"What do Sunnis intend for Alawis following Regime change?" by Khudr

I received this article by an old friend who has posted on Syria Comment before: Asad's Alawi Dilemma. His present article is remarkable for its honest and direct approach to Syria's essential sectarian problem. He wrote:

Dear Joshua,

I wrote the attached article in poor English full of grammatical mistakes but I hope you can publish it on your website under a pseudonym, such as "Syrian in the far east," or "Khudr", or whatever you like.

Many people read your blog and comment about it in their blogs or sites, which makes the chance that this will find a proper readership high. Many Syrian expatriate intellectuals will also discuss it on other sites, at least the English language forums. The subject is too sensitive in Arabic, alas.

The subject is: What do Sunnis intend for Alawis following regime change? I ask this question in light of the general discussion now being carried out about the prospects for change in Syria.

In a time when everybody is emphasizing national unity, many would think that talking about issues between religious communities in Syria should be put aside or that they come from a backward Alawi fanatic. I am not a zealot, the only thing I am fanatical about is my hope, one I know will never come true, of the creation of a pure Syrian nationalism as strong and independent as Japanese or Korean Nationalism.

As an engineer, I find it absurd that Syrians believe they can solve a problem without first analyzing it and dealing with it head on.

What do Sunnis intend for Alawis following regime change?
by Khudr
Syria Comment
August 30, 2006

I came across an article in a blog in which the writer, a Syrian dissident, calls for a coup-d’etat by a Musharraf-like Syrian Army General. This is a reformulation of an earlier article by, Volker Perthes, director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, which was written when the West was casting about for a new leader for Syria during the Fall of 2005. The assumption is that this will move the stagnating economic, social, and political situation in Syria forward in the proper direction. Although the author is deliberately provocative, he raises an extremely important question in a country where almost all the rulers in its modern history, except two presidents, have risen to power through a coup-d’etat.

The article is also, unintentionally, asking a more fundamental question regarding the position of the Alawi sect on the issue of regime change. The Army General who is to take power should be an Alawi. This is because non-Alawi officers (mainly Sunni and Druze) have no leverage to lead mostly Alawi soldiers, sergeants and officers against the Alawi regime in power.

Although, rarely explicitly said, few people would argue that radical change from within can be achieved without the help of the Alawis themselves, excluding a full-fledged mass uprising or a foreign invasion. At the very least, this change has to be approved by Alawi Syrians if they have to stand aside watching the Alawi rule terminated.

The original question of the article (why a Syrian Army General would not do a coup d’etat?) can then be re-written as: Why the Alawi Syrians do not terminate Assad’s rule?

First, I think it is not an exaggeration if we say that many Alawis are not happy, to say the least, with the present regime. The reasons that are usually circulated are:

- Poverty (slum living Alawis around Damascus, poor villages and deteriorated unemployment rate in the costal area, etc, as examples); and
- Political imprisonment if they dare to challenge (Salah Jdeed and Communist Work Party in the past, and Aaref Dalilah in the present given as examples).

There are also other fundamental reasons that are rarely spoken of. I refer by “we” herein to a generation of Alawis borne after the beginning of the sixties, when the Baath took power and the Alawis assumed for the first time a dominant position in ruling Syria:

1. Most of us have not lived the unjust circumstances that our fathers and grand-fathers were subjected to by the Sunnis. As such, we do not have the same appreciation as our fathers of the Alawi rule that the late president Hafez Assad brought.

2. Hafez made huge improvement to our rural areas after they had been completely and utterly neglected by successive Syrian governments, whether Ottoman or Syrian. (A negligence that the Assad regime has sadly repeated in the Jazeera, the east-northern parts of Syria). However, these improvements have long been frozen, and for more than one generation, things have been heading backwards and not forwards.

In our fathers’ youth, coastal cities at the foot of the Costal Mountains, such as Tartous, Banias, Jabla, Lataqia, were transformed from purely Sunni communities to organized multi-sectarian modern cities (of course relatively speaking). But, our generation lived during times when those nice cities became slum-like dirty places due to corruption, bad-planning and patronage. We watched them become a playground for the cowboys of the new generation, the Assad clan in Kurdaha, sometimes called the Shabbiha.

3. Our fathers’ support for Hafez was driven largely by their resentment for the wealthy bourgeois that Hafez and his Baath claimed to oppose and which imbued their movement with much of its legitimacy. The followers of Rifa`at al-Assad used to recount to us in the seventies how they admired him because he would pick up a dirty used tuna can from the floor and drink tea from it. I wonder what those people think about him now that he uses golden utensils in his multi-million dollar villas in France and Spain? In the past, older Alawis honestly admired many Alawi figures in power. I still have not met a single person who has the slightest admiration for Rami or Asaf, for example. Unfortunately, we are watching how the Alawi rulers and many of their children, are becoming the very same thing they taught us to despise.

4. It is a fact that Alawis still control the important positions in the security systems in Syria. However, it is also a fact that this control serves only a small circle at the top of the pyramid and is becoming less and less beneficial or responsive to the poor members at the base.

5. Seeing that most of the Assad regime on top has made full-fledged alliances with Sunni families through marriage (like the president himself, Nassif’s daughters etc..), or through monopoly enterprises (like Maher, Bahjat Suleiman, Asaf, etc..), the regime has lost any claim to representing the Alawi sect or to defending its rights. The claims that Hafez and his generation used to convince our fathers to support him with have largely been lost.

6. The direction Syria is now heading does not look good. The last thing Alawis want is to have a group of people (composed of many sects, not only Alawis) leading Syria to a catastrophe, while everyone else in Syria accuses the Alawi sect of being responsible for it.

So why then don’t Alawis are do anything about the situation? Why are we silent? Why doesn’t an Alawi Army General carry out a coup?

A. Reasons general to all Syrian citizens:

1. The culture of fear has been deeply planted in every Syrian person regardless of their sect or race.

2. We have been deeply conditioned to mistrust and be suspicious of everyone, making it extremely hard for any two Syrians to work together, not to mention organize in a group. To see how deep this problem has become, look at how much the Syrians in the Diaspora are fragmented even when they are away from the regime and its influence. No two Syrian expatriates are able to organize a cultural gathering, not to mention a political party. No sooner does a new party emerge than its members, who are from the same sect and race and background, start to split apart into uncountable factions.

3. The external animosity of the United States paralyzes internal movements, organized to act against the regime, no matter how well intentioned they are. No one wants to risk a serious move against the regime while there is an enemy at the door. The United States has not shown any sings that is interested in improving Syria’s internal situation or helping Syria. What the U.S. is asking for clearly and loudly are changes in external policies, period. Most of those policies are not attractive to the Syrian opposition. The regime is popular on most of these issues, such as the occupation of Palestine, the Golan, or Iraq.

A coup-d’etat at this moment risks being labeled American-made even if it does not have the slightest connection to America.

The present sentiment in the Syrian street is anti-American. This means that any opposition that seeks support from the Syrian street will be anti-American and will be spurned by the West, as happened with Hamas. Any opposition that seeks external support will lose the street, as is the case with Khaddam. We are in a tricky situation; the regime understands this well and has exploited it well.

4. The organization of the Army and security forces was masterminded very cleverly by the late president Hafez Assad to prevent coups similar to those that rocked Syria during the three decades after Syrian independence. The Syrian forces capable of carry out a coup-d’etat (Army, Special Forces, Police Force, and Security Apparatuses) are all bulky and centralized with an extremely complicated command structure, purposefully designed to frustrate plotters. Lateral communication is absolutely forbidden between units; all communications between units must travel through a cumbersome vee, first ascending up the command structure to the top level of one unit before descending down again through the ranks of the other unit. Most importantly, the many units and departments have an interlocking command structure so that no entity is autonomous. They cannot act without several other departments knowing about it. For example, any air force unit is under the influence of aerial-security (Mukhabarat Jawiyyah), army-security (Mukhabarat Askariyyah), the morale-guidance headquarters (Idarat el Tawjih al-manawi), military police, air force headquarters, army general headquarters, the Republican Guards, and the Palace. Officers with loyalties to theses various branches of security are sprinkled liberally throughout the security forces. This command structure makes the military practically useless against foreign enemies because of its stultifying array of conflicting loyalties, but extremely effective at guaranteeing internal stability. Any attempt to rebel is quickly thwarted and can be dealt with on the spot.

5. Most Syrians, as unhappy as they are with the present regime, see no point in changing the regime without a solid alternative. The opposition has yet to present a clear vision for the future that would inspire people to risk the few joys of Syrian life that they have, security being at the top of the list. Vague and generalized talk about democracy and a better life are the only promises made by present regime-change advocates. They aren’t reassuring.

6. We have to admit that corruption has insinuated its deep into the souls of almost every Syrian. It is highly questionable that any form of regime change is going to achieve real economic or social change, without being preceded by a long process of grass roots reform and cultural revival.

We do have a corrupt leadership, but even an honest leadership would find it impossible to overcome the pervasive culture of bribery, disrespect for hard work, and indifference to public interest that is shared by state, and indeed, private sector employees. Most Syrians’ sense of virtue has become so crooked that fooling a customer is defined as cleverness.

Can change really be enforced from the top down? The regime changers avoid this thorny question, but it must be aired and debated. Are we willing to act, think, and work differently when the regime is changed?

