What Does the New Syrian Cabinet Portend?

What do the recent changes in the Syrian cabinet mean? See the fine article by Nicholas Blanford in the Daily Star: "Questions remain after Syrian Cabinet reshuffle" for views of Ibrahim Hamidi and your humble servant among others.

The change of information minister Ahmad Hassan to Mahdi Dakhlallah is an important sign that Bashar wants more reform faster.

Dakhlallah is known as the pro-reform Baathist. He is editor-in-chief of the ruling Ba'ath party daily Al-Ba'ath. Whereas, Ahmad Hassan, the outgoing Minister of Information, is know to be quite ideological and a true believer in the special role of the Baath Party, Dakhlallah is a reformer, who insists he wants to make the Baath smaller, more democratic and less involved in day to day politics.

He has argued that the party is "too big, too meddlesome, and too removed from its founding principles of social justice, socialist economics and Arab nationalism." He doesn't have much respect for the new generation that is entering into the party, claiming they do so mostly in the belief that it will advance their careers. It is the promise of preferential treatment in university admissions and lucrative jobs in Syria's largely state-controlled economy that draws them to join up. He wants the party to return to its ideological roots. It should be smaller and more democratic, he says. Most controversial, he says he wants the party to play a smaller part in the government and believes there should be more democracy and a greater field of parties vying for political influence. See Scott Wilson's excellent article on the reform culture brewing within the Baath Party, which I reprinted several posts ago.

Bashar has been nibbling away at the influence and power of the party ever since he became president. Many of his education reforms, canceling militaristic school uniforms, dropping the requiremnet that students be members of the Baath in order to participate in campus politics, annulling the obligatory "national culture" classes in university, which formed the backbone of Baathi indoctrination for university students, starting four new universities may not seem like much on the surface. But they are very important in the long run. Smart students don't have to join the party today and I imagine they are not doing it. Down the line this will have a profound effect on Syrian culture and education. Dakhlallah's appointment will hasten such reforms and give teeth to the new culture of openness that Bashar has been gently pushing ever since he became President.

Bashar is anxious about the slow pace of reform. He has admitted to reporters recently that he has not accomplished much. All the pundits have been claiming that the old guard really controls things and that the official government doesn't really count. It is the secret government of security chiefs and Baath apparatchiks who really run things, they say. That is why the hundreds of new laws being passed change so little. Bashar pushes the buttons of government power, but nothing happens, is the standard complaint.

Bashar must get the buttons of government to work if he wants to be taken seriously. For too long governments have understood that they are largely window dressing. Bashar is frustrated with this paralysis. By changing the government, he is letting officials know that he expects results and that they will be responsible for performance. He wants action and accountability.

His father held fast to the same group of people for 30 years. He valued stability above all else. He proved this by staying extraordinarily loyal to his original friends who helped him to power. He stuck by them and they by him. This policy was good for Syria in its day. Every one wanted stability after so many decades of political turbulence. Syria was known as the banana republic of the Middle East in the 1960s. Many Syrians welcomed a change of reputation. But the cost was that Hafiz al-Asad produced a culture of caution, procrastination and extreme conservatism in Syrian politics and among bureaucrats.

Bashar knows he must break Syria's culture of caution and prevarication. He has been shaken by France's turn toward the US. Paris finally got tired of seeing no change in Syria. They had gambled on Bashar and worked with him, believing he was the best vehicle for change in Syria. After four years, Paris became disillusioned with the pace of change in Syria and the US insisted France was being made a fool of by Bashar. By taking French leave and joining with Bush to write resolution 1559, Paris gave Bashar a wake up call. He knows he must deliver on reform or he will fail to get out of the dog house the West has placed him in.

Mahdi Dakhlallah, devoted two editorials to the subject of reform recently: "Reform: Political or Economic?" [1] and "Developing the Social Foundation: Much Work Awaits." [2]The following are excerpts from the editorials:

'Reform: Political or Economic?'

"All systems in Syria – political, economic, legal, and cultural – operate mutually and in agreement within the overall social system. Any significant change in one system directly affects the others and the overall social system… There is no doubt that it is impossible to bring about significant economic change without developing the entire political sector, especially in a country like Syria, in which the political regime is considered the primary motivating force in society.

