Will Asad Fall?

The blog Hunna Syria remarks on how the Baath Party flag has been taken down in front of some ministries, leaving only the Syria flag flying. Flying the Syrian flag without other embellishments has become the norm during the past several months. Even posters and images of the President are surprisingly absent. In Hafiz's day, it would have been the "struggling leader" whose image would have been brandished and displayed throughout Syria in times of crisis. No longer. The Syrian flag is accompanied by the words: "God protect Syria." Bashar has decided to go with "God and Country," rather than the cult of personal or party leadership. Asadism is out. Patriotism is in.

In this time when the international community and Bashar's opponents, such as Khaddam and the Muslim Brotherhood, are trying to distinguish between the house of Asad and the nation, this is a smart move. By championing God and country Bashar trying to undercut this attempt to drive a wedge between him and the people. We will see if it works. All the same it is a welcome development, for Syria has too long suffered from a lack of "Syrianism" and too much "Arabism." Perhaps an unintended benefit of Syria's crisis will be to create a real debate about what is good for Syria and not the quasi-mythic Arab world or its leaders, who have for so long sought to confuse their own interests with those of the nation.

Asad has begun to denounce Khaddam personally. He denied once again that he had threatened Hariri before he was killed, saying":

"I wish to say here that no one joined us in the last meeting between me and Hariri, so where did these allegations come from?"

Assad accused Khaddam of scheming against Syria before resigning in June and also hinted that, as president of Syria, he would be immune from questioning by a team investigating Hariri's February assassination. Assad said Syria had previously voiced its readiness to cooperate with the probe if the request had a "legal basis". When the committee was first established, Asad said, Syria had invited the committee "to visit Damascus and to sign a protocol ... to outline the mechanism for dealing with Syria at all levels".

Meanwhile, Khaddam met with Mehlis' team in Paris to testify on the Hariri murder. That should be worrying to Asad. Khaddam will be able to air much of Asad's dirty laundry, even if he wasn't privy to the plotting against his friend Hariri.

The internal Syrian opposition, as opposed to the external opposition, is distancing itself from Khaddam. Michel Kilo, Yasin Hajj Salih and the director Omar Amiralay have all suggested that Khaddam has no place in a democratic Syria. Khaddam's credibility is zero as a democrat, reformer, or clean politician. That has not kept much of the external opposition from welcoming him to their company. Khaddam has announced that he welcomes the opposition to join him. The pissing match between Khaddam and the opposition has already begun, as Bashar's opponents jockey for position among themselves.

Michel Aoun questions Khaddam allegations. He said there were many things that needed explaining after Khaddam's recent allegations.

"In an interview with USA Today on February 16 of last year, two days after Hariri was assassinated, Khaddam said that Israel murdered Rafik Hariri," Aoun recalled. "But, either way, when Khaddam said this he was in Syria and now he is in France and many things have changed since then."

The FPM leader also commented on Khaddam's claim that Lebanon's intelligence apparatus supplied Syria with falsified reports about Hariri, which the Syrians believed. "The instigations against Lahoud started in 2000," Aoun said, "which was the same time when Khaddam left his post in the Syrian authority. Was he still able to monitor the reports coming from Beirut?"

In contrast to Aoun, I do not think we should doubt that Lahoud and Hariri were already locked in battle in June 2000 before Dr. Bashar came to power. I wrote earlier (see half-way down the post)that Lahoud reportedly told Bashar, shortly before Hafiz died, that Hariri, Junblat and possibly Khaddam were working to keep him from succeeding Hafiz al-Asad. This provoked Bashar to stimulate the three al-Hayat articles of mid-June 2000 that claimed that there was "an alliance of corruption" in Beirut. This article deeply worried Hariri and Khaddam, because they saw it as a clear indication that Bashar would champion Lahoud against them.

Here is what I wrote on January 1:

The power struggle between Khaddam and Bashar began before he became president. The first overt sign of the power struggle revealed itself before Hafiz al-Asad died. In the weeks leading up to Bashar's father's death, Hariri and Junblat working with Khaddam, Shihabi and possibly Kanaan seem to have been plotting to push Bashar aside and eliminate the house of Asad from power.

The specifics of this are not clear, but evidently this is what Bashar was told by Lahoud and others who visited him from Lebanon. This news convinced Bashar to attack Shihabi, who was the weak link among his opponents. Shihabi was accused of corruption in a story leaked to al-Hayat only a week or so before Hafiz's death on the 10th of June 2000. A few days later a follow-up story was printed in al-Hayat, claiming that an "alliance of corruption" had been detected in Lebanon. Hariri was implicated and so were others. It was impossible not to associate Khaddam and Kanaan with this alliance, for they had been the architects of Syria’s Lebanon policy. Shihabi, who was in AUB hospital at the time, fled to the United States as soon as he could. Following Khaddam's purge from the state, he moved to France. When his retirement was officially announced at the Bath Party conference of June 2005, he openly with Foreign Minister Sharaa about who had been responsible for losing Lebanon. Both Khaddam and Shihabi were rumored to be plotting against Bashar in Paris. Kanaan's suicide was announced shortly following the spread of these rumors making it hard not to link the three men in a possible conspiracy against the regime. The women at Kanaan’s funeral in his hometown of Bahamra chanted that they wanted the “truth.” Few believed his suicide was voluntary. Perhaps it was connected to Khaddam’s and Shihabi’s presence in Paris and the on-going Mehlis investigation, or it may simply have been a precautionary purge by a regime that felt it could take no chances, Kanaan being the last of the old guard in a position to organize from within the state system.