B. Reasons specific to Alawi Syrian citizens:

The main reason that prevents Alawis from being active in supporting any regime change plans is their fear of the “other.” Those who propose regime change without explaining to us what the end of Alawi rule will mean for thousands of ordinary Alawis will get no where.

There are two sorts of “others” in Syria:
a. First are the Sunni religious and Kurdish opposition leaders who say bluntly and clearly: “We want to end the Alawi rule”.

b. Second is everyone else, who says shyly and elliptically: “The monopoly over top army and security posts by one sect should end.”

Not a single Syrian intellectual, political leader, or plain good-will writer, has ever dealt with the following fundamental question:

What exactly are your plans for the Alawis after we give up power?

Why do answers to this question have to be vague and general? What are your plans for the tens of thousands of Alawis who work in the army and other security apparatuses? What are your plans for the republican guard and the special forces that are staffed primarily by Alawis? Are you going to pay them pensions if you decide to disband their forces? Or will they be fired and dumped on the streets, humiliated and ostracized as the Americans did in Iraq? Do you have any idea of the impact on security such dismissals would engender? Will you be satisfied with a scenario by which these forces remain in their positions in exchange for their giving up political power?

What are your plans for the tens of thousands of Alawis who work as government employees in many non-functional establishments? Are you going to close these establishments? Do you have any idea of the social impact of such closures? Are you going to stop improvement projects in the costal area as all past Sunni governments have done since independence? Are you going to reverse confiscation laws to return land taken from Sunni landlords and distributed among tens of thousands of farmers?

Are you going to demand that security officials stand trial for their actions during the last 35 years? What is the highest rank that you are going to hold responsible? Are you going to ask for trials for past deeds? How about the present leading elite? Who exactly are the people you want to hold responsible? And If you do bring them to trial, are you going to hold the Sunni elite to the same standard? Will Sunni families who have benefited from the regime through monopolies and sweet-heart deals, such as the Nahhas family in Damascus and the Jood family in Latakia, be treated as Alawis are?

These questions should be answered not only by opposition intellectuals, but also by every non-Alawi Syrian. What do you want to do with us if we give you back political power? Are you really willing to live side by side with us, to cherish Syria’s diversity, and consider the past 40 years merely another failed episode in our long history of failed revolutions.

A change for the better must include all sectors of Syrian society, including Alawi Syrians. Because Alawis control all the main security forces of the state, regime change will not happen without assuring them that they too will have a place in Syria’s new future. Without such assurances, there will be no Alawi Musharif, nor will any other army General carry out a coup d’etat that will bring anything other than chaos to Syria.

Syrians refuse to speak openly and honestly about our most important challenges; so much is kept in the dark. But this is no time for “shatara” or dissembling. We must confront and discuss religious and communal issues directly and honestly. If Sunnis really want regime change, then they have to address the Alawi issue head on. Unless the answers to these questions are cleared up by all concerned forces and individuals, Alawis, no matter how dissatisfied and disappointed with the present leadership, will not entertain the idea of regime change; they will not relinquish the ramparts of power.

"Doubts whether Bush is good for Israel" by Jim Lobe

Doubts whether Bush is good for Israel
By Jim Lobe
Asia Times
Aug 31, 2006

.... In Washington, the traditional foreign-policy elite - from Republican realists such as former deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage to Democratic internationalists such as former secretaries of state Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright - have publicly criticized Bush for rejecting talks with Damascus, at the very least to probe its willingness to rein in Hezbollah, if not loosen its alliance with Iran, during the past month's fighting.

"I can't for the life of me understand why we don't [talk with] Syria," said James Dobbins, an analyst at the RAND Corporation who, as a senior State Department official, coordinated the Bush administration's diplomacy during and immediately after the war in Afghanistan.

"I think this idea that we don't talk to our enemies simply has to be jettisoned," he told a forum at the New America Foundation (NAF) last week.

Dobbins' critique echoes that raised by a number of prominent Jewish figures, such as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, former ambassador to the UN Richard Holbrooke and Dennis Ross, the main US negotiator on Israeli-Palestinian issues under presidents George H W Bush and Bill Clinton, and organizations in recent weeks.

The most direct challenge surfaced on Tuesday when the Zionist group Americans for Peace Now sent a letter to President Bush calling on him to clarify whether his administration opposes renewed peace negotiations between Israel and Syria.

"Unfortunately, many in Israel and the US believe that your administration is standing in the way of renewed Israel-Syria contacts," the letter, which also called on Bush to "reject the thinking of those who view the Syrian regime as irredeemable", stated. "We urge you to clarify, publicly and expeditiously, that this is not the case."

While the administration is likely to dodge the question, its commitment to isolating Syria, particularly since the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, has never been in doubt.

Indeed, in the opening days of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel, the White House not only reportedly rebuffed an appeal by Olmert himself for Washington to quietly approach Damascus about pressing Hezbollah to release two Israeli soldiers whose capture touched off the crisis, but also urged the Israeli prime minister, according to one account in the Jerusalem Post, to attack Syria directly.

"In a meeting with a very senior Israeli official, [Deputy National Security Adviser Elliot] Abrams indicated that Washington would have no objection if Israel chose to extend the war beyond to its other northern neighbor, leaving the interlocutor in no doubt that the intended target was Syria," a well-informed source, who received an account of the meeting from one of its participants, told Inter Press Service.

While Abrams was discreetly urging Israel to expand the war to Syria, his neo-conservative allies, some of whom, such as former Defense Policy Board chairman Richard Perle and former House of Representatives Speaker Newt Gingrich, are regarded as close to Vice President Dick Cheney, were more explicit, to the extent even of expressing disappointment over Israel's lack of aggressiveness or success in "getting the job done".

Cheney's own Middle East advisers, John Hannah and David Wurmser, have long favored "regime change" in Damascus and, according to the New York Times, argued forcefully - and successfully, with help from Abrams and pressure from the Israel lobby's leadership - against efforts by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to persuade Bush to open a channel to Syria in an effort to stop the recent fighting.

But Bush's adamant refusal to engage Damascus is precisely what has raised doubts in Israel about whether his policies are in the long-term or even in the immediate interests of the Jewish state.

Since the ceasefire, a growing number of former and current senior Israeli officials, including Olmert's defense, interior and foreign ministers, have called for talks with Damascus. And, while Olmert himself has rejected the idea for now, he has also abandoned his previous pre-condition for such talks - that Washington remove Syria from its terrorism list.

Of the officials, the two most important are both former Likud Party members - Interior Minister Avi Dichter, the former head of Israel's Shin Bet intelligence agency, and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who reportedly enjoys a strong relationship with Rice and has appointed her former chief of staff, Yaakov Dayan, to explore possible ways to engage Syria.

Meanwhile, other prominent Israelis are asking even more basic questions about the regional strategy pursued by Bush and its consequences for Israel.

In a column published by the newspaper Ha'aretz, former foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami argued that, in the aftermath of the Lebanon war, which, in his view, had proved "the limits of [Israeli] power", a peace accord with Syria and the Palestinians had become "essential" for Israel, particularly in light of "the worrisome decline of the status of Israel's ally in this part of the world and beyond".

"US deterrence, and respect for the superpower, have been eroded unrecognizably," he wrote. "An exclusive pax Americana in the Middle East is no longer possible because not only is the US not an inspiration today, it does not instill fear."

Indeed, the widespread perception that Washington's influence in the region has fallen sharply as a result of both the war in Iraq and the Bush administration's stubborn refusal to engage its foes diplomatically has raised new questions about whether Bush and his neo-conservative advisers have actually made Israel less rather than more secure.

"The Bush administration at first avoided and then was unable to deliver the diplomatic agility that was called for, and that is bad news for Israel," wrote former Israeli peace negotiator Daniel Levy in this week's Forward. "The United States had no direct channels or leverage with key actors, and could not commit troops to any ceasefire-implementation force.

"The idea that current American policy advances Israeli security and national interests is thoroughly discredited - something that is now openly aired in the Israeli media, and raised, albeit in more discreet circles, by Israeli cabinet ministers," wrote Levy, who currently directs the NAF's and Century Foundation's Middle East initiative.

(Inter Press Service)

Also, see the letters sent out byFarid Ghadry posted by Ameen Always (in Arabic) One is entitled, "Why the Alawites Should Go Back to the Mountains." Another, "Damascus Will Remain the Umayyad Capital and Not the Capital of the Alawites." I understand these letters to be the beginning of a new campaign designed to convince the United States and Sunnis to embrace violent regime change in Syria. He has taken a page right out of the old Muslim Brotherhood handbook, accusing the Alawites of being non-Muslim and non-Arab in order to incite sectarian violence.

In his last English language note, he writes: "The United States... should concentrate on... plans for Assad's departure...."

Should Syria and Israel Negotiate? - Syria Think Tank

Camille-Alexandre Otrakji has done it again at Syrian Think Tank. Four excellent articles on the question: Should Syria and Israel start peace negotiations now?

Interestingly, all come to a similar conclusion despite getting there is different ways. Each reveals a slightly different perspective. Must reads, all of them. Missing is the perspective of the neocons, but this perspective can be found in your local paper. Also worth reading is Katherine Zoepf's article on the Qubaysiat organization in Syria, which has had a number of good articles written on it, in particular by Ibrahim Hamidi a few months ago.