"Giving temporary priority to economic reform being 'the first among equals,' does not change this truth. Rather, it is based on a different truth that raises a different question: Is the political system [in Syria ] – the most important factor in political life as a whole – still capable of bringing about [economic] development? Is there enough space in the infrastructure of the political system and its activities to absorb the innovations and advance together with them?

"The answer is definitely affirmative. It is the political and ideological system in Syria that began to raise the issue of [economic] development, and it is the primary force that promotes economic development and directs it… There is no doubt that the announcement of specific laws aiming at accelerating economic reform is thought to be a change in the content of the political system… however, this does not change the structure of the system itself.

"…There is no doubt that [more] advanced stages of [economic] reform will [also] demand [alterations] in the structure of the political system, which will help continue the push forward. What is surprising is that our political system [itself] is capable of developing its activities at the appropriate stage.

Ghazi Kanan as minister of interior suggests that Bashar wants a stronger grip on the interior situation. As a master Mukhabarat maystro, he will be dealing with the people as a policeman. See the interesting and informative biography of Kanaan done by the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, which is on this page and written by Daniel Nassif.

This is consistent with Bashar's determination to follow the China model. He believes he needs internal stability and control in order to reform the economy and cultural life.

Also, the nature of the Syrian opposition is changing rapidly. It is no longer so much internal as it is, on the one hand, connected to the Christian opposition in Lebanon, who have won important US legislative backing and linked up very effectively with US pro-Israeli lobby groups, (also the new Jumblatt connection) on the one hand, and the very dynamic landscape in Iraq on the other, which is producing jihadists and a complex of new Iraqi resistance organizations. These changes are bound to have a profound impact on Syria if they turn inward. (witness the al-Qaida cell in Lebanon just cracked) Also Washington allegations that the Tikriti cousins are ensconced in Syria and running money, guns and men to Iraq. There is also a new and, as yet amorphous, network of civil society groups that are becoming very outspoken inside Syria. Managing this new architecture of opposition will take real dexterity and a new class of educated and worldly men at the top.

Kanaan may fit this picture. Having been responsible for Lebanon for so many years, one can expect him to be much more sophisticated than the traditional mukhabarat men of the 1980s, who were brutal and focused on the Muslim Brotherhood. Bashar has, by and large, made peace with the Brotherhood. He has released the scores of prisoners who were languishing in prison for the last 20 years. Brootherhood exiles have been permitted to come home on a case-by-case basis.

Dealing with the civil society groups will be a big challenge. All my friends in these groups are very anxious about the recent arrest of Nabil Fayyad - see my recent post on him. They are also looking at what has happened to Issa Touma, the gallery owner and artist-entrepreneur from Aleppo who has been battling against Baathist narrow-mindedness for several years in a very vocal fashion. Touma's gallery has been shut, his large international festival closed down, and his life made extremely difficult. His friends are worried that he may be arrested as well.

There seems to be a crackdown on intellectuals going on now because the regime has been shaken by events in Lebanon. A chill has spread throughout the community of civil society types. Their story needs to be told and the US embassy should stand up for them and insist that Kanaan discriminate between real opponents of the government and intellectuals like Fayyad and Touma, who are responsible for bringing the kind of fresh ideas and open debate that Syria needs.

Bashar has not indicated that he wants to shut down the civil society or the small cultural renaissance that has begun since 2000. The new quasi-"think tanks" that have cropped up in Syria are a god send. Perhaps Kanaan will not be ham-fisted in this regard. Bashar needs a very smart and educated Minister of Interior. I don’t know if Kanaan is that man, but his experience with the very smart Lebanon crowd may have taught him a thing or two about the much more sophisticated and complex architecture of Syrian opposition politics now emerging.

Kanaan's most significant achievement during the 1980's was his successful effort to lure collaborators within the predominantly Christian (and ostensibly anti-Syrian) Lebanese Forces (LF) militia. Kanaan has good relations with several American officials, particularly in the intelligence community, and has visited Washington DC on at least one occasion (in February 1992). His skill in dividing his enemies and his connections to Washington will surely make him a valuable minister of interior now that Syria has the opportunity to strengthen its relationship with Washington through cooperation on the Iraq-Syria border.