indeed began to loudly denounce the security forces and call them infidels.



"Positive message" on Iraq
It is widely believed that the storming of this hideout came in the context of the official Syrian efforts to "combat the jihadists" who wish to go and fight the Americans in Iraq. Damascus, it is said, wished to send a positive message to the Americans and the British that it was "breaking up" networks that wished to back the insurgency in Iraq. This happened at a time when it was coming under international pressure regarding the investigation into Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri's assassination.

A Western diplomat said that he believes that "this hideout was used to smuggle weapons to Iraq". Official sources, however, said that the discovery of this hideout, "which belonged to an Arab fundamentalist organization," came as a result of confessions made by two persons who sustained serious wounds during a security raid that occurred in Aleppo's Al-Naqqarin neighbourhood two days before this operation. That raid, the official sources said, led to the discovery of an explosives factory in that region, which links northern Syria to central Iraq. SANA declared that the Aleppo group had been planning attacks on Syrian officials and government offices.


Al-Khaznawi assassination
In addition to these announced operations, it is believed that other operations occurred about which no announcements were made for security reasons. These operations undoubtedly indicate that Islamist communities in secular-pan-Arab Syria have started to breed certain fanatical groups. One should note at this point that in June 2005 an enlightened cleric, Shaykh Ma'shuq al-Khaznawi, was assassinated two weeks after he was abducted from a Damascus street.

Islamist parliament member Muhammad Habash attributed Al-Khaznawi's assassination to the wish of Salafi Muslims and extremists to dictate their own agenda both to their narrow conservative Islamist circles and also to the wider non-conservative Muslim community. Habash added that he received a death threat on his cellular telephone a few days prior to Al-Khaznawi's kidnapping because of the "enlightened and anti-fanatical ideas" that he embraces and advocates in his writings, the pamphlets published by the Islamic Studies Centres that he directs, and the Friday sermons that he delivers at Al-Zahra Mosque in Al-Mazzah neighbourhood.

Habash said that the uncovering of the "Jund al-Sham" organization and Al-Khaznawi's assassination come under the same heading of "religious fanaticism".

Meanwhile in June 2005 some Western newspapers including the Christian Science Monitor accused certain security circles in Syria of kidnapping and assassinating Al-Khaznawi because he held a meeting with the Muslim Brotherhood's leader in Brussels in February 2005. The brotherhood is a banned group in Syria in accordance with Law 49 of 1980.

Western diplomatic sources have explained the killing of Al-Khaznawi as the "meeting point" of three factors: the growing Islamism in the country, a political "opposition" that lacks broad popularity, and the Syrian Kurds who are organized in around 13 unlicensed political parties, which now enjoy regional status as a result of their political gains in Iraq and the international popular support they get in Europe. The Syrian government has denied this and asserted that Al-Khaznawi's kidnapping from Damascus followed by his torture and murder was merely a criminal action according to the confessions made by the abductors even before his body was found buried in a grave in Dayr al-Zur in northeastern Syria.



Towards Islamism
Parliamentary deputy Habash, who founded the Islamic Studies Centre, is one of the people who are following the movement of Syrian society towards Islamism in a country that has long been regarded as secular and that has long struggled to maintain a pan-Arab, progressive, and secularist character.

Habash formerly told Al-Hayat that he believes that around 80 per cent of the Syrian people are conservative and 20 per cent are reformist and that only one per cent of them are fanatical. He warned, however, that the "80 per cent have no political project and whenever they think of politics, they search for a leader or a cleric who might either be a reformist or a hardliner."

One official expert said: "Not all the conservatives are searching for a leader or a shaykh because the stream that is demanding pluralism and democracy is widespread among conservatives and reformists alike."

Others believe that the Syrians are conservative by nature and that pan-Arab ideology arose in the country at the end of the 19th century when "the sick man of Europe, that is, Ottoman Turkey" grew feeble and the Ottoman Empire, which Islamist ideologues now regard as a 400-year extension of the Islamic Caliphate, began to collapse.

Symbolic signs [subheading as published]
An observation of the apparent changes in the country and its population makes it seem probable that the secular-pan-Arab Syria is becoming increasingly Islamist. This can be seen through symbolic signs like wearing the veil and the proliferation in bookshops of Islamic books instead of communist writings and "Soviet novels". Indeed the large bookshop that lies opposite the Russian Cultural Centre in Damascus's 29 May Street has become one of the largest distributors of religious books and an advanced centre of disseminating religious culture. Formerly the bookshops on this street were full of Marxist books and were frequented by customers who had freed themselves of many local social restrictions.

Coinciding with the increasingly familiar scene of bearded young Syrian men wearing short jallabah as a sign of "Islamic Salafism" most of the restaurants on the Barada River and the Ayn al-Khadra and Al-Fayja neighbourhood on the outskirts of Damascus have stopped offering alcoholic beverages on their menus and have set aside separate sections for families in compliance with conservative social traditions. Indeed these restaurants are now vying with each other to hang the portraits of famous clerics on the walls.

During this year's month of Ramadan Damascus inhabitants in rich neighbourhood started to hang pictures with Islamic themes from their balconies. During last year's Ramadan one citizen in the township of Jurmana, which has a Christian community, was jailed because he "behaved in a way contrary to public morality" by smoking in public while others were fasting.

These Islamist signs become increasingly clear the further we get away from Damascus and into rural Syria. It is precisely such rural areas that were in the past scenes of violent clashes between the Muslim Brotherhood and the authorities.

Al-Hayat previously noted that the red colours of the slogan "We will crush the Muslim Brotherhood gang, the puppet of imperialism and Zionism," which had been daubed on a wall, had started to fade. New slogans written in bright green are starting to appear on the highway between the capital and Ma'arrat al-Nu'man. They state: "Do not forget to mention God," and "Pray for the prophet." These slogans have replaced earlier mottos that spoke of secularism, communism and Arab nationalism, for example "No life in this country except for progressiveness and socialism."

In addition to these new slogans green domes are increasing in number in several Syrian villages and towns, with the best specimens rising alongside the highways.