Ibrahim Hamidi Dar Alhayat

After the October War of 1973, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger conducted famous shuttle diplomacy between Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Cairo. This led to the disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel, setting buffer zones between the two warring countries, and establishing a no-peace, no-war relationship. Both parties have remarkably respected this relationship despite all the tension in the Middle East. Kissinger’s shuttle diploma......

Ammar Abdulhamid Tharwa Project

In order to answer this question in a meaningful manner, we should bear in mind that neither Syria nor Israel can actually plan such a major undertaking step without first consulting their respective allies and supporters, namely Iran and the United States. Moreover, we should not be oblivious here as the current regional context in which these talks are to be held, a namely: the ongoing investigation into the assassination for former Lebanese P......


Patrick Seale Syrian Think Tank

Recent indications would suggest that Israel – or at least some Israelis – are beginning to explore the possibility of restarting negotiations with Syria after a six-year interruption. The Israeli daily Haaretz reported that Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni had appointed a senior official – Yaakov (Yaki) Dayan, formerly head of the diplomatic desk at the Ministry – as ‘project manager’ of possible future talks with Damascus. There have ......

Ghayth Armanazi Syrian Media Centre

Before the recent war in Lebanon, the idea of resuming peace talks between Syria and Israel seemed far-fetched. Nothing in the then prevailing regional geopolitical dynamics, nor in the rigidity of Washington’s approach to dealing with a demonised Syria , pointed to any appetite for revisiting the dust-encrusted dossier of the moribund Syrian-Israeli ‘peace track’. Within Israel the previous government of Ariel Sharon had cold-shouldered the c......

A Personal Memo - By EHSANI2

I have just returned from a three-week vacation to Syria. I must admit that I have struggled to think of something incisive to write about. What possible insight can I offer readers of this forum I thought? Given my personal interest in economic matters, it made sense for me to concentrate on this topic first. I will conclude my note with the inevitable discussion of non-economic issues as well. I warn the scores of regime supporters here: The truth is sometimes painful to hear.

One tends to often read statements like “Syrians” are behind Bashar and are keen to maintain the status quo. Others may offer a different picture by proclaiming that “Syrians” are very unhappy with the regime but are afraid to say so in public.

But which “Syrians” are we referring to here?

In the personal opinion of this writer, Syria is made up of two separate countries: Syria 1 which contains close to one million people and Syria 2 which contains the remaining 19 million.

Syria 1 is made up of the affluent, highly connected industrialists, merchants and very high Government officials. Given the high standard of living of this group, one would expect them to support the regime and the current status quo. While most may admit that that progress has been slow, they are quick to point that given the circumstances, the country is on the right track. They highlight their latest cell phones, home and office Internet connections as well as their brand new cars as irrefutable signs of the economic and social advances that the country has been experiencing as of late. My suspicion is that most readers of this forum fall in this group. My Syrian friends and I certainly do too. Seen from their prism, the Syrian economy seems prosperous judging by the superb outdoor dinners, number of servants, lovely homes, fancy cars, latest cell phones, rising land values, and monopolistic businesses.

Life could not be more different for the 19 million people of Syria 2. As I opined in the past, Syria’s Baath has caused enormous economic damage to this country. It is clear that this silent majority has suffered the brunt of this grave economic mismanagement. This is evident in this group’s salary levels. If they were lucky enough to have jobs, salaries of this group is likely to be around Syp 10,000 ($200) per month. Their average family size is 6-7 (four to five children). They all seem to feel that what they really needed was an extra $100 per month before things would be “fine”. Almost a year ago, the Government has stopped offering new jobs in its vast public sector. You now need a huge connection to land such a job. What was truly amazing to me was how valuable people considered a job with the Government. A stable income of $200 was the envy of those aspiring to find such positions. Taxi drivers were an interesting case to study. 90% of them do not own their vehicles but are hired to drive it for close to 8 hours a day. Asked how much they expected to make on a daily basis, the level of Syp 300 ($6.0) was often cited. When asked how many children they had to support with this salary, an average of five children always seemed to be the answer. This does not mean that members of Syria 2 do not move up the income ladder. Highly technical machine technicians cited to me figures approaching Syp 20,000 ($400). Private Bank employees (newly commissioned ones) expected closer to $500 a month. Our highly connected and very entrepreneurial area “Mukhtar” is able to draw in close to Syp 40,000 (he sells gas cylinders on the side). Though not statistically accurate, it is my observation that close to 19 million lives in this $200 to $400 per month world.

What can $200-$400 buy this group is the obvious next question. It is perhaps best to answer this by offering these anecdotes:

A close friend of mine has recently started a small chain of coffee shops (call it a Syrian Starbucks). I frequently visited it during the past 3 weeks. A double espresso was my usual order at a cost of Syp 150 ($3). Two such orders a day cost me what my taxi driver earned in 8 hours of driving in a boiling non-air-conditioned Iranian or Chinese-made vehicle. Remember that this had to cover his cost of shelter, food, medical bills, and school supplies for all 6-7 members of his family.

Eating out in Syria is relatively cheap. Before I left the country, my wife and I invited 10 of our best friends out for dinner. The food was amazing. The bill was Syp 8,000 ($160). Given what I would have paid for this overseas, I considered the outing an excellent value of money. For the record, my poor taxi driver will have to drive for 27 days to be able to afford this meal (his family can expect no money in the meantime).

I am sure that lots of readers are going to argue that every country has its haves and have-nots. So what is special about Syria they might ask?

What distinguishes Syria is how its middle class has been squashed by the horrific economic mismanagement by the country’s economic leadership. $6 a day for 6 people (average family size) is the unmistakable result of this catastrophic system.

Every time I asked how they could possibly get by with such low income, the answer was “We have gotten used to it”.

A note on politics:

Contrary to what many people on this forum think, most of the people that I spoke to seem to think that the Hariri investigation is a massive cloud that continues to hang over the regime’s leadership.

Another thing that struck me was the low confidence that most people have in the personality of their young President. Even his loyal supporters seem to admit that he lacks the charisma and purpose of his late foxy father.

As for the regime’s ability to hold on to power, I found absolutely no evidence to indicate a weakening in the regime’s grip. Internal dissent was nonexistent.

Why have the 19 million people decided to accept living in such conditions?

I think the following quote by Karl Marx can answer this question best:

“The great mass of the French nation is formed by the simple addition of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes.”

Conclusion:

This visit to Syria has convinced me that the country’s economy is in a far worse position than currently believed. When Syria becomes a net oil importer by 2010, the current economic challenges will multiply. A very small minority of Syrians will continue to benefit from the current system and hence get even richer in the meantime. My own close friends are some of the richest people in the country. A number of them made hundreds of millions following the recent climb in land values. Money laundering was thought to be the main explanation behind the incredible advance in real estate. While it is easy to assume that Syria 1 is the reality of the situation, the truth is otherwise.

The vast majority of the population is likely to suffer even further going forward. Though inconceivable, their children may fare even worse than their horrific $6 payday. The population explosion has resulted in scores of unemployed men walking its major cities. Those residing in the rural part of the country have fared even worse. Their decision to locate to the big cities has made things even worse. It is my conviction that this regime cannot reform fast enough to arrest the decline in its economy and the standards of living of its citizens. Bashar’s last interview with Dubai Television was striking. His admission of complete isolation from the other Arab leaders was rather shocking. It is my opinion that the Hariri investigation may unsettle this regime to the point where its survival beyond one more year could well be questioned. My friends in Syria 1 sure hope that I am wrong. The potatoes that make up Syria 2 are hopeless, powerless and confused. They have been squashed for 43 years now. They have learnt to accept their fate. They know no better. I have heard and read all the commentary that Syria has won the recent battle. Most Syrians on this forum and inside the country have rallied around their leader and the flag. This is to be expected in such times. This writer, on the other hand, sees things differently. He sees a country in decay. A majority that is deep in poverty. Soaring unemployment is unavoidable. Significantly falling standards of living is inevitable. This is the picture of Syria that most refuse to hear. Their nationalistic genes have blinded them to these obvious facts on the ground. Regrettably, our once proud nation is in a state of despair and decline.

News Round UP (27 August 2006)

Hezbollah leader admits regret
27 Aug 2006: ITN

Shiekh Hassan Nasrallah has made a surprise admission about the capture of two Israeli soldiers. In a remarkable interview, he said if he had known the scale of the resulting war he would never have ordered the kidnappings.

Hezbollah is trying to negotiate a prisoner exchange with Israel for the safe return of the soldiers. Nasrallah's comments come ahead of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's visit to Lebanon.

Jesse Jackson says Syria backs prisoners' release: Washington Post

Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Fayssal Mekdad said: "We look kindly toward Reverend Jackson's mission and encourage it. He is someone who is concerned about the human dimension of crisis."

Jackson is heading a group of Muslim, Christian and Jewish leaders on a humanitarian mission to the Middle East aimed at shoring up a cease-fire in Lebanon. He will visit Lebanon and Israel next.

Jackson used his clout as a non-establishment politician to negotiate the release of several U.S. prisoners abroad in the 1980s and 1990s. He secured the freedom of an American Navy pilot held by Syria in 1983 after meeting with the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

Tom Lantos, one of Israel's leading congressional supporters, said in Israel on Sunday he would block aid President George W. Bush promised Lebanon and free the funds only when Beirut agreed to the deployment of international troops on the border with Syria.