Bashar had been told by his father that in order to rule Syria, he had first to rule Lebanon. It would seem that Bashar took this fatherly advice to heart. Right from the beginning of his tenure, Bashar sought to cut the Gordian knot of money and personal connections that linked Riyadh, Beirut and Damascus together in a triangle of graft and influence. The old guard members who had overseen and nurtured the construction of this triangle over the 30 years of Syrian rule in Lebanon, believed they could direct affairs of state in Syria – preferably with Bashar in nominal power, but without him if necessary.

From 2000 on the main power-struggle in Syria was between the young president and his vice-president, Abdul Halim Khaddam. Bashar moved precipitously in 2000 to support Salim al-Hoss for Prime-Minister against Hariri. His effort failed because Khaddam and Kanaan outfoxed him and demonstrated their superior control of events. Hariri had become too important in Lebanon to be denied the position of Prime Minister. Bashar was forced to write off his failure to overthrow Hariri as an indication of his benevolence and intent not to interfere in Lebanese affairs. He claimed a new page had been turned in Syrian-Lebanese relations and that Syria would allow Lebanon more freedom. Bashar, however, was only biding his time. He needed to consolidate his position further inside Syria before he could move more forcefully against Kanaan and Khaddam, which would ease the way toward eventually pushing aside Hariri and Junblat. In his eyes, they were all of a piece. He moved Kanaan out of Lebanon in 2003 and whittled away at Khaddam’s authority little by little, moving his people out of ministries and, in particular, out of the relevant security agencies.

The Saudis are divided over how far to back Khaddam and whether to push for regime change in Syria. The word is that King Abdullah wants regime change, but he doesn’t want sanctions to be placed on Syria for fear that they will drive the people closer to Bashar. Amir Sultan does not want regime-change, but prefers gradual change so as not to create more instability in the region.

Robert Rabil, writing for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argues that Khaddam's defection is the sign of real troubles within the Asad regime, which may bring about eventual regime-change. He reads it as a sign that the Sunni - Alawi alliance, which has been the back bone of the regime, is breaking up and that Bashar is relying ever more exclusively one family and fellow Alawi associates.

I think this is wishful thinking, although the Muslim Brothers and other Sunni opponents of the regime have been quick to welcome Khaddam to their struggle. Yes, Khaddam is Sunni and influential. He certainly angled in the past to increase Sunni power in Damascus, both by developing the Riyadh - Beirut alliance that he so carefully cultivated by promoting Hariri, as well as by wooing the Sunni tribal members and ex-Baathists of Iraq. By promoting Sunni power and influence in neighboring governments, Khaddam believed he would promote Sunni power in Syria. This was a sound strategy, which has been dealt a big blow by his ouster.

But does Khaddam's defection also mean the destruction of Bashar's link to the Sunni community? I don't think so. Most Sunnis will wave good bye to Khaddam with few tears. He was from Banyas and not Damascus. He was not from an old Damascene family or "ibn A'iley" which for many Damascenes means he was never one of them. Yes, his son married an Atasi - good job. But that doesn't give Khaddam an immediate in.

Rabil suggests that the retirement of Mustafa Tlas, another ex-Defense Minister and old guard Sunni (He is Damascene), also riled Damascenes and undercut Sunni support for the regime. But Rabil doesn't mention that Tlas' two influential sons, Firas, the businessman, and Manaf, the military man, are both close to the President. Manaf is particularly close. President Asad has cultivated his own Sunni allies, who he is bringing up to replace the old-guard Sunnis that bunched around Khaddam and other old guard figures.

Bashar is well known among Alawi circles for being less "confessional" than his father was. This is undoubtedly a product of his having been brought up in Damascus rather than Latakia. As early as 2000, he drew up a list of 400 people who he believed could be brought into the ranks of the government to energize the regime and provide a new base for his rule. Many of them were Sunnis and not a few have been brought along.

We are seeing a contradiction in Bashar's methods, however. Unlike his father, who, early in his rule, established a small group of loyal allies to whom he remained faithful for 30 years, Bashar has circulated people at the top and in government with frequent cabinet changes and reshuffles of security personnel. Some of this has been done to ease out the old-guard without making it look like a purge, but mostly it is because Bashar is different from his father and did not come to power with a ready-made clique of fellow conspirators. Ironically, this may require him to rely ever more closely on his family ties to provide security during the present crisis and showdown with Khaddam. But it also means that he has been able to promote many outsiders into positions of authority without letting them own their offices. This may prove a security weakness, because it does not ensure absolute loyalty in the face of external pressure.

But it may also prove to be strength in the long run. By circulating more people in and out of power, he may broaden his alliance with the Sunnis and other groups in Syrian society because he will be able to give more people a chance at the top. It may also help prevent the development of encrusted, long-term graft and patronage, epitomized by Khaddam's thirty years at the top.