Furthermore, Akram al-Jundi, an inhabitant of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man and the first Syrian citizen to obtain a licence to operate a private television station, which he did in the early 1960s, insists on broadcasting religious programmes on his channel, which has a capital of 12m dollars which he gathered during his work in the Gulf.

When you visit villages and rural neighbourhood, you can hear stories that explain what is happening. In the village of Urum al-Jawz, located in rough mountainous terrain that had once been a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold and a scene of armed clashes, the young man Muhammad al-Nuri could in the past declare openly that he was a communist, for example, or defy local social traditions in the way he dressed and behaved. Fasting was not compulsory in those days and young women rarely wore the Islamic veil. Today, however, the rebellious young man has become a shaykh or at least a conservative man who clings to social traditions. He believes that "Islam is the alternative solution" to communist ideology, which he learnt in a Soviet university and from paperbacks that were given as gifts to Syrian young men.



Story of a generation
The story of Muhammad, who is now in his fifties, tells the story of an entire Syrian generation. Muhammad studied in Moscow in the 1980s and returned as a learned and rebellious man to educate the villagers in "secularism". Two decades later he had surrendered to the power of society and traditions. Indeed Muhammad is now more religiously committed than Ahmad Yusuf, who calls himself the young men's friend, who returned to the village after 10 years in Saudi Arabia, bringing with him conservative Islamist slogans mixed with some Salafi ideas and many Gulf customs in dress and daily behaviour.

In the past the competition between the two "rebellious" young men focused on digging away at the foundations of the strong wall of traditions and social customs because their enthusiasm was strong and their dreams of change were bigger than the village's few scattered houses. Today the competition is focused in reverse and tends to bolster the wall of traditions and attain a greater level of stringent religious commitment. To the local society today, a "virtuous" young man is someone who spends a greater part of his time at the large mosque that was built a few years ago next to the highway so that travellers between Aleppo and the coastal city of Latakia could see it. It replaced the old mosque that was located in a remote corner of the village. In this way the mosque would tell the millions passing along the road in their cars: Look and see how committed we are to our religion.

Hajj Ahmad, as he came to be called after returning from his expatriate years in the Gulf, was at the forefront of the effort to collect donations to build the "Al-Iman" [faith] Mosque on a hill in Urum al-Jawz. Shaykh Muhammad now sends his four children to this mosque to study religion. Formerly he dreamed of building a cultural centre or a large clinic on one of the village hills. His two boys fast in Ramadan and the two girls started wearing the veil before reaching the age of 10. Just as a reminder, this "shaykh" planned in his youth to marry a Soviet woman and have unveiled liberal daughters, just as several thousand other Syrians who studied in the Eastern Bloc used to dream.

Simply put, the experiences of these two men in the past two decades are a specimen of the transformation in the ranks of a generation whose government made ardent efforts to turn society into a modern civil society. The efforts failed and brought about contrary results.

Source: Al-Hayat website, London, in Arabic 4 Jan 06

"Islamism in Syria" by Ibrahim Hamidi

Ibrahim Hamidi has the best articles on the spread of Islamism in Syria. See these articles from the January 4 issue of al-Hayat

4/01/2006 London-based paper argues Syria moving towards "Islamism"
Syrian society is moving increasingly towards Islamism, Ibrahim Hamidi has argued in an article published by London-based Arabic paper Al-Hayat. He said that there had been doubts about reported operations against militant cells by Syrian forces, noting that the timing often coincided with international pressure on Syria. But he went on to argue that these incidents and others point to a developing trend in which Syria is departing from a secular socialist past and witnessing increasing signs of an Islamist future. The following is the text of part one of a two-part report headlined: "Islamist streams on the march in Syria. The authorities launch 'pre-emptive strikes' against takfiri dens", published by London-based newspaper Al-Hayat website on 4 January; subheadings inserted editorially unless otherwise indicated:

The Syrian government's announcement that it recently uncovered and broke up several "takfiri cells" [Muslim trend that considers other Muslims as apostates] raises numerous questions. The first question pertains to the level of the Islamist threat to this country, whose "secular" political system has relied on a pan-Arab socialist-leftist ideology for many years. The ultimate question is how successfully the Syrian authorities can keep the Islamist genie in the bottle.

For the first time since the end of the violent clashes between the authorities and the Islamists in the mid-1980s the government announced at the end of April 2004 that it had foiled a "saboteur group's" attempt to attack a building formerly used as a UN office in Al-Mazzah neighbourhood in south Damascus. A few days later Syrian state television broadcast interviews with two of the culprits, during which they said that their motive was to "lift the injustice imposed on the Muslims". Official sources declared that three of the group's four members had gone to Iraq to fight after Saddam Husayn's regime collapsed in the spring of 2003. Among the group members was a man called Ayman Shlash who had run as a ruling Ba'th party candidate in the parliamentary elections in the spring of 2003.

The Al-Mazzah incident was a warning bell about the potential danger of the "Iraqi Arabs" like the "Afghan Arabs" before them, who had returned to their various Arab countries after their "jihad" experiment against the Soviets.


"Locally manufactured"
Several Western governments and some diplomats in Damascus cast doubt on the possibility that Syria was really in danger of "an Islamist terrorist threat". One US spokesman said that the operation had been "locally manufactured" to enable the Syrian government to claim that, rather than being a sponsor of terrorism as according to US terminology, it stood in the same trench as the rest of the world in combating terrorism.

These questions continued to occupy journalists and diplomats whenever an armed clash occurred between extremist groups and the Syrian "anti-terrorist squads" in the second half of 2005. There were reasons for these questions, namely, that all of the terrorist attacks were forestalled and foiled by the security forces and because the names of the "terrorists" who were captured or killed were generally the names of obscure individuals. Political timing was another factor for doubting the official Syrian accounts, for the announcements about these terrorist operations frequently coincided with mounting foreign political pressure on the country.


Jund al-Sham
The first operation, which was attributed to the "Jund al-Sham Organization for Unity and Jihad" occurred in mid-2005 when the security forces besieged a "terrorist cell" in Damascus' Daff al-Shawk neighbourhood. It was the first time that this group's name appeared in the official Syrian media.