"The international community must use all our available means to stiffen Lebanon's spine and to convince the government of Lebanon to have the new UNIFIL troops on the Syrian border in adequate numbers," said Tom Lantos, the ranking Democrat on the U.S. House of Representatives' International Relations Committee.

Lantos said he was putting a legislative hold on Bush's proposal to provide $230 million (121.8 million pounds) in aid for Lebanon in the aftermath of the 34-day war between Israel and Lebanese Hizbollah guerrillas.

Syria is ready to resume the peace process with Israel whenever the Jewish state is ready, Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Meqdad said on Sunday.

"When Israel, supported by the US, is ready to resume the peace process on the basis (of international resolutions), Syria will be constantly ready to achieve results that restore the Arabs' legitimate rights, notably a just peace" in the region, Meqdad said.

Bashar and Siniora Both Come Out Winners in the Post War Diplomacy

Syria seems to have maneuvered well in the post war wrangle over Lebanon. Lebanon's PM Siniora says foreign peace keeping troops will not police the border with Syria. Chirac seems to have gotten guarantees from Israel that it will stop bombing Lebanon. He also says that on 6,000 and not 15,000 foreign troops are needed to police Lebanon. With no policing of the Syrian border and fewer foreign troops in Lebanon, Syria has diminished the likelihood that it will be challenged by Washington in the UN or Israel in the air.

Siniora has wisely decided that foreigners should not decide Lebanon's future and that only some form of political deal between the March 14 crowd and Hizbullah will pave a way out of the terrible situation Lebanon finds itself in as the man in the middle. He has effectively elbowed both Syria and Israel aside as much as he can in order to leave himself room to maneuver. He has done about as much as he can to preserve Lebanese sovereignty by playing all sides off against the other in Lebanon's interest.

US Blasts Syria on Lebanon Peacekeeping By David Gollust, 24 August 2006

The United States Thursday welcomed apparent progress in Europe toward fielding an upgraded U.N. peacekeeping force for Lebanon. At the same time, the State Department condemned as "preposterous" Syria's stand that the U.N. force should not be allowed to patrol its border with Lebanon.

Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni of Israel told her Italian counterpart, Massimo D'Alema, yesterday that Israel will not end its current military blockade of Lebanon until an effective weapons embargo against Hezbollah is in place, Ha'aretz reported.

Syria has said it will oppose patrols of foreign troops to prevent arms smuggling along its border with Lebanon. President Assad said earlier this week that he would consider any deployment of foreign troops along the border "an act of aggression."

Prime Minister Siniora yesterday reiterated his unwillingness to confront Damascus. A diplomat familiar with the meeting between Mr. Siniora and U.N. representatives Vijay Nambiar and Terje Roed-Larsen earlier this week told The New York Sun that Mr. Siniora refrained from asking that foreign troops patrol the Syrian border.

"We want amiable relations with Syria and we are concerned about the border matter to prevent any infiltration into Lebanon," Mr. Siniora told France's TV5 yesterday. "We have deployed the Lebanese army and we have no intention of showing any animosity toward Syria."

Mr. Siniora said the force will not disarm Hezbollah. "It's clear that the Lebanese army will carry out this mission," he told an Italian newspaper, La Repubblica." The multinational force is not supposed to do that and should not bother itself with it. Hezbollah is a political party represented in the government and it agreed to the seven-point plan presented to the U.N. by the Lebanese government."

French President Jacques Chirac, whose diplomats helped draft the August 11 Security Council resolution that authorized up to 15,000 peacekeepers to deploy in Lebanon, said he was unsure how many troops were needed but that 15,000 was too many.

The number was "completely excessive", Chirac told a news conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Paris.

"It doesn't really make sense. So what is the right number, 4,000, 5,000 or 6,000? I don't know," he said.

Israel:
More than 60 pct of Israelis want Olmert to quit: poll

An excellent summary of the wrangle going on in Israel over whether or not to engage Syria appears in the Jewish News: Calls for Talks With Syria Increase in U.S., Israel Olmert Says Not Now, Bush Also Seen as Being Opposed. The conclusion is that Israel will have to push for talks over US objections if it wants to plum the possibilities of peace with Syria, because Washington wants war. Here is the conclusion of the article.

“There is so much static that it would make more sense for Israel to find its own lines into the Syrians,” said Edward Walker, who has served as the American ambassador to both Israel and Egypt.

Theodore Kattouf, a former American ambassador to Syria, said the only way the United States would ever overcome its resistance is if Israel pushed hard. “Without the Israelis urging it, it’s not going to happen,” Kattouf said.

The tone in Israel has not been about moving forward, but rather on evaluating the military failures in Lebanon, said David Makovsky, an analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who has been in Israel for the past week.

“Right now Israel is traumatized and is looking inwards, not talking about diplomatic initiatives,” Makovsky said.

But Makovsky also said that given the lack of hope in negotiations with the Palestinians, the attention may return to Syria when the period of introspection is over.

“I don’t think anything is going to happen soon on Syria,” he said, “but I wouldn’t rule it out, in a way that was ruled out until very recently."

Iran

Russia blew American plans to sanction Iran out of the water by announcing that it will not support sanctions on Iran for the time being. Russia is finding a way back into the Middle East as the protector of the resurgent Shia bloc. It is a powerful combination at a time when the US can only pressure local states through multilateral action in the UN. From French pronouncements, it looks as if the Europeans are delighted to have Russia run interference for them with Washington. America's stand on Lebanon disgusted most European leaders. They don't trust the US to do the right thing with its leading role in the UN. France undercut US plans in Lebanon. Now Russia will take the heat for Karate chopping Washington on Iran.

Russia ruled out on Friday any discussion for now of sanctions against Iran over its nuclear programme, saying these had proved ineffective internationally in the past and there was still room for diplomacy.

"I know of no instances in world practice and previous experience in which sanctions have achieved their aim and proved effective," Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said.

"Moreover, I believe that the question is not so serious at the moment for the U.N. Security Council or the group of six to consider any introduction of sanctions. Russia stands for further political and diplomatic efforts to settle the issue."

Gareth Porter, writing in Asia Times, deftly explains how Washington has undermined European efforts to engage Iran and to head off the confrontation that has now emerged between Iran and Washington over its nuclear plans. The Europeans wanted Washington to promise that it would not attack Iran in exchange for rolling back its nuclear program. Washington refused.

Rice denied on Fox News on May 21 that the US was being "asked about security guarantees", but that was deliberately misleading. As a European diplomat explained to Reuters on May 20, the only reason the Europeans had not used the term "security guarantees" in their draft was that "Washington is against giving Iran assurances that it will not be attacked".

News Round UP (24 August 2006)

Bitter Lemons has another excellent round table on Lebanon and Hizbullah:

Whose Lebanon will it now be? Joseph Bahout
A symptom of the Lebanese system Ferry Biederman
Hizballah: where to go from here Oussama Safa
Force will not disarm Hizballah Rhonda Roumani

All four articles come to similar conclusions. They argue that the March 14 coalition must accommodate Hizbullah and struggle for a political compromise, by offering the Shiites a greater political role in the central government, either by renegotiating Taif (Biederman) or by offering them more cabinet positions (Safa). All insist that it cannot be disarmed by force and urge the international community no to force the government into a corner on this issue.

Bahout very skillfully describes the opposing projects of the March 14 movement and Hizbullah. He argues that the expulsion of Syria, which contained and balanced the aspirations of both groups, followed by the imposition of UN resolution 1559, demanding Hizbullah's demilitarization, forced the group on the defensive and drove it to reassert itself by kidnapping the Israeli soldiers. Bahout argues that Hizbullah did not carry out a "coup" as some have argued, but that "If Hizballah is not to become a state within a state or even the state itself, it will still have the ambition--some would say the right--to implant its own definition of Lebanese statehood and the new "Lebanonism". In such a venture, in which many Lebanese will have to learn to accommodate those they consider newcomers."

Another excellent article on Hizbullah is: Iran, the Vatican of Shi‘ism? Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr.

Roschanack deftly argues that Hizbullah is not a creature of Iran, as some have argued. She explains how it has defied Iran on a number of issues, by asserting its Lebanese and Arab identity in the face of Iranian efforts to dominate its cultural and spiritual agenda.

Firas Mikdad of the Eurasian Group helps explain what the French think they are doing in Lebanon:

24 August, 2006

French President Jacques Chirac will likely reverse course and announce a significant troop contribution to UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNFIL), possibly a battalion of more than 2000 French troops. The expected announcement will reinforce a fragile ceasefire and persuade other European countries to follow suit. On the other hand, Syria's 23 August threat to blockade Lebanon should UN forces deploy on the Lebanese-Syrian border is unlikely to materialize since Lebanon is not expected to sanction such a deployment.

President Chirac's is expected to put an end to differences between the French Foreign and Defense Ministries on the deployment of troops by announcing France's contribution of additional forces later today. Despite concerns voiced by French Defense officials about troop safety, Gaullist Chirac favors taking the risk in order bolster France's longstanding influence in Lebanon rather than surrendering force leadership to Italy. His expected decision was probably made easier by Israeli assurances against renewed hostilities and an amendment that now permits UN forces to engage Hizbullah if provoked.