In mid-June 2005 the state-owned newspaper Al-Thawrah and Syrian state television transmitted confessions by persons who were said to be members of the "cell". What was striking, however, was that the television station for the first time showed "Jund al-Sham" pamphlets that indicated that the organization embraces an ideological, political and military "project" against Greater Syria's political regimes and man-made laws. They also said that the group advocated violent means to establish an "Islamic emirate" or "caliphate" in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the Land of the Two Rivers [Iraq], currently under "Crusader" occupation. This was the substance of the pamphlets that Syrian government sources spoke of.

Ever since then Syrian official media has begun to make periodic announcements about "storming operations" to "break up" takfiri cells in Damascus, then Hamah, then Aleppo, and finally in Idlib at the beginning of December 2005. These were the cities that were the scenes of the most violent clashes between government forces and the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the late 1970s and early 1980s.


Reporting operations
The common denominator among all these operations is that the authorities have confined themselves to a terse official announcement broadcast by the Syrian News Agency, SANA, while television showed a few pictures of stores containing weapons, ammunition and explosive belts. Because it was difficult or impossible to "verify" these reports and exactly when each operation occurred, other media had to rely on the accounts given by official sources especially as eyewitnesses hesitated to tell their stories.

A striking point is that the official announcements altered their description of the extremist groups from "saboteur groups" to "terrorist cells" belonging to "Jund al-Sham". After the most recent incidents, official reports started calling them "takfiri cells" that had been planning to carry out "terrorist operations". The background behind this official change of terminology from "sabotage" to "takfiri" and "terrorism" remained obscure.

Arab experts who specialize in studying extremist Islamist groups believe that the "Jund al-Sham" organization was founded by Syrian, Palestinian and Jordanian individuals in Afghanistan in the 1990s and that it is linked to Abu-Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's "Al-Qa'idah of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers".

It is hard to know whether there is any connection between "Jund al-Sham" and other organizations that carry similar names. A group carrying the name "Jund al-Sham" claimed responsibility for a suicide operation in a British school in Doha in March 2005.

In 2004 a statement was released in Ayn al-Hulwah camp in Lebanon by a group carrying the name "Jund al-Sham". In April 2005 a group calling itself the "Group of Succour and Jihad in Greater Syria" claimed responsibility for Prime Minister Al-Hariri's assassination. It was not taken seriously by Lebanese, Arab and international circles.


A "takfiri" farm and the philosopher of doubt [subheading as published]
According to official sources, a recent operation occurred on a farm in Al-Hamidiyah village, close to the city of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, hometown of the famous Arab sceptic philosopher Abu-al-Ala al-Ma'arri in Idlib Governorate. It was very violent because it involved a "major headquarters of the fundamentalist groups". Eight died, three of whom blew themselves up with explosive belts in the same way used by Iraqi terrorists and the terrorists who carried out the simultaneous bombings in three Jordanian hotels in November 2005.

Informed sources said that the Syrian security forces arrived at dawn at the farm located on the side of the Damascus-Aleppo highway. The forces surrounded the place and asked all those who were inside the location to surrender. They refused. The security forces requested reinforcements and a helicopter arrived to show the fundamentalists that the government forces were serious. They were asked a second time to surrender but again they refused and indeed began to loudly denounce the security forces and call them infidels.



"Positive message" on Iraq
It is widely believed that the storming of this hideout came in the context of the official Syrian efforts to "combat the jihadists" who wish to go and fight the Americans in Iraq. Damascus, it is said, wished to send a positive message to the Americans and the British that it was "breaking up" networks that wished to back the insurgency in Iraq. This happened at a time when it was coming under international pressure regarding the investigation into Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri's assassination.

A Western diplomat said that he believes that "this hideout was used to smuggle weapons to Iraq". Official sources, however, said that the discovery of this hideout, "which belonged to an Arab fundamentalist organization," came as a result of confessions made by two persons who sustained serious wounds during a security raid that occurred in Aleppo's Al-Naqqarin neighbourhood two days before this operation. That raid, the official sources said, led to the discovery of an explosives factory in that region, which links northern Syria to central Iraq. SANA declared that the Aleppo group had been planning attacks on Syrian officials and government offices.


Al-Khaznawi assassination
In addition to these announced operations, it is believed that other operations occurred about which no announcements were made for security reasons. These operations undoubtedly indicate that Islamist communities in secular-pan-Arab Syria have started to breed certain fanatical groups. One should note at this point that in June 2005 an enlightened cleric, Shaykh Ma'shuq al-Khaznawi, was assassinated two weeks after he was abducted from a Damascus street.

Islamist parliament member Muhammad Habash attributed Al-Khaznawi's assassination to the wish of Salafi Muslims and extremists to dictate their own agenda both to their narrow conservative Islamist circles and also to the wider non-conservative Muslim community. Habash added that he received a death threat on his cellular telephone a few days prior to Al-Khaznawi's kidnapping because of the "enlightened and anti-fanatical ideas" that he embraces and advocates in his writings, the pamphlets published by the Islamic Studies Centres that he directs, and the Friday sermons that he delivers at Al-Zahra Mosque in Al-Mazzah neighbourhood.

Habash said that the uncovering of the "Jund al-Sham" organization and Al-Khaznawi's assassination come under the same heading of "religious fanaticism".

Meanwhile in June 2005 some Western newspapers including the Christian Science Monitor accused certain security circles in Syria of kidnapping and assassinating Al-Khaznawi because he held a meeting with the Muslim Brotherhood's leader in Brussels in February 2005. The brotherhood is a banned group in Syria in accordance with Law 49 of 1980.

Western diplomatic sources have explained the killing of Al-Khaznawi as the "meeting point" of three factors: the growing Islamism in the country, a political "opposition" that lacks broad popularity, and the Syrian Kurds who are organized in around 13 unlicensed political parties, which now enjoy regional status as a result of their political gains in Iraq and the international popular support they get in Europe. The Syrian government has denied this and asserted that Al-Khaznawi's kidnapping from Damascus followed by his torture and murder was merely a criminal action according to the confessions made by the abductors even before his body was found buried in a grave in Dayr al-Zur in northeastern Syria.



Towards Islamism
Parliamentary deputy Habash, who founded the Islamic Studies Centre, is one of the people who are following the movement of Syrian society towards Islamism in a country that has long been regarded as secular and that has long struggled to maintain a pan-Arab, progressive, and secularist character.

Habash formerly told Al-Hayat that he believes that around 80 per cent of the Syrian people are conservative and 20 per cent are reformist and that only one per cent of them are fanatical. He warned, however, that the "80 per cent have no political project and whenever they think of politics, they search for a leader or a cleric who might either be a reformist or a hardliner."

One official expert said: "Not all the conservatives are searching for a leader or a shaykh because the stream that is demanding pluralism and democracy is widespread among conservatives and reformists alike."

Others believe that the Syrians are conservative by nature and that pan-Arab ideology arose in the country at the end of the 19th century when "the sick man of Europe, that is, Ottoman Turkey" grew feeble and the Ottoman Empire, which Islamist ideologues now regard as a 400-year extension of the Islamic Caliphate, began to collapse.

Symbolic signs [subheading as published]
An observation of the apparent changes in the country and its population makes it seem probable that the secular-pan-Arab Syria is becoming increasingly Islamist. This can be seen through symbolic signs like wearing the veil and the proliferation in bookshops of Islamic books instead of communist writings and "Soviet novels". Indeed the large bookshop that lies opposite the Russian Cultural Centre in Damascus's 29 May Street has become one of the largest distributors of religious books and an advanced centre of disseminating religious culture. Formerly the bookshops on this street were full of Marxist books and were frequented by customers who had freed themselves of many local social restrictions.

Coinciding with the increasingly familiar scene of bearded young Syrian men wearing short jallabah as a sign of "Islamic Salafism" most of the restaurants on the Barada River and the Ayn al-Khadra and Al-Fayja neighbourhood on the outskirts of Damascus have stopped offering alcoholic beverages on their menus and have set aside separate sections for families in compliance with conservative social traditions. Indeed these restaurants are now vying with each other to hang the portraits of famous clerics on the walls.

During this year's month of Ramadan Damascus inhabitants in rich neighbourhood started to hang pictures with Islamic themes from their balconies. During last year's Ramadan one citizen in the township of Jurmana, which has a Christian community, was jailed because he "behaved in a way contrary to public morality" by smoking in public while others were fasting.

These Islamist signs become increasingly clear the further we get away from Damascus and into rural Syria. It is precisely such rural areas that were in the past scenes of violent clashes between the Muslim Brotherhood and the authorities.

Al-Hayat previously noted that the red colours of the slogan "We will crush the Muslim Brotherhood gang, the puppet of imperialism and Zionism," which had been daubed on a wall, had started to fade. New slogans written in bright green are starting to appear on the highway between the capital and Ma'arrat al-Nu'man. They state: "Do not forget to mention God," and "Pray for the prophet." These slogans have replaced earlier mottos that spoke of secularism, communism and Arab nationalism, for example "No life in this country except for progressiveness and socialism."

In addition to these new slogans green domes are increasing in number in several Syrian villages and towns, with the best specimens rising alongside the highways.

Furthermore, Akram al-Jundi, an inhabitant of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man and the first Syrian citizen to obtain a licence to operate a private television station, which he did in the early 1960s, insists on broadcasting religious programmes on his channel, which has a capital of 12m dollars which he gathered during his work in the Gulf.

When you visit villages and rural neighbourhood, you can hear stories that explain what is happening. In the village of Urum al-Jawz, located in rough mountainous terrain that had once been a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold and a scene of armed clashes, the young man Muhammad al-Nuri could in the past declare openly that he was a communist, for example, or defy local social traditions in the way he dressed and behaved. Fasting was not compulsory in those days and young women rarely wore the Islamic veil. Today, however, the rebellious young man has become a shaykh or at least a conservative man who clings to social traditions. He believes that "Islam is the alternative solution" to communist ideology, which he learnt in a Soviet university and from paperbacks that were given as gifts to Syrian young men.



Story of a generation
The story of Muhammad, who is now in his fifties, tells the story of an entire Syrian generation. Muhammad studied in Moscow in the 1980s and returned as a learned and rebellious man to educate the villagers in "secularism". Two decades later he had surrendered to the power of society and traditions. Indeed Muhammad is now more religiously committed than Ahmad Yusuf, who calls himself the young men's friend, who returned to the village after 10 years in Saudi Arabia, bringing with him conservative Islamist slogans mixed with some Salafi ideas and many Gulf customs in dress and daily behaviour.

In the past the competition between the two "rebellious" young men focused on digging away at the foundations of the strong wall of traditions and social customs because their enthusiasm was strong and their dreams of change were bigger than the village's few scattered houses. Today the competition is focused in reverse and tends to bolster the wall of traditions and attain a greater level of stringent religious commitment. To the local society today, a "virtuous" young man is someone who spends a greater part of his time at the large mosque that was built a few years ago next to the highway so that travellers between Aleppo and the coastal city of Latakia could see it. It replaced the old mosque that was located in a remote corner of the village. In this way the mosque would tell the millions passing along the road in their cars: Look and see how committed we are to our religion.

Hajj Ahmad, as he came to be called after returning from his expatriate years in the Gulf, was at the forefront of the effort to collect donations to build the "Al-Iman" [faith] Mosque on a hill in Urum al-Jawz. Shaykh Muhammad now sends his four children to this mosque to study religion. Formerly he dreamed of building a cultural centre or a large clinic on one of the village hills. His two boys fast in Ramadan and the two girls started wearing the veil before reaching the age of 10. Just as a reminder, this "shaykh" planned in his youth to marry a Soviet woman and have unveiled liberal daughters, just as several thousand other Syrians who studied in the Eastern Bloc used to dream.

Simply put, the experiences of these two men in the past two decades are a specimen of the transformation in the ranks of a generation whose government made ardent efforts to turn society into a modern civil society. The efforts failed and brought about contrary results.