France's expected announcement will likely bolster the fragile ceasefire and prompt hesitant European countries to step up their contribution. It will also help the UN meet its target of having 3,500 peacekeepers in place by 2 September, 6,500 by October, and 15,000 by yearend. That will then set the stage for a visit by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to the region next week, followed by the start of negotiations on a possible second UN resolution on an exchange of prisoner and the status of the disputed Sheba'a Farms by mid-September.

Despite Israeli demands however, UN forces are unlikely to take up positions on the Lebanese-Syrian border. UN resolution 1701 leaves the issue vague enough for Lebanon to deploy its own forces instead, thereby averting a confrontation with Hizbullah and Syria's threat to close all border crossing. Such an unlikely move would have a chocking effect on the Lebanese economy, preventing the great majority of Lebanese exports from reaching their markets in Arab Gulf countries.

Firas Maksad
Associate, Middle East & Africa
Eurasia Group
1101 30th Street NW, Suite 100B
Washington, D.C. 20007

Syria bars UN patrols on Lebanon border
Agence France-Presse, The Associated Press
Published: August 23, 2006

The deployment of international troops along the Lebanon-Syria border would be unacceptable, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria was quoted as saying Wednesday.

"This is an infringement on Lebanese sovereignty and a hostile position," Dubai Television quoted him as saying in an interview without showing video in advance of its airing.

Assad also urged the Lebanese government to adhere to its responsibilities and not embark on anything that could sabotage relations with Syria.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said Tuesday that Israel had no plans to lift its air and sea blockade on Lebanon until an international peacekeeping force took up positions along the Syrian border and at Beirut's airport.

Foreign Minister Philippe Douste- Blazy of France said again Wednesday that Israel must end its sea and air blockade of Lebanon.

The blockade "cannot continue," Douste-Blazy told France 2 Television. "If Lebanon is to reconstruct, if it is going to recover economically, this blockade must be lifted."

He also said that the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, or Unifil, should at the same time enforce a strict embargo on arms. Israel accuses Syria of sending weapons into Lebanon to arm Hezbollah.

"The reinforced Unifil will have two missions," the foreign minister said. "It will be there to permit the Lebanese Army to deploy, and to guarantee the embargo on arms delivery across all borders - I repeat, across all borders."

Israel imposed a total embargo on Lebanon shortly after the start of its offensive against Hezbollah on July 12 and has maintained it even after a UN- brokered cease-fire went into effect on Aug. 14.

While the resolution did not explicitly call on the force to police the Syrian frontier, it said it could help Lebanon, at its government's request, to secure its borders and prevent illegal weapons from entering the country.

How the Shebaa Farms will be demarcated is also of importance to the resolution of this problem. Sami Moubayed has an excellent article of the regions checkered past, which sheds light on who it belongs to. As Sami shows the disputed area is legally Syria's but it has always been owned, registered, and farmed by Lebanese. The French Mandate authorities were lazy. Sami suggest there is a real dispute and it should be Lebanese. Here is a continuation of the API article quoted above:

Assad also was quoted as rejecting the demarcation of his country's border with Lebanon in Shebaa Farms, a small sliver of land where the corners of Lebanon, Syria and Israel meet.

Lebanon claims the region as its own, but Israel has occupied the area since capturing it from Syria in the 1967 Mideast war.

Syria says the territory is Lebanese but has not provided official documents stating that, and the United Nations has said the territory is Syrian.

The Lebanese government has asked that Shebaa Farms be put under UN control until an official border with Syria could be delineated.

The UN-brokered cease-fire called for Secretary General Kofi Annan to come up with proposals to demarcate Lebanon's borders, especially in disputed areas such as Shebaa Farms, and to present those ideas to the Security Council within 30 days.

Italy refuses to send troops until Israelis stop shooting: Globe and Mail
Max Boot: Israel Should Hit Syria First: Los Angeles Times

Syrian Foreign Minister Waleed Muallem stressed in an interview with Kuwaiti daily al-Anbaa' Wednesday that "Israel tried military option in Lebanon lately, but the Lebanese national resistance inflicted on it a certain defeat."

"This is a lesson that Israel should acknowledge... The option of military force and arrogance is not useful, leaving no choice for Israel but that of a just peace settlement," Muallem added.

Syria has been trying to take credit for and advantage of Hezbollah's resistance during the 33 days of Israeli onslaught on Lebanon in reviving its peace discussions with Israel. The hostilities, which came to a halt Aug. 14 in line with Security Council Resolution 1701, claimed the lives of 1,200 people, mostly civilians. Three thousand people were injured, and the civilian infrastructure largely destroyed.

Muallem said the path for a just and comprehensive peace is based on returning Arab territories seized in 1967 and

"guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people according to international resolutions."

Muallem called on Arab countries to boost and warm up relations with Syria's non-Arab but Muslim ally, Iran, which he said adopts the Arabs' rightful cause against Israel.

"We do not see any contradiction between our Arab allegiance and alliance with Iran, which is a Muslim country with clear standing on the just causes of the Arabs."

The shaky cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah was tested Wednesday as the Israeli Army fired artillery into a disputed border region in response to what it said was an attack from inside Lebanon.

An Israeli soldier was killed Wednesday and three others were wounded by a land mine that Israel had planted in southern Lebanon, Israeli officials said.

Israel said its army had planted the minefield just inside Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah guerrillas from infiltrating. Lebanese security officials said the soldiers' tank drove over a mine, but Israel said it could not confirm that.

Another Israeli soldier was shot in the head during a military operation in the Lebanese border village of Taibe, Al Arabiya television reported. It did not specify the soldier's condition. Israel did not immediately comment on that report.

Asad says there is a "Big Chance for Peace"

This Elaph article explains that Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, after meeting with Asad yesterday, said that Syria's president believes there is a "big chance" for peace in the region and renewed talks for Golan.

دمشق: أعلن وزير الخارجية التركي عبد الله غول اليوم أن دمشق وأنقرة تريان "فرصة كبيرة" للسلام في الشرق الأوسط وذلك بعد لقائه الرئيس السوري بشار الاسد. وقال غول للصحافيين "كنت سعيدا جدا للاستماع الى الرئيس الاسد ونائبه (فاروق الشرع) يقولان ان هناك فرصة كبيرة لاعادة تحريك عملية السلام في المنطقة". واضاف ان تركيا "تؤمن في ذلك. نعتقد ان هناك فرصة لتحقيق السلام. على كل واحد ان يستخلص العبر من الاحداث الاخيرة"، في اشارة الى الهجوم الاسرائيلي على لبنان.

Asad will be speaking on Dubai TV this evening. Let's see if he repeats this phrase and how he tries to repair relations with Gulf rulers.

The 'New Middle East' Bush Is Resisting

By Saad Eddin Ibrahim
WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, August 23, 2006; A15

President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice may be quite right about a new Middle East being born. In fact, their policies in support of the actions of their closest regional ally, Israel, have helped midwife the newborn. But it will not be exactly the baby they have longed for. For one thing, it will be neither secular nor friendly to the United States. For another, it is going to be a rough birth.

What is happening in the broader Middle East and North Africa can be seen as a boomerang effect that has been playing out slowly since the horrific events of Sept. 11, 2001. In the immediate aftermath of those attacks, there was worldwide sympathy for the United States and support for its declared "war on terrorism," including the invasion of Afghanistan. Then the cynical exploitation of this universal goodwill by so-called neoconservatives to advance hegemonic designs was confirmed by the war in Iraq. The Bush administration's dishonest statements about "weapons of mass destruction" diminished whatever credibility the United States might have had as liberator, while disastrous mismanagement of Iraqi affairs after the invasion led to the squandering of a conventional military victory. The country slid into bloody sectarian violence, while official Washington stonewalled and refused to admit mistakes. No wonder the world has progressively turned against America.

Against this declining moral standing, President Bush made something of a comeback in the first year of his second term. He shifted his foreign policy rhetoric from a "war on terrorism" to a war of ideas and a struggle for liberty and democracy. Through much of 2005 it looked as if the Middle East might finally have its long-overdue spring of freedom. Lebanon forged a Cedar Revolution, triggered by the assassination of its popular former prime minister, Rafiq Hariri. Egypt held its first multi-candidate presidential election in 50 years. So did Palestine and Iraq, despite harsh conditions of occupation. Qatar and Bahrain in the Arabian Gulf continued their steady evolution into constitutional monarchies. Even Saudi Arabia held its first municipal elections.

But there was more. Hamas mobilized candidates and popular campaigns to win a plurality in Palestinian legislative elections and form a new government. Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt achieved similar electoral successes. And with these developments, a sudden chill fell over Washington and other Western capitals.

Instead of welcoming these particular elected officials into the newly emerging democratic fold, Washington began a cold war on Muslim democrats. Even the tepid pressure on autocratic allies of the United States to democratize in 2005 had all but disappeared by 2006. In fact, tottering Arab autocrats felt they had a new lease on life with the West conveniently cowed by an emerging Islamist political force.

Now the cold war on Islamists has escalated into a shooting war, first against Hamas in Gaza and then against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel is perceived in the region, rightly or wrongly, to be an agent acting on behalf of U.S. interests. Some will admit that there was provocation for Israel to strike at Hamas and Hezbollah following the abduction of three soldiers and attacks on military and civilian targets. But destroying Lebanon with an overkill approach born of a desire for vengeance cannot be morally tolerated or politically justified -- and it will not work.