Source: Al-Hayat website, London, in Arabic 4 Jan 06

Who Killed Hariri? The "Pushed Against the Wall" Thesis" as elaborated by Nasrallah and Asad

Who killed Hariri? This is the question that runs through Hassan Nasrallah's interview with al-Hayat. Nasrallah, the leader of Hizbullah, absolves Syria of responsibility, but he also tries to explain the context which led to Hariri's murder. He blames Walid Jumblatt's intransigent refusal to reconcile with the Syrians in December 2004 and join a Hariri government under Lahoud for leading to Hariri's death. It is in this context that Hariri's murder, according to Nasrallah, becomes understandable. In his explanation of the context, Nasrallah elaborates the "Syria Pushed to the Wall" thesis.

The complete Nasrallah interview with al-Hayat is now available in English at (Dar Al-Hayat). T_desco, who has been following the Lebanon wrangle closely, underlines the importance of this interview, because Nasrallah is quite frank about his reading of Syrian-Lebanese relations and their history.

Nasrallah claims that Bashar al-Asad does not want to return to Lebanon to control its affairs as it did in the past. "When I said in an interview that Syria did not want to return to Lebanon in the way that prevailed in the past, I meant it, and I know this," Nasrallah says. All the same Nasrallah is outspoken about his belief that Syria will always have a role in Lebanon. He argues that the present forces who oppose Syria are bad for Lebanese interests because they are determined to overturn the Syrian government, which will only provoke war between the two countries. More importantly, he claims they will lose. Here are his words:

Today, I'm not working to re-introduce Syrian forces in Lebanon, or re-introducing Syrian intelligence here, or Syrian influence. By the way, whether or not we like it, or whether or not others like it, Syria has influence in Lebanon that no one can eliminate, due to what is said about common factors of history and geography, and a network of interests, and the intersection of family and social relations.

There's another goal that we're working for. We reject fighting Syria from Lebanon. We reject seeing Lebanese involved in any project to bring down the Syrian regime. This is dangerous for Syria and Lebanon. Due to Lebanese, national reasons, we believe that any war, in terms of politics, security or the media, not to speak of a military war that some of them want to drag Lebanon into, represents something that is against Lebanese national interests, regardless of the pan-Arab issue, or Israel, or the strategic situation in the region, because it is a losing war, based on all criteria and balances of power. What we're saying today is that in Lebanon, there are those who want to bring down the regime in Syria.

Nasrallah claims his fight is with Junblat and others, less vocal, who want to overturn the Syrian regime with US support. He regrets that an understanding with Syria has been torpedoed. He says:

The final attempt, in Jeddah, between King Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz and President Bashar al-Assad was an attempt to arrange things between Lebanon and Syria, in a way that puts Lebanon at ease, and puts Syria at ease as well, providing an opportunity for the investigation to be concluded. Before anyone knew what happened during this meeting, the attacks began from Lebanon, of course using
language that was less (harsh) than what the secretary general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, was subject to. I have the feeling that in Lebanon there are those who don't want any kind of understanding to be reached with Syria, under any consideration, and some of those are the most fearful about revealing the truth about the assassination of Prime Minister al-Hariri.

Nasrallah argues that Hizbullah did not benefit politically from Syria's presence in Lebanon as others parties did.

al Hayat: There are those who say that Hizbullah has a program to see Syrian influence return to Lebanon.

Sayyed Nasrallah (Laughs): First of all, this is a charge that has no evidence behind it. Second, if we take Hizbullah, how has it benefited from the Syrian presence in Lebanon? I'm not talking about the last 30 years, since Hizbullah didn't exist prior to 1982. From 1982 until the present, when Syrian forces exited Lebanon, how has Hizbullah benefited from the Syrian presence in Lebanon? How has Junblatt benefited? Or the many, many others?

Let's talk about the period of Syria's presence in Lebanon. First of all, our presence in state administrations: we don't have any presence. On the contrary, the doors have been closed to us when it comes to the bureaucracy. As for the regions in which we are active, and in which we enjoy a moral and popular influence, deprivation and poverty have increased. We haven't benefited in terms of state positions, or projects, or development, or official political power, or in any domain where others have benefited. Therefore, we have no problem with whoever wants to judge this period; in fact we are comfortable about the topic because we were "outside" (the equation).

Of course, the Syrian presence in Lebanon concerned us in two respects. First, the principal factor involved securing domestic stability, due to the fragility of the situation. Second, this presence constituted a protective shield for the resistance against the Israeli occupation. Therefore, my position on Syria is subject to national and strategic considerations, and not personal calculations, or party-based calculations, or short-term interests. I didn't support Syria in Lebanon because I would receive positions in state administrations, or because it would secure projects for me, or give me a budget to work with, or ministers, or MPs in Parliament. That's how they work. On the contrary, the Syrian committee that used to manage Lebanese affairs up to 2000 would purposely ignore Hizbullah when it came to the Lebanese domestic (political) formula.

Sayyed Nasrallah: There are many such people, including Walid Jumblatt, who call for US troops to occupy Syria and eliminate the regime, like they did in Iraq. This is clear. He has called on the Syrian opposition to receive assistance from outside the country. Walid Jumblatt is distinguished by the fact that he says what he wants. There are others who do things and don't say anything. Don't ask me who these people are; when they say so, I'll tell you. In our opinion, this is dangerous for Lebanon. Today, our problem is that some of them want us to be part of their open war against Syria, and we reject this. The problem isn't that they don't want Syrian influence in Lebanon, while we do. This is not true.

Who is responsible for the deterioration of Lebanese-Syrian relations on the eve of Hariri's assassination on February 14, 2005? Nasrallah blames Junblatt and claims that Asad was trying to reconcile with Junblatt. Of course, this is a highly self-interested version because of the recent hostile exchange between Nassrallah and Junblatt, in which the Druze warlord stepped up his campaign against the Shiite warlord, claiming his party's allegiance to Iran and Syria overshadowed its loyalty to Lebanon.

Also, it must be remembered that at the time Nasrallah's attempted reconciliation between Asad and Jumblatt Syria had just extended Lahoud's presidency in contravention to the Lebanese constitution and was trying to impose its will on Hariri and Jumblatt. Hamadeh, Jumblatt's ally, had just been almost killed in an effort to intimidate Junblatt. Here are Nasrallah's words about the atmosphere during the week before Hariri's murder:

I realized that Walid Jumblatt had no serious intention of reconciling with the Syrians, even prior to PM Hariri's assassination, and that Walid Jumblatt had taken the decision to enter into a conflict with this regime. Even so, I believe that what he said at the Bristol was hurtful to me personally, as a mediator, and to Prime Minister al-Hariri, who was enthusiastic about the mediation, and to the Syrians themselves. It was clear, and I can attest to the fact that this was the climate prior to PM Hariri's assassination.