On July 30 Arab, Muslim and world outrage reached an unprecedented level with the Israeli bombing of a residential building in the Lebanese village of Qana, which killed dozens and wounded hundreds of civilians, most of them children. A similar massacre in Qana in 1996, which Arabs remember painfully well, proved to be the political undoing of then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres. It is too early to predict whether Prime Minister Ehud Olmert will survive Qana II and the recent war. But Hezbollah will survive, just as it has already outlasted five Israeli prime ministers and three American presidents.

Born in the thick of an earlier Israeli invasion, in 1982, Hezbollah is at once a resistance movement against foreign occupation, a social service provider for the needy of the rural south and the slum-dwellers of Beirut, and a model actor in Lebanese and Middle Eastern politics. Despite access to millions of dollars in resources from within and from regional allies Syria and Iran, its three successive leaders have projected an image of clean governance and a pious personal lifestyle.

In more than four weeks of fighting against the strongest military machine in the region, Hezbollah held its own and won the admiration of millions of Arabs and Muslims. People in the region have compared its steadfastness with the swift defeat of three large Arab armies in the Six-Day War of 1967. Hasan Nasrallah, its current leader, spoke several times to a wide regional audience through his own al-Manar network as well as the more popular al-Jazeera. Nasrallah has become a household name in my own country, Egypt.

According to the preliminary results of a recent public opinion survey of 1,700 Egyptians by the Cairo-based Ibn Khaldun Center, Hezbollah's action garnered 75 percent approval, and Nasrallah led a list of 30 regional public figures ranked by perceived importance. He appears on 82 percent of responses, followed by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (73 percent), Khaled Meshal of Hamas (60 percent), Osama bin Laden (52 percent) and Mohammed Mahdi Akef of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (45 percent).

The pattern here is clear, and it is Islamic. And among the few secular public figures who made it into the top 10 are Palestinian Marwan Barghouti (31 percent) and Egypt's Ayman Nour (29 percent), both of whom are prisoners of conscience in Israeli and Egyptian jails, respectively.

None of the current heads of Arab states made the list of the 10 most popular public figures. While subject to future fluctuations, these Egyptian findings suggest the direction in which the region is moving. The Arab people do not respect the ruling regimes, perceiving them to be autocratic, corrupt and inept. They are, at best, ambivalent about the fanatical Islamists of the bin Laden variety. More mainstream Islamists with broad support, developed civic dispositions and services to provide are the most likely actors in building a new Middle East. In fact, they are already doing so through the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, the similarly named PJD in Morocco, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Palestine and, yes, Hezbollah in Lebanon.

These groups, parties and movements are not inimical to democracy. They have accepted electoral systems and practiced electoral politics, probably too well for Washington's taste. Whether we like it or not, these are the facts. The rest of the Western world must come to grips with the new reality, even if the U.S. president and his secretary of state continue to reject the new offspring of their own policies.

The writer is an Egyptian democracy activist and a sociology professor at the American University in Cairo. He is currently a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, writing his prison memoirs.

"SYRIA VERSUS IRAN," by Alon Ben-Meir

SYRIA VERSUS IRAN
Alon Ben-Meir
view author's other articles
August 21, 2006
American Chronical

The Bush administration’s strategy of treating Syria and Iran as if they are evil twins is fundamentally flawed. Although Damascus and Tehran have many common interests in addition to their grievances against the United States, they differ dramatically in their assessment of their regional roles and strategic objectives. To foster a more peaceful Middle East, Washington must take these into account and pursue a different strategy, one that seeks to further separate Syria’s interests from those of Iran.

Syria’s and Iran’s long-term alliance is based more on circumstance than common strategic interests. Although both fear the U.S. policy of regime change, Washington’s hostility provides a greater incentive for them to cooperate. While Syria has embraced Iran to avoid isolation, Iran has used Syria as an “assistant” in building Hezbollah into a tool to promote the Islamic revolution. Their common interest in Lebanon has also led Iran to embrace Syria’s Alawites ruling elite, viewed disfavorably by the Sunnis. In addition, both nations, which previously considered Saddam Hussein as a threat, are now concerned that the turmoil in Iraq could spill across their borders. Finally, whereas Israel is seen as a common enemy, both Tehran and Damascus boast few allies inside and outside the region, making each other’s support critical.

Even a cursory look at what both nations share suggests that their enduring alliance has little to do with strategic objectives. Iran, which espouses revolutionary Islam, finds itself, as a Shiite country, frequently at odds with the Arab world, and in fact criticizes Arab leaders for turning away from Islam. In addition, Iran's nuclear ambitions arise not only from the desire to neutralize Israel's presumed nuclear power, but because it wants to establish regional hegemony, including over Syria. With the rise of Hamas to power, made possible in no small measure through Iran’s direct support, Tehran is determined to take over the Palestinian agenda from the Arab states. And, with the election of the Shiites in Iraq, Iran sees an historic opportunity to consolidate the Shiite crescent, extending it, under its own leadership, from the Persian Gulf to Lebanon, thereby fulfilling an historic quest to dominate the region. Finally, Iran’s interest in Western financial incentives has dramatically diminished due to the rise in the price of oil, which has nearly quadrupled Iran’s earnings in the past few years allowing Tehran to amass close to $100 billion in foreign currency reserves.

In contrast, Syria, in its role of secular Arab nationalist state, has an entirely different agenda. This agenda is based on four main principles or goals. The first is for the United States to abandon its desire to change the regime in Damascus. The second is to ensure that the Golan must be returned to Syrian sovereignty in exchange for peace with Israel. The third is that the United States and Israel must recognize that Syria has a special relation with Lebanon. The fourth is to normalize relations with the United States because this would bring great benefits to Syria, such as the possibility of critically needed economic development.

Certainly the United States has many grievances against Syria, including that it offers refuge to several extreme terrorist groups, mostly Palestinians, sworn to undermine U.S. and Israeli regional interests. Among the other sticking points are Syria’s alleged support of the insurgency in Iraq, which contributes to the instability and bloodshed there, its being behind the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and its colluding with Iran to provide Hezbollah with arms to stir up trouble for Israel, all of which led to the recent war in Lebanon. These are obviously serious charges, and Damascus needs to address them in one form or another, but they pale compared to the mischievous and dangerous conduct of Iran toward the West and Israel in particular, which, if unchecked, could precipitate a major regional war involving weapons of mass destruction.

Nothing will more undermine Iran’s strategic interests and bring Tehran down to size than breaking the so-called Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis. Although separating Iran and Syria’s tactical interests is itself important, engaging Syria now could yield many other benefits. These include changing the dynamic of the Arab-Israeli peace process, disarming Hezbollah, stabilizing Lebanon, strengthening the Sunni camp against the growing power of the Shiites, diminishing Iran’s influence in the Mediterranean, weakening Hamas’ resolve and slowing the rising tide of Islamism everywhere. A change in American policy toward Syria is especially vital at this point because just about every initiative of the Bush administration seems to have backfired, creating an unprecedented Arab and Muslim backlash. Promoting democratic reform in the Middle East has failed, Iraq has plunged into civil war, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has worsened, the war in Lebanon has left half the country in ruins, and the anger and hatred of Arabs and Muslims toward the United States has reached new heights.

The future danger to the region will come from Iran, not Syria. Yes, Syria may have played a dangerous game by supporting Hezbollah’s reckless provocation of Israel. No one is saying that Syria is entitled to a special treatment. Rather, the suggestion is that the growing regional danger demands urgently a new strategy toward Syria that addresses Damascus’s special national requirements and in so doing distancing the Assad government from that of Iran with its own very different agenda. Such a strategy will call Syria to task while offering Damascus clear incentives to separate from Iran. Bullying Damascus will not lead to submission: it will simply force Syria to seek ever-closer relations with Iran and that’s where the greater danger lies.

News Round Up (Aug 21, 2006)

t_desco has brought this Le Figaro article by Georges Malbrunot to our attention: L'ombre du Hezbollah sur l'assassinat de Hariri: 19 aug. 2006. It claims that UN investigators are now searching for a member of Hizbullah, implicated in the Hariri murder. Malbrunot goes on to quote people close to the search to suggest that Syria remains the prime target, but investigators believe that Hizbullah may have had a role and that Syria distributed responsibilities among its allies in Lebanon. Hariri people were helpful with the leaks. It is hard to know how much of this is politically motivated.

Another article from Le Figaro is also of interest: Hubert Vedrine: 'We have to speak with Hamas and with Syria'. The former foreign minister of the Lionel Jospin government denounces "the fiasco" of the US policy in the Middle East. Vedrine explains what France has done wrong in Lebanon and what it has done right and where it should be headed in its relationship with Israel, the US, and Lebanon. He concludes:

I welcome what former Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben Ami has rightly written on this score: "war on Hezbollah, peace with Hamas!" We have to go back on the boycott of Hamas, which makes our democratic message inaudible, we have to speak with the Hamas government, and we must restore international aid. That is the meanest blow that we can inflict on the Syrian and Iranian governments and the Islamists. The Bush administration is doomed to fail in the Middle East, and, by refusing to understand this, it exposes us.

Public Security Minister Avi Dichter of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's Kadima party said Monday that in return for a genuine peace with Syria, it would be legitimate for Israel to cede the Golan Heights.