President al-Assad demonstrated the required positive reaction to overcome the problem with Walid Jumblatt, but Walid Jumblatt insisted on clashing with the regime in Syria. After al-Hariri's assassination, things became more difficult. It was no longer possible to talk about mediation.

Nasrallah even obliquely accuses Jumblatt’s refusal to reconcile with Asad for creating the atmosphere of confrontation with Syria which led to Hariri's death. According to Nasrallah, Rafik al-Hariri was ready to make up with the Syrians after the September 2004 Lahoud extension (which Hariri begrudgingly facilitated). Hariri told Nasrallah in December 2004 that he was prepared to form a government, but only if it included Walid Jumblatt. (Hamadeh was almost killed in October, well before this December effort to bring him back into the Syrian game.) Nasrallah explains:

We even worked with our Syrian brethren to clarify that the circumstances, and the country's interest, after [Lahoud's] extension, required that Prime Minister al-Hariri form the new government. However, al-Hariri said to me, "I have a problem with forming a government without Walid Jumblatt. In light of the difficult climate between Jumblatt and the Syrians, it will be hard to form a Cabinet. I want you to help me regarding Jumblatt, and his relationship with
the Syrians.

Jumblatt refused to reconcile, having already committed himself to UN Resolution 1559 and the Franco-American effort to yank Lebanon out of Syria's sphere of influence and into their own. According to Nasrallah, this is the key to the context of Hariri's assassination.

The logic of Nasrallah's history and explanation could also be used to explain why Syria killed Hariri, even though Nasrallah insists on pointing the finger variously at Israel, al-Qa'ida, or other obscure anti-Syrian and anti-"resistance" forces. Here is my reading: Syria believed that Lahoud is the key to its grip on Lebanon and its interests there so Bashar extended Lahoud's presidency, despite US and French admonitions not to. Hariri was willing to re-enter the circle of Syrian domination, despite his humiliation at the hands of Bashar over the Lahoud affaire, but only if Jumblatt would also reconcile with Syria and join his government. Jumblatt refused, going over to the dark side. Hariri begins to go over to the dark side with Junblatt. Syria takes him out. In Nasrallah's "resistance" logic, this is not really Syria's fault, but Jumblatt’s. Syria, which, in Nasrallah's view, still stands for "pan-Arab" interests, has been pushed to the wall by the West. Anyone who joins this pressure becomes a "traitor" and plays with fire. Thus, it is not Syria (even if it pulled the trigger) but the forces alligned against Syria who are the real assassins.

Bashar al-Asad has tried to bolster this line of reasoning. In an interview last October 7 with Jihad El Khazen, Asad claimed that France and the US had already made the decision to gin up a Security Council Resolution against Syria's presence in Lebanon as early as June 2004. Thus Lahoud's extension was a defensive move to fortify Syria's team in Lebanon and not an aggressive initiation of the tit for tat war that resulted in Hariri's murder. Here is how al-Khazen summarized his two-hour interview with Bashar al-Asad:

President al-Assad links the extension of President Emile Lahoud's mandate to the battle in which France and the US joined forces against Syria, each for its own reasons. The White House is pressuring to rein in the Syrian position regarding the US military presence in Iraq and the confrontation with Israel. France found itself in a big political dispute with the US and decided to offer Syria as a price for reducing the harshness of Washington's position against Paris.

*The agreement over Syria between President George Bush and President Jacques Chirac began in Normandy in June 2004, when the extension hadn't yet been raised. When the Syrians heard in roughly August that the two countries were preparing a Security Council Resolution against Damascus and its interests, extension became possible.

This is the "pushed to the wall" thesis that both Bashar and Nasrallah elaborate. The death of Hariri becomes "objectively" not Syria's fault because Syria was defending itself along with higher Arab interests against a plot by the Israeli oriented West and their minions in Lebanon. This is the logic that Asad is selling to Syrians. This explains why Asad accuses the Israelis of murdering Hariri and may actually believe it at some metaphysical level. More importantly, it is why so many Middle Easterners accept the logic. They believe it at some deeper psychological level, which helps them avow Asad's technical innocence.

The Manichean struggle between Israel and the Arab World, in which both sides claim to be "existentially" threatened, has unraveled ordinary morality. Murder gets swept into a larger allegorical reading of light and darkness. As the cosmic logic of good and evil takes over, murder becomes "collateral damage" and we enter into the twilight zone of myth in which human actions lose their meaning in the face of contending Gods. The ends justify the means. Higher principles, such as Arabism/, Islam or democracy/ freedom trump smaller ones, such as murder.

Unfortunately, Arab leaders and their followers are not the only ones to do this.

"COURT IN THE MIDDLE" from Syria Today

COURT IN THE MIDDLE
Syria Today
December 2005

Islamic laws applied in Syria too often do little or nothing to protect the rights of women. As Dalia Haidar reports, activists are now calling for widescale reforms.

One month after her wedding, Loubna al-Sharif was beaten by her husband several times. They had scarcely finished their honeymoon, Loubna said, and she could not understand what had led to her new husband’s sudden, harsh treatment.

A few months later, she became pregnant. She was still only 19 years old, and she wanted to keep the baby, but her husband forced her to have an abortion. He continued to beat and verbally abuse her until she finally fled to her parents’ house and filed for divorce.

But the process of divorcing her husband only prolonged Loubna’s agony.

“I became depressed by the judicial system here,” said Loubna, who is now 24 years old and works a translator for a private magazine. “It took me two and a half years to get a divorce and, in the process, my file was lost three times in the justice palace.”

But according to Loubna, her real problem wasn’t the delays, but a whole system of laws unfairly skewed in favour of men.

“Even the judge had a masculine mentality, and the lawyers were pushing me to solve it peacefully without asking for my rights,” said Loubna, who finally obtained her divorce in a Syrian court which operates under a code of so-called ‘personal status laws’ which are mainly derived from Islamic law. “They kept repeating sayings of the prophet in order to convince me to end my case.”

According to Da’ad Mousa, a prominent Damascus lawyer and women’s rights advocate, Syrian women enjoy many privileges in the public sphere that their counterparts in other parts of the Arab world are denied. They have relatively high rates of employment, political involvement and access to higher education. Fifteen percent of Syria’s lawyers are female, and in Syria’s parliament, 12% of the seats are held by women.

And yet, said Mousa, Syrian women continue to face discrimination in the personal sphere, particularly when it comes to issues of marriage and divorce.

“Women in Syria suffer from discrimination in their private lives, and it is not just related to tradition; it is also a legal discrimination,” said Mousa. A whole host of laws related to family life and women’s status should be completely rewritten, she suggested.

In Syria, there is no one court that specialises in family law. Rather, family issues are handled in three separate courts, for Muslims, Christians, and Jews, according to a range of personal status laws.

For Muslims, marriage, divorce and child custody issues are managed in the Islamic courts, located in each of Syria’s major cities. There are separate courts, known as the Spiritual Court, for both Jews and Christians, functioning, in the case of the Christians, according to the rules of each Christian sect. The Jewish courts are rarely used, although they have not been closed down.

All the courts function according to Syria’s code of personal status laws, which deal with issues related to inheritance and child custody. The personal status laws were first issued in 1953 and reformed by the People’s Assembly in 1975 and in 2003.

The latest reforms allowed divorced mothers four years extra custody over their children, up to the age of 15 for girls and 13 for boys, before the right to custody passes to the father. At 18 years old the child is deemed to be an adult and can choose to live wherever he or she pleases.

Lawyers and human rights activists say the laws are still badly in need of reform.

“The family law, which is called the personal status law, should be reviewed from the first article to the last one,” said Da'ad Mousa.

According to Syria’s personal status laws, for example, Syrian women do not have the right to pass along Syrian nationality to their children. Interfaith marriages and civil marriages are banned in Syria; even if a Syrian couple has a civil wedding abroad, their marriage will be considered illegal when they return home.

Syrian law is particularly harsh to women when it comes to divorce, say women who have been through divorce in Syrian courts. Men, according to the law, can divorce their wives directly and quickly, without a legal case, simply by telling the wife, “You are divorced,” three times.

On the other hand, women who want to divorce their husbands must navigate a multitude of legal hurdles, even though Islam theoretically gives women the right to divorce their husbands in the event of domestic violence or if the husband has a sexual problem. Women must file for separation, which generally takes about two years in Syria’s Islamic courts. If she wins the separation case, she is free to marry again.

According to Mohammed Ismaiel, a Damascus lawyer, Islam is the force that protected women’s rights to property, employment and education after generations of slavery and unfairness. The problem, he said, lies not with the laws themselves but in their implementation.

“The law is good, but the process of implementing it is really wrong,” Ismaiel said. “Prolonging the case is the main problem. We need to increase the numbers of Islamic courts and judges, and shorten the period between the trials,” he added.


Activists are currently working to change many aspects of Syria’s personal status laws. For example, an article in the personal status law gives men alone the right to pass along Syrian citizenship to their children. This poses problems for Syrian women who have short-lived marriages to foreigners; many young mothers find themselves abandoned by their foreign husbands, raising children in Syria who are not recognized by their fathers and who are denied Syrian nationality.

Not all of the legal issues that arise in families are handled in Syria’s separate religious courts. Some types of familial financial disagreements are handled in Syria’s civil courts, and issues of physical and sexual abuse in families, as well as the so-called ‘honour crimes,’ are handled in Syria’s criminal courts, the laws of which date from the French mandate era of the early 1920s.

Honour crimes typically occur when a man suspects a female relative of an illicit sexual affair, and then kills her, believing that doing so will restore his family’s ‘honour.’ Syrian lawyers and activists say that honour crimes are among the most common issues discussed in Syria’s criminal courts, and that men involved in such cases often go unpunished.

According to Da’ad Mousa, the lawyer, Syrian law actually takes into account the fact that such men would consider their female relatives’ actions a reflection on their ‘honour,’ and become incensed at the mere suspicion of an infraction. Though such cases are greatly underreported, Mousa said, more than 100 cases of honor killings were reported in Syrian newspapers between 2000 and 2003.

A group of Syrian women’s rights activists have recently launched a campaign called ‘Stop the Honour Killing,’ lobbying Syria’s parliament and Ministry of Justice to change the articles in the criminal law code (namely nos. 242, 241, 240, 239, and 548) which make it easier for men to escape punishment in the event of an honour killing. In September, a young Druze bride was killed by her brother because she had married outside her religion. Her death triggered a public outcry.

The organisers of the campaign have already collected 7,700 signatures in an online petition, and plan to send the petition to the president of Syria and the parliament, requesting changes to these articles.

Meanwhile, changes to these articles are being actively discussed in government.

“We are asking for changes to some articles in the personal status law because we feel that the current situation demands it,” said Mohammad Habash, an Islamist parliamentarian and head of the Islamic Studies Centre in Damascus. “I have personally asked for the removal of the articles in the criminal law code that permits honour killing because it directly contradicts Islam.”

Another group of women’s rights activists, the Etana Press, recently hosted a conference on the intersection of law and tradition in Syria and their effect on women’s rights. According to the conference’s organisers, their aim was to improve Syrian women’s legal status by creating dialogue between the Syrian government and local NGOs.

“This conference is trying to open a dialogue between the government and the activists, in addition to connecting between the people and the different organisations in Syria,” said Ma'an Abdelsalam, a human rights activist and the director of Etana press.

The conference, which was attended by delegations of women from all over the Middle East and Europeended by creating a list of sixteen recommendations to be presented to the Syrian government. The recommendations urged the government to review the articles of the criminal law code which make it easier for honour killings to take place, to reform the personal status law so that all Syrians are treated equally, regardless of religion or sect, to create a special civil family court for the resolution of legal issues related to the family, and to encourage religious figures to support the principle of equality between men and women.