Asked if in exchange for a genuine peace with Damascus, he would be willing to return the Golan Heights, captured from Syria in the 1967 Six Day War, Dichter told Army Radio:"In return for a true peace with Syria or with Lebanon, over those issues that from the standpoint of the land have a history, which we know and the Syrians know and the Lebanese know, I think that what we did with Egypt and with Jordan is legitimate here as well. "Dichter said that meant a return to the internationally recognized border.

IsraelNN“The territorial concessions are similar to those we paid for peace with Jordan and Egypt,” stated Dichter. However, he added that the “water issue and the Kinneret are a matter that I would not yield on so easily.”

PM: No talks with Syria if it continues backing terror
By Haaretz Service and Agencies

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said Monday that Israel would not negotiate with Syria unless it stops sponsoring terrorist groups. His remarks followed comments earlier in the day by Public Security Minister Avi Dichter, who said that in return for peace with Syria, Israel could give up the Golan Heights.

Asad apologizes: President Asad claimed that he was not referring to Saudi or Egyptian leaders when he called some Arabs "half men" in his speech last week. Walid Muallim, Syria's foreign minister is trying to repair the damage done to Syria's relations with fellow Arab states by the President's speech.

"What President Assad meant by this phrase was those individuals inside Syria and maybe outside it who threw doubts on the ability of the resistance to achieve victory," Foreign Minister Walid Moallem told the Al-Anba daily

Massoud Derhally, the Diplomatic Editor of "Arabian Business," has two new articles of interest on Lebanon: He pursues the Michael Young debate but brings in pro-Hizbullah voices. He also quotes interesting Lebanese on what lessons should be learned from this conflict.

The unvarnished truth: Sunday, 20 August 2006
Rising from the rubble: Sunday, 20 August 2006

Turkish FM heading to Syria as part of peace mission:

Israel Appoints "project manager" for Syria Talks

For readers in Canada, A half-hour talk show on Canadian Broadcasting C. that I recorded with Afshin Molavi, who wrote the excellent book, The Soul of Iran, will air on the Sunday Edition across Canada (and border states) on CBC Radio One, right after the 9 a.m. news. We talk about the Iran-Syrian relationship and how people in both countries view the Lebanon war. It also airs across North America on Sirius satellite radio, channel 137 (at a different time, but people with satellite radio should have the schedule). People can also listen live online by clicking here

FM Livni appoints envoy for possible Syria talks
By Akiva Eldar, Haaretz Correspondent
20/08/2006

Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni appointed a special "project manager" for possible negotiations with Syria. Yaakov (Yaki) Dayan, who until recently was head of the diplomatic desk in the Foreign Ministry, met last week with Tel Aviv University President Prof. Itamar Rabinovich, who headed the Syrian negotiations team under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in the mid-1990s.

Dayan is scheduled to meet shortly with Uri Sagi, who held the same post under PM Ehud Barak in the late '90s. Dayan has been asked to present Livni and Foreign Ministry officials with a document detailing the chances for resuming the diplomatic dialogue with Syria in the light of Syrian and Israeli positions on substantive issues such as borders, security and normalization.

Ido Aharoni, Livni's media adviser, confirmed Saturday Livni's appointment of Dayan but said there is no reason to infer from his appointment that Livni advocates resuming talks with Syria.

Israeli experts are divided when it comes to analyzing Syrian President Bashar Assad's intentions. Military Intelligence officials emphasize Assad's recent military threats, while Foreign Ministry officials take seriously his call to renew the peace talks.

People in both camps have expressed concern about the growing relations between Iran and Syria as well as their increasing support for Hamas. The declaration last week by Defense Minister Amir Peretz advocating the creation of conditions for talking to Syria followed a series of talks with Syria hands. Associates of Peretz say he has become convinced of the need to examine Assad's intentions. They see he views the Syrian president as an important factor in preventing a renewal of fighting on the northern border and in enforcing the arms embargo on Lebanon.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert opposes any deviation from his strict policy of boycotting Syria as long as the U.S. keeps it on its list of states that support terror. After the outbreak of hostilities in the North, Washington began considering a more conciliatory approach to Damascus. Israeli officials, however, do not expect to see a change in American policy before the Congressional elections this November.

The Syrian Ambassador to Kuwait too a rather different line than President Asad in calling for Arab Unity.

Massoud Derhally writes in Arabian Business (20 August 2006) that the Lebanon war has:

lessons for the Arab world as well. For those of us who believe in democracy it is now all too clear that we cannot rely on untrustworthy friends like the US or for that matter Britain. No one knows that more than the embattled Lebanese prime minister Fuad Siniora, who was eagerly courted by Washington when it suited its purpose during the so called "Cedar Revolution," last year, only to realize he and his nation are nothing more than an expendable asset. If anything France's stance has been most honorable and a barometer of what others should have done.

For the impotent Arab governments that stood idly by and watched, as Israel callously butchered innocents, their behavior is reprehensible and despicable. The ineptitude of Arab nations will only serve to confirm the perceived mendacity of regimes among their citizens and portentously add to the political malaise that pervades the region.

Addendum: Here is Farid Ghadry's response to Israel's opening the door to dialogue with Syria sent in an email circular. He is the head of the Washington based Syrian Reform Party:

The present leadership of Israel is weak and inexperienced. Faced with adversity, it is buckling under the pressure. It believes that Assad will become a civilized man suddenly and will, once he collects back the Golan Heights, refrain from attacking Israel using the plateau as a military point to finish what Iran started in the Middle East: The destruction of the Jewish State. The present Israeli leadership simply do not understand that once the Golan Heights is returned, Assad's nationalism and raison d'être will, eventually, break down his system of tyranny. Assad does not want the Golan Heights back. He just screams for it to gain more popularity. The only way Israel can have peace is when real democratic changes take place in Syria after the fall of the Assad minority-led regime.

Arab Foreign Ministers are meeting in Cairo today (Sunday) to agree on a plan to rebuild Lebanon: ``This is a war over the hearts and mind of the Lebanese, which Arabs should not lose to the Iranians this time,'' said a senior Arab League official. Kuwait has offered 800 million dollars.

Where Does Syria Stand in the Post War Middle East?

David Ignatius of the Washington Post moderates an interesting discussion between Michael Young (Lebanese-American) and Saul Singer (Israeli-American) on:

How to End the Mideast War

Michael Young and Saul Singer
Lebanese and Israeli Journalist
Tuesday, August 15, 2006; 12:00 PM

Lebanese journalist Michael Young and Israeli commentator Saul Singer were online Tuesday, August 15, at noon ET to debate how best to deal with Hezbollah and Iran and end the conflict in Lebanon.

This is a fascinating discussion of how Hizbullah must be disarmed. Both journalists seem to believe Iran will and should be attacked within the next two years in order to keep Israel and Lebanon safe from terrorism and destruction. Young is skeptical that Siniora will find the resolve or power to disarm Hizbullah. Singer believes he will if the international community holds his feet to the fire and threatens to cut Lebanon off if he doesn't. Singer believes this will be the defining battle for Israel. If it loses, Israel's existence is in jeopardy.

The Israeli attack on Hizbullah forces near Baalbek seems to indicate that this cease fire will be very messy. The New York Times article by Steven Erlanger, "Israel Carries Out Raid Deep Into Lebanon" is interesting for its long interview with an unnamed Israeli commander, who says:

that the Hezbollah leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, remains a target for Israel as the head of a group that Israel and the United States have labeled terrorist. At one point in the interview, he said simply: "This man must die."

The pro-Syrian president of Lebanon, however, Emile Lahoud, praised Mr. Nasrallah and Hezbollah for what he called their victory over Israel.

In a nationally televised speech, Mr. Lahoud said that Mr. Nasrallah "willed this victory to be a victory for all Lebanese and all the Arab peoples."

Israel and the United States, however, view Hezbollah as a tool of Shia, non-Arab Iran, which created it, and of Syria, which supports and helps to supply it, rather than being loyal to Lebanon and its multi-religious government.

Israel, the officer said, views Hezbollah as "Iran's western front," and regardless of how poorly the new United Nations forces may perform, he argued, Israel will benefit from new international support for the extension of Lebanese sovereignty to the Israeli border, made most visible in the deployment of the Lebanese Army.

"I don't care about the capability of the Lebanese Army," he said. "What is more important, and here I'm not speaking for the Israeli government, is the understanding that the Lebanese government took control of southern Lebanon. Now we can deal with them as a country and a government, and speak and compromise. This is the huge change this operation created."

It is clear that Israel will now hold Siniora's feet to the fire in order to force the weak Lebanese government to act against Hizbullah. The alternative for Siniora is to stand by and watch Israel carry out more and more raids, such as the one near Baalbek. Lebanon will then become another failed state with the full sanction of the United Nations and International Community.

The Washington Post's article on the Israeli raid is interesting because it raises the possibility that Israel was not targeting the resupply of Hizbullah from Syria (which would make the raid sanctioned by the UN resolution, which calls for stopping the supply of weapons to Hizbullah) Rather the Post quotes sources speculating that the Israeli raid was not directed at halting weapons transfers, which would make it a clear violation of the UN cease fire. Edward Cody of the Post writes:

Local officials speculated to journalists that a senior Hezbollah leader, Sheik Mohammed Yazbek, may have been the commandos' target. Other Lebanese suggested that the raid may have been an attempt to recover two Israeli soldiers whose seizure by Hezbollah commandos on July 12 precipitated the war.