For Loubna al Sahrif, though her experience of the Islamic law that drives the workings of Syria’s family courts was a painful one, she argues that it is the understanding of Islam that needs reform, rather than the faith itself.

“Even though for a long time time I felt like a social outcast, I am happy I did not give up and that I pursued my rights. We need to understand the way we understand and practise Islamic law.”


Courts dealing in family issues in Syria

The Islamic Court: Rules on personal issues, such as marriage, divorce and child custody, for all Syrian Muslims. The court works from the ‘personal status law’ which was issued in 1953 and was reformed by the People’s Assembly after a presidential decree in 1975 and 2003. This law is based on Islamic, or sharia’a law.

Spiritual Courts: For both Christians and Jewish from all sects.
The Christian court functions according to the particular laws of each Christian sect with regards to marriage divorce and personal issues. The court follows the ‘personal status law’ in solving other issues like inheritance and child custody.

Confessional Court: A court for the Druze, an offshoot of Shi’ite Islam, which functions according to Druze law.

Panel Court: Works from the criminal law that was issued on June 22, 1949, three years after Syria’s independence from France, and specialises in family crimes issues such as aggressiveness, family planning, abortion, rape, sexual abuse and so-called ‘honour crimes.’

Civil Court: Specialised in financial and estate disagreement between families and functions according to the Syrian civil law which was issued on May 18, 1949.

Asad's Speech to Lawyers Union Jan.

In his much-anticipated speech today Bashar al- Assad refused to submit to UN's interview request in Hariri's probe. The President's tone was less hostile to the US and Lebanon than it was during his speech of November 10, 2005 at the University of Damascus, though he blamed Lebanese officials for the failure of a Saudi Arabian initiative to defuse tensions between the two countries. All in all, there was not much new and Asad hewed to the message he has been refining for months. Reuters called Asad, "down beat."

President Bashar Assad, invoking Syria's national sovereignty, indicated Saturday he would not submit to an interview request from the U.N. investigation into Rafik Hariri's assassination. In a speech to the Arab Lawyers Union, Assad pledged, however, to continue cooperation with the international probe the former Lebanese premier's assassination.

The U.N. investigation has said Syria has not been sufficiently forthcoming and the Security Council demanded full cooperation.

"The issue of national sovereignty is paramount, not the (U.N.) Security Council decision, or others," Assad said. The Syrian leader did not specifically address the request by the U.N. investigation for an interview with him and his foreign minister about threats Assad allegedly made against Hariri months before the Feb. 14 assassination. That left open the possibility that he might later agree to meet with U.N. investigators, rather than submit to an interview.

"We should not give up our national sovereignty even if the circumstance requires that we fight for our country. We must be prepared for that.”

In a swipe at the Syrian opposition he said: "Anyone who accepts ... something to be above his national sovereignty in any country or place in the world, should swap his nationality and sacrifice it and take in its place an international one from the United Nations." He called the UN panel "a condemnation committee, not an investigation committee.”

Kofi Annan tried to softened the international reaction to Asad's speech by stating on Friday that Syria will facilitate the UN probe, which suggests he will accept Asad's refusal to testify on grounds of national sovereignty as legitimate.

Asad returned to his indirect accusations that Israel was behind the Hariri murder by accusing Israel of murdering Yasser Arafat when he said, "Of the many assassinations that Israel carried out in a methodical and organized way, the most dangerous thing that Israel did was the assassination of President Yasser Arafat."

On Reform, Asad let down Syrians who may still be expecting something dramatic. He said very little other than that he would not be pushed into things by the West. "Reform begins with our domestic needs and we totally reject any reform imposed from outside under any slogan or pretext," he said.

"We are still at the beginning of a long road, but we will not let it be said that we have achieved nothing. Maybe the (pace) is slow ... but we are speeding as much as possible.”

Asad referred in a general way to moving ahead with the new party law that was recommended at last June's Baath Party meeting, as well as to the anti-corruption campaign that he has talked about since coming to power, and developing an independent judiciary. He said:

We are undertaking several projects that will boost public participation and help enrich democratic life, whether it be linked to the parties’ law or to election and local government laws."

"We are also working on strengthening institutions, the rule of law and judicial independence to activate political life, enrich our national activities and remedy some negative symptoms it is facing.”

Sana has published these paragraphs from the speech

In his address at the Arab Bar Association Conference, President Bashar al-Assad has stressed that the Iraqi issue is a political, pan-Arab and moral earthquake to the Arab Nation and has created a new reality in the Middle East, the tragic feature of which have begun to surface on the structure of its societies, and to shake the conventions and national and pan-Arab affiliation.

“ Phenomenon of terrorism has begun to expand threatening to sabotage the national and social texture of the countries in the region due to wrong international and regional pre-mediated stances regarding the Arab Nation,” al-Assad said, pointing out that terrorism phenomenon is being used as a tool by some forces that allege combating terrorism to terrorize the others…

President al-Assad indicated in his address at the Arab Bar Association Conference that all roads have been blocked before the Middle East peace process not only because the Israeli governments rejection to respond to peace requirements and continuous denial of the Arab rights, but the current international situation and influential forces are not ready also to push the peace process forward, in addition to non commitment of the international community to meet its requirements regarding the peace process and stability in the region…

The current events and circumstances have been the results of the past decades but have intensified in recent years and the Arab nation in paying high price for strange projects and settling the debts of others on its land from the blood of its sons and their stability, " Al-Assad stressed in his address.

In his address at the Arab Bar Association which is being held in Damascus President al-Assad stresses that the stage through which the Arab nation is passing requires high sense of affiliation and readiness for giving and honest work in addition to clarity of vision and direction…

President Bashar al-Assad expressed high appreciation Saturday over the sincere efforts of the Arab lawyers in advocating the right and defending the Arab nation’s causes.

He lauded the Arab lawyers’ solidarity with Syria in the face of dangers surrounding her.

SANA

Yesterday's news was the Syria and Iran – Joint Statement that came at the end of the President of Iran's visit to Damascus.

Syria and Iran have agreed to launch joint projects in oil and land and air transport, the official Syria Times newspaper reported

Israeli Defense Ministers Shaul Mofaz