The Israeli military, however, specified that preventing the transport of weapons was its objective. "The goals were achieved in full," it added in a statement.

Interestingly, neither the Post nor Times correspondents were able to track down any indication that weapons were being transferred or were intercepted by Israeli troops, suggesting, as PM Siniora stated: "The attack was a "flagrant violation" of the U.N. cease-fire.

By STEVEN ERLANGER
Published: August 19, 2006

A road to peace through Syria?
BY MICHAEL ROTHFELD
Newsday Staff Correspondent
August 18, 2006

JERUSALEM -- On the day after a cease-fire with Hezbollah, Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz turned to Syria, another longtime enemy, and held out the prospect of negotiating for peace.

"Every war creates an opportunity for a new political process, and I am sure that our enemies understand today they cannot defeat us by force," he said Tuesday. "We must hold a dialogue with Lebanon, and we should create the conditions for dialogue also with Syria."

It was a somewhat surprising declaration, given that Israeli and American officials had just spent a month blaming Syria and Iran for supplying sophisticated weaponry to the Lebanese militia. The United States cut off relations with Syria last year.

Immediately, conventional Mideast politics took over. Right-wing Israeli politicians attacked Peretz as soft. Later that day, Syrian President Bashar Assad spoke in Damascus, strongly criticizing Israel and the United States for fomenting unrest.

"We don't like to use the word 'hatred,' but Israel has left no option for itself but to be hated," Assad said. "The Israeli leadership needs to save itself from its own stupidity."

But if Israel and the United States draw lessons from the war against Hezbollah, some experts and analysts believe they most certainly will take a long look at new talks with Syria.

The following quote comes from former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam's Free-Syria organization in an article entitled:

لبنان دفع ثمن اختلافات 4 أجندات هل استهدفت حسابات الأسد الخاطئة "14 آذار" أم حزب الله؟قد تكون هناك اسباب عديدة دفعت الاسد الى هذا التصعيد الاستثنائي ضد العرب وضد فريق لبناني اساسي، ابرزها فشل دمشق في فتح نافذة في جدار العزلة حولها خلال ثلاثين يوما من الحرب على لبنان من خلال استدراج عروض حول دور سوري جديد، سواء داخل لبنان او على صعيد المنطقة.. هذا بالاضافة الى هاجس قيام محكمة دولية تستدعي مسؤولين سوريين لمحاكمتهم بجريمة اغتيال الرئيس رفيق الحريري، وهو هاجس يضغط على دمشق باستمرار، وكان هذا الامر حاضرا بوضوح في خطاب الاسد الذي اشتكى من عدم تشكيل محكمة دولية لضحايا قانا متسائلا 'هل لأنهم فقراء لا يستحقون محكمة' وكأنه يوحي بأن قتل الاغنياء ممكن من دون محاكمة!

وقد سارعت بعض الاوساط في بيروت، خصوصا المقربة من حزب الله، الى اعتبار هذه المعركة السياسية محاولة من قوى 14 آذار لتجميع صفوفها واستنفار قواها مجددا بعد الانجازات التي حققها الحزب، ولكن هذه الاوساط تتجاهل ان الذي فتح المعركة هو الاسد. ودمشق لم تتورع طيلة فترة الحرب، وبواسطة حملة سياسية متواصلة، عن اعتبار هدفها الوحيد هو الاطاحة بحكومة السنيورة والترويج لحكومة اتحاد وطني تعيد جماعة سوريا وميشال عون الى الحكومة، مما يؤدي عمليا الى استعادة النفوذ السوري في لبنان.

He argues that Asad instigated the Lebanon war in order to reassert Syrian power in Lebanon and bring down the Hariri led government. He believes Syria has failed and will fail. He sees Asad's speech to Arab journalists as a fit of desperation and anger at this failure and at his having been cut out of all UN negotiations. He writes that Asad saw this war as a window of opportunity to break out of Syria's isolation, but was unsuccessful. Thus, he believes that the Syrian opposition will be strengthened along with the Hariri led opposition to Syria.


Commentary:
Where Does Syria Stand in the Post War Middle East?

My own analysis is that Lebanon will come out the big loser in this war. Not only because it has been badly destroyed, but because it will be unable to put its house back together again. Israel will continue to violate the spirit of the cease fire. Hizbullah will not be disarmed; rather, Syria and Iran will successfully help rebuild its forces. Siniora will try to triangulate but will fail to nail down Hizbullah and satisfy US and Israeli objectives. This will lead to the US and international community abandoning Siniora and his weak government. The boming of Lebanon demonstrated that they already have. Moreover, Lebanon is already in debt up to its eye balls. Who would want to throw good money after bad. Saudi Arabia and Iran will be the primary donors because each has a lot to lose in the struggle for Lebanon's soul.

As for Iran, I don't think that Europe will rally behind America and Israel's drive to sanction it through the UN. Europeans no longer trust the US to handle such dimplomacy responsibly. This will leave the US with the choice of bombing alone. Michael Young argues that because of Israel's unsuccessful bombing campaign in Lebanon, the US will have to use ground forces in Iran for a short period. I guess that this will not come to pass. Although Bush's campaign to pin this war on Iran is working in the US media, my hunch is that the American people will not have the heart for another campaign, especially one as messy as a campaign against Iran is sure to be.

Where does that leave Syria? I think Syria scrapes by. It is saved by its own weakness and by the universal conclusion that chaos would prevail in Syria should the regime be destroyed. Alex, writing in the comment section of the last post, made a number of excellent observations. He argues that Syria is actually in a stronger position than it was in 1982, when the regime had to face the Muslim Brothers alone and was opposed by every one of its neighbors. Today Syria can count on the support of Iran. It can count on Turkey, within limits. It is developing good relations with many Iraqi leaders. It has taken back the Palestine card from Egypt. It has Hizbullah, which promises to remain a vital force in Lebanon. There is a small chance that new elections could be called and anti-Hariri politicians in Lebanon would do better than they did in the last elections. I don't put much store in a pro-Syrian Lebanon emerging from this war. The animosities between the two peoples are great. What is more, I see Lebanon getting mired in its old rivalries and becoming more chaotic with no one the winner. This will actually be OK for Syria in a very cynical way. Today, Lebanon is considered American territory by Syrian politicians. If Syria can deny it to America, it will be a mitigated win for Damascus. Damascus would much prefer for Lebanon to be consolidated within its sphere of influence, but absent that possibility, it will continue to work to make it useless terrain for future assaults on Syria by Washington and Tel Aviv.

What is more, Syria is exploiting new possibilities open to it in the East with China and Russia on the make.

Syrian leaders believe the US has about shot its wad in the Middle East, whether in terms of its ability to project military force or unite the international community behind multilateral action that can impose economic sanctions and real financial pain of the sort Syria could not survive. Syrians know that the US remains dangerous. They will continue to play rope-a-dope and wait for the remaining powers to drain out of the Bush administration. It will provoke, but not overly much. Such a plan is popular with the Syrian public even if it means making little headway on economic reform and full scale forward progress. Most Syrians have come to the conclusion that the US under the present administration has nothing to offer Syria. It will not encourage economic progress in Syria. It will not allow the Golan to be put back on the table. It will not encourage Israel to change its tune. It will not restrain Israel on the Palestinian front. It will not leave Iraq. It will forbid Lebanese politicians from working out an accommodation with Hizbullah and Syria. In short, Syrians are convinced that the US offers only woe and insult. If Bashar continues to insult America in return without drawing Syria into open conflict, they will continue to conclude that he is doing what he can.

This is a bleak prognosis, but I don't see any other that seems probable. After we watched two hours of LBC and al-Jazeera the other night, which were repleat with accusations and insults being hurled between various Lebanese politicians, Syrians and Saudis, Syrians and Israelis and every other possible combination of Middle East faction, subfaction and malefaction, my wife shut off the tube claiming she could no longer watch - "Nothing good will come of our region," she concluded. "It is worse than ever," and went to bed.

Was President Asad's Speech Radical?

Fadi's article on SC was quoted by UPI's interesting article by Claude Salhani

Was President Asad's Speech Radical?

Syria came out of the Lebanon war mercifully unscathed. It is now Syria's turn to repay Hizbullah for the strong support Nasrallah gave Syria when it was unceremoniously expelled from Lebanon in April of 2005. When Bashar was down, following the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and needed time to consolidate his forces and repair internal divisions at home, Nasrallah stepped forward in dramatic fashion to reassure Syria that it was not alone and attack Syria's enemies. He organized a stunning demonstration of support for Syria in the heart of Beirut and publicly thanked Syria for all it had done for Lebanon in bringing the civil war to an end and preserving "Arab" values. I was living in Damascus at the time; Nasrallah's speech was a great tonic for Bashar and his regime and aleviated much of the anxiety and self doubt Syrians felt about their government's involvement in Lebanon and Bashar's abilities.

The President's speech to Syrian journalists a few days ago was Bashar's effort to pay Nasrallah back. It was meant to lift Shiite spirits in Lebanon and assure them that they had strong and loyal support in Syria and beyond. Nasrallah is in no position to take a hard and combative stand at this time. He must triangulate